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 1 
Introduction 
In this study I undertake two tasks: to develop a reading of the De Regno of 
Thomas Aquinas, and thereby to inquire into the rationality that informs Aquinas’ 
political thought. Particularly I want to ask the following: Can explicitly Christian 
principles be invoked and put into practice in political life without thereby rendering that 
politics fideistic, exclusionary and immoderate? Could such principles in fact strengthen 
the rule of reason in politics?  
Many secular and Christian thinkers agree that the answers to these latter 
questions must be no, parting ways only on their practical conclusions. One finds no 
shortage of suggestions that Christianity, whether classical or modern, has little wisdom 
for the political problems of our times, either because it is simply outmoded, or because it 
is dangerously irrational. This is an academic opinion, of course, but also one of great 
popular currency.1 As to Christians, there are some who fundamentally accept some 
version of the Enlightenment critique of Christianity and thus favor liberal democracy 
over any sort of Christian politics, and indeed may see liberal modernity as the natural 
heir of Christianity, at least in its Protestant and Catholic-humanistic forms.2 There are 
some who see some form of theocracy as the only possible sort of Christian politics.3  
                                                
1 Without going back to Gibbon, Hume or Voltaire, one might cite Rawls 1971 or Rorty 
1999, but on a more popular level best expressed in JFK’s infamous 1960 Houston 
speech, which resembles in many ways Jefferson’s vision of American politics in his 
1802 Letter to the Danbury Baptists. 
2 This seems to be something like the opinion of Lord Acton 1877 and Novak 1990, 107. 
See Craycraft 1994, but cf. Murray 1960, 32. 
3 A serious statement of the former is Finnis 1980, and, along more theological lines, the 
works of Hans Küng, particularly after 1971, and Leonardo Boff’s Church: Charism and 
Power. Such thinking in the U.S. has a curiously wide popular platform in the writings of 
lapsed Catholics, including Andrew Sullivan, Bill Keller and Maureen Dowd. The 
 2 
But Aquinas’ much-neglected De Regno suggests the matter is not so simple. In 
his careful pedagogical structuring of De Regno, Aquinas opens up the possibility of a 
kind of dialogue between convention, reason and revelation, one that permits him to 
propose and reformulate his political teachings according to diverse but convergent 
principles. I aim to develop an account of Aquinas’ political teaching that reveals itself as 
indebted to both revelation and reason for its principles, and thus neither irrational, 
exclusionary nor immoderate.  
Indeed, the task of recovering such a vision of Thomistic politics has not been 
aided by the late arrival of his primary political work, De Regno or On Kingship. Long 
circulated as part of a larger work devised by one of his students, Ptolemy of Lucca’s De 
Regimine Principium, Aquinas’ De Regno was first presented apart from this other work 
only in 1931 in French, with an English version in 1935, and a substantial revision of the 
English following in 1949.4 Yet the content of this “new” text has been difficult to square 
with his other works, and questions linger as to the proper ordering of the text extracted 
from Ptolemy’s elaborations.5 While some scholars have consequently restricted 
themselves to cautious treatments of narrow facets of De Regno, others have come close 
to rejecting the work entirely, most notably John Finnis. In short, De Regno’s career has 
not been much brighter for the light shed on it.6 
                                                                                                                                            
“theocratic” positions includes those of Carl Schmitt (especially Political Theology II), 
Milbank 1990 and Kozinski 2010. 
4 The French is Roguet 1931; Phelan 1935 and Eschmann 1949 are the English. 
5 Spearheaded by Eschmann, the study of these apparent differences concern in chief the 
relation of the temporal and spiritual powers (Eschmann 1958) and the relative emphasis 
of Aristotle and Averroes in the initial chapters (Eschmann 1949, 4, footnote 3). 
6 Since its rescue from De Regimine Principum, De Regno has been included in a few 
sourcebooks of mediaeval political thought, but that has not had appreciably influenced 
its influence( cf. Lerner and Mahdi, 1972; O’Donovan and O’Donovan 1999 and Regan 
2002). 
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Yet I argue that De Regno offers an invaluable and unique perspective on 
Aquinas’ political theory. Four facts about De Regno supply reasons for studying it in the 
light of our questions: De Regno is a neglected text; it is a practical work; the few 
disputes that have arisen over its interpretation center around whether it is philosophical 
or theological; and it borrows heavily from both Aristotle and Augustine. 
First, the neglect of De Regno. For good reason, the Secunda Pars of the Summa 
Theologiae has pride of place among interpreters of Aquinas’s political thought. Indeed, 
as we shall see, there is much to be gained in turning to the Summa even in a study of De 
Regno. It cannot be denied, however, that a ressourcement attitude toward the study of 
Aquinas, which is to say to read Aquinas rather than his interpreters, has considerable 
merit. Because De Regno has been historically neglected, we can short-circuit a great 
many debates over the structure and meaning of the Summa Theologiae that have bogged 
down countless interpreters.7 I moreover argue that a study of a relatively “new” work of 
Aquinas can reinvigorate debate on his other politically relevant works, looking not only 
to his Questions on Law in the Prima Secundae, but his commentaries on Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics and Politics, as well as his Scriptural commentaries, e.g. on the 
Letter to the Romans.8 Such study will give us a more dynamic picture of Aquinas’ 
political thought, one that exposes the development of his thought, his changing 
emphases and sources, and perhaps even changes of heart. 
Second, De Regno is a practical work. De Regno is Aquinas’ longest political 
work, and in fact his only freestanding one.9 De Regno, again, is a letter written to a 
                                                
7 Di Blasi 2006 is a remarkable feat along these lines. 
8 See Guerra 2002 for the place of the Questions on Law in Aquinas’ political thought, 
and Maritain’s 1955 (62-5) on the commentaries.  
9 The Commentary on the “Politics” is famously incomplete, and while Aquinas’ 
Commentary on the “Ethics” is a rich and varied practical work, Aquinas therein does 
not consider the regime as explicitly as he does in De Regno. One can grant that Aquinas’ 
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prince.10 If this is a letter to a prince, how ought it to be read? What would this prince 
derive from reading it? Aquinas might not have known much about this king or his 
kingdom, but certainly he knew that he was writing a letter meant to be of practical value 
for a Norman war baron attempting to show up his royal prerogative, and not an abstract 
delineation of theoretical principles for theology students at the University of Paris. For 
this reason, I suspect that De Regno will be a particularly valuable example of how 
Aquinas takes his theological teachings to be relevant in practical affairs. If he would 
teach the prince toward a better regime, what king of reform does Aquinas envision? Is it 
peaceful and tolerant? Is it violent and intolerant? How, in short, does it accommodate 
political actors already in situ? We will also have to ask how Aquinas makes his 
teachings agreeable to someone he could not assume to be particularly intelligent or 
virtuous. Thus what makes De Regno so attractive for our purposes is that one sees in it 
Aquinas wrestling with several practical tensions in political life that any polity will have 
to address. I hope to make this case particularly with his nuanced treatment of tyranny. 
Of course to call it “practical” is one thing; it is another to ask whether it is 
practical theology or philosophy. This has been the flashpoint in discussion about De 
Regno. As one of many specula principum (mirrors of princes) written in the mediaeval 
ages, De Regno has often been invoked in the defense of various programs, sometimes 
proto-Gallican, sometimes avowedly hierocratic.11 Yet the few 20th-century studies on it 
                                                                                                                                            
Letter to the Duchess of Brabant is something like a freestanding political work, as we 
will explore later. 
10 Eschmann 1949, xxx-xxxi. 
11 Ironically, one of the first works to cite De Regno came as a defense of Philip the 
Fair’s campaign against the Papacy, in John of Paris’ De potestate regia et papali. John 
of Paris, also known as Quidort, argues that political and religious matters are not only 
formally but materially distinct, and that the Church lacks any temporal authority even 
indirectly as it bears upon the spiritual. Yet a king can depose a pope for temporal 
reasons. This he concludes from arguments that the moral virtues can be perfected 
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have taken pains to emphasize that De Regno cannot be read as “an independent treatise 
on political philosophy,” or even deny that it has a political teaching.12 This conversation 
tends to conflate “theological” with “speculative” and “philosophical” with “practical” or 
“political”. If De Regno does turn out to be primarily theological, these arguments 
assume, then it has no substantial bearing on politics.13 The assumption that theology has 
no practical relevance is unwarranted. Moreover, no full reading of De Regno has been 
undertaken, and the tantalizing passages on the relation between the political and 
ecclesial communities (Church and State) have been studied largely in isolation from the 
overall text.14  Again, then, I intend to show that this discussion of the relation between 
philosophy and theology is as useful for our understanding of De Regno as it is for the 
larger question of the nature of practical philosophy within Aquinas’ work. 
Lastly, I turn to De Regno because of its relevance to understanding Aquinas’ 
knowledge and use of Aristotle and Augustine. As is well-attested, Aristotle and 
Augustine influenced Aquinas’ thought perhaps more than anyone short of the Holy 
Spirit.15 While their mark on Aquinas’ works is wide-ranging, it is not always clear how 
                                                                                                                                            
without charity, and that perfect justice is attainable on earth through man’s exertions. If 
these arguments are not Aquinas’, it will be worth asking how De Regno can be 
interpreted in such fashions. 
12 Jordan 1992, 163. 
13 Aquinas says at ST I, q.1 a. 4 that sacra doctrina, which is roughly theology, is 
primarily speculative, not practical, but is practical in so far as it touches upon practical 
activity from the perspective of God. 
14 Eschmann 1958, Fitzgerald 1979, Boyle 2002 
15 Pinckaers 1995, 134; 174; MacIntyre 1984, 177-80. While to my knowledge, Charles 
McCoy never made this claim explicit, I take it to be in keeping with I.V of his Structure 
of Political Thought (1963), to which I will have occasion to turn in this study. We 
should note that some scholars see Aquinas as primarily indebted only to one of these 
two thinkers. For Manent (1996, 11-12) and Fortin (1996, 199-222), Aquinas 
fundamentally breaks with Augustine in his (unsuccessful) use of Aristotle. For Radical 
Orthodoxy scholars (Milbank 1990, Rowland 2003), Aquinas is the Augustinian par 
excellence. 
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Aquinas conceives of their relation, especially concerning politics.16 To reduce the 
thinkers to crude yet pervasive caricatures, how can one harmonize two political 
teachings, one of which elevates politics above convention and sophistry to the natural, 
and the other of which seems to deny any sort of “nature” that can cohere without grace? 
In a work such as De Regno, in which Aquinas purports to treat of the regime as such, we 
will want to be attentive to whether and how Aquinas reconciles these seemingly 
contradictory strands of his intellectual heritage. While a survey of the influence of 
Augustine and Aristotle on Aquinas would require a separate study, bearing this question 
in mind will allow us to inquire more deeply into how Aquinas views the relation 
between politics as natural (Aristotle) and politics as marked by beatitude and sin 
(Augustine). As we will see, De Regno bears clear signals of both ways of so viewing the 
political activity of man. 
Granted that we ought to study De Regno, what do we know about it? No study of 
De Regno could avoid beginning with the pioneering scholarship of I. Th. Eschmann, 
whose work brought to light numerous inconsistencies in the Latin manuscripts and 
raised invaluable questions about the meaning and structure of the text. He lays out his 
critique of De Regno in two places: the introduction to his 1949 revision of Gerald 
Phelan’s translation, and a 1958 article comparing De Regno with Aquinas’ Scriptum 
super Sententiis. In his introduction to that translation, he identifies several obstacles to 
gaining a proper understanding of the text, but for our purposes we can limit ourselves to 
a consideration of two sets of problems: structure and audience. 
                                                
16 Note that this is a question of interest for the Summa Theologiae as well. For if 
Aquinas’ political thought in the Summa can easily be characterized as Aristotelian, with 
its focus on law as the rule of reason, it still betrays strong influences of Augustine, 
particularly in the Questions on Law relating to the Old Law (ST I-II.98-105). 
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De Regno, a tract on kingship written by Aquinas for the Norman Crusader-king 
of Cyprus, probably in the early 1260s, a fruitful period during which he had read 
Aristotle’s Politics but had not yet begun working on his more famous practical works, 
including the Questions on Law in the Summa Theologiae.17 De Regno was perhaps 
undertaken to encourage the Cypriot royal house to look favorably upon the expanding 
Dominican presence in the Levant. In other words, this kingdom was to become a 
strategic maritime base for the expansion of Western Christendom, particularly through 
its most worthy exponents, the Order of Preachers. The composition of De Regno was 
therefore itself something of a political act.18  
It comprises a brief prooemium or opening introduction and twenty chapters, with 
the first twelve in Book I (I.1-12) and the latter eight in Book II (II.1-8). De Regno has 
for most of its history been known only through or in spite of its concealment within a 
text worked out by a student of Aquinas’, Ptolemy of Lucca. There need not have been 
anything sinister in Ptolelmy’s intentions: mediaeval authors regularly embellished and 
completed each other’s works, with a greater concern for finishing a job, for avoiding the 
horror vacui, than for the concern we have today, namely for preserving the integrity of a 
text as it was received from a canonical author.19 The work known to us as De Regno 
results from a centuries-long process of extricating it from Ptolemy’s work. Yet certain 
gaps even in the current text, Eschmann urges, reveal the incompleteness of the work. 
Most glaringly, in the prooemium Aquinas promises to discuss two subjects: the “origin 
of kingship” (regni originem) and “the things which pertain to the office of a king” (ea 
quae ad regis officium pertinent). Yet Aquinas does not execute this plan, Eschmann 
                                                
17 Eschmann 1949, xxvi-xxx 
18 Eschmann 1949, xxx-xxxi; Hill 1948, 305, footnote 2; 27 
19 Blythe 1997; Eschmann 1949, ix-xii.  
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argues, because the last chapters of Book I concern not the origin of kingship, but rather 
its reward and the punishment for tyranny. The reward of the king is a practical rather 
than a theoretical consideration, and thus belongs in Book II, with “the things which 
pertain to the office of the king.” This section, I.7-12, was in fact set up as a distinct 
book, De Praemio Regis (or “The Reward of the King”), by at least one medieval 
compiler of the text.  
What can we make of this claim? Prima facie, Eschmann could have a case, 
although we might wonder if we simply lack a text between I.6 and I.7 that justifies this 
organization. Further, as Mark Jordan notes, this section could easily be transposed to 
Book II without threat to the integrity of the text.20 But one could also ask if there is no 
intrinsic connection between the origin of kingship and its reward. As a letter written for 
a king, would we not expect Aquinas to link closely the king’s reward with the pre-
conditions for its attainment? As Roguet explains, this text is in part a “pedagogical 
tract”, although Eschmann heatedly rejects this characterization because it could, he 
fears, lead one to take a section such as “The Reward of the King” for a mere 
“exhortative sermon.”21  
Eschmann does recognize the significance of the audience of De Regno in other 
respects, particularly why Aquinas would write this work for a king of Cyprus and 
whether the text reflects an awareness of Cypriot politics. Yet he ignores a more obvious 
question: if this is a letter to a prince, how ought it to be read? Aquinas might not have 
known this king personally, and he might not have been knowledgeable about the young 
Crusader kingdom planted on that island, but certainly he knew that he was writing a 
                                                
20 Jordan 1992, 161-2 
21 Roguet 1931, vii; Eschmann 1949, xvii 
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letter meant to be of practical value for a Norman baron, and not an abstract delineation 
of theoretical principles for advanced theology students at the University of Paris.  
While Eschmann’s subsequent investigations of De Regno center on its 
compatibility with other works of Aquinas, his concerns about the text’s integrity 
significantly color these studies. In a 1958 piece, he compares De Regno’s teaching on 
the relation of the temporal and spiritual powers with that of Aquinas’ Scriptum super 
sententiis. He finds that they contradict one another radically, leading him to worry that 
De Regno is not after all an authentic work of Aquinas.22 As Finnis notes, the reasons for 
this radical conclusion are unclear.23  
If Eschmann viewed De Regno as incomplete, and moreover only examines one 
chapter of De Regno in this 1958 article, how far did he expect to come in interpreting it? 
The key suggestion, if not argument, of Eschmann’s article seems to be buried in a 
footnote, and explains the seemingly disproportionate conclusion of the study. In that 
note, Eschmann adverts to his earlier doubts about De Regno’s structure and lacunae in 
the 1949 introduction as though he viewed them even then as grounds for questioning 
Aquinas’ authorship.24 At times one suspects that Eschmann assumes what he sets out to 
prove.25 
Mark Jordan engages Eschmann’s work in two ways. First, he considers De 
Regno’s structure, rejecting as “extreme” Eschmann’s description of the work as “a 
collection of fragments”, and specifically suggests that “The Reward of the King” 
                                                
22 Eschmann 1958, 204-5 
23 Finnis 1998, 254 
24 Eschmann 1958, 195, footnote 60 
25 Boyle responds to Eschmann by demonstrating grounds for reconciling these two 
texts, but misses the heart of Eschmann’s trepidation (Boyle 1974, 7-8). Perhaps most 
revealingly, Boyle sees no difficulty in reconciling the thought of the medieval 
theologian John of Paris (Quidort) with that of Aquinas (Boyle 2000, 8-11).  
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belongs after the first chapter of Book II.26 He compares this proposed ordering of the 
text with three other works, and finds it representative of the period. Second, Jordan 
makes it clear that De Regno cannot be read as “an independent treatise on political 
philosophy,” thus speaking to a central problem for Eschmann.27 As Jordan 
acknowledges, De Regno is a speculum principis, and so is addressed to a king, as its full 
title reveals: De Regno, Ad Regem Cypri (On Kingship, to the King of Cyprus).  
Jordan goes on to speculate as to the reasons for Aquinas “abandoning De regno 
in favor of more adequate structures for ethical teaching.”28 This claims rests on a correct 
premise, namely that De Regno is not an academic treatise on political philosophy. Yet 
how does Jordan advance from that premise to the conclusion that the work is inadequate 
and was recognized as such by Aquinas? It would seem that one would have to think that 
a work that was not a treatise could not contain important political teachings, a claim 
against which I will later argue. Yet Jordan might not want to deny that De Regno has a 
significant political teaching, but rather that such a teaching could be the primary purpose 
of the work. And this seems to be his point, as he concludes with the suggestion that 
“Thomas thinks about political matters only within the larger project of a Christian 
morality… [and] never intended to construct a political theology.”29 This is a reasonable 
point. Granting its possibility, we might yet wonder if the content of the text itself has as 
much to say about its moral or theological context as any putative abandonment. After 
all, if this genre is inadequate to Aquinas’ aims, why is that the case? This is not an 
obvious claim. The most famous speculum principis, Machiavelli’s The Prince, is 
certainly one of the most original books on politics, and in fact itself a tremendous 
                                                
26 Jordan 1992, 161 
27 Jordan 1992, 163 
28 Jordan 1992, 163 
29 Jordan 1992, 167-8 
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innovation on the mirror of princes genre. Yet no one argues that Machiavelli failed 
because he did not satisfy the conventions of the speculum. Moreover, what precisely 
was the aim of Aquinas that he found himself unable to fulfill through De Regno? We 
cannot assume that it is the same as that of his other works, precisely because no other 
works in his oeuvre are quite like De Regno. Yet Jordan would undoubtedly agree with 
these last points. And I accept his chief thesis: De Regno is not an academic treatise, and 
if we are to learn from it we must not treat it as one. 
Thus we come to John Finnis’ treatment of De Regno in his Aquinas: Moral, 
Political, and Legal Theory. Finnis speaks of De Regno in two places, with regard to the 
common good30 and tyrannicide. While in his treatment of tyrannicide Finnis is 
understandably advised in his use of the text, and warns against taking it as Aquinas’ 
final word on the subject, he abandons this restraint in his discussion of the common 
good. Like Eschmann, Finnis relies upon a single chapter from De Regno. What is more, 
he works out a reading of the text not on its own terms, but one that comports with his 
own controversial interpretation of Aquinas on the common good.31 He does not, then, 
argue for a particular teaching of De Regno, but only for the possibility of the conformity 
of isolated statements from it with his own analytic philosophy.32 As a purported coda to 
preceding scholarship, Finnis’ method thus represents a rejection of De Regno not 
because he refuses to consider it, but rather because he abandons any attempt to discern 
any central or independent teaching.  
Having taken the measure of the extant literature on De Regno, we might be 
inclined to take the view of Mary Keys, that De Regno is a peculiar text written for a 
                                                
30 Finnis 1998, 228-31, 287-8 
31 Pakaluk 2001; Wright 2009 
32 Finnis 1998, 228 
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particular audience with which we must exercise great caution. Also, as she notes, the 
work seems to concern preventing tyranny more than constructing a just regime.33 This 
last claim is particularly rich in insights, for if, as Jordan suspects, this work has as much 
to say about politics’ relation to ethics as about politics itself, then perhaps this 
preoccupation with tyranny relates to what Aquinas sees as the ethical basis and 
limitations of political rule. Keys thus may be quite right that De Regno does not 
expressly concern the best regime, but why this should be so could prove most revealing. 
This question alone shows us how little we yet know about De Regno, and the stakes in 
understanding who Aquinas took himself to be writing for and with what purpose.  
Thus we can agree with Marc Guerra that the rhetoric and audience of this text 
must not be neglected.34 De Regno requires a treatment that examines its meaning 
through the entirety of its structure, is open to the possibility that it is not congruent with 
all of Aquinas’ other works, and especially that De Regno might not even be the same 
sort of genre as those other works. For then it will have to be read on its own terms, as we 
now propose to do. 
I will close this introduction with a word on the structure and strategy of the 
present study. There are five chapters. Chapters 1-3 constitute a close reading of De 
Regno. While such a dedication of space to close reading will seem excessive to some, it 
is my contention that De Regno deserves to be read carefully and thoughtfully as the 
great work of politics that it is. If this dissertation does nothing else, it will establish a 
claim that De Regno is worthy of further exploration by scholars more competent than I. I 
divide De Regno into these three chapters according to the tripartite division noted above: 
I.1-6, I.7-12 and II.  
                                                
33 Keys 2005, 164 
34 Guerra 2002, 9-10 
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Chapters 4 and 5 are not meant to be applications of the conclusions from 1-3, but 
rather developments of our understanding of De Regno in light of our preliminary reading 
and with regard to two dominant themes of the work: the natural law and classical 
political philosophy. In chapters 4 and 5 I respond to two questions: “Why has De Regno 
seemingly nothing to say about natural law?” and “What is the best regime of Thomas 
Aquinas according to De Regno?” This latter question particularly will permit me to 
consider the ramifications of the political thought of Thomas Aquinas for modernity. 
All translations of De Regno are mine, from Spiazzi 1954 in consultation with 
Eschmann 1949 and Roguet 1931. Chapter and paragraph numberings follow Eschmann 
1949, with a Roman numeral followed by an Arabic numeral indicating book and 
chapter, e.g. “I.4” denotes Book I, Chapter 4, and Arabic numerals in parentheses 
indicate a paragraph number, e.g. (59) cites a quotation coming from paragraph 59. I 
benefited greatly from the posting of the complete works of Thomas Aquinas undertaken 
by the “Corpus Thomisticum” project. The Eschmann/Phelan translation has considerable 
merit, although my own standard, that of Allan Bloom’s Republic, is not one it meets. I 
have striven to make this translation as literal as possible, and to indicate any possible 
alternative translations when such choices lead to divergences in the meaning of the text. 
Translations of the Summa Theologiae are from the canonical Blackfriars edition, 
with the occasional emendation noted. 
As to the strategy or manner of proceeding, let me make two points, one related to 
my methodology and one with reference to the “genre” of the text. As to methodology, 
this dissertation proceeds primarily through exegesis. As a close reading of the text, our 
study will be attentive to what Aquinas writes and how the individual teachings within 
the text cohere as a greater whole. As will quickly become apparent, the structure of this 
work is of signal importance to its argument. Moreover, what Aquinas does not say can 
 14 
sometimes be just as important as what he does say. As we will see in Chapter 4, Aquinas 
at times fails to raise issues that his original readers would be surprised to see absent. 
There will also be themes, for instance tolerance, whose absence from De Regno is not as 
such surprising, yet can be usefully questioned for our own purposes. But all of these 
suggestions all point to one claim, namely that we should try so far as is possible to allow 
the text of De Regno to direct our understanding of it, rather than the other way around. 
This outline of my hermeneutic is also a warning to the reader. For if portions of De 
Regno are diffuse or even aporetic, we must bear with this diffuseness in our own 
analysis of it rather than force premature conclusions from it. This is perhaps most clear 
with regard to the relation of this text to the Summa Theologiae. Let me say in principio 
that we will be best served by training our attentions on De Regno, and no less if we hope 
(eventually) to understand De Regno well enough to compare it to other works of 
Aquinas. In a similar spirit, while I relate sections of De Regno to other works of 
Aquinas, particularly the Summa Theologiae, it should be understood that such 
connections are necessarily provisional. Moreover, the study of De Regno will be the 
more profitable if we do not force ourselves to assume that this great teaching of Aquinas 
is in these other works rather than De Regno, simply because we have studied those other 
texts for centuries before the revelations of De Regno have become known to us. 
As for genre, we have noted before that De Regno appears to be a kind of 
speculum principum, or mirror of princes. But what manner of education does Aquinas 
take our king to be in need of? What sorts of teachings will he impart upon our king? I 
will suggest here that a careful attention to the text will be our ally in this endeavor. For 
instance, as becomes clear by Book II, in De Regno Aquinas never takes up the classical 
question of the number of man’s ends. Perhaps this is not surprising: we would not expect 
fundamentals of systematic theology to be pervasive themes of this work for a politically 
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active man. Yet perhaps aspects of a teaching on the number of ends of man do appear in 
De Regno precisely insofar as they are practically useful. Thus I argue that Aquinas does 
indirectly address man’s ends by emphasizing the significance of man’s earthly activity, 
and prepares the king to see the celestial end of man as at once complementary to man’s 
earthly end and yet of an entirely different order.35 From this order of presentation one 
might come to think that the chief concern of Aquinas in De Regno is not the number of 
ends of man, but the effective manner of relating the different sorts of activity of man, 
however they ultimately coalesce as ends, in the education of our king. Naturally, then, 
the number of ends of man will not be irrelevant to such a teaching, and one could well 
compare these arguments in De Regno with that of other works of Aquinas. But the 
reader must be willing to accept considerable indeterminacy in the results. For, to repeat, 
the scholarly task of studying Aquinas must bear in mind the less-than-scholarly audience 
for which it was at least in part intended.  
An interesting application of this teaching concerns the practical value of this text. 
De Regno as a speculum principis ought to have a practical lesson, we have already said. 
Yet will it be “practical” insofar as it offers concrete policy prescriptions, or practical 
insofar as it teaches us how to think practically? Will our king be given specific 
instructions as to how to rule, or will he be given the kind of moral education that permits 
him to develop such instructions for himself? In the latter case, we must not only expect 
that Aquinas will not give us a recipe for successful politics, but that we must ourselves 
undergo this moral education so that we may discern what practical implications De 
Regno has for our own time.   
 
                                                
35 De Lubac 1948 
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Chapter One    
Of what little has been said of De Regno, the bulk of it concerns the first six 
chapters of Book I.1 What has been said, moreover, pertains largely to those chapters’ 
surprising focus not on the best regime or the natural law or the common good, but on 
tyranny.2 Indeed, these first chapters have a special unity, for in this book of a theologian 
written for a king, they are primarily a naturalistic philosophy of tyranny. What unites 
these chapters, then, separates them from the rest of De Regno, either because later parts 
turn out to be explicitly theological or because they treat more directly on kingship. 
These early chapters therefore deserve to be treated provisionally as a discrete moment in 
the work. That treatment must be provisional in addition because of the aporetic nature of 
this section, an attribute not noticed by many. 
 Chapter 1 thus comprises a reading of I.1-6 of De Regno. After studying 
Aquinas’ proposed plan of proceeding, I discuss his regime analysis and his preponderant 
concern with tyranny. I note the significance he gives to law, virtue and the common 
good, and in what ways he seems to be following the thoughts on such subjects of his 
philosophical master, Aristotle. Finally, in noting this section’s teachings, particularly 
Aquinas’ stark (and Augustinian) focus on tyranny and his surprising thoughts on 
resistance to such unjust rule, I hope to show that De Regno is thus far neither simply 
political theology nor political philosophy. 
 
                                                
1 See especially Keys 2005, 63-64 
2 Keys 2006 offers a brief but invaluable account of the current state of De Regno 
scholarship. 
17 
PROOEMIUM 
Aquinas begins De Regno with a brief address or prooemium to the king of 
Cyprus. Aquinas in turn begins that prooemium, and thus De Regno, with the phrase 
“Cogitanti mihi.” “Cogitanti mihi,” literally “in thinking to myself” or “reflecting”, are 
Cicero’s, echoing his famous De Oratore, a central theme of which is the rare coincidence 
of the political power of oratory and philosophical wisdom.3 In this short address Aquinas 
states that he intends this work to be a gift “worthy of [your] royal highness and befitting 
my profession and duty”. This gift turns out to be a book on kingship, both its purpose, 
“in quo et regni originem,” and the duties attached to it: “et ea quae ad regis officium 
pertinent.” As the gift of an erudite theologian, Aquinas’ prospective sources for the 
work are not surprising: “the authority of Holy Scripture, the teachings of the 
philosophers, and examples of illustrious princes.” Closing the address on a pious note, 
Aquinas asks for the help of God, whom he calls “King of kings and Lord of lords, 
through whom [all] kings reign, God, great Lord and great King above all gods.”4 While 
Aquinas begins the prooemium with a becoming attestation to this earthly king’s majesty, 
he ends with a forceful reminder of the majesty of the King of all kings, God. 
Immediately three facts present themselves. First, this is a letter to a king. Second, 
this letter is written by a theologian. Third, the theologian presents the letter as an 
offering worthy of this king. 
First, this is a letter to a king. Perhaps, then, it should be understood as an 
example of the specula principum, or “mirrors of princes”, genre, along with Xenophon’s 
Education of Cyrus, Machiavelli’s Prince and Erasmus’ Education of a Christian Prince. 
                                                
3 Eschmann 1949, 2; see Nederman 1992. 
4 There are echoes in this line of several Bible verses, as Eschmann notes, including Deut 
10:17, Prov 8:15 and Ps 94:3. 
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We have already noted that Aquinas begins the prooemium with Cicero’s “Cogitanti 
mihi”, which wass a stock phrase of mediaeval specula.5 What is more, most of the 
phrases in the prooemium track closely with phrases found in other specula, as well as the 
Bible. Aquinas in large part would seem to be speaking through others’ words, which is 
another way of saying that he follows closely what other authors of specula have said 
before him. Surely, then, De Regno must be read as an education of a prince. 
But what follows from De Regno being a speculum principum? These specula 
have been written in all times and places, and by all kinds of thinkers. Will Machiavelli 
and Erasmus, for example, use this genre to the same effect? Or must we know 
something of their thinking to grasp how they use the genre?6 If a particular genre is 
something that many authors find useful for achieving a certain purpose, perhaps we can 
learn something of that purpose through studying the genre if that purpose is typical. But 
if the purpose or argument of a particular work is different from that of other works, then 
we cannot assume that the author of that work is using that genre to the same effect as 
other writers. And when we read the works of a great thinker like Thomas Aquinas, we 
might wonder if the teaching of his works is ever merely typical, and a fortiori if his use 
of a genre is ever merely typical of that genre. 7 As we read De Regno, then, we might 
suspect that whatever it means for it to be a speculum principum, it is not what we think 
that would mean for a typical example of that genre. We must be attentive to how 
Aquinas masters this genre not by following its conventions to the letter, but rather by 
discovering the questions that found it, uncovering the principles that guide it and 
extending its conclusions beyond the common or representative. 
                                                
5 Thorndyke-Kibre 1937, 105 
6 cf Gilbert 1938 
7 As Maritain argues, Aquinas is too great a thinker to be taken as representative of 
mediaeval thinkers (Maritain 1968, 12-13). Dawson 2008, 253 echoes this point. 
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Second, this is a letter written by a theologian. Aquinas does not directly say this. 
He speaks rather of “his profession and office”. Aquinas does not need to specify what 
this profession is to his audience, however, as the king presumably knew the work was 
coming from the Dominican Order. Thomas Aquinas is a theologian. This explains his 
profession. But what of his office? The king might know, as we do, that Aquinas is a 
leading teacher among the Dominicans, in fact an innovator of their educational system. 
But in this very prooemium Aquinas presents himself holding a second office: he is an 
advisor to a king. A theologian advising a king would surely have theological advice, and 
so Aquinas promises to advise the king “according to the authority of Holy Scripture”. 
Aquinas will also proceed “according… to the teachings of the philosophers as well as 
the examples of worthy princes.” But what does a theologian know about philosophers 
and princes? What does theology have to do with philosophy and political history? To 
consider only the very obvious, theology is a science of God, studying the necessary 
relations between speculative principles. But is politics susceptible of this level of rigor? 
Would one not need rather to deal in the probable and the characteristic, the typical and 
the exception in the study of human behavior? Does Aquinas as a theologian have this 
kind of knowledge?8 
Thus, third and finally, this theologian presents the letter as an offering or gift 
worth of our king. It befits someone selected to teach a king to be a master teacher, but 
what about the subject material of a theologian’s study makes his teaching an apt gift for 
kings? How can a theologian, in other words, benefit a king? Aquinas writes that he will 
“expound… both the origins of kingly government and that which pertains to the office 
of a king”. As Eschmann notes, Aquinas has in mind by “origin” not a historical account, 
                                                
8 This is a caricature of theology, and we will have opportunities to consider the role of 
the particular and singular in theology later in this study (cf. ST I 1.2).  
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but the necessity of kingship, the causal origin of “kingly government”.9 This might seem 
to be a most speculative subject, one with no immediate relevance to his royal audience. 
Thus what is “worthy” of a king is something lofty or beautifully superfluous. But that is 
not all Aquinas promises to give the king. “That which pertains to the office of a king” 
will follow the origins of kingship. As Eschmann correctly suggests, this second part will 
concern the king’s duties.10 But that is not a speculative question, but a most practical 
one. The “benefit” the king derives from the theologian will also then be practical.  
Thus we wonder the more about the relation between Aquinas’ sources, and what 
teaching as a theologian he will draw from each. Similarly, we might wonder what the 
relation is between a theoretical or causal account of kingship and a teaching on kingship 
oriented according to the practical duties of a king. Perhaps Aquinas means to clarify the 
king’s duties through a study of a theory of kingship. Surely how Aquinas addresses this 
question will bear upon what kind of speculum principum this work turns out to be, and 
what kind of princeps Aquinas takes himself to be addressing. But this also recalls what 
we first noted as curious in the prooemium: the ending. Aquinas begins the address with 
requisite flattery and presents this book or letter as designed to be most worthy of the 
king. Yet Aquinas ends the prooemium on a different note: that of a prayer to God as 
King of Kings and Lord of Lords. The audience of the address has shifted from a 
particular rex to the Rex regum as such. The Cypriot king as a Christian has heard such 
language before. Yet might its invocation here awaken a new understanding of it in him, 
coming at the end of an address in which he is the rex of note? And if this work means to 
help this particular king understand his office precisely insofar as he is an example of 
                                                
9 Eschmann 1949, xvi 
10 Eschmann 1949, xv-xvi, sets up this bipartite purpose as the beginning of all 
confusions concerning the structure of De Regno. 
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kings in general, does Aquinas single out God as “King of kings” as the paradigmatic 
example of kings? Is God in other words the exemplar of kingly office? Or does Aquinas 
mean “King of kings” in the same way he means “King great above all gods,” which is to 
say, the only true king? If Aquinas means it in the latter case, then the purpose of this 
work grows even more mysterious. For if Aquinas means to explain that God is king of 
kings in a way that no earthly king can be, perhaps this will not surprise us as the 
speculation of a theologian. But in so presenting God as this king above all kings, 
Aquinas not only humbles the Cypriot king.11 Aquinas also seems to say that the 
paradigm of kingship is not something to which any king can attain. Thus, the earthly 
king can never be truly and fully king, and the word “king” applied to the Cypriot must 
be equivocal or analogous at best.  
Yet we wondered earlier if Aquinas will clarify the king’s understanding of his 
practical duties through elaborating a theory of kingship. Given the potentially radical 
theory of kingship suggested by our investigation of the prooemium, we might doubt that 
Aquinas means merely to “clarify” those duties. Aquinas’ answer to this question, we 
might think, would show us how he takes theology to bear upon politics, and how a 
theologian might teach a king. But this would be knowledge of a politics very different 
from it as typically understood by that king. Thus the theologian as writer of a speculum 
must know how a king sees politics, how this theologian wishes him to understand 
politics, and how best to bridge that gap not only rationally or theoretically, but also as a 
practical and educative matter. The prooemium thus indeed presents De Regno as a 
speculum principum, a guide for a king from a would-be adviser. But the profession of 
that admirer makes us question just what kind of unarmed prophet he is, and the 
                                                
11 Viewed in this light, Machiavelli seems to cast himself in the role of God in the letter 
dedicatory of The Prince. 
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suggestion that his teaching will be of such comprehensive assistance to the king makes 
us wonder all the more how such a dazzling prophecy will be made intelligible to the 
intended audience. Thus we can doubt that this will be any ordinary speculum.  
Perhaps I have belabored these simple points about the prooemium, but it turns 
out to be far richer than it would prima facie seem. And as Aquinas agrees with Aristotle 
that well begun is half done, it ought not to surprise us if he took especially seriously the 
introduction to this work. 
 
CHAPTER I 
What is a king? “…quid nomine regis intelligendum sit.” This question opens 
Chapter 1. As we learn in this chapter, the paradigmatic king is the directive principle of 
a perfect community leading them to their common good. But Aquinas builds up to this 
definition. 
All things ordered to an end, Aquinas begins, require some directive principle to 
guide them there “directly” (paragraph 3). Man is an intelligent agent, and clearly acts in 
light of an end “to which his whole life and all his actions are ordered”. Thus man needs 
a directive principle to lead him toward that end. But is it not the case that, for man as an 
intelligent creature, this directive principle is simply reason? Indeed, the “light of reason” 
is “implanted naturally” in each man: reason guides man toward his end (paragraph 4). 
But is reason enough? If men were meant to live alone, then yes, it would be enough. 
Each man would rule himself as a king under God the highest king (summo rege). But 
man in fact is an animal sociale et politicum, and naturally lives in groups. Aquinas then 
goes on to explain how man’s social and political character is a necessity of his nature.  
Aquinas thinks three facts make the sociality of man evident: his lack of natural 
defense; his lack of instincts; and his faculty of speech (paragraph 5). All three involve 
23 
explicit comparisons with other animals, for man is an animal; the question is what 
makes him more “social and political” than other animals. Unlike other animals, man 
lacks teeth, horns, and other natural attributes for defense, nor does he have hair for 
covering or an immediate supply of food. Unlike other animals, man has no “inborn skill” 
by which he discerns readily what is useful or poisonous (“utilia vel nociva”) for him 
(paragraph 6). Man therefore cooperates with other men to remedy these lacks. What man 
lacks in the physical realm he compensates for in his intellectual attributes, qualities that 
he completes with and through other men. For although man lacks physical attributes for 
his survival, he has reason, “by the use of which he could procure all these things for 
himself by the work of his hands.” And while he lacks instinctual knowledge of what is 
particularly good and harmful for him, he does have “a natural knowledge of the things 
which are essential for his life”. 
As for speech, which he can use far more articulately than animals can, this is a 
great boon to his gregariousness (paragraph 7). Language is instrumental to the 
cooperation whose need arises from these two lacks. But speech also seems to be itself a 
proof of his sociality: “by which one man can fully express his conceptions [conceptum] 
to others.” How much weight one ought to assign “conceptum” is unclear, but it seems to 
point toward the higher functions of speech. 
Whatever the strength of these arguments, Aquinas means them to lead us back to 
the conditional statement “If man were meant to live alone, he would need only reason to 
guide him to his end”. For man does not and cannot live alone, but rather in community. 
He therefore needs something beyond reason to lead him to his end, or rather men in 
community need something to lead them to their end. But why do they need something 
beyond reason? What is this new directive principle? To what end does it lead them? 
Moreover, what precisely is its relation to the reason that guides each man? Reason 
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figures heavily in Aquinas’ three-fold account of man’s social and political nature; will it 
matter for what binds men in community? Having adduced these reasons for man’s 
sociality, Aquinas goes on to state: 
If, then, it is natural for man to live in the society of many, it is necessary that 
there exist among men some means by which the group may be governed. For 
where there are many men together and each one is looking after his own interest, 
the multitude would be broken up and scattered unless there were also an agency 
to take care of what appertains to the commonweal (paragraph 8). 
 
What governs men must reconcile their diverse interests, “having care for what 
pertains to the good of the multitude.” Man is naturally social and political, then, but his 
communal ordering is not spontaneous; it must be directed by someone. Perhaps this 
should be obvious: for an individual to be political by nature means for him to be 
disposed to enter into communal relations with other individuals. Such relations are an 
achievement in a way that man being oxygen-breathing by nature is not: they must be 
developed and attained. Aquinas concludes paragraph 8 with another quotation of 
Solomon: “Where there is no governor, the people shall fail” (Prov 11:14). The 
community like a body must be held together. And the community must not only be 
materially held together as the skin “holds” together the parts of the body, but also in the 
way that the reason of a man “watches over the common good of all members” of that 
body. 
Aquinas continues: “Indeed it is reasonable [rationabiliter] that this should 
happen, for what is proper [proprium] and what is common [commune] are not identical” 
(paragraph 9). The proprium or “proper” is what is particular to the individual; the 
common is shared across individuals. But what exactly is reasonable? Is it reasonable that 
the people should fall without a governor? That the multitude has a tendency to disperse 
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and break apart? What is the difference between the proper and the common that the 
latter is so fragile?  
Aquinas recasts this distinction between the “proper” and the “common” into one 
of cause and effect: the different effects proper to individuals are due to a diversity of 
causes. A common good requires a common cause, or, from a more Aristotelian 
perspective, is itself the source of formal unity of a community. Instituting and preserving 
the common good, then, would require identifying and maintaining that cause which 
produces similar effects in all individuals “over and above that which impels towards the 
proper good of each individual.” Aquinas can immediately say one thing about this cause: 
it is one: “…in all things that are ordered towards one end, one thing is found to rule the 
rest.” As the soul rules the body and the rational part of the soul rules the other parts, so 
the first mover in the universe moves subsequent bodies, and the heart moves the body. 
“There must be, therefore, in every multitude some government [regitivum]” (paragraph 
9).  
This might seem a bit quick for the modern reader. Perhaps it is “rational” for 
man to live in society, and for social groups to require some kind of governance to direct 
them toward their goals. But we might wonder just how “natural” it is for man to live in 
political communities in the first place. What is the difference between “natural” and 
“rational” here? This will be particularly important in light of the examples Aquinas 
gives about the relation between celestial bodies, parts of the soul and the soul’s rule over 
the body. What is the force of these examples? What exactly is the relation between 
humans, and is it anything so “natural” or “teleological” as that between organs of the 
body?12  
                                                
12 We might recall that in other places Aquinas speaks of a rather weak principle of unity 
of men, namely a “unity of order”: Summa Contra Gentiles, III, 69; De Ver. 11.1; De Ver. 
5.8 ad 12; and In Sent. II.1.1.5 (cf. Baur 2011).  
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What follows intensifies rather than settles such questions. As with all things led 
to an end, the multitude can be led in a right way and a wrong way: “A thing is rightly 
[recte] directed when it is led towards a befitting [conventientem] end; wrongly when it is 
led towards an unbefitting end” (paragraph 10). But what is a “befitting end”, and what is 
an “unbefitting end”? To answer this question, Aquinas elaborates another distinction:  
 
Now the end which befits a multitude of free men [multitudini liberorum] is 
different from that which befits a multitude of slaves [servorum], for the free man 
is for his own sake [sui causa est], while the slave is for the sake of another 
[alterius est]. If, therefore, a multitude of free men is ordered by the ruler towards 
the common good of the multitude, that regime will be right and just, as is 
suitable to free men. If, on the other hand, a regime aims, not at the common good 
of the multitude, but at the private good of the ruler, it will be an unjust and 
perverse regime (paragraph 10). 
 
Aquinas differentiates between the liber and the servus, or the free man and the slave. A 
multitude of free men has a different end from that of a multitude of slaves. The free man 
is or exists for his own sake [sui causa]; the slave exists for that of another [alterius]. But 
what does it mean to be a sui causa?13 The contrast with the slave suggested here is 
illuminating, for it seems obvious that the slave acts for the good of another; what good 
he brings about is caused by another for that same cause’s good. He is an instrument. 
Somehow, then, the liber is not an instrument of another. As his own cause does he direct 
himself to his proper goods? The word causa after all ought to remind us of Aquinas’ 
                                                
13 Aquinas takes this formulation from Aristotle’s Metaphysics A, and it appears in 
several other places in Aquinas’ works. This reference in De Regno, however, would 
seem to precede most of the others, including his more famous discussions of it in the 
Summa Contra Gentiles (II, 48), the Summa Theologiae (I 83.1 ad 3) and his 
Commentary on the “Metaphysics”. To the extent that we can determine what in De 
Regno Aquinas means by the phrase, then, we will contribute to the intriguing question of 
Aquinas’ understanding of Aristotle’s metaphysics. See Spiering 2011 for an excellent 
account of the term, although she does not discuss its appearance in De Regno. 
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discussion only a paragraph before about the diverse causes that lead to the different 
proper effects of individuals. But Aquinas does not speak here simply of the finis liberis, 
but the finis multitudini liberorum, the end of a “multitude” of free men. Is the common 
end of the multitude something different from the end proper to each free man within it?  
As Aquinas continues here, he argues that the “right and just regime” will ensue 
when a “multitude of free men is ordered by the ruler to the common good of the 
multitude”. The “unjust and perverse regime” arises when a rule aims at “the private 
[privatum] good of the ruler.” Perhaps being sui causa requires living in community and 
being governed toward the good of that community. But to know this would require an 
answer to our earlier question: what is the sui causa? What does it mean for him to be 
governed toward a bonum commune? It makes sense for Aquinas to claim that the just 
regime requires the multitude to be led to their common good. It is difficult however to 
know what that means when everything seems to hinge on this multitude being one of 
free men. What are they, and what does it mean that they are causae sui? 
Rule aiming at the private good of the prince is unjust: it is the very definition of 
tyranny. Aquinas quotes Ezekiel’s warning to the tyrant: “Woe to the shepherds that feed 
themselves: should not the flocks be fed by the shepherd?” (Ezek 34:2). As the shepherd 
seeks the good of his flock, so the ruler seeks the good of his people. We might note, 
however, that Aquinas introduces a new word: privatum. He speaks of the unjust ruler 
seeking his bonum privatum. Earlier, he contrasted the bonum proprium of the individual 
with the bonum commune of the community. Where one might have expected him to 
argue that the tyrant seeks his own proper good, Aquinas argues that the tyrant seeks his 
own private good.  
What is the difference between the proper good and the private good? Given 
Aquinas’ earlier concern to establish the way that the proprium emerges from causal 
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diversity and the commune from singular causality, it seems curious that he would seem 
not to relate directly unjust rule to the proprium and commune, but instead introduces a 
third term without relating it explicitly to either term. Does Aquinas mean to distinguish 
the proprium and the privatum, the latter perhaps distinguished by its violence to the 
commune? The word privatum after all suggests not merely individual or specific, but 
privation: a forcible separation, in this case from the commune. As we will see, privatum 
occurs in De Regno three times in connection with the good of the tyrant (Ch. 1, 
paragraph 10; Chapter 3, paragraphs 24 and 26), although it later is used to refer to the 
private person who seeks to kill the tyrant on his own authority (VI.47-48). Thus we can 
at least say that the privatum appears to be a good of the individual that is opposed to the 
commune, whereas the proprium good is related somehow in a complementary manner to 
the good of the common. The distinctions between liber and servus and proprium, 
commune and privatum must be borne in mind. 
Aquinas then proceeds to a division of regimes: the three unjust (paragraph 11) 
and the three just (12). This section will not surprise students of ancient political 
philosophy. Just rule and unjust rule can be executed by one, a few or many.14 Aquinas 
begins with injustice, descending from the one to the many. The most notable dimension 
of his description of unjust governments is its emphasis on force: the tyrant “oppresses by 
might”; oligarchs “oppress the people by means of their wealth; the democrats “by force 
of numbers oppress the rich.” Aquinas begins accenting this point in his proposed 
                                                
14 Eschmann rightly notes that Aristotle lays out two regime divisions: one on the basis 
of number (Politics 1271a27 et seq.) and one on the basis of the qualifications or virtue of 
the rulers (Politics 1279b38). Eschmann errs, however, in suggesting that Aquinas 
follows only the first teaching in the regime division of De Regno I.1. Aquinas admittedly 
begins with number, but makes clear in his discussion through I.6 that the virtue of a 
regime’s ruling element is at least as important as the number of rulers (Eschmann 1949, 
7, footnote 16). 
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etymology of “tyrant”: “such a ruler is called a tyrant—a word derived from strength—
because he oppresses by might instead of ruling by justice. Thus among the ancients all 
powerful men were called tyrants” (paragraph 11). As Eschmann notes, this derivation is 
likely from Isidore of Seville’s Etymologies.15 The last suggestion, that “among the 
ancients all powerful men [potentes quique] were called tyrants”, is particularly striking. 
Does Aquinas not understand the significance of the tyrant in classical politics? Or does 
he mean by potentes something quite specific, perhaps the man who takes potentia only 
for oppression’s sake? The apparent opposition herein between potentia and iustitia 
would support this conclusion. Isidore’s claims at Etymologies IX.18-21 are perplexing, 
but he seems to think that the ancient Romans made no distinction between the king and 
the tyrant: they were both public magistrates. Aquinas also relates oligarchy and 
democracy back to tyranny as he describes them: “the few… differ from the tyrant only 
by the fact that they are more than one”, and in democracy “the whole people will be as 
one tyrant”. In other words, every unjust regime is rule by potentes, whatever that means. 
Every unjust regime is a shade of tyranny.  
Aquinas next outlines the just governments in descending order: polity, 
aristocracy and monarchy. After defining polity in military terms, following Aristotle’s 
claim in the Politics (1279b1-3) that a great body of men can only hope for a kind of 
military virtue, and aristocracy, which he translates into Latin as “potentatus optimus, vel 
optimorum”, he presents monarchy: “And if a just government is in the hands of one man 
alone, he is properly called a king. Wherefore the Lord says through Ezekiel: “My 
servant, David, shall be king over them and all of them shall have one shepherd” 
(paragraph 12). This regime division does not seem particularly novel, but it is curious 
that Aquinas allies kingship with God’s rule. If polity is a military rule, and aristocracy is 
                                                
15 Eschmann 1949, 8, footnote 17 
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a virtuous rule, then monarchy would seem to be a quasi-divine rule: God calls David 
servus meus. It is notable also that Aquinas speaks of polity and aristocracy in classical 
terms, and only of kingship in Biblical language. He might, for instance, have turned to 
the Hebrew commonwealth as an example of polity, as he would later do in his 
“Questions on Law” in the Summa Theologiae (ST I-II.105).   
But what kind of community does this multitude constitute? The societas perfecta 
is that which supplies fully the necessities of life, for it is these necessities that lead man 
to live in community in the first place (paragraph 19). Thus the king as such rules the 
self-sufficient community. The family provides a certain nutritive sufficiency, and the 
neighborhood or vicus a measure of economic sufficiency. The vicus is not simply the 
same social formation as Aristotle’s extended family or clan.16 But the principle is 
similar: local ties of amicitia beyond the immediate family that support the procreative 
aim of the family and also turn that family beyond itself toward a wider range of 
interactions. 
So what is the self-sufficient community beyond the family and vicus? Given the 
seemingly conventional Aristotelian analysis thus far, we are not surprised that Aquinas 
writes that in the city [civitas] can be found all the necessities of life. He even calls the 
city the perfecta communitas. Yet Aquinas has more to say on the nature of the perfect 
community, and it is worth recapitulating his progress on this question: 
There is, to some extent, sufficiency for life in one family of one household 
[familia domus unius], insofar as pertains to the natural acts of nourishment and 
the begetting of offspring and other things of this kind. Self-sufficiency exists, 
furthermore, in one street [vicus] with regard to those things which belong to the 
trade of one guild. In a city [civitas], which is the perfect community, it exists 
with regard to all the necessities of life. Still more self-sufficiency is found in a 
provincia because of the need of fighting together and of mutual aid against 
enemies (paragraph 14).  
                                                
16 cf. Politics 1252b12-16 and Eschmann 1949, 9, footnote 22 
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It is the last lines that are new to this study. The city would seem to be the perfect 
community. But the city cannot protect itself adequately. Or, at least in some cases it 
cannot fulfill the “need of fighting together… against enemies.” Thus the provincia is the 
perfect community. Yet Aquinas does call the city the perfecta communitas. It would 
seem that the provincia is self-sufficient in the matter of self-defense, but that the city has 
everything it needs otherwise.  
But what is a provincia? The word has a generic meaning as a part of some 
political whole, and a technical one as a subdivision of the Roman Empire or the Catholic 
Church. Eschmann writes: “Nothing is very definite about this notion except that, at any 
rate, a province is part of a greater and more comprehensive whole.”17 Eschmann 
continues that Aquinas is simply adapting ancient thought to mediaeval realities in his 
affirmation of the provincia as a perfect society. Indeed, Aquinas could be pointing to the 
Cypriot’s dominion as a part of a greater Norman confederation, or even as part of 
Christendom. But Aquinas might also be raising a question about the self-sufficiency or 
excellence of the provinicia. Aquinas attributes the superiority of the provincia to its 
ability to respond to the “necessitatem compugnationis.” But one could say that this is an 
accident of the city: not all cities need protect themselves, and the strength required of 
those cities depends as much upon the strength of their enemies as upon themselves.18 
                                                
17 Eschmann 1949, 10, footnote 23  
18 Aquinas’ provincia would make interesting fodder for students of international 
relations. The rise of this provincia from the polis provides an interesting account of how 
domestic factors determine a community’s relations with other polities, but also how 
external factors, e.g. the threat of war, determine the conduct of domestic politics. One 
would then have the beginnings of the “international order” that is so crucial to theories 
of international relations, but also so under-theorized. While Aquinas’ theory of 
international order would thus not be particularly parsimonious, it would offer three 
excellent attributes: (1) it captures the dynamic relation between individual states and the 
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Yet if a provincia were large enough to secure itself through military defense, we might 
wonder if it still retains the character of a polis as classically conceived. Aristotle after all 
thought that a too-large city could not form a genuine paideia.19  
Yet the Normans’ stronghold on Cyprus was small for a provincia, and we might 
note its origins: in the Christian Crusades against Islam. If there were ever a genuine 
paideia of a Christian polity, it would be Cyprus’ in the fight for recovering the Holy 
Land. In fact, it would seem to be the very epitome of the kingship that serves God, 
recalling the earlier servus meus title God assigns to the epitome of kings, David.  
There is also this obvious fact: the Normans attained and maintain their Cypriot 
kingship through armed force. And did Aquinas not suggest that the highest excellence of 
the polity was a kind of military one? This military excellence is after all the great 
advantage of the provincia above the city. Is there some kind of contradiction between 
being a monarchy and a provincia? No one would deny that the provincia serves a useful 
purpose in defending its citizens. But should the provincia exist in a time and place where 
this is necessary, then it requires a modification of the teaching according to which the 
civitas or polis is the perfect community. Or we might wonder if the provincia is simply 
perfect, or perfect secundum quid, to borrow a stock phrase of Aquinas. For the point of 
the city, after all, is not simply to live, but to live well, as Aquinas affirms in other 
                                                                                                                                            
“order” that binds them all (Ikenberry 2001); (2) it would be neither a residual variable, 
because it rests upon clearly defined variables (Trubowitz 2011), nor an 
“overdetermined” variable used to explain everything (Mearsheimer 2001), because 
Aquinas makes clear that any state’s actions depend upon the contingent choices the 
states makes in the use of its resources and the unpredictable and equally contingent 
decisions of external powers; and (3) it would account for change across time (in the 
“English school” of Bull and Kupchan) while acknowledge that the international order 
must have important enduring features. In short, this international order would not be a 
metaphor. Thanks to Peter Harris for thoughts on this matter. 
19 Politics 1276a27-30; cf Nicomachean Ethics 1170b34-35 
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places.20 One might wonder, then, if the military strength of the provincia is merely an 
incidental addition to the polis, or if the perceived need for a strong military comes to 
supplant the city’s need to be virtuous. The contradiction between the provincia and 
kingship would disappear if the provincia were led by the king who sought the heights of 
virtue, i.e., service to God. But, again, this takes on a special significance for a king 
whose dynasty founded their kingdom by military means, and whose precarious situation 
must require them to remain a highly militarized society. Will they direct their efforts to 
the service of God, or will they concern themselves with arms and conquest? Does the 
Cypriot’s situation obscure that the city – the provincia – exists not just for the sake of 
bare life, but for the sake of the good life? 
Recalling also that the free man acts for his own sake [sui causa], we might find it 
striking that his life should become so dependent upon the military might of his society. 
If man seeks in community what he cannot have in solitary life (paragraphs 5-7), then it 
would seem from Aquinas’ arguments about the provincia that he stays in that 
community on account of another consideration: protection from men in other societies. 
Does man’s communal life bring out some violent element in him that we would not 
expect from an analysis of the liber? If, as we suspect, politics in the provincia orients 
itself to security and defense in a way that it does not in the civitas, does the liber lose 
some element of his status as causa sui? 
This is all quite speculative. But at present I would urge we resist the temptation 
to reduce this teaching of Aquinas to a mere bowing to historical change. The notion of 
the self-sufficient community is foundational to political philosophy, and Aquinas would 
                                                
20 Politics 1252b29-30 
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not be proposing such teachings lightly. I will thus not translate the word as “province”, 
but leave it as provincia to indicate the question it raises.21 
Perhaps this exposition on the provincia was a digression. We meant to ask, after 
all, what is a king? If we collect what Aquinas has said of the rex, we see that as a 
shepherd he seeks the good of his self-sufficient community, a multitude of free men. 
Aquinas thus closes the chapter with a definition:  
It is plain, therefore, from what has been said, that a king is one who rules the 
people of one city or province, and rules them for the common good. Wherefore 
Solomon says [Eccl. 5:8]: “The king rules over all the land subject to him” 
(paragraph 15). 
 
We note that Aquinas again links kingship to God. Aquinas described kingship alone of 
the regimes as a service to God, and he has cited Solomon three times as not only a 
dispenser of wisdom for kings but also, indirectly, as an example of a king obedient to 
God. Is kingship somehow more closely related than other regimes to God? Given 
Aquinas’ earlier arguments (paragraph 9) that everything must be ruled by one, is this 
service rooted in an analogy between God-in-His-Creation and the king-in-his-kingdom? 
If so, is there a way in which rulers in other regimes can participate in this analogy by 
degree? Or, perhaps a simpler explanation, does Aquinas mean to relate kingship to 
divine rule because of his audience? Is the point that the rulers of any regime need to be 
servants of God, and that Aquinas happens to want to highlight this dynamic especially 
for his royal audience? Perhaps Aquinas might even be using the pride or ambition of this 
king – elevated to a servant of God, after all – to remind him of his duties to God. 
                                                
21 See Dietz 2012 on the problems raised by “empire” for political philosophy, which are 
pressing ones: ambition, tyranny, death in battle for love of country, reducing political 
activity to a more tractable if less human enterprise, and the proper ends of government. 
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But the question of God’s relation to the king might remind us of our earlier 
questions about the relation of the king to man, or rather the analogy between the king 
ruling the multitude as reason rules each man. We asked earlier: why do men in 
community need something to lead them to their end? What will be their new directive 
principle? What precisely is its relation to the reason that guides each man? Prima facie 
Aquinas has given us no answers to these questions. There would seem to be a certain 
kind of reason necessary for the king to fulfill his duty, namely ordering the multitude 
toward their common good. But we do not know what this common good is or how it 
relates to the proper good of each individual, which surely is something to which each 
man is rationally directed. Aquinas also intrigues us by suggesting that the unjust ruler 
seeks his “private” good rather than the common good, but we might wonder if this 
“private” good is different from the “proper”. If it were, then the common good the king 
seeks would seem to be an affair of reason. Finally, if the king is the servant of God, does 
that tell us anything about the character of his service? The frequent references to David 
and Solomon suggest that Aquinas means something quite serious by this 
characterization of kingly duty. In what way is the king’s service related to reason? If it 
requires faith in God, for example, is it simply rational? Does it go beyond the bounds of 
reason? These are puzzles for which Chapter 1 would not seem to have answers.  
  
CHAPTER II 
Chapter 1 begins with the question “What is a king?” In answering this question, 
however, Aquinas had to answer two other questions: what is a ruling element? What is 
the perfect community? In casting monarchy as a kind of rule over the self-sufficient 
community, he then opens up two other questions: is monarchy the only kind of rule? 
And is it the best? The first question can easily be answered with “no”. That then 
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complicates the second question, which is the subject of Chapter 2: “it is necessary to 
seek after what provides [expedit] better for a province or city: whether to be ruled by 
many or one [a pluribus regi, vel uno]” (paragraph 16). Aquinas immediately adds: “This 
question may be considered first from the end of government [ex ipso fine regiminis].” 
Why does Aquinas omit “the few”? Chapter 1 laid out a regime typology of rule 
by one, the few and the many; would we not want to know which of the three is best? 
Perhaps Aquinas means to give reasons for the excellence of a certain regime that hinge 
on the distinction between “one” and “more than one.” The subsequent line is also 
intriguing, as the finis regiminis is precisely what we wanted explained further in Chapter 
1: what is this bonum commune? What follows is revealing: 
 
Now the good and safety of a multitude formed into a society lies in the 
preservation of its unity, which is called peace. If this is removed, the benefit of 
social life is lost and, moreover, the multitude in its disagreement becomes a 
burden to itself (paragraph 17). 
 
The good and the health or safety of the assembled multitude is that its unity be 
conserved or preserved. This unity is called peace. Something of this teaching we saw in 
Chapter 1: that a ruling element is necessary to impel the diverse elements of a society 
toward a single effect (paragraph 9). But we had not heard this unity described as peace. 
What does it add to our knowledge of ruling to refer to its end as peace? What follows is 
similarly intriguing but not illuminating: the ruler (rector) must then procure the unity of 
peace (pacis unitatem). What is this end of peace, and how is peace a kind of unity?22 
According to Eschmann, William of Moerbeke used the Latin pax in his translation of the 
Ethics to translate Aristotle’s ευνομία. While this might not be the most apt translation, 
meaning something more literally like “good laws”, it is not clear from De Regno that it 
                                                
22 Cf. ST II-II 29.1 
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leads Aquinas astray. After all, Aquinas calls not just pax the end of governance, but 
unitas pacis, which surely implies something like a well-ordered regime of laws. And it 
raises the question: where is law in De Regno?23 
Apparently following Aristotle’s discussion on the same subject, Aquinas 
continues by arguing that the ruler may not “deliberate whether he shall establish peace in 
the multitude subject to him” anymore than the physician may deliberate as to securing 
the health of a sick man. He then states the classic delimitation of prudence: “for no one 
should deliberate about an end which he is obliged to seek, but only about the means to 
attain that end.” Returning to the teaching of Chapter 1, Aquinas argues that “the more 
efficacious a government is in keeping the unity of peace, the more useful it will be. For 
we call that more useful which leads more directly to the end.” So what leads most 
directly to the end of politics? We know that this end is unity. So what leads most directly 
to that end also leads most directly to unity. What is this, then? “Manifestum est autem 
quod unitatem magis efficere potest quod est per se unum, quam plures.” What is itself 
one (per se unum) can better than many bring about unity [unitatem: one-ness], “[j]ust as 
the most efficacious cause of heat is what is in itself hot (per se calidum)”. Thus the rule 
of one is more useful than the rule of many. 
Aquinas then goes on to argue that “several persons could by no means preserve 
the stability of the community if they totally [omnino] disagreed. ”But what if they do not 
totally disagree, but rather only partially? Aquinas chooses omnino for a reason: to rule at 
all they must have some modicum of agreement. And to rule well they must be 
substantially united. But then they draw closer to being one. Even the rule of many, then, 
                                                
23 NE 1112b14 and in Aquinas’ Commentary on the “Nicomachean Ethics,” III.8: 474, 
as noted in Eschmann 1949, 11, footnote 2  
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must imitate the rule of one. “Therefore one rules better than many approaching one 
[appropinquant ad unum].” 
But could not the many in some sense rule as one and in another sense surpass 
that rule? Perhaps Aquinas feels the need to spell out such considerations, for the third 
reason he gives in favor of monarchy is this: it is according to nature. The argument is 
simple. What is in accord with nature is best, “for in all things nature does what is best.” 
But governance in nature is always by one. Now man in making things according to art 
imitates nature; a “work of art is better according as it attains a closer likeness to what is 
in nature”.  Therefore man, in imitating nature, ought to conform to this rule by one.24 
Aquinas gives a few examples of this monarchical principle in nature: the heart 
moves the organs; reason is chief of the powers of the soul; a beehive has one bee king; 
and in the universe there is “Deus factor omnium et rector”: one God, maker and ruler of 
all things (paragraph 19). Aquinas has already cited a few of these examples in Chapter 1 
(paragraph 9), but he now appends a lesson to them: “Omnis enim multitudo derivatur ab 
uno.” Every multitude is derived from one. This is a startling statement. Has not Aquinas’ 
argument all along been that the multitude exists and must be held together by the ruler? 
Does the “one” not come later? In what sense is the multitude derived from the one ruler? 
The examples Aquinas gives of nature’s monarchical tendency are stock examples 
in mediaeval and ancient politics and metaphysics, and perhaps some, most notably the 
examples of God and the bee king, would be familiar to the Cypriot. We might wonder, 
however, if they evince the same kind of unity derived from one. To take the obvious 
example, the heart might move all of the other organs, but it is nonetheless an organ, one 
                                                
24 To understand the place of such arguments in Aquinas’ opera, one should consult his 
thoughts on Aristotle’s criticism of Plato’s treatment of the good as unitary, especially 
Aquinas’ Commentary on the “Nicomachean Ethics”, Lectures VI-VIII on Ethics I.6. 
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among many.25 On the other hand, God as factor omnium stands outside creation. He 
rules not as great among many, but as great above and beyond all. If, as Aquinas suggests 
in his Metaphysics commentary, Aristotle took the heart to be the principle of the body 
because it diffuses the soul, then this would be a nobler role than moving the other organs 
or (according to modern theories) simply and exclusively pumping blood. But note this: 
the heart as the principle of the body’s activity would yet be an “internal” or “inherent” 
part of that very activity, just as the keel of a ship has a pre-eminent role in determining 
the movement of a ship, precisely as a part of that ship. God as the creator and mover of 
the cosmos, on the other hand, is external or outside of that activity because He is 
extrinsic to that being, something like how a mother and father produce a baby.26 So the 
heart and God stand in radically different positions vis-à-vis their “subjects”. And while 
the bee king and the human ruler seem to have more in common than they do with the 
heart, we might recall Aristotle’s famous claim in the Politics that man is more political 
than any bee or other animals. 27 
In one sense, the human king seems to rule more like the heart or the bee king 
than like God, because the king is an internal or inherent part of the unity he shapes. It 
also suggests a more conventional political sensibility, namely the problem of politics as 
being the designation of some ruling element in a community. On the other hand, we 
                                                
25 In Aquinas’ Commentary on Aristotle’s “Metaphysics”, probably written several 
years after De Regno, Aquinas argues that for Aristotle the heart is the principle of the 
body because “all of the soul’s powers are diffused throughout the body by means” of it, 
not because of the conventional opinion according to which the heart is merely the 
principle of motion in the body (Metaphysics V.1:755).  
26 Aristotle speaks in this language in Metaphysics V, 1012b34 - 1013a23. There is a 
great difference between God making man and man and woman making babies, as 
reflected in the language of “creation” and “reproduction.” 
27 Politics 1253a7. Aristotle thought the ruling bee to be male because of its stinger, a 
defensive weapon thought generally thought not possessed by female animals generally. 
(HA 625b7-22). 
40 
know that the king will rule with reason, something the heart and bee lack, and has some 
kind of freedom to choose his proximate ends and the means through which he pursues 
them. The heart and bee lack this, as well. In that sense, then, the king seems to rule more 
like God than like the bee and heart. Yet the king is not quite like God, because he did 
not create what he rules and thus lacks the perfect knowledge of and providence over it.28 
And while man does rule himself in reason, we have been left to wonder how rational the 
king’s rule of the multitude can be. So how precisely will God’s rule be exemplary for 
human rule?  
Perhaps such questions are beyond Aquinas’ royal reader. We certainly would not 
expect him to know Aristotle’s Metaphysics or Politics, much less Aquinas’ 
commentaries on them, which likely came some years after De Regno. And, to repeat, 
Aquinas might have offered these examples simply as stock examples, to show the king 
that monarchy operates at every level of the universe. This would indeed be a salutary 
teaching. It has led us, however, to ask where exactly to place man within the universe. 
And stock examples are sometimes useful because they present conventions that are 
wrong or only partially correct. Perhaps Aquinas will have more to say on this subject 
later. 
The concluding paragraph of the chapter claims the evidence of experience as 
proof of the superiority of monarchy to rule by the many. It is worth quoting in full: 
This is also evident from experience. For provinces or cities that are not ruled by 
one person are torn with dissensions and tossed about without peace, so that the 
complaint seems to be fulfilled which the Lord uttered through the Prophet [Jer 
12:10]: “Many pastors have destroyed my vineyard.” On the other hand, 
provinces and cities which are ruled under one king enjoy peace, flourish in 
justice, and delight in prosperity. Hence, the Lord by His prophets promises to His 
                                                
28 The heart does not rule over the other organs in every sense; that would make it like 
the horseman in Plato’s Republic who commands the bridle maker despotically (Republic 
X). Cf. ST I 83.3 ad 2 and I-II 56.4 ad 3 
41 
people as a great reward that He will give them one head and that “one Prince will 
be in the midst of them” [Ez 34:24, Jer 30:21] (paragraph 20). 
 
It is curious that the quotation from Jeremiah lamenting tyranny is retrospective, whereas 
the latter quotation is prospective. The first quotation is of God surveying the ravages of 
the Babylonians against Israel, but He seems to blame Israel’s past ruler – “many 
pastors.” The latter quotation is not only prospective, but it is unclear for what reason the 
Lord will grant His people “a great reward”. The great reward itself seems to be “one 
Prince”. But if that is the case, does that mean that kingship is in fact a reward or an 
effect of a good society rather than the cause of it? And if, as it sounds, this latter promise 
is in fact Christological, one might wonder how seriously we expect in the here and now 
to have kings who guide their peoples toward peace, justice and prosperity. In other 
words, the example Aquinas gives us of the “experience” of terrestrial cities is actually a 
promise in the supernatural order.29  
Let us return to the question we asked at the beginning of this chapter, why 
Aquinas inquires into the rule of only the one and the many and yet not the few, as we 
seem to have at least a partial answer. The argument for the need for effectual unity 
applies as much to the few as to the many; the argument secundum naturam is a strike 
against the few as much as against the many, as he clearly spells out in paragraph 18; and 
the argument from experience is also directed against any regime forms “which are not 
ruled by one person.” To the degree that each of these arguments is persuasive, then, one 
can agree with Aquinas’ dichotomous approach to the question.  
                                                
29 What lessons Aquinas draws from the Hebrews’ experiences must be followed 
carefully. The Old Testament at times excoriates monarchy as a rejection of God’s rule, 
as at I Sam 8, but in other places laments the weakness of a monarchy that cannot keep 
Israel united, e.g. Judges 17:6, 18:1, 19:1 and 21:25. Aquinas of course famously 
describes their regime as a mixed regime at ST I-II 105. 
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Such arguments in favor of monarchy would also sit well with Aquinas’ royal 
reader. And so there may be rhetorical reasons for why Aquinas focuses on the 
distinction between the one and the many. For one thing, many mediaeval monarchies 
were “constitutional”: they involved other political authorities, even if the monarch made 
the final decisions on many matters.30 So if the Cypriot king’s regime involves others 
besides himself, as Eschmann suggests, it might not be politic to abuse rule by the few 
(Eschmann 1949, xxxvi-vii). Yet it is also true that rule by the many, polity, is the 
strongest contrast among the just forms of government with monarchy, and so is a natural 
term of comparison with monarchy. Yet Aquinas does not just contrast monarchy with 
polity, but even democracy, or at least malfunctional democracy. Recall his claim that the 
rulers who cannot agree amongst themselves can achieve little. And this is a persistent 
threat among such regimes, Aquinas suggests, insofar as they must strive to be effectually 
one if not factually one. Without accusing Aquinas of dissimulation, then, it is clear that 
he has been able to paint monarchy in a most favorable light in Chapter 2. This is a bit 
different from his less flattering tone in the prooemium.  
Aquinas thus raises yet more questions in Chapter 2. He has proposed pacis unitas 
to be the bonum commune. Also, while this chapter, like Chapter 1, promised to be rather 
naturalistic, it ended with a number of references to God and the divine that might lead us 
to question the nature of political philosophy for Aquinas, especially in its relation to 
natural and revealed theology. The analogy between God making and ruling the universe 
and man as king of a realm is obviously important to Aquinas’ argument, but it is not 
quite clear what he means by it. Note especially that God says that many bad kings have 
destroyed “my vineyard”, and God will give the good peoples “one Prince”. This might 
make one suspect that the one from whom is derived every multitude is God, the pre-
                                                
30 Kern 1939, Barraclough 1947 and Folz 1969 
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eminent example of paragraph 19. In the final sense that is of course true. The question is 
what Aquinas makes of it in the political realm.  
 
CHAPTER III 
Aquinas’ regime typology has unfolded slowly. After presenting the six regimes 
in Chapter 1, he discussed the best regime, kingship, in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 turns out to 
be about the worst regime: tyranny.  
 Aquinas begins the chapter by noting that what is contrary to the best is 
worst. And what is best, he has proven, is monarchy. Thus tyranny as the opposite of 
monarchy is the worst regime (paragraph 22). “[A] united force,” Aquinas argues, “is 
more efficacious in producing its effect than a force which is scattered or divided” 
(paragraph 23). This was a reason to prefer kingship over other regimes. Yet a united 
force can do good or do evil. The king as a united force does great good. The tyrant is 
also a united force, but a force directed toward injustice. Thus among unjust 
governments, the more united the ruling element, the more harmful the rule will be. Thus 
tyranny bests oligarchy and democracy in this regard.  
As if sensing our desire for him to say more about what counts as injustice, 
Aquinas supplies a further reason about the common good.  
Moreover, a government becomes unjust by the fact that the ruler, paying no heed 
to the common good, seeks his own private good [bonum privatum]. Wherefore 
the further he departs from the common good the more unjust will his government 
be (paragraph 24). 
 
So what regime departs most fully from the common good? Oligarchy seeks the good of 
the few (bonum paucorum), Aquinas reasons, and so is more unjust than democracy’s 
pursuit of the bonum multorum. But tyranny seeks the good of just one (bonum tantum 
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unius), which is the greatest departure from the common good of all: “For a large number 
is closer to the totality than a small number, and a small number than only one” 
(paragraph 24). It would have been illuminating had Aquinas referred to the “bonum 
privatum paucorum” and “bonum privatum multorum”, although that would seem to be 
the sense in which he speaks of these goods. 
These arguments about diversity of rulers are “made clear to those who consider 
the order of divine providence, which disposes everything in the best way” (paragraph 
25). Good things ensue from one perfect cause; evil “results from any one partial defect.” 
“Thus ugliness results in different ways from many causes; beauty in one way from one 
perfect cause,” as the well-known teaching goes. He here vouches for the providence of 
this arrangement: “It is thus with all good and evil things, as if God so provided that 
good, arising from one cause, be stronger, and evil, arising from many causes, be 
weaker.” What is good is stronger than what is evil, because evil depends upon many 
causes. Evil can arise from any defect in a cause, and the more defects, the more evil. Yet 
the more evil something is, the more causes it depends upon for its character. Evil is thus 
an ever-shifting attribute, for its specific defectiveness changes whenever one of its many 
causes is removed or altered. The political consequence of this teaching is 
straightforward: 
It is expedient therefore that a just government be that of one man only in order 
that it may be stronger; however, if the government should turn away from 
justice, it is more expedient that it be a government by many, so that it may be 
weaker and the many may mutually hinder one another. Among unjust 
governments, therefore, democracy is the most tolerable, but the worst is tyranny 
(paragraph 25). 
 
Tyranny in its goal or final cause, injustice, could be not further from kingship. Yet in its 
formal unity, as the rule of one, it is the unjust regime most parasitic upon kingship. 
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Democracy in its multiplicity of unjust rulers is the most removed from kingship. What 
makes democracy so defective is also what limits its efficacy: “the many may mutually 
hinder one another”. 
Paragraph 26 opens with an extension of this teaching: “This same conclusion is 
also apparent if one considers the evils which come from tyrants.” The tyrant seeks his 
bonum privatum, not the bonum commune. Different tyrants are motivated by different 
passions, and the same tyrant can be driven by multiple passions. And the privatum 
bonum the tyrant seeks he pursues single-mindedly. Thus he propagates pervasive and 
persistent instability throughout his regime. “Nobody,” Aquinas elaborates, “will be able 
firmly to state: This thing is such and such, when it depends upon the will of another, not 
to say upon his caprice [libido]” (paragraph 26). “Keep far from the man who has the 
power to kill,” Aquinas quotes Sirach 9:13, because, as Aquinas explains: “he kills not 
for justice’s sake but by his power, for the lust of his will [pro libidine voluntatis].” 
Libido is a charged word for Aquinas, recalling Augustine’s theological history of 
Rome (De Civitate Dei V.12-21). The desire of the Romans to control other peoples was 
absolute, an insatiable appetite hemmed in only by propriety. Thus it is no surprise that 
Aquinas’ model tyrant herein seeks total control of his subjects, body and soul. The tyrant 
does not seek “merely” to control his subjects “in corporal things”, but also “hinders their 
spiritual good.” As Aquinas has it, they do not seek to control their subject in spiritual 
matters only for their need to control them. They also fear “all excellence in their subjects 
to be prejudicial to their own evil domination. For tyrants hold the good in greater 
suspicion than the wicked, and to them the valour of others is always fraught with 
danger.” As Aquinas goes on to describe in paragraph 27, the tyrant fears in all their 
forms the virtues of and amicitia between others. The tyrant will “sow discords among 
the people”, nurture pre-existing ones, and generally “forbid anything which furthers 
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society and cooperation among men,” mentioning among other things marriage.31 
Aquinas ends the paragraph on a Biblical note: “The sound of dread is always in his ears 
and when there is peace (that is, when there is no one to harm him), he always suspects 
treason” (Job 15:21). It is perhaps no surprise, then, that few virtuous men are to be found 
in the tyrannical regime. In a florilegium of quotations from Aristotle, Cicerco (always 
“Tullius”) and St. Paul, Aquinas deftly recapitulates the lesson of the tyrant:  
For, according to Aristotle’s sentence [NE 1116a 20], brave men are found where 
brave men are honoured. And as Tullius says [Tuscul. Disp. I, 2, 4]: “Those who 
are despised by everybody are disheartened and flourish but little.” It is also 
natural that men, brought up in fear, should become mean of spirit and 
discouraged in the face of any strenuous and manly task. This is shown by 
experience in provinces that have long been under tyrants. Hence the Apostle says 
to the Colossians [Col 3:21]: “Fathers, provoke not your children to indignation, 
lest they be discouraged.” 
 
These quotations expose several further layers of this teaching. Aquinas has had frequent 
recourse to the words voluntas and libido in this chapter; he closely connects the tyrant’s 
search for the privatum bonum with passions divorced from reason. This is notable if 
only because in Chapter 1 Aquinas does not make clear the relation between the reason 
that rules man and the man that rules men. Further, what the tyrant loves is what 
flourishes in the regime; what he hates dies. The “loves” of the city, as Augustine would 
say, factor also in this series of quotations. Aristotle and Cicero attest to the formative 
influence a regime’s paideia has on its citizens. Thus the quotation from St. Paul is all the 
more ambiguous, for he speaks at a different level: the family.  Perhaps Aquinas means to 
                                                
31 Eschmann is right that Aristotle’s Politics, the likely source of this section, contains 
no reference to tyrants suppressing marriage (Eschmann 1949, 17, footnote 11). As a 
Christian, Aquinas’ concern with marriage will naturally exceed that of Aristotle, not 
only as the sacramental basis of society, but as the natural basis of society, as well (cf. ST 
III 65.2 ad 1). 
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emphasize that the head of a family exercises an influence over his children analogous to 
that of the leaders of a regime over their subjects.32 But can the father exercise any decent 
influence over his children in a basically indecent regime? Surely the answer is yes, even 
if that education is necessarily defective. This answer is supported by another 
consideration: the good leader that reforms a bad regime has to come from somewhere. In 
ancient times it was often poetically suggested that great reformers or law-givers came 
from mythical or mysterious backgrounds. A Christian like Thomas Aquinas will not 
resort to anything like that, but he will have to show that the family and especially the 
father as the head of the family have the moral ability to rise above the depravity of a 
disordered regime. The family can become a sort of refuge from society, a place to 
cultivate excellence in a limited way and endure until circumstances are more auspicious 
for championing virtue. This notion has a particular significance for Christians, whose 
families are patterned after the earthly family of Jesus and whose greatest virtues are not 
cultivated or acquired but infused. Thus Aquinas might seek through this quotation to 
point out the importance of the family not only as analogous to the city, but also to 
remind us, as many Christian thinkers before him did, that the family can have a kind of 
autonomy from the regime that allows it to function as both a source of renewal for that 
regime.33  
It would be easy to forget the beginning of this paragraph: “This same conclusion 
is also apparent if one considers the evils which come from tyrants.” This “conclusion” 
concerns the multiple causes bringing about evil, pulling it in countless directions and 
vitiating it. Aquinas invoked this claim to argue that democracy was the most tolerable 
                                                
32 He makes a similar claim at ST I-II 90.3 ad 1, primarily to emphasize that the 
command of the father falls short of law. 
33 Compare Augustine’s famous discussion at City of God XIX.17 on the need in bad 
regimes for families to be just such a refuge. 
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unjust regime, because the multiplicity of agents would “hinder” one another’s 
malefactions. But the argument also explains the behavior of one ruler, the tyrant. For all 
the dissension between squabbling democrats or oligarchs, conflict and confusion are also 
to be had within the psyche of a single tyrant. It makes him unpredictable, rapacious and 
self-defeating. Pace Machiavelli, there can be no “cruelty well-used” for the tyrant, 
because his reason is a slave to his passions.34  
De Regno is littered with quotations of Solomon, and the paragraph that 
concludes Chapter 3 is no exception. This chapter has been notably rich for its invocation 
of Scripture. Aquinas, following the procedure of the Summa Contra Gentiles, has 
generally placed Scriptural quotations at the end of philosophical arguments. But are 
these quotations largely illustrative or exemplary? These Solomon quotations, for 
instance, seem to be pious sayings that support but do not extend the conclusions of the 
chapter. Consider the second quotation: “When the wicked rise up men shall hide 
themselves” (Prov 28:28). Aquinas explains: “It is no wonder, for a man governing 
without reason, according to the lust of his soul [secundum animae suae libidinem], in no 
way differs from the beast.” This is not simply an interpretation of the text, but rather an 
allusion to Aristotle’s great claim that those who live outside of the polis must be either 
beast or god. The tyrant who thinks himself a god is actually the beast who destroys the 
polis in trying to making it fit for his habitation.  
Chapter 3 has been engrossing in part because Aquinas is therein far more direct 
about the nature of tyranny than he has hitherto been about the nature of kingship. One 
could perhaps draw an indirect teaching from it: if the tyrant destroys virtue and 
friendship among the citizens, and encourages faction and vicious hate, then the king 
                                                
34 The Prince VIII (Quotations from The Prince come from the Mansfield translation, 
and follow his citation practice of chapter and, when necessary, page number.) 
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presumably fosters virtue and friendship, seeking order and concord. Or at least he does 
not prevent virtue and friendship. But it is without a doubt tyranny that is Aquinas’ focus 
in this chapter. He presents an impressive metaphysics of tyranny, one predicated upon 
the multiplicity and weakness of its contradictory causes. Whatever the pacis unitas is, it 
is not this. Unjust rule involves ruling men for the private good of the ruler, and treating 
the populace like slaves (paragraph 10). For the servus is one who is not his own cause, 
but the instrument of another. Yet in this chapter it has not been the populace who have 
been the servi so much as the tyrant.  
To someone well versed in Aquinas’ political thought, it might seem that De 
Regno has presented a very weighty teaching thus far. We have after all been able to 
make numerous connections between what has been written here and in other places in 
Aquinas’ oeuvre. For our king, however, what has been presented must seem thin and 
indirect. Most notably, while Aquinas did present a compelling case for the need for 
government (I.1), this was not an argument that promised a particularly virtuous or just 
society. Subsequently, Aquinas has made a more thorough and concrete case for the 
inferiority of tyranny (I.3, or 9 paragraphs) than for the superiority of monarchy (I.2, at 5 
paragraphs). This has allowed him to say more about the nature of injustice and the 
slavish regime. Not only is length at issue, but also quality: while Aquinas’ defense of 
monarchy as the best regime was an abstract argument from unity and the imitation of 
nature, his vilification of tyranny descends immediately into practical details, in effect 
limiting our knowledge of concrete politics to tyranny. But why not more about kingship?   
It is a strange teaching moreover because it seems to depend upon tyranny and 
kingship being quite similar in one respect and very different in another one. Thus 
everything depends upon being clear on the exact sense in which they are similar and 
different. Chapter 4 takes up this problem.  
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CHAPTER IV 
From the question “What is a king?” Aquinas has proceeded to ask which regime 
is best and which is worst. Kingship is indeed the best, and tyranny is the worst. The 
inferiority of tyranny Aquinas originally presents as simply “the contrary of the best” 
(paragraph 22). The inverted term is the rule of one:  
Because therefore the best and the worst [government] are latent in monarchy, i.e. 
in the rule of one, the royal dignity is rendered hateful to many on account of the 
wickedness of tyrants. Some men, indeed, whilst they desire the rule of a king, 
fall under the cruelty of tyrants, and exceedingly many [quamplures] rulers 
exercise tyranny under the pretence of royal dignity (paragraph 30). 
 
The rule of one issues in both royal and tyrannical rule. This fact presents a considerable 
difficulty for kings. In the popular mind, kings are odiosa because of their association 
with tyranny. This is not just a theoretical confusion, but a practical one: men seeking to 
install a king end up with a tyrant. Then, too, many tyrants take advantage of this 
confusion, ruling behind a façade of royal justice. When Aquinas with Isidore suggests 
that all potentes are called tyrants, it is in light of this ambiguity that he speaks 
(paragraph 11). But given that this work is an educative text for a king, we might wonder: 
if the confusion between tyranny and monarchy is such that many subjects are deceived 
between the two, is it possible that some rulers are also deceived by this distinction, or 
that they deceive themselves? Then it would not simply be the case that some tyrants 
pretend to be kings, but also that some kings “fall under the cruelty” of their own 
tyrannical rule. Such a teaching would not only be a highly edifying one for our Cypriot, 
but also reinforce the lesson of Chapter 3, that according to which tyrannical rule is a 
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slavery first and foremost of the tyrant himself. For perhaps this slavery begins with a 
kind of ignorance of the nature of justice.35 
In any event, Chapter 4 addresses the hatefulness of the royal dignity thanks to 
tyranny through the “clear example” of this dynamic in the case of Rome (paragraphs 31-
33) and a “similar process” among the Hebrew people (34).  
Rome’s early kings made the word rex detestable, although they were really 
tyrants, Aquinas argues, not kings (paragraph 31).36 The aristocratic regime that 
subsequently developed had much to recommend it. “For it frequently happens,” Aquinas 
reasons, “that men living under a king strive more sluggishly for the common good… But 
when they see that the common good is not under the power of one man, they do not 
attend to it as if it belonged to another, but each one attends to it as if it were his own.” 
This is a startling admission on Aquinas’ part. He has had nothing ill to say of monarchy, 
and little at all about rule by the few. Chapter 2, which considered the best regime, 
notably omitted that option. Now he not only suggests that kingship can lead men to a 
tepid defense of the common good, but that aristocracy can be a greater boon to that 
good. A city under rotating leaders can sometimes achieve a great deal more than those 
under kings: “small services extracted by kings weigh more heavily than great burdens if 
imposed by the community of citizens” (paragraph 32). Indeed, he argues, the Roman 
Republic incorporated the plebeians quite successfully, through the army, and the 
wealthy stinted nothing toward the defense of the common good in time of need. 
Yet this regime too came to an end. “Continual dissensions” led to civil wars, and 
those wars spelled the demise of their liberty. Then arose the Empire, whose emperors 
                                                
35 Cf. Budziszewski 2011 
36 See Kalyvas 2007. Perhaps we might amend the above-mentioned suggestion of 
Isidore to suggest that the early Romans did distinguish between tyranny and kingship, 
but only after they had discarded both. 
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while avoiding the title rex were monarchs nonetheless, and often tyrannical ones. Some 
of them were just, Aquinas admits: “But most of them became tyrants towards their 
subjects while indolent and vacillating before their enemies, and brought the Roman 
commonwealth to naught” (paragraph 33). This is the very inverse of their republican and 
military glory. Aquinas argued at the beginning of the chapter that men seek kings but 
end up with tyrants, and tyrants masquerade under the name of king. In the Roman 
example, however, tyrants precisely did not do this: they eschewed the name king just 
because of the associations with tyranny it raises. The emperors rather claimed to rule for 
Rome as new consuls. But this suggests that any regime, not just monarchy, can 
degenerate into tyranny. What counts ultimately is that the tyrant can claim to serve the 
common good.    
This last claim, however, is a disturbing one, as Aquinas appeared to agree with 
Sallust that every citizen of the Roman Republic loved the common good in a way that 
they did not under the old kings. Will this republican virtue not prevent tyranny? How did 
the emperors become able to abuse the common good? One clue is these “continual 
dissensions” that Aquinas mentions without explanation, as though they were there from 
the beginning. However these dissensions started, they eventually built up to civil war. 
Can we connect this discussion to Aquinas’ discussions in Chapters 2-3 about the need 
for unity in rule? Perhaps in Rome’s early period she benefitted from the diversity of her 
citizens; later, however, this diversity turned into faction. She then became internally 
divided and vulnerable, at first to Roman strongmen, later to foreign invaders. More 
speculatively, we might connect this dynamic to the war that so quietly pervades this 
section. Rome after all built herself on the military spirit of its citizens, whether great or 
small: this is how she incorporated them into a predominantly aristocratic mixed regime. 
So long as Caesar had Gauls to subdue, Rome had new treasures for her leaders and new 
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lands for her plebeians: so she grew and prospered. But when this military spirit turned 
inward, the wars became internal, and the “continual dissensions” we puzzled over were 
simply the consequences of her partial virtues brought home. The collapse of the 
Republic culminated in tyranny. In other words, Rome in abandoning monarchy for the 
wrong reasons opened itself to tyranny. Perhaps, as with our conclusions about I.1, in 
attempting to become a provincia Rome became less than a polis.37 
The example of the Hebrews is similarly complex. The Hebrew people, Aquinas 
begins, were ruled by judges, but persuaded God to grant them kings (1 Sam 8). These 
kings were wicked and led them into idolatry, and then into “captivity.” What are we to 
make of this example? The rule of judges was no good thing, Aquinas argues, for owing 
to the Hebrews’ weakness “they were ravished by their enemies on every hand”. Yet they 
fared no better under kings: first they abandoned God, and then they were enslaved by 
foreign forces. Is this because they picked the wrong kings?  
Strikingly, according to Aquinas the initial difference between their condition 
under judges and under kings was not temporal but spiritual. They abandoned judgeship 
because of temporal failures, but kingship in the first place led to a worsening of their 
spiritual condition, and then subsequently to temporal failure as well. Thus, as Aquinas 
states in the beginning of this chapter, they desired a king but fell under tyranny. Perhaps 
they desired kingship not for bad political reasons, but out of spiritual malady. 
                                                
37 I thus agree with Stoner that “It is hard to imagine a stronger argument in favor of 
republicanism” than Aquinas’ treatment of Sallust, and that the question for Aquinas (and 
us) is whether the republic can contain or reform the often perverse wills of men that are 
given new political power under the republic (Stoner 2007, 12-13). This surprising 
openness to republicanism is indeed part of what makes Aquinas’ defense of kingship 
“ironic,” as Stoner stresses. Yet it is nonetheless a defense, and we might wonder if 
Aquinas’ final education of our king leads to a royal mixed regime like that of the Summa 
Theologiae. Stoner also makes the surprisingly needful point that asking whether Aquinas 
advocated republicanism is not to ask whether he was the “first Whig” (Stoner 2007, 2, 
footnote 1). 
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According to Scripture, although Aquinas only elliptically suggests it with “at 
their own pressing,” God did not want to grant Israel a king in the first place. Why is 
this? Perhaps because they wished for monarchy for the wrong reasons? Indeed, the 
Hebrews found the rule of Samuel’s sons unjust, but the people also express to Samuel a 
desire to be “like all the [other] nations” (1 Sam 5), a request with profound theological 
undertones given that they knew God had set them apart as a chosen people. Thus God’s 
response to Samuel: “You are not the one they are rejecting. They are rejecting me as 
their king” (1 Sam 7). This would seem to recall the teaching of the prooemium. Perhaps 
in seeking leaders who would better secure their prosperity, they elected among them 
rulers who cared more for possessions more than for virtue, rulers who came to care for 
their own possessions, the privatum bonum, more than their subjects’ possessions, never 
mind their subjects’ virtues.  
The Hebrew example might help us to make more sense of Aquinas’ account of 
Rome. I suggested that the decline of Rome had in part to do with the lack of unity in the 
ruling element, a point that Aquinas has repeatedly stressed. But note something more. If 
the Roman tyrants did not call themselves kings, as Aquinas predicted, it is because the 
Roman people themselves did not want kings. Yet the Romans did seek a just regime, 
aristocracy, and after becoming a republic finally ended in an unjust regime, tyranny. 
What is more, it was precisely the emperors’ avoidance of the title rex that made the 
Romans blind for so long to their usurpations. One might wonder if, as with the Hebrews, 
Rome’s decline connects to its orientation to the common good. Perhaps any regime 
pursued for the wrong reasons, whether monarchy or otherwise, leads to tyranny. Note, 
for instance, that after they overthrew their kings, the Roman citizen began to work 
toward the common good “as if it were his own” (paragraph 31). This sounds initially 
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like an endorsement of the Roman polyarchy.38 But at some point it came about that the 
Romans only cared for their own private goods, and they were ruled by men who were 
animated by this greed. It seems that, like the Hebrews, the Romans sought regime 
change not because of the inferiority of their regime, or not just because of some 
inferiority in their regime, but because they wanted to grasp power for themselves. 
Perhaps as Sallust said they worked toward the common good, but they worked toward it 
not as common but as something to be grasped for themselves.39 Then Aquinas would 
seem to be warning that changing regime forms often happens as a result of a 
community’s illegitimate deliberation on the ends of political society. 
What are we to conclude from this chapter? Not only are monarchy and tyranny 
closely linked theoretically: their close identification has considerable practical 
implications. Thus Aquinas can conclude: 
Danger thus lurks on either side: whether while the tyrant is feared the best rule of 
the king is missed, or, that considered, royal power turns into tyrannical 
wickedness (paragraph 35).  
 
This chapter could be of no comfort to our king. For if the chapter seemed to begin with a 
need to explain why the people can confuse monarchy for tyranny, then the chapter 
concludes with a strong argument that these regimes are not confused but fused. And so 
Aquinas has led us to see that the greatest danger of monarchy is not that arising from the 
convention that kingship easily lapses into tyranny, but that there is considerable truth to 
this convention.  
                                                
38 We noted earlier that Aquinas uses regimen plurium at points to refer to aristocracy 
and polity, as in “whether to be ruled by many or one [a pluribus regi, vel uno]” 
(paragraph 16). 
39 One thinks of Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees. 
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But then, writing for a king, this might all seem quite the useful lesson for 
considering not only how one ought not to be mistaken for a tyrant, but also how not to 
be a tyrant. Given Aquinas’ audience, this is likely the more important teaching. 
 
CHAPTER V 
Chapter 4 muddies the distinction between kingship and tyranny gradually 
developed over the first three chapters. From Chapter 4 we might have formed the 
impression that kingship must be avoided to circumvent tyranny. We might have even 
decided that kingship is not the best regime, or at least is not the best regime for practical 
purposes, because it deviates so readily into tyranny. If this is a possible conclusion from 
Chapter 4, Aquinas means to disabuse us of it in Chapter 5. It opens thus: 
When one must choose between two things, from both of which danger impends, 
surely that one should be chosen from which the lesser evil follows. Now from 
monarchy, if converted into tyranny, less evil follows than from an aristocracy 
[regimen plurium optimatum] when corrupted (paragraph 36). 
 
Another arresting claim: tyranny produces less evil than oligarchy. How is this possible? 
Did we not learn in Chapter 3 that the contrary of the best is the worst, and that tyranny is 
the contrary of the best regime, monarchy?  
Aquinas explains. Dissension most often arises from polyarchy (regimen 
plurium). Such dissension pervading a multitude “runs counter to the good of peace, 
which is the chief thing [praecipuum].” A tyrant does not destroy this good, but only 
“obstructs some goods of particular men” (paragraph 37). But how is this possible given 
the chaotic picture of tyranny that Aquinas presents in Chapter 3? The sentence 
continues: “unless there be an excess of tyranny [excessus tyrannidis] and he rages 
against the entire community.” Aquinas seems to be arguing, then, that in most cases the 
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corruption of monarchy does not lead to an “excess of tyranny”, but only some milder 
form. In that case, Chapter 3 would seem to be describing tyranny as precisely the 
“excess” that “rages against the entire community” and to the mortal detriment of the 
praecipuum of the bonum pacis.  
Aquinas offers two more arguments for why oligarchy is more dangerous than 
tyranny. The first is this: that which produces dangers with greater frequency is to be 
avoided, and polyarchy (regimen multorum) turns to oligarchy more often than monarchy 
turns to tyranny. This proceeds from Aquinas’ arguments in Chapters 3 and 4 according 
to which evil arises from multiple causes. When many rule, there is a greater chance that 
any one of them will abandon the common good (divertat ab intentione communis boni). 
And when any one of them does this, the entire group of rulers is threatened by internal 
strife. This strife in turns leads to dissension among the people. But the monarch is only 
one man, so there is no chance of him being drawn into conflict with other rulers. And 
when he does fall away from the common good,  
…it does not immediately follow that he proceeds to the total oppression of his 
subjects, which is the excess of tyranny [excessus tyrannidis] and the worst 
wickedness in government [et in malitia regiminis maximum gradum tenens], as 
was shown above (paragraph 38).  
 
Eschmann notes that “as shown above” refers to the discussion of Chapter 3 on tyranny. 
According to Eschmann, the reversal here of the claims of that chapter is only apparent, 
because “the reasoning of ch. III proceeds on the supposition of an absolute and total 
tyranny, which is here expressly set aside.”40 This is true so far as it goes. Aquinas uses 
the phrase excessus tyrannidis here, the same one he employed in the previous paragraph 
(37) to distinguish the tyranny that apparently rarely happens from the more mild or 
                                                
40 Eschmann 1949, 22, footnote 1 
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moderate tyranny that he compares with oligarchy in this chapter. As with the previous 
argument, Aquinas argues here that a king can fall away from justice without lapsing into 
unrestricted tyranny, and that this moderate tyranny is the more likely outcome.  
But has not this shift stacked the deck for monarchy? Aquinas defines tyranny in 
the most awful terms in Chapter 3 in contrasting it with kingship, but in Chapter 5 he 
contrasts it favorably with oligarchy. He does this, in turn, because of what comes in 
between: tyranny at its worst, he argues in Chapter 4, is a serious argument against 
monarchy altogether. Taking into full account the argument of Chapter 5, the confusion 
between kingship and tyranny we saw in Chapter 4, although still a grave matter, would 
then seem to arise from a relatively rare manifestation of tyranny.  Thus Aquinas can 
claim that the effects of the corruption of aristocracy are typically worse than those of the 
corruption of kingship, eliminating a doubt as to whether we should really prefer 
monarchy. This would be particularly welcome news to our royal reader, who might have 
formed the impression that monarchy frequently descends into total tyranny. But Aquinas 
now tells him that such occurrences are not common, and that only a mild form of 
tyranny normally ensues. 
Aquinas’ last reason is yet another surprise: not only does polyarchy devolve into 
oligarchy more often than kingship does into tyranny, but “a polyarchy deviates into 
tyranny not less but perhaps more frequently than a monarchy” (paragraph 39). In the 
case of dissension among multiple rulers, “it often happens that the power of one 
preponderates and he then usurps the government of the multitude for himself.” This fits 
with Aquinas’ concern in the previous paragraph that it only requires one unjust ruler to 
pervert polyarchy: in all likelihood it is this very ruler who quietly amasses power to then 
depose the others. Aquinas can thus sum up the historical record he has investigated in 
these past few chapters: “There has hardly even been a polyarchy that did not end in 
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tyranny.” More tyrannies, Aquinas goes on to argue, have arisen in lands ruled by many 
than in those ruled by one. In what political formation did this dynamic most “manifestly 
appear”? The Roman Republic. The lengthy rule of magistrates gave way to “the most 
cruel tyrants,” disintegrating under the pressure of civil wars and dissension, fomented by 
a parade of ambitious and selfish supposed republicans. This is the same history Aquinas 
presented in Chapter 4 at paragraph 33, although in that chapter Aquinas notes that kings 
preceded the magistrates. We at the time found that historical investigation difficult to 
grasp. Now Aquinas’ point is clear: tyranny cannot be avoided by rejecting kingship. In 
fact, the degeneration of polyarchy itself reveals a monarchical principle, and a tyrannical 
one at that.41 Aquinas therefore ends this chapter with a restatement of the problem that 
lurked beneath the surface of Chapter 4 and was brought to the fore in this one:  
The strongest objection why monarchy, although it is “the best form of 
government”, is not agreeable to the people is that, in fact, it may deviate into 
tyranny. Yet tyranny is wont to occur not less but more frequently on the basis of 
a polyarchy than on the basis of a monarchy. It follows that it is, in any case, more 
expedient to live under one king than under the rule of several men (paragraph 
40). 
 
It has been Aquinas’ goal in reformulating the threat of tyranny to preserve or re-assert 
the excellence of kingship. In comparing monarchy favorably with the worst of tyranny, 
and comparing oligarchy unfavorably with mild tyranny, he paints tyranny as such in the 
worst light, while being more forgiving toward those instances of mild tyranny that are 
perhaps no more than minor detours from kingship. 
                                                
41 By “monarchical” I mean rule by one, not whether it is just (royal) or unjust 
(tyrannical). Aquinas himself seems to use regimen unius in this generic sense, with 
monarchia being far less common (only at I.5, I.6), and rex for the king. Most of 
Eschmann’s renderings of “monarchy” are in fact regimen unius. 
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Aristotle also spoke of two kinds of tyranny, although it is unclear how closely 
Aquinas read that portion of the Politics.42 Concerning the question as to how to preserve 
tyrannies, Aristotle writes that tyrants have two choices: first the “traditional way,” by 
which the tyrant attempts to control his citizens and territory to the greatest possible 
extent, or second, an apparently novel way, by playing the part of a king, winning the 
people over to him.43 This second way, Aristotle says, “one can get an understanding 
of… from the way kingship is destroyed.” As one destroys kingship by making it more 
tyrannical, so one can “save” tyranny by making it more kingly. While the emphasis is on 
the tyrant “appearing” to be good, according to Aristotle he must conduct himself in a 
fairly decent way most of the time for this ploy to succeed. This tyrant could easily be 
mistaken for an imperfect king trying to become better. But perhaps this is Aristotle’s 
intent: in so acting, the tyrant’s reign will “be more noble and more enviable”, and he will 
render himself “nobly disposed for virtue”, and “not wicked but half wicked.”44 
The first “method” matches Aquinas’ excessus tyrannidis: the tyrant who pants 
after power and possessions, who incurs universal hatred and must take extraordinary 
steps to preserve himself. The second, the tyrant who appears royal, seems to correspond 
to Aquinas’ moderate tyrant, the king who departs only minimally from justice.  
                                                
42 I say “unclear” not to cast doubt but to admit ignorance: Aquinas’ Commentary on 
Aristotle’s “Politics” ends abruptly early in Book III, thus raising enticing questions 
about how closely Aquinas studied what followed or what he judged to be its value (Keys 
2005, 15-21). One must bear in mind that Aquinas did not complete a great many of his 
works, and a disproportionate number of his incomplete works are Aristotelian 
commentaries (Torrell 2005). Further, we have hardly begun to ask why Aquinas 
composed the Aristotelian commentaries. Perhaps his purposes were served by what he 
completed? Given how little of Aquinas’ works directly impinge upon politics, it would 
be fascinating to know whether his failure to complete his Politics commentary indicates 
less a dissatisfaction with Aristotle’s teaching on politics than a greater interest in other 
subjects, most obviously the systematic theology that absorbed his later years. 
43 Politics 1314a29-1315b10 
44 Politics 1315a40-b10 
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But granting a similarity between these teachings, what is Aristotle trying to 
accomplish through his, and could the same be said for Aquinas? Simpson offers a 
helpful commentary on this portion of the Politics.45 If it seems strange that Aristotle 
should offer advice on preserving tyranny, we might consider that a citizen or sage may 
very well be asked to advise an unjust monarch on such matters.46 He would have to say 
something about the “traditional” method of preserving tyranny, both because it is such 
an obvious solution and because it is one any tyrant would know. But does this mean the 
advisor must recommend it? Not exactly. Aristotle suggests, Simpson thinks, that we 
point out a better way to the tyrant. Holding to the pretense of advising a tyrant, we can 
suggest another way to preserve tyranny, one that happens to be in the self-interest of the 
tyrant and of his people precisely because it directs him and his people toward the good. 
Thus this section of the Politics could function as a kind of education for the less-than-
perfect monarch whose rule must be directed toward kingship and justice.  
But is this not the point of De Regno as well? For if a tyrant is not necessarily a 
raging slave to erotic lusts, but perhaps often instead a misguided or inexperienced ruler 
who is only somewhat unjust, then Aquinas has widened the net to take in a fair number 
of would-be kings who rarely go by the name “tyrant.” He includes those who rule out of 
selfish reasons but see the need to effect more than that in their governance. Thus he 
presents perversions of monarchy as actually quite common, and not necessarily 
particularly unjust. We will have to keep reading De Regno to see if this is really what 
Aquinas is up to, but it is certainly a funny conclusion to a series of chapters lamenting 
                                                
45 Simpson 1998, 411-15 
46 To call a tyrant a tyrant is not something one does in modern political science (cf. 
Strauss 1963, 22-24). 
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the horrors of tyranny. Yet he also warns that such kings flirt with something far worse: 
full-blown tyranny of the sort that enslaves the tyrant’s passions.  
Aquinas has not deepened our knowledge of the meaning of bonum commune or 
unitas pacis. On the other hand, he has presented his political teaching in an engrossing 
blend of metaphysics and convention, philosophy and theology. This has been no manual 
or textbook. Chapters 4 and 5 concern popular opinions about monarchy that are not 
wholly wrong but stand in need of correction, both on their own terms and according to 
additional considerations that Aquinas lays out. Aquinas has not sought to dismiss 
popular beliefs out of hand, but to examine them so as to learn from what they teach us 
about politics and about what people think about politics. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
If Chapter 4 raised doubts about monarchy, Aquinas seems to suggest in Chapter 
5 that kingship is yet the best defense against tyranny: the disposition to foster a just 
monarchy and not the acceptance of a second-best regime secures politics against 
injustice. In other words: the commitment to justice cannot be abandoned, and will lead 
us to give monarchy, with all of its dangers and perils, a second look. Aquinas opens 
Chapter 6 with a re-iteration of this point. He then proposes to show how tyranny can be 
prevented among monarchs. Aquinas states three conditions for avoiding tyranny: 
selecting the right man; carefully arranging his government; and the tempering of his 
power.47 Aquinas cites 1 Samuel 13:14 in explanation of the first condition:  
                                                
47 Eschmann and Carlyle believe that a fuller treatment of this third consideration would 
have shown Aquinas to be advocating a constitutional or limited monarchy (Eschmann 
1949, 24, footnote 2 (citing ST I-II.105.1) and Carlyle 1936, V.94). That could well be 
true. Yet De Regno is not a treatise but a speculum principum. Thus we might think of 
this less as a lacuna than a deliberate decision not to discuss this topic here. Why Aquinas 
does not raise the question here is more important than whether he could have done so. 
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Wherefore Samuel, commending the providence of God with respect to the 
institution of the king says: “The Lord sought a man according to his own heart, 
and the Lord appointed him to be prince over his people” (paragraph 42). 
 
This quotation is in fact an admonition of Samuel to Saul that Saul’s kingdom will 
be destroyed and Saul removed from the throne.48 The New American Bible renders 1 
Sam 13:13-14: 
Samuel replied to Saul: “You have acted foolishly! Had you kept the command 
the LORD your God gave you, the LORD would now establish your kingship in 
Israel forever; but now your kingship shall not endure. The LORD has sought out 
a man after his own heart to appoint as ruler over his people because you did not 
observe what the LORD commanded you.”49 
 
If God can reward men by placing them on the throne, he can also punish tyrants by 
removing them. As Eschmann notes, the business of preventing tyranny only occupies 
these first two paragraphs of the chapter (Eschmann 1949, xviii). The remainder of this 
long chapter is given over to provision for the king lapsing into tyranny. This is perhaps 
the most disconcerting lacuna in the text, not least because Aquinas has thus far devoted 
more attention to the evil qualities of the tyrant than to the character of the just king. This 
next section, in turn, will turn out to bear chiefly upon the populace rather than upon the 
tyrant. We might think that Aquinas does not discuss the selection of a king because it is 
a moot point for our king: he has already been selected. As for the arrangement of his 
government, is this also because our king has a government already in place? If this is the 
case, Aquinas might not simply be avoiding wasted space: he might also want to avoid 
                                                
48 While the verse Aquinas has in mind seems to be 1 Samuel 13:14, with Samuel 
speaking, Busa thinks it to be from the first book of Kings, Kenny gets the book right but 
thinks Daniel is speaking, and Eschmann 1949 attributes it to 1 Kings and Daniel. 
49 This quotation may not accord fully with that of Aquinas in part because Aquinas 
tended to quote from memory. 
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causing affront to an imperfect king and an imperfect government. He has, after all, gone 
to great lengths to compare kingship favorably with other regimes (I.3-5). Or is there 
some deeper strategy at work here? Perhaps Aquinas once again presses on to tyranny to 
give our king a negative teaching, an indirect discourse on kingship through a treatment 
of its unjust opposite. 
Having not considered in any depth these initial questions, Aquinas proposes to 
move on: “Finally, provision must be made for facing the situation should the king stray 
into tyranny” (paragraph 43). He does not take long to make his point. 
Aquinas rejects tyrranicide. Such attempts rarely succeed, and when they do they 
often lead to the rule of men as bad as or worse than the original tyrant. If there be no 
excess of tyranny [excessus tyrannidis], then the people should tolerate their tyrant, and 
private individuals should never take it upon themselves to act in the name of the people; 
this Aquinas thinks inevitably leads to faction (paragraphs 46-8). That tyranny falling 
short of excessus tyrannidis can be tolerated only bolsters Aquinas’ earlier arguments that 
they are not an unconscionable threat to justice. And the more this is the case, the more it 
is also true that the lapse of monarchy into tyranny is not a strong argument against 
monarchy. 
Yet if a tyrant’s reign becomes unbearable, Aquinas argues, the manner of 
proceeding varies. A people can depose a tyrant if it was they who set him up. If some 
higher authority set up the king, such as an emperor, appeal should be made to that 
authority, who can depose the king. Yet if no human effort or help against the tyrant can 
be had, one option remains: prayer. For if tyranny is not simply caused by bad institutions 
or false philosophies but by a hard heart, then only God can turn the heart of the tyrant to 
the common good by softening his heart. Aquinas lists a few examples of this, including, 
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somewhat humorously, the drowning of the Egyptian pharaoh in the Red Sea at the 
climax of the Hebrew exodus (paragraph 51). 
While this recourse to prayer will strike many modern readers as fantastic, two 
things are worth noting here. First, Aquinas does not mention appeal to the pope. The 
centuries preceding this work saw innumerable controversies over the temporal power of 
the pope and his ability to depose rulers, especially with regard to the ancestral homeland 
of the Norman king of Cyprus, France, but Aquinas does not raise this issue here.50 Is this 
because Aquinas does not wish to distract his reader with contemporary issues likely to 
inflame his passions? Or is Aquinas trying to avoid a discussion of the Church, which 
thus far has gone unmentioned? Second, such prayer, Aquinas says, will only be 
efficacious if the people themselves turn away from sin. God gives the people a king in 
His anger with them, just as we would expect a self-interested ruler to emerge from a 
society of self-interested people, and only turning back toward Him will redeem them. 
And why remove a tyrant if a thousand members of the populace stand ready to take his 
place? We might see in this a subtle revision of his criticism of ancient Rome in chapter 
4. Was Rome’s decline into empire caused merely by bad rulers, or also by a morally 
weak populace? We might even think that the rulers and the ruled are bound by a culture 
of moral failure. This would bring Aquinas’ understanding of Rome quite close to 
Augustine’s famous view in The City of God, V.12-21.  
Thus Aquinas cites Job that God “makes a man that is a hypocrite to reign for the 
sins of the people” (Job 34:30). As the reign of a hypocrite, tyranny is confirmed as the 
worst regime. And as a hypocrite, the tyrant himself is the worst sort of man. Yet it this 
regime and this ruler, Aquinas urges, that nations can sometimes come to deserve. 
                                                
50 As Genicot 1976 notes, De Regno notably lacks any explicit references to 
contemporary political events, although Eschmann thinks he finds one at paragraph 39.  
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Tyranny might not just be an isolated political problem of the bad man with political 
power, then, or it might not only or always be that. Perhaps tyranny more fundamentally 
stems from the sickness of a paideia, an entire society losing its way. We again hear 
echoes of Augustine’s City of God, for this sounds much like the earthly city [civitas 
terrena] or City of man. In fact, Aquinas ends chapter 6 with one of this book’s most 
Augustinian lines: “Therefore sin must be obliterated, that the plague of tyrants may 
cease” [Tollenda est igitur culpa, ut cesset a tyrannorum plaga].” For tyranny is a 
punishment for sin, and so the tyrant is an instrument of God’s justice. 
Chapter 6 has done little to settle our picture of monarchy. For on the one hand, 
tyranny is the very worst regime, invariably radically corrupting monarchy. On the other 
hand, tyranny rarely degenerates that far, and so monarchy remains the best regime, 
practically and theoretically. So how does one prevent tyranny from imperilling justice? 
And, to repeat our endless question, what is the end of kingship that it so often 
degenerates slightly but rarely to tyrannical excess? Moreover, what precisely is the main 
thrust of Chapter 6 if mild tyranny is to be tolerated, and salvation from full tyranny 
requires divine intervention? Does this mean that politics is hopeless? We would have a 
better grasp of this question if we knew just how pervasive Aquinas takes mild tyranny to 
be, and if we knew why Aquinas skimps on his description of selecting a just king in 
Chapter 6. For if this mild tyranny is quite pervasive, and selecting a would-be just king 
is not something Aquinas takes to be worth bothering about, then a rather dour image of 
politics emerges from De Regno. And this does not bode well for the answer to our 
question in chapter 1 about the relation between reason and the ruling element in a 
community. 
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CONCLUSION 
We might ask to where our royal reader has been led. In the prooemium, Aquinas 
promises him a gift worthy of a king and fitting his office as a theologian, one Aquinas 
will execute through the full battery of theology, philosophy and history. In Chapters 1 
and 2, Aquinas begins to lay down a political philosophy organized around the nature of 
community and the excellence of kingship. But where one might have expected him to 
explain to his reader the duty of the good king and the nature of the common good he 
serves, Aquinas instead ventures into an extended discussion of tyranny, particularly the 
practical problems associated with tyranny as closely related to, and thus popularly 
identified with, kingship. This prompts Aquinas to re-assert his defense of monarchy as 
the best regime, no doubt to the relief of the Cypriot, an argument that requires Aquinas 
to distinguish moderate from extreme tyranny. Aquinas thus keeps the ambiguities of 
monarchy – just in kingship, unjust in tyranny – at the center of his analysis. As we 
predicted in the beginning, De Regno is no ordinary speculum principum. For Aquinas 
has done a masterful job of safeguarding the excellence of monarchy in De Regno, but 
seemingly at the cost of admitting the incredible prevalence of tyranny. Perhaps the 
tyranny into which monarchy lapses is not often unbearable, but it is tyranny nonetheless. 
The Cypriot, then, must fear that it could slouch still further. And so he and we have 
every reason to learn more not about the tyranny that we already know threatens us, but 
about the kingship that would hold it at bay. 
But why this winding organization? For one thing, Aquinas is not writing a 
theological textbook: he intends this work to be useful to a king. The presentation of the 
teaching dictated by the principles of practical philosophy might not be that presentation 
best suited to teaching a political man. Perhaps this tortuous organization also relates to 
the surprisingly negative tone. Assuming that this work is not meant to be simply a 
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collection of lamentations, it could be a negative education. Indeed, Aristotle leads a 
tyrant to become more kingly through a pretense of preserving that tyrannical regime; 
Simonides in the Hiero similarly seems to draw the tyrant Hiero toward kingship by 
coaxing him to tell him of the reputed benefits of tyranny. Aquinas like them might want 
to put the horrors of tyrannical rule before the king, and by a method that allows the 
tyrant to recognize these horrors for himself. Thus Aquinas will never himself suggest 
that the king is a tyrant or potentially tyrannical.  
What specific teachings on tyranny does Aquinas advance? There are four of 
which we have taken notice, bearing in mind the primarily negative and indirect method 
Aquinas has adopted thus far: (1) no regime is safe from lapsing into tyranny, and 
aristocracy and polity are no safer than monarchy (paragraphs 36-40); (2) changes in 
regime form will not protect a community from tyranny if that community’s own resolve 
to justice falters (paragraphs 31-35); (3) when citizens’ injustice leads to tyranny, they 
must reform themselves before tyranny can be brought to an end (paragraphs 51-52); but, 
(4) while men typically know what they do not want from a tyrant, oppression, they do 
not seem to know what should be the purpose of just government, what justice should 
look like, thus condemning themselves to tyranny (paragraphs 31-33; 45-48). This last 
point might point to an articulation of the rhetorical dimension of De Regno. Perhaps 
Aquinas has spoken of the tyrant rather than the king and the servus rather than the liber 
because he is not yet ready to introduce his positive teaching for some reason, but also 
perhaps to mimic the state of knowledge of politically active men. The images of tyranny 
and slavery that Aquinas presents to the king are horrifying, and surely they would lead 
most rulers to seek justice. But do such images point us unambiguously to the true form 
of justice, to the best form of government? Perhaps not, according to chapter 4 and the 
lessons of Rome and Israel. So if in the constant change and motion that is politics rulers 
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set the course of politics to avoid the easily identifiable dangers of tyranny, we could 
worry that they would still lack a firm knowledge of that toward which politics should 
advance. Thus it might seem that the two-fold task of De Regno is to urge our king to 
avoid deliberating about the ends of politics, namely justice, yet also to think 
speculatively about just what justice is and what it requires. 
Part of this search for political wisdom requires identifying where wisdom is to be 
found. Must the king become a theologian to serve justice? Does Aquinas propose a 
strictly philosophical teaching in De Regno? Thus far, we again encounter aporia. 
According to some, Aquinas puts both Scripture and philosophy to very light use in De 
Regno, the very sources through which Aquinas promised to teach us in the prooemium.51 
But if the teaching has been negative, do we yet know the positive teaching? Perhaps we 
cannot say to what use the Bible and the ancients are being put. And in any event, the use 
of such sources has been more perplexing than mundane. In a book written by a 
theologian for a king, Aquinas has said little about the virtue or piety that would even 
necessitate a turn to the Bible or the philosophers, nor has he spoken explicitly of any end 
or happiness of man the knowledge of which would require such wisdom. Scripture has 
been used to illustrate or deepen some arguments, but Aquinas has not used revelation to 
ground any positive teaching. Perhaps because the political arrangements of the Old 
Testament do not bind Christians?52 Yet his New Testament quotations do not seem to 
offer systematic direction, either.53 His discussion of the God-king analogy takes its 
principles from natural political theology. Conversely, Aquinas has treated extensively on 
the natural causes and evils of tyranny. While invocations of Scripture like David as 
                                                
51 Jordan 1992, 157-60 
52 ST I-II.98-108; cf. Kries 1990 
53 Schall 2000  
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servus meus are suggestive, we do not know from De Regno if this is meant to be a seal 
on Aquinas’ philosophical teaching or if a king’s service to God should lead him to act 
beyond or against reason.54 There is certainly no “political theology.”55 So what is this 
theologian teaching the king? 
I.1-6 of De Regno might seem “philosophical” insofar as systematic theology is 
conspicuously absent from it. If it is, however, it is quite a thin political philosophy.56 
Aquinas has not shown that reason can secure justice in man’s community. As Eschmann 
notes, the proof of man’s sociality advanced by Aquinas in I.1 of De Regno is Avicennan 
rather than Aristotelian: man’s needs and utility are the key to his political nature.57 
Man’s koinonia is meant to serve instrumentally to remedy a lack, not to realize anything 
in man that would show him to be political or social. Is the bonum commune about more 
than meeting material needs? Aquinas has acknowledged that the point of living in 
society is living, but certainly not that it is living well.58 Pace Manent and (possibly) 
Dawson, then, Aquinas’ great political work thus far cannot be accused of exaggerating 
in a “neo-Aristotelian” fashion the autonomy of the temporal from supernatural 
concerns.59 
                                                
54 A student of Aquinas might object that we know Aquinas not to be a fideist. Perhaps 
we do, but we are interested here in how he presents himself – and his teaching – to the 
king. Only thereby will we understand how Aquinas means this speculum principum to 
function.  
55 Cf Nelson 2010, 142, footnote 3; Maritain 1955, 100 and Maritain 1940, 120, fn 1 
56 One might take it to be Blondel’s “philosophy of insufficiency” (Blondel 1931 and 
1932), as Cain 2007 seems to. 
57 Eschmann 1949, 4, footnotes 2-3; cf. Pinckaers 1995, 432 
58 Perhaps Aquinas, more in the tradition of Augustine than that of Aristotle, has modest 
hopes for our ability to live well in this life? (Kraynak 2001) 
59 Manent 1996, 11-12, and Dawson 2008 [1965] 253, 261, 280, 286 
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Thus, in seeking answers to Aquinas’ positive teaching in this work, we might 
hope that he not only addresses the nature of kingship and the common good in relation 
to reason, his intriguing but vague schema of the common, proper and private good, how 
the common good is a “unity of peace”, and in what relation each citizen as a sui causa 
stands to this common good. We will also wish him to address why he has made this 
education of a prince thus far primarily a teaching in which the distinction between king 
and tyrant is obscured. And by “obscured” I do not mean that he denies the distinction 
like Hobbes or Machiavelli, but that he has not told us enough to differentiate the two 
regimes sufficiently.60 Indeed, he promised at I.4 that such a distinction would be difficult 
to make in practice. And perhaps in so doing Aquinas will make clear whether to his 
mind politics depends upon affirming a certain scope for theology and revelation in 
public affairs. 
We will also want to observe whether Aquinas invokes well-known features of his 
later political theology, particularly the natural law and constitutional monarchy.61 
Nothing has been said of natural law thus far, a notable omission for a thinker whose 
politics is often said to depend upon it.62 Perhaps its absence is of a piece with Aquinas’ 
general silence on virtue and the common good.63 Then, too, Aquinas in these early 
chapters champions potent monarchy. But in other places, especially the Summa 
Theologiae, he recommends a mixed regime. Eschmann and Carlyle think they find 
evidence of restraints on monarchy’s power in this section, and it would be obtuse to 
                                                
60 Strauss, 1963, 24 
61 It should now be clear to the reader that by “political theology” we mean not that of 
Carl Schmitt, as will become clearer as we progress in our analysis. This is not to say, 
however, that we should abandon the phrase. 
62 Guerra 2002, 14, footnote 2 
63 Guerra 2002  
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deny that evidence. Yet I would again urge us to ask: why, in a letter designed to educate 
a king, does Aquinas not see fit to expand on this subject when he has had the 
opportunity to do so multiple times?64 At least on my reading of De Regno, we gain less 
from importing into De Regno political teachings that Aquinas would write a decade later 
than from considering the singularly odd order and emphasis of these teachings. In this 
odd order may hide great surprises. 
Aquinas’ dour focus on tyranny in the first six chapters of De Regno does not 
bode well for rational politics. Yet this teaching actually only occupies the latter chapters 
(I.3-6), and, thought it does little to support the promise of the first two chapters and 
especially the prooemium, it does not directly contradict that teaching. Aquinas moreover 
acknowledges in chapter 4 that a great problem for political life is distinguishing tyranny 
from monarchy. Thus we cannot be sure by the testimony of these chapters that Aquinas 
simply rejects the quest for the best regime.65 Nor can we assume that he rejects the 
ability of philosophy or theology to uncover that regime or of man to instantiate it 
practically. We will, however, have to ask as we continue reading whether this order of 
presentation reflects a certain pedagogical strategy, and, if so, what it reveals about 
Aquinas’ political thought. 
                                                
64 See footnote 47 on Eschmann and Carlyle 
65 Cain 2007  
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Chapter Two    
Thus far De Regno has been aporetic. The letter has led the reader to ask many 
questions for which there have been no immediate answers. Like all great aporetic texts, 
however, De Regno raises questions precisely because of how much it reveals. A king 
must lead his people to the common good; in so doing he is serving justice and God, and 
moreover fulfilling the promises of the best regime, kingship. Yet kings are in constant 
peril of becoming tyrants, and their citizens will often be suspicious of them. This is for 
good reason: tyranny is the worst regime and a nightmare for all who live under it. Thus 
we are led to continue reading De Regno not only because of a speculative interest in 
Aquinas completing his teaching, but also because, like Aquinas’ royal reader, we have 
seen the urgent need for an effective teaching against tyranny. 
 As we noted in the introduction, I.7-12, or De Praemio Regis (“The 
Reward of the King”) has been at the center of controversies concerning the proper 
ordering of the text of De Regno.1 Yet such controversies have been carried out in the 
absence of close textual analysis of the work. Therefore our two-fold mission in this 
chapter will be to grasp the teaching of I.7-12 and clarify its teaching vis-à-vis that of I.1-
6 says about the proper order of these sections.  
 
CHAPTER VII 
Chapter VII begins as follows: 
Since, according to what has been said thus far, it is of the king to seek the good 
of the multitude, the task of a king may seem too burdensome unless some proper 
                                                
1 Eschmann 1949, xiv-xxi. 
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good [proprium bonum] should come to him from it. It is fitting therefore to 
consider in what is a fitting reward [praemium] for a good king (paragraph 53). 
 
The paragraph is strange for a number of reasons. First, it is an abrupt shift in focus: 1.3-6 
concern tyranny, and now Aquinas proposes to treat not the long-awaited duties of the 
king, but their reward. While Aquinas has previously asserted that “it is the king’s duty to 
seek [quaerere] the common good,” he has said nothing as to what that common good is 
or in what that duty consists. As Eschmann notes, this idea has been articulated in chapter 
I as a purely theoretical matter, not as a practical one: the practical dimension of De 
Regno has dwelt only upon tyranny.2 Thus it is the more striking that Aquinas asserts that 
the king’s duty may seem “burdensome.” And it is not only “burdensome,” but also 
perhaps “too burdensome” save it should be accompanied by some “advantage” to the 
king. Yet Aquinas has taken pains to show that the tyrant bears tremendous burdens, and 
this because the tyrant rules for himself, not for the common good. Why then would 
Aquinas emphasize the burdens attached to the opposite of tyranny, kingship? Moreover, 
given that the king works for the common good, not his own private one, why would 
Aquinas associate the attainment of justice with a reward for the king, and not with the 
advantage of the common good? Does the king really work for the sake of the common 
good? 
Seemingly oblivious to such considerations, Aquinas goes on to consider whether 
honor and glory could be the king’s reward. Aquinas cites the reports of Aristotle and 
Cicero that some men say that honor and glory are the rewards proper to a prince 
(paragraph 54). “For it is in the heart of all men to seek their proper [proprium] good,” 
                                                
2 Eschmann 1949, xvi 
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the reasoning seems to go, and “if the prince is not content with glory and honor, he will 
seek pleasures and riches and so will resort to plundering and injuring his subjects.” 
Aquinas finds five problems with this conventional opinion (paragraphs 55-59). 
First, Aquinas repeats the well-known argument that “nothing is more fragile among 
human things than the glory and honor of men’s favor” (paragraph 55).3 After all, it rests 
upon the “fickle” opinion of men. Is it rational for a king to expend “so many labors and 
anxieties… for a reward so perishable”? Thus the prophet Isaiah calls such glory and 
honor “the flower of the field” (Isaiah 40:6). When argued thus, the quest for glory 
becomes not merely arduous and perilous, but Sisyphean. 
Second, Aquinas argues that the need for glory and honor “takes away greatness 
of soul,” turning men into slaves. If, as previously stated, honor and glory depend upon 
the good opinion of others, then “he who seeks the favor of men must serve their will in 
all he says and does” (paragraph 56). Aquinas cites Cicero’s De officiis in support of the 
conclusion that “the inordinate desire for glory is to be guarded against; it takes away 
freedom of soul, for the sake of which great-souled men [magnanimis viris] should put 
forth all their efforts.” If being great-souled is to be valued among princes, Aquinas 
argues, then the prince seeking glory and honor through the good graces of other men is 
not the way to that greatness of soul. 
These first two reasons concern the prince. The third relates to his people. For 
Aquinas next argues that “it hurts the multitude if such a reward be set up for princes” 
(paragraph 57). This should animate us: as we noted above, Aquinas has not yet spoken 
concretely of the king’s duties to the multitude. The virtuous man, Aquinas argues, has 
no concern for glory. Yet if glory is the reward for princes, then good men will not 
become princes on account of that glory. Kingship will rather attract the wrong sort of 
                                                
3 Eschmann renders fragilius as “perishable.”  
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man, i.e. the kind who seeks glory as his final end. But then not only will the city come to 
ruin through vicious kings, but they will lose the advantages of the rule of a virtuous man. 
Continuing in the next paragraph, Aquinas fourth argues that “dangerous evils [to 
the multitude] come from the desire for glory” (paragraph 58). A prince’s desire for glory 
often leads to the ruin of his country, first because such a prince risks destroying himself 
and his army through warfare, even should they win, and second, when they finally do 
lose, through the country’s eventual subjection to those foreign combatants. This adds 
flesh to our concern at I.1 that the provincia would turn out to be a defective regime if its 
orientation toward military affairs – however originating – led not only to a diminished 
concern for virtue, but even to the extinction of the community itself. 
“Moreover,” Aquinas fifth and finally continues, another effect of glory-seeking 
is to be feared: hypocrisy. Virtue is difficult; simulation of virtue, easy. Sallust and Christ 
are both brought in to testify to this. “Ambition drives many mortals to become false,” 
Sallust says. “They keep one thing shut up in their heart, another ready on the tongue, and 
they have more countenace than character.” Christ says: hypocrites “do good work that 
they may be seen by men,” not because they are good men. Even the man who does 
apparently good deeds can be vicious, in other words. This paragraph ends: 
Therefore, just as there is danger for the multitude, if the prince seek pleasures 
and riches as his reward, that he becomes a plunderer and abusive, so there is 
danger, if glory be assigned to him as reward, that he becomes presumptuous and 
a hypocrite (paragraph 59). 
 
Aquinas has not mentioned material goods as a reward other than in what he reports of 
Cicero and Aristotle. But the analogy is obvious: just as the honor-seeking prince will 
defraud his subjects by imitating the appearance of a man who deserves glory, so the 
pleasure-loving man will place those goods that give him pleasure above the common 
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good. Both work to be hypocrites. This teaching recalls Aquinas’ discussion at I.4 of the 
tyrant who masquerades as a king. But can such a fraud hide that he is “a plunderer and 
abusive,” or that he is “presumptuous and a hypocrite”? Perhaps, as in the case of the 
Romans, such attributes become known to the people only after they become powerless 
to depose him. We might also think that, as in the case of the Romans, the kind of people 
who set up and maintain such a monarch are also the kind of people who will themselves 
become increasingly hypocritical as they participate in the same game for riches and 
honor. This would explain why Aquinas urged the reform of the people as a resolution to 
the problem of tyranny (I.6). 
Aristotle and Cicero seem to endorse honor and glory, Aquinas argues, not 
“because they judged that the king’s intention should be principally directed to that 
object, but because it is more tolerable for him to seek glory than to desire money or 
pursue pleasure” (paragraph 60). The desire for glory depends upon the opinion of other 
men. To the extent that these other men are good, then, the man seeking their favorable 
opinion will play at being good from his outsider’s perspective. He will not know why 
what he does is good, and he will lack genuine prudence, but he at least follows the lead 
of those who do. Thus the hypocrisy that Aquinas earlier castigated has a silver lining. 
Considering that “few men reach true virtue,” such hypocrisy might even be necessary in 
many regimes. Perhaps the hypocrite will be taught toward justice in this way? But how 
long will the hypocrite be restrained to good works by the accidental presence of good 
men in his regime? As Aquinas goes on to argue, if “the one who desires to domineer 
lacks the desire for glory,” then nothing will restrain him in his pursuit of power and “he 
will surpass the beasts in the vices of cruelty and lust” (paragraph 60). Aquinas puts forth 
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Nero as an example of such a man, reminding us again of the degeneration of the Roman 
love for glory and honor.4 Aquinas then summarizes the conclusions of this chapter: 
Indeed all this is quite clearly contained in what Aristotle says in his Ethics 
[1124a 16] regarding the magnanimous man: True, he does seek honor and glory, 
but not as something great which could be a sufficient reward of virtue. And 
beyond this he demands nothing more of men, for among all earthly goods the 
chief good, it seems, is this, that men bear testimony to the virtue of a man 
(paragraph 60). 
 
Aquinas mentioned this magnanimous or great-souled man in passing earlier. What or 
who is he? From this passage, we know him as someone who deserves and seeks honor, 
yet not as “a sufficient reward” for his virtue. And if honor and glory from virtuous men 
are the chief earthly goods, then he certainly does not act in the interest of lower goods 
like money or pleasure. When we turn to Aristotle’s treatment of magnanimity (Greek: 
μεγαλοψύχια, Lat: magnanimitas) in the Nicomachean Ethics, we see that it is no 
ordinary virtue, but an embellishment or crown (κόσμος) upon the others.5  For the 
magnanimous man to be magnanimous, he must already be thoroughly virtuous. 
What is interesting for our purposes is the magnanimous man’s relative 
independence from other humans. He has little truck for the opinion of vicious or petty 
men: he and not they knows what virtue is. The magnanimous man rather seeks the good 
opinion of those he knows to have worthy opinions. Yet because the magnanimous man 
knows what virtue is independently of such men, then he is in no sense their slave, as 
though seeking merely to please them regardless of what true virtue is. He knows he 
                                                
4 City of God V.12-21, Augustine’s account of how the Roman love for liberty declined 
into a love of dominating others. Viewed in light of his famous revision of Cicero’s 
definition of the republic (XIX.21 and XIX.24), Augustine means through V.12-21 to 
show Rome as the City of Man par excellence whose partial virtues descend into the 
worst vices as the love that binds Rome comes to embrace baser and baser objects. 
5 NE 1123a34-1125a35 
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deserves honor from them, but as something due to him by his nature rather than as a gift 
in their favor to be withheld arbitrarily.6 
This magnanimous man seems to be something like the liber at paragraph 56. He 
is free from the opinions of other men, and free from an inordinate striving after glory or 
goods below it. Aquinas thus cites Cicero’s phrase “liberty of soul” (animi libertatem). 
Aquinas’ stress in this section seems to be that glory and honor are beneath the 
magnanimous man. The magnanimous man surely deserves them, and in some sense 
really wants them, but does not want them at the pleasure of others. 
In this sense, the magnanimous man also seems to be the liber from Chapter 1. 
There we learned that the free man is sui causa: he acts toward his own end, not as an 
instrument of another (paragraph 10). Here Aquinas gives flesh to that terse abstraction: 
the liber is not under the power of the opinion of other men, but is guided by virtue. And 
guided by virtue, he might see glory and honor as the highest things to be had on earth, 
but they will not satisfy him. In some sense, liberty is the fruit of magnanimity: the 
cultivation and ordering of the virtues such that one sees in full why one ought to be 
virtuous in the first place.7 
                                                
6 Consider Robert Faulkner’s summary of the magnanimous man: “Aristotle’s diagnosis 
comes to this: the great-souled man is at once drawn above and drawn to humanity. He 
exhibits his superiority by aiding his fellows, and yet his wish is less to aid them than to 
avoid being or appearing dependent on them. He would in his virtue by independent of 
them, and yet he depends upon them for distinguishing himself” (Faulkner 2007, 44). 
7 Debate has arisen as to whether Aristotle’s notion of magnanimity stands in tension 
with or even contradicts other aspects of Aquinas’ own thought, e.g., Arnhart 1983, 
Manent 1998, Holloway 1999, Keys 2006, Corbett 2012. As Aquinas himself suggests: 
“Further, no virtue is opposed to another virtue. But humility is apparently opposed to the 
virtue of magnanimity, which aims at great things, whereas humility shuns them. 
Therefore it would seem that humility is not a virtue.” (ST II-II 161.1 obj 3) Let us note 
for now that Aquinas seems in De Regno to invoke magnanimity for a narrow purpose: to 
suggest what a virtuous person will not seek after. And perhaps Aristotle himself had 
reservations about the great-souled man as the pinnacle of virtue (Keys 2006, 144-7; 
Collins 2004; Howland 2002; Smith 2001). 
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It is also curious that throughout this chapter the life of pleasure is discussed so 
briefly, and then only as inferior to the life of honor. Why could this be? Perhaps Aquinas 
means to present the magnanimous man as an attractive alternative to our princely 
audience’s possibly pleasure-seeking ways. Aquinas appeals to the king’s desire for 
honor and glory, which desire can often lead men to repress their desires of pleasure. 
Aquinas then presents the magnanimous man who is above even honor and glory, which 
could, as we suggested above, flatter the king’s sense of autarky.8 Thus the magnanimous 
man looks most attractive to the king. And since the magnanimous man is surely above 
sensible pleasures, then so will be our king. 
Whatever its final significance, the emphasis on magnanimity in Chapter 7 seems 
to flatter the king’s sense of self-sufficiency and power. His is a splendid task, the chapter 
assures him in its opening, and earthly things of the kind petty men seek after are beneath 
him. Beneath this rhetoric, however, is the suggestion that the king can and indeed should 
attain to great virtue to become this magnanimous man. This would not only be 
reassuring to the king, who would fear after reading I.3-6 that kings never avoid tyranny, 
but also because we can hope that Aquinas will show the king, and us, just how the king 
is to become magnanimous. For surely then we would have a firmer grasp of the duties of 
kingship and the nature of the common good it serves. And in so articulating the 
connections between the end of the liber and that of the community, we can hope that 
Aquinas might clarify why the magnanimous man, so noble and above the common run, 
would actually want to participate in the fullness of political life for the benefit of others. 
                                                
8 Cf. Howland 2002, 46-9, and 53, fn 44. Susan McWilliams (2012) considers something 
like the magnanimity of Captain Ahab in Melville’s Moby Dick. Insofar as Ahab claims 
an exaggerated autonomy from nature and other men, McWilliams argues, he is actually 
typical of Americans rather than some strange aberration, and I would add, typical of 
anyone obsessed with his bonum privatum.   
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It is clear that he must engage in public life if he is to do great and noble things for 
others, but what this man “to whom nothing is great” should gain from those actions is 
less obvious.9 
Thus Chapter 7 seems to have more answers than earlier chapters have had. The 
magnanimous man has given us something of a picture of the liber: in pursuing his own 
end he is not drawn to earthly things, including the caprice of other men, but rather to the 
reward of virtue. The servus precisely as a slave to other men values their fickle opinions, 
not virtue. After the dire description of politics in I.3-6, our king has received some 
encouragement of reward and in being a magnanimous man above earthly things. 
But why does Aquinas introduce the problem of the reward of the king in the first 
place? For one thing, it answers an objection to Chapters 3-6, the objection of Glaucon: 
whatever the injustice of tyranny, the tyrant meets with considerable rewards in this 
life.10 In fact, Aquinas argues herein, even if the tyrant gained all of the earthly good that 
he pants after, he would still be unhappy. And thus all the more would the virtuous or 
magnanimous prince be unhappy merely with such rewards. This at the end of I.7 should 
be clear also to our princely audience. 
For another thing, the reward of the king seems to relate to what we remained in 
ignorance about through I.6. Citizens wish to avoid a tyrant and so abandon monarchy. 
But with what then is it that they should replace the tyrant? What is the goal of politics? 
For if any regime can eventually slide into tyranny, then every regime must guard itself 
against it. In considering the just reward of the king, Aquinas considers what royal 
                                                
9 Keys 2006 points to the strange inhumanity of this virtuous man (144-47), noting that 
Aristotle describes the magnanimous man as “he to whom nothing is great” three times in 
the Nicomachean Ethics (1123b32-3, 1125a3-4 and 15-16). 
10 Glaucon first raises this objection to the goodness of justice at the beginning of Book 
II of the Republic, and explicitly as a common popular opinion (357a-362c). 
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reward would be good for the people, what kind of reward would attract the kind of ruler 
whose governance would benefit the common good (paragraphs 57-9). We can hope that 
he continues that analysis.   
At points in De Regno we have encountered arguments that might be interesting 
or even engrossing to us today, but hardly of any real significance beyond the 
antiquarian. Perhaps this argument on the insufficiency of earthly goods is one of them. 
Does man have an earthly end? Does he have an end at all? Maybe he seems to 
have an end but it is not one we can see. If man did have an end, what would be the 
political significance of that end? Note that Aquinas is asking in the first place not 
whether a political community has the authority to designate some good or goal as the 
end of politics and orient politics around achieving that end. Rather, he is asking whether 
man has an end. And what he wants to show in Chapter 7 is that this end cannot be 
merely material. Is this something that means anything to us today? 
I think so. Most rights-based and axiological theories of politics seem to presume 
that something in man is somehow greater than matter. The individual cannot be 
sacrificed for expedience or temporary advantage because the individual person counts as 
higher than the material benefits that would accrue through such outcomes. In fact, there 
is a sense in which individual human beings are incommensurable: while self-sacrifice is 
noble, we generally do not kill some merely for the sake of others. Persons have control 
to make their own decisions. This current of thought arises from Locke’s notion of the 
person and Kant’s autonomy.11 To be clear: I am not suggesting that any particular 
justification in modern philosophy for the superiority of man to other things comports 
with that of Aquinas, nor that such theories, whether in the guise of “natural right,” 
“autonomy,” “respect” or what have you, account sufficiently and to an equal degree for 
                                                
11 Schneewind 1998 
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such a notion. What I do want to emphasize, however, is that such theories all attempt to 
describe or account for a concrete phenomenon, the pervasive conventional judgment that 
man is superior to matter or is at least greater than anything that he sees. Even those 
theories that claim to see nothing special in man, especially materialisms arising from the 
natural sciences, often imagine that man has a special awareness of his condition, and that 
in his subjection to this immanent nature, it is a source of power for him to accept and 
even embrace that condition. Is this not the rhetorical strategy of Hobbes in Leviathan?12  
Just as critically, the sorts of arguments that Aquinas makes in Chapter VII can be 
found in variety of philosophical sources dating back to ancient times. Besides the 
discussions in the works of Plato,13 Aristotle14 and Cicero,15 there are hundreds of 
attestations to the idea from every culture in every time period.16 Their arguments are 
proof that this sense of the inadequacy of the earthly to man is not something dreamed up 
by Christian theologians.  
Yet one might object to Aquinas’ argument not because of what he argues, but out 
of a fear as to how he intends to use the conclusions. After all, he is a Christian 
theologian. We expect that the point of him elaborating this category of “earthly” goods 
will be to oppose it to some “spiritual” or “supernatural” category. On the one hand, this 
is not strictly speaking an argument against Aquinas’ criticisms, but an appeal to 
consequence. The magnanimous man, after all, alerts us to a question that we would like 
                                                
12 Ahrensdorf 2000; cf. Gillespie 2008, 207-10. 
13 See especially the Phaedo (including the four arguments for the immortality of the 
soul, 61c-107a) and Symposium. Socrates’ death is itself a great argument of this fact. 
14 NE I and X, especially the claim at 1177B that what is best and most divine about man 
is more than human.  
15 Cicero’s De finibus malorum et bonorum takes the question for its very title. 
16 C.S. Lewis famously compiled a cornucopia of such sentiments as an appendix to his 
The Abolition of Man, although not all are relevant to our current question. 
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to answer: if man has some special dignity, what is its source? To what sort of life ought 
it to lead him? How does it bear upon his relations with other men? On the other hand, 
the reader is right to wonder how far along he will be able to go with Aquinas after this 
chapter. Let us now turn to Chapter 8 to find out. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
With “worldly honor and the glory of men not sufficing as reward for royal cares 
[sollicitudini],” what reward is sufficient to the king (paragraph 61)? The next paragraph 
states it up front: 
It is proper that a king look to God for his reward, for a servant looks to his 
master for the reward of his service. The king is indeed the minister of God 
[minister Dei] in governing the people, as the Apostle says: “All power is from 
the Lord God” [Rom 13:1] and God’s minister is “an avenger to execute wrath 
upon him who does evil” [Rom 13:4]. And in the Book of Wisdom [6:5], kings 
are described as being ministers of God. Consequently, kings ought to look to 
God for the reward of their ruling (paragraph 62). 
 
This is a breathtaking statement. After numerous chapters detailing the evils and 
uncertainty of political life, a key dynamic of which was the futile endeavor to save 
kingship from tyranny, we were told in Chapter 7 that the king works tirelessly for his 
people, and as a selfless ruler deserves a great reward. We are now told that the king is 
not just any public-spirited person, but a minister of God. Thus the servus meus that 
Aquinas invoked at I.1 was no metaphor. And the king’s reward will thus come from God 
Himself. But what is the reward? Aquinas does not spell it out. He rather writes that the 
king “look to God” or “await from God”[expectet a Deo] his reward. Perhaps we should 
have been prepared for this conclusion from the repetition of the inadequacy of honor and 
glory, which goods Aquinas restates as “worldly [mundanus] honor and the glory of 
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men.” Could he mean that the king hopes for heavenly honor and the glory of God? 
Aquinas continues: 
Now God sometimes rewards kings for their service by temporal goods, but such 
rewards are common to both the good and the wicked… Therefore, if God 
recompenses wicked kings who fight against the enemies of God, though not with 
the intention of serving Him but to execute their own hatred and cupidity, by 
giving them such great rewards as to yield them victory over their enemies, 
subject kingdoms to their sway and grant them spoils to rifle, what will He do for 
kings who rule the people of God and assail [God’s] enemies with pious intention 
[pia intentione]? 
 
God rewards kings good and bad with temporal goods. Why would God reward a 
bad king? Aquinas states explicitly that such bad kings act not to serve God, but out of 
“their own hatred and cupidity.” As for the tyrant’s “victory over their enemies,” they are 
also God’s enemies, and that is why God rewards tyrants with the temporal goods that 
allow them to defeat those foes. But then these evil kings are slaves, caused in their 
actions by others. And not just by any other, but by God. This is an entirely new gloss on 
the distinction between servus and liber first raised in Chapter 1. The tyrant is the slave 
not only of his passions and intemperate desires (paragraph 26), but also of God. This 
recalls Aquinas’ earlier suggestion that the magnanimous man is free from inordinate 
attachments to goods beneath him. The king, then, is presumably free in embracing God’s 
will. We might wonder whether in some sense any liber, king or subject, is free in 
obeying God. But then in the liber would coincide the causa sui and the minister Dei. 
How can liberty consist in both acting for one’s own sake and service to God? 
This discussion draws out an ambiguity at the beginning of paragraph 62. Citing 
St. Paul’s famous chapter from his Letter to the Romans, Aquinas argues that all power is 
from God (Rom 13:1). Therefore the king is a minister to God and should be obeyed, not 
resisted (13:2). Indeed, kings enforce God’s justice as an “avenger” for God’s 
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“wrath”(Rom 13:4). Paul’s teaching would seem to present no problem for subjects of 
just kings. But what of subjects of tyrants, those monarchs who in not serving their 
subjects seem also not to serve God? Must their subjects serve them? And, if they do, 
how do they avoid becoming slaves? Is the subject of a servus thereby not also a servus? 
Perhaps the answer to such questions must begin with I.6. If the citizen is not drawn 
immediately to violence against the tyrant, but contemplates the end of his community 
and what would be serve it, then his eventual course of action would not be one of 
animal-like reaction against the tyrant, but the fruit of his own intellect. Thus he would in 
that sense not be a servus to the tyrant. 
Yet God does not always reward the tyrant, as Aquinas’ two quotations 
concerning Nebuchadnezzar indirectly make clear. In the first, God tells Ezekiel that He 
has given Nebuchadnezzar no reward for unknowingly doing God’s bidding in besieging 
Tyre (Ezekiel 29:18). It is in fact this citation that Aquinas offers as evidence that God 
rewards the tyrant.17 But when Nebuchadnezzar is finally rewarded, it is emphatically to 
fortify him in God’s mission (Ezekiel 29:19). So if God often enough does “reward” 
tyrants for their service to Him, then how does God reward those kings of pious 
intention? Aquinas answers this question in closing this long paragraph: 
He promises them not an earthly reward indeed but an everlasting one and in none 
other than in Himself. As Peter says to the shepherds of the people of God (1 Pet 
5:2,4): “Feed the flock of God that is among you and when the prince of pastors 
[princeps pastorum] shall appear, i.e. the King of kings, Christ, you shall receive 
a never-fading crown of glory,” concerning which Isaiah says (28:5): “The Lord 
shall be a crown of glory and a garland of joy to His people.” 
 
                                                
17 It this verse that immediately follows “Now God sometimes rewards kings for their 
service by temporal goods, but such rewards are common to both the good and the 
wicked…” (paragraph 62) quoted above. 
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This quotation answers many questions. The reward of the just king is not more or 
better temporal goods than those given to the tyrant, or it is not just that. Further, the king 
does not just look to God for a reward, as though that reward could be something other 
than God. Rather, the just king’s reward is in God, “in Himself” [in se ipso]. Note that 
Peter refers to Christ as princeps pastorum. Aquinas embellishes this with id est rex 
regum, Christus, emphasizing that Christ is King of kings, including of the Cypriot, in the 
same way that Peter calls Christ the Shepherd of shepherds, i.e., over the Church leaders 
to whom Peter speaks. 
As for the reward to be found in Him, perhaps “the unfading crown of glory” has 
something to do with life with or in Christ, that is to say, beatitude. But in a certain way 
this is a strange reward for a king: is beatitude not the reward of all Christians? Aquinas 
himself indicates an awareness of this problem or question. First, the quotation from 
Peter’s Letter is meant to apply to a wider audience than kings. That Aquinas saw this is 
obvious just from Aquinas’ decision to insert the clarification rex regum into the verse, 
which states God’s relation to the royal reader of De Regno. Second, Aquinas proceeds to 
quote Isaiah, in which a similar promise is made not just to kings, but to God’s people 
more generally. But because the prophecy concerns in the first place the harried and 
divided Hebrews of Isaiah’s time, the verses appears as a kind of promise or succor to a 
beleaguered people. In fact, the complete verse refers not to “His people” but to the 
“remnant of His people” [residuo populi sui]. The quotation thus suggests that the “crown 
of glory” goes not only to Christians in general, but even to those who were governed 
badly by inept or tyrannical rulers. It might give our king pause, for it suggests that his 
people could well receive a reward finally denied to him should he fail. 
Chapter 8 thus far has completed the philosophical argument of Chapter 7 with 
revelation: that which completes man is had from God. In what follows, Aquinas returns 
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to moral philosophy to sketch out how the God of revelation fulfills the promises of the 
happiness posited or sought out by ethics. 
The first argument sets up the other two. “The reward of virtue is happiness,” 
Aquinas argues, and “this is placed in the minds [mentibus… inditum] of all who use 
reason” (paragraph 63). And what is virtue?18  
The virtue of anything whatsoever is explained to be that which makes its 
possessor good and renders his deed good. Moreover, everyone strives by 
working well to attain that which is most deeply implanted in desire, namely, to 
be happy [esse felicem]. This, no one is able not to wish. It is therefore fitting to 
expect as a reward for virtue that which makes man happy [beatum]. Now, if to 
work well is a virtuous deed, and the king’s work is to rule his people well, then 
that which makes him happy will be the king’s reward [praemium] (paragraph 
63).19 
 
Here we are again entering unfamiliar territory for De Regno. Aquinas seems to 
be defining and relating virtue and happiness as the means and end of all human activity. 
In defining happiness as the end of virtue, Aquinas also seems to be going beyond his 
discussion of the magnanimous man, whose ends in action are ambiguous. We noted in 
I.7 that Aquinas seemed to present the magnanimous man as attractive because of his 
freedom from earthly goods, without saying exactly what kind of goods the 
magnanimous man was thereby free to embrace.  
                                                
18 Cf NE 1106a15 
19 Felix is Latin for happy, beatus for blessed. Felicitas and beatitudo are the 
substantives. There is an ambiguity in these words similar to that for the Greek 
eudaimonia and makaria, but beatitude seems to mean the perfect happiness that 
circumstances on earth often deny man. Aquinas argues in other places that beatitudo 
perfecta can only be had in the afterlife. It is noteworthy that Aquinas never distinguishes 
the terms in De Regno, and perhaps our king would have simply understood by felicitas a 
general happiness, and beatitudo its superlative. Cf. Celano 1987. 
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But this all raises a larger question: what is happiness? Aquinas goes on to define 
it: “Happiness, we say, is the ultimate end of desires [ultimum desideriorum finem].” 
Here ultimate means final and universal. It is final in the sense that it is desired for its 
own sake, not for some further good, or that for which it is desired for would be real 
happiness.20 It is universal in the sense that only what is universal satisfies the intellect 
(paragraph 63). Thus happiness is “the perfect good” in the strongest sense of the word 
“perfect”: per-facere, or completely or fully made or done. 
What qualifies? We might recall from Chapter 7 that no earthly good could be 
such a thing. And Aquinas says here: “But no earthly good is such a good.  
They who have riches desire to have more, they who enjoy pleasure desire to 
enjoy more, and the like is clear for the rest: and if they do not seek more, they at 
least desire that those they have should abide or that others should follow in their 
stead. For nothing permanent is found in earthly things. Consequently there is 
nothing earthly that can calm [quietare] desire. Thus, nothing earthly can make 
man happy, so that it may be a fitting reward for a king (paragraph 63). 
 
Aquinas is thus showing how his earlier comments in Chapter 7 fit within a fuller 
moral philosophy. Those who think that transient goods can give man happiness become 
trapped in pleonexia. And we now see Aquinas’ sleight of hand: the reward of the king 
[praemium regis] becomes the end of man [finis hominis], much as we suspected in 
connection with Aquinas’ quotation of Isaiah 28. In moving from the more conventional 
analysis of Chapter 7 to this moral philosophy of Chapter 8, we move from the 
magnanimous man to man as such. Certainly we are retaining what was good about the 
magnanimous man: his virtue and his sense of its lofty worth. In fact Aquinas’ discussion 
of the magnanimous man gave us a sense for what Aquinas has in mind by this 
distinction between the liber and servus. But since our very first questions in reading De 
                                                
20 Compare Aristotle’s famous discussion at NE 1097b20-1098a-19. 
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Regno concerned the relation between the end of the liber and the common good 
(paragraph 10), as well as the rationality of the king who was supposed to rule as reason 
rules the soul (paragraphs 8-9), we can bring these two questions together to ask how the 
end of the king in ruling bears upon the common end of the community and upon the end 
of each citizen with that community. 
Aquinas’ second argument from reason runs as follows: what perfects something 
is higher than it, just as gold added to silver perfects the silver. Happiness, Aquinas 
argues, is just this sort of thing: it perfects man because it is his ultimate or final good. 
Turning to the human mind, however, we see that all things on earth are beneath it. This 
we learned in Chapter 7, although Aquinas spoke there only of “man.” As for man’s 
mind, Aquinas singles out what is highest in man: his rational soul.21 It is, after all, matter 
that we see around us on earth. It is man’s soul that stands above it. So man’s fullest 
happiness will be that which completes his soul. This cannot be had among earthly 
things. Thus Aquinas cites Augustine’s discussion of happy Christian princes: they are 
happy in hope, not in fact.22 We can call them happy insofar as they act with justice and 
in the hope of eternal happiness. “But neither is there any other created thing,” Aquinas 
argues, “which would make a man happy and which could be set up as the reward for a 
king.” Happiness consists in finding one’s perfection, which can be thought of as one’s 
“end,” but also in a sense as one’s cause or source, that which determines what one ought 
to become. And the source [principium] of created things is found not in other created 
things, but whatever stands before creation, the creator. For Christianity, of course, this is 
God, who made man and gave him a certain likeness of God’s own image.23  
                                                
21 Cf. NE 1177b25-1178a8 
22 Augustine, City of God 5.24 
23 It is questionable whether any notion of creation ex nihilo as radical as the Judeo-
Christian one existed before Genesis. See Gilson 1936, 64-83. 
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Aquinas’ third argument from reason is brief. “[T]he human mind knows the 
universal good through the intellect,” he writes, “and desires it through the will: but the 
universal good is not found except in God.” What is notable for our purposes is that 
Aquinas affirms what we might have noticed before: the integral connection between the 
intellect’s faculty of knowing and the will’s faculty of desiring in the moral act of 
deliberation. The tyrant follows libido, Aquinas suggested at I.3. The king must conform 
his will to reason. As if to confirm this, he cites King David from Psalms: “What have I 
in heaven? And besides Thee what do I desire upon earth? It is good for me to adhere to 
my God and to put my hope in the Lord God” (Ps 73:25, 28)24 David invokes both his 
knowledge of and desire for the good.  
Aquinas then closes the chapter. Just as those who do not seek earthly glory and 
honor are those that receive it, so those who rather seek heavenly glory and honor receive 
both. He again invokes the example of Solomon, who sought to be godly and was 
honored by other good men on earth for it. Solomon sought to be a “citizen with the 
saints and a kinsman of God,” which language would well strike a chord with the king, 
who would be reminded of a lower kind of citizen to which he must attend, one who is 
actually controlled by the king, and kinsmen of the worst kind: fierce competitors in 
dynastic struggle.  
We can draw many points from these three arguments from reason, but I will 
focus on three. First, Aquinas has herein laid down the beginnings of a potent ethics. We 
saw him in paragraph 63 lay out a definition of happiness and virtue that depends upon 
the greatest good of man’s highest faculties. It is an ethics, moreover, that Aquinas has 
expanded beyond the king to discuss man as such. We have been waiting for this. Since 
I.2, we have wondered about the relation between the good of the individual and the 
                                                
24 Eschmann cites this as Psalms 72 (Eschmann 1949, 38 (fn 14)).  
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common good. This is a difficult project rhetorically: Aquinas has moved slowly but 
deliberately from the prooemium, in which the king was a great and noble addressee, to 
the end of Chapter 8, in which the king can hope to be not a king at all, but a citizen of a 
kingdom far above his. That kingdom of course is God’s, the Rex regum pointed out in 
the prooemium itself. 
Second, this moral philosophy centers on happiness. Perhaps this need not be 
controversial. Yet when one considers the range of Thomistic ethics, whether 
philosophical or theological, it is curious that one would rarely get the sense that Aquinas 
deems happiness to be central to ethics, or that he would make it so for our king.25 Of 
course Aquinas has yet to say a great deal about how this happiness or eudaimonia will 
transform our understanding of political life as adumbrated at I.3-6. Most notably, how 
does this image of the king as a minister Dei complete the king-God analogy in I.2? What 
end does the king seek, for himself and for his people, as God’s minister?  
Third, while Aquinas has laid out philosophical arguments in I.7 and I.8 for the 
kind of end that man must seek, that end can only be identified by revelation. Thus in 
paragraph 64, Aquinas stipulates that man’s good is neither material nor created, the 
latter a point that arguably would not be clear without revelation. Similarly, in paragraph 
65 Aquinas invokes Psalms to remind us that the good sought by the will and intellect is 
none other than the Christian God. Such examples seem to suggest that for Aquinas a 
purely philosophical ethics would be impossible: it would not know the great fact of 
man’s end.26 
                                                
25 Pinckaers 1995, 8-13, 17-24426-31  
26 As Maritain puts it: “For this [natural ethics] lacks two things: the knowledge of the 
true ultimate end to which man is actually ordained, and the knowledge of the integral 
conditions of man’s actual existence” (Maritain 1955, 63).  
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Revelation can play another role in ethics. We considered earlier an obstacle for 
our king, namely the notion that actions have ends and a human life in a sense has an end, 
too. For in daily life we encounter a morass of false starts, confused intentions and failed 
attempts, and this is especially true in politics. It can seem wrong, then, or at least 
misleading, to speak of human actions in terms of purposes or ends. One can argue from 
reason alone that man has an end, as Aquinas does at I.7 and the latter parts of I.8, and as 
was often done by ancient philosophers. That so much of De Regno is dedicated to 
making the king amenable to that teaching suggests that this is a difficult and ambiguous 
teaching. Yet the Bible tells man just this thing, that man has an end and that it is God. 
Thus revelation proposes a teaching that both lays out a teaching that could be had from 
philosophy (on man’s end) and gives it a concrete completion (that end is God).27 Yet 
revelation would then have a second-order teaching, one according to which things that 
can and should be known by all men through reason may in fact be most obscure to them. 
 
CHAPTER IX 
In Chapter 9, Aquinas sets out to prove that “they who discharge the kingly office 
worthily and laudably will obtain an elevated and outstanding degree of heavenly 
happiness.” So he must answer two questions. What is an “outstanding degree of 
heavenly happiness”?28 And why is kingly office worthy of it? 
Aquinas begins from the formulation: “For if happiness is the reward of virtue, it 
follows that a higher degree of happiness is due to greater virtue” (paragraph 68). This 
seems relatively uncontroversial. But why does a king deserve it? For Aquinas, this has 
something to do with the king ruling not only himself, but others. 
                                                
27 This follows ST I q. 1. a. 1. 
28 ST I-II.95.2 
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First, Aquinas argues that those who rule others manifest more virtue than those 
over whom they rule, comparing the ruler and subject to a teacher and student (paragraph 
69). In framing good laws and exhorting them to virtue, the king is leading his subjects to 
become good themselves. Yet the virtue of a king stands above that of any teacher, for he 
leads an entire multitude. Aquinas quotes Aristotle: “But the good of the multitude is 
greater and more divine [divinius] than the good of one man.”29 Numerous commentaries 
have considered the meaning of this line, and we will not settle the controversies 
attending them here. But Aquinas at least seems to want to impress upon the king that the 
good of the multitude is of a different order from that of the individual. For sometimes 
some must suffer to preserve the common good, Aquinas notes, as with a thief put to 
death to keep the peace. Similarly, Aquinas argues, “God Himself would not allow evils 
to be in the world but that through them He draws out good for the advantage [utilitatem] 
and beauty [pulchritudinem] of the universe.” Something about the order and perfection 
of the whole seems to transcend that of any of its parts. Yet we might wonder if the liber 
of I.1 could really be a sui causa if he could be sacrificed for the good of the whole, 
much as we suggested in I.7 that humans beings are above material things and themselves 
have a dignity vis-à-vis one another. 
In any event, Aquinas chiefly wants to press the point that the king is worthy of a 
great reward. As a private person “is praised by men” for a public spirit through which he 
helps other and strengthens his community, so the king is praised all the more for 
devoting his life to such acts of justice. And he does not simply perform individual such 
deeds, but through his good rule makes those very acts possible (paragraph 71). 
 Second, Aquinas argues: “The greatness of kingly virtue also appears in this, that 
he bears a special likeness to God [quod praecipue Dei similitudinem gerit], since he 
                                                
29 NE 1094b7 
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does in his kingdom what God does in the world…” The more similar that something is 
to God, Aquinas writes, “the more acceptable it is to Him.” If kings are most like God in 
this respect, then kings are the most acceptable or “the most pleasing to God and are to be 
most highly rewarded by Him” (paragraph 72). 
Aquinas gives two examples of kings being acclaimed god-like by their regime: 
the Hebrews judges in Exodus and the Roman emperors. The Hebrews were originally 
ruled by judges, because God alone was to be their king (1 Sam 8). As for the Roman 
example, on the one hand it perhaps simply reflects man’s natural apprehension of the 
quasi-divine nature of kings. On the other hand, however, the Romans did not call their 
emperors divus in mere metaphor: many emperors were treated exactly as gods, both in 
the respect they were accorded and in the scope of things they were allowed to do. 
Aquinas’ quotation from Ephesians helps us to make sense of this difficulty: “Be you 
therefore imitators of God as most dear children” (Ephesians 5:1). Imitation has this 
ambiguity, namely that one aspires to be like another while still being other than that 
person. This particularly holds when one seeks to imitate the ground of being itself, like 
God. 
This argument recalls at least two others in De Regno. There is first the argument 
for the excellence of monarchy from unity: art should imitate nature, and nature is always 
rule by one, including God’s rule of the cosmos (paragraph 19). In retrospect this seems 
to be a strange argument, and a fortiori this present one seems strange as well, because of 
Aquinas’ attempt to teach the king that he is beneath the King of kings. Perhaps I 
exaggerate. But it is only in Chapter 7 that the king’s relation to God comes to be seen in 
a positive light, and that as minister Dei, or minister or servant of God (paragraph 62). As 
heirs of the 17th-century, we immediately worry that such god-king comparisons can only 
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be put to cynical use.30 It would seem, however, that Aquinas shares our concerns. The 
king must not only be encouraged to think of himself as the winner of great rewards, but 
as a servant of God who bears great virtue and performs great deeds for his people to 
deserve those rewards. 
As if to reinforce that this kingly duty will not be easy and will not come with 
sure material gains, Aquinas moves on to a startling argument. Kings are like sailors on 
ships battered by “stormy waves”: in such conditions even experienced sailors can be 
“bewildered.”31 Kings are always at the center of tumults that test their virtue. 
Compounding these difficulties are the constant temptations posed by earthly riches and 
the flattery of men. These goods we have rejected as final ends in Chapter 7. Yet Aquinas 
sees the need to re-iterate the danger they represent here. On the one hand, “Authority 
shows the man,” as Aquinas cites Bias (probably via Aristotle) to say. One sees much of 
a man’s true character when he is given the opportunity and power to exercise it. Yet it is 
also true that the vagaries of politics can lead to the misfortune of anyone.  
The very difficulty, then, of acting well, which besets kings, makes them more 
worthy of greater reward; and if through weakness they sometimes do amiss, they 
are rendered more excusable before men and more easily obtain forgiveness from 
God provided, as Augustine says, they do not neglect to offer up to their true God 
the sacrifice of humility, mercy and prayer for their sins (paragraph 73). 
 
The king who struggles for virtue will be forgiven for those times when he falls 
short of perfect virtue, and will even be rewarded for his efforts. Thus he should not fear 
the struggles against tyranny that he has been promised (I.3-6). He should not fear, in 
other words, that in undertaking this task he should subject his soul to great dangers. And 
our Cypriot audience should not fear that, already become a king, he could not face this 
                                                
30 Nelson 2010 
31 This metaphor he takes from Saint Gregory the Great, Regula Pastoralis I, 9. 
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task that Aquinas presents him, but should rather lose himself in material goods or honor 
and glory in an effort to forget that he is called to something higher. Rather, he should see 
God’s grace as giving him the strength to face the law. Note that Aquinas refers to kings 
as “sailors,” not as “pilots.” The term “governor” in its Latin root, gubernator, comes 
from the Greek κυβερνήτης for pilot, and of course metaphors about the ship of state 
and the prince as pilot are as old as politics. Aquinas could mean to undercut the 
navigational competence of the king as pilot, and thus metaphorically to remind the king 
that his control of his community is weak.  
The image of the king as a sailor in a ship on a storm-tossed sea might remind us 
of the image of tyranny at I.3. Tyranny arises from multiple and contradictory causes, 
such that “Nobody will be able firmly to state: This thing is such and such, when it 
depends upon the will of another, not to say upon his caprice [libido]” (paragraph 26). 
Friendship, marriage and even the most basic economic relations are imperiled by the 
random and arbitrary violence of the tyrant. The tyrant “kills not for justice’s sake but by 
his power, for the lust of his will [pro libidine voluntatis].” Thus a similar chaos 
characterizes the tyrant’s regime. But the tyrant introduces those disordered passions in a 
way that the “waves” of the ocean are not introduced by the king. The tyrant also 
introduces this order by the very disorder of his soul, so he has little hope of gaining 
mastery over it. And if the king comes to ruin from these waves, at least he maintained 
order in his own soul as those of his familiars as best he could. In a way the king-pilot is 
a sailor just like anyone else on the “boat”, perhaps comparable to the citizens at I.6 
tossed about by the stormy chaos of tyranny. 
Aquinas ends the chapter by again comparing our king to King David, to whom 
was promised by the prophet Zachariah a perfect share of beatitude in the afterlife. David 
won his reward, the quotation reminds us, by carrying out the work of God among 
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David’s people. Again, Aquinas seems to be balancing exhortations to the king to be a 
virtuous leader with encouragement not to lose heart. Aquinas then writes: “This was also 
in some measure realized [somniatum] among the Gentiles, for they thought to transform 
into gods the rulers and preservers of their cities.”32 
This final quotation is a gloss on Aquinas’ earlier comments (paragraph 72) about 
the Roman habit of divinizing their emperors. Unlike David, those emperors did not 
know the true God. Unlike David, then, they could not serve the people for that true God. 
Or at least they could not do so knowlingly or willingly, to recall the case of the tyrants 
who unwittingly fulfill God’s ends (I.3). In a sense, then, Aquinas is calling upon the 
Cypriot to be an even greater prince than the emperors of Rome. 
Chapter 9 has a relatively limited scope. Aquinas has little to say here about the 
liber, the servus, the common good, and other questions we continue to urge upon 
Aquinas. Yet this chapter extends the conclusions of Chapters 7 and 8 in telling ways. If 
the king is to seek his end in God, and not in material things, we might wonder why he 
should be a king at all. Is not beatitude the gift of every Christian? But Aquinas assures 
the king that his reward will be that of a great saint. Like David he will be well-seated at 
the heavenly banquet. Yet here another question arises: even though the reward be great, 
is there not yet great risk involved in seeking it? The perils of tyranny laid out at I.3-6 are 
so pervasive in part because earthly goods are so attractive to men. Moreover, the desire 
to rule for one’s own good, and to the exclusion of others, can lead to a kind of libido 
dominandi. Is Aquinas then setting unrealistic expectations for a saint-like king? Perhaps 
Aquinas sees this risk. Thus he explains with great patience in this chapter the 
tremendous reward of the king who serves God as he can, even if maladroitly. Aquinas 
                                                
32 Eschmann renders “somniatum” as “dimly realized, as in a dream,” which if prolix 
conveys the meaning as well as my translation. Aquinas could be playing on the multiple 
meanings of somno, including “to foresee” or “to dream.”  
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thus reinforces the lessons of Chapter 7 and 8 while subtly reminding the king that he 
must avoid the tyranny of I.3-6. 
 
CHAPTER X 
Chapter 10 opens with a recapitulation of I.7-9: 
Since such a grand reward in heavenly happiness [caelesti beatitudine] is set 
before [proponatur] kings if they have acted well in ruling, they ought to keep 
careful watch over themselves in order not to turn to tyranny. For nothing ought 
to be more acceptable to them than to be transferred from the royal honour, to 
which they are raised on earth, into the glory of the heavenly kingdom. Tyrants, 
on the contrary, who desert justice for a few earthly advantages [terrena 
commoda], are deprived of such a great reward that they could have obtained by 
ruling justly (paragraph 75). 
 
Having treated on beatitude after a long discussion of the evils of tyranny (I.3-6), 
Aquinas now brings the reward of good kings to the fore. That reward is incredibly 
desirable, for kings receive both the heavenly glory they seek and the earthly glory they 
have voluntarily rejected as an end in itself. The tyrant, however, loses everything: both 
the earthly goods he seeks and the great reward he could have had by ruling well. While 
we have heard much of the temporal woes of the tyrant in I.3-6, and the great 
supernatural reward of the king at I.8-9, this is the first time that Aquinas has connected 
these lessons to warn the tyrant: the tyrant loses beatitude. The lesson is clear, Aquinas 
urges:  
How foolish it is to sacrifice the greatest and eternal goods for trifling, temporal 
goods no one could not know but a fool or an infidel (paragraph 75).33 
 
                                                
33 This line echoes Mark 8:36: “For what shall it profit a man, if he gain the whole world 
and suffer the loss of his soul?”  
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Why a fool or an infidel? The fool [stultus] is one who lacks knowledge; the 
infidel [infidelis] lacks faith. Perhaps the fool is someone who sees the advantages of 
earthly goods but does not know either the supremacy of heavenly ones or the obstacles 
that the pursuit of earthly goods can place between one and heavenly goods.34 The 
infidel, on the other hand, has no faith in a supernatural happiness: he would see earthly 
goods as the highest end for which man can strive, or at least not see something beyond 
them, even if he admitted to their inadequacy.  
This condemnation of those who do not grasp Aquinas’ point might seem a bit 
harsh. Perhaps the fool is someone who knows that supernatural goods immeasurably 
outweigh earthly goods, but thinks that Aquinas has not shown how politics can be 
conducted in view of heavenly goods. At an extreme, perhaps this person fears that he 
must abandon politics to protect his soul. Consider how our own royal reader might 
become so disturbed by the dangers to his soul described in I.3-6 that he shies from this 
teaching. For it would be not just a teaching for him, but an accusation. Then he might 
continue to engage in politics, but in willful self-deception as to the demands of his faith 
upon his political activity. He might cling to the earthly and to vice and sin, perhaps even 
devising theologies to justify his position.  
As for the infidel, we can grant that someone without Christian faith will not see 
the point in Christian beatitude as the end of politics. Yet he could be someone of 
goodwill who wants to know how politics can be noble, how politics can take seriously 
the claims of philosophy to see and cultivate great things in man. He might not then have 
no desire to “sacrifice the greatest and eternal goods” for politics. But he might, like 
Socrates’ philosopher-king (Rep 516a-21c), see little connection between the life of 
                                                
34 Cf. Hobbes’ fool in Leviathan xv. Like Hobbes’ fool, lack of knowledge does not 
seem to be the basis of the cavil of Aquinas’ fool. 
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wisdom and politics.35 Or he might worry that such a high aim for politics misses the 
perversities that constantly attend human activity, that Christianity has both high aims 
and high expectations.36 He might also wonder how specifically Christian this polity will 
be, and what kind of room there will be for him in it. 
I raise these possible identifications of the fool and the infidel not to urge that 
Aquinas is wrong to so refer to dissenters to his claims, but only to suggest that we can 
imagine rather wise fools and pious infidels. In other words, perhaps most tyrants are 
finally fools or infidels. But we might reject tyranny and yet find ourselves unsure at I.10 
what the proper alternative ought to be. Whilst Aquinas has presented a compelling 
contrast between the reward of the king and the tyrant, we can doubt he has laid out how 
choosing the heavenly over the earthly reward can lead to moderate and rational politics. 
Moreover, even were it possible, how can Aquinas persuade us that the average king – 
not the ideal king – will rise to this challenge? For if he could not, then Aquinas’ teaching 
will be worse than useless. In any event, in speaking of this “fool” and “infidel,” it would 
seem that we have crossed a sort of divide, after which Aquinas’ audience is no longer 
the would-be tyrant, but the man who, being neither an infidel nor a fool, is safe from the 
temptation of tyranny. We like the king are in a more purified state of ignorance than we 
were at the prooemium. 
We should further be glad to have considered these questions, however, for 
Aquinas is poised with the next line to take them up: 
                                                
35 In this vein, one of Jaffa’s great objections to Aquinas’ reading of Aristotle is that, 
according to Jaffa, Aquinas fails to see that politics and ethics are autonomous spheres 
for Aristotle, not dependent upon any happiness beyond them (Jaffa 1952, 29-34, 121-3). 
36 Schall argues that Christianity has a clearer sense of the cause of man’s perversities 
(Schall 2000, 54-7). Strauss argues that modern political philosophy has set for itself low 
goals but very high expectations of filling “low but solid ground”, whereas classical 
political philosophy had higher aims but lower expectations (Strauss 1955, 247).  
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It is to be added further that these temporal advantages for which tyrants abandon 
justice work to the greater profit of kings when they serve justice (paragraph 76). 
 
Aquinas seems to speak to the fool who thought that the tyrant could benefit from 
temporal goods, or that infidel who thought that in serving God one might lose the ability 
to serve men, i.e. no longer be secure in earthly possessions.  But how will Aquinas 
support this claim? 
Aquinas begins by arguing that, “among all worldly things [mundana omnia] 
there is nothing that seems worthy to be preferred to friendship” (paragraph 77). Most 
critically, “Friendship unites [in unum conciliat] virtuous men and preserves and 
promotes virtue.” It also promotes pleasure, such that “There is no tyrant so cruel that 
friendship does not bring him pleasure.” Aquinas relates another story of Dionysius of 
Syracuse  (mentioned in paragraph 44), who was so touched by the friendship of two 
men, one of whom he had decided to kill, that he not only pardoned the man, but also 
asked to be included in their friendship. There is something pitiable about tyrants, for 
tyrants deny themselves friendship. “For when they do not seek the common good, but 
their own good,” he argues, “there is little or no communion between them and their 
subjects.”37 Aquinas makes the simple point that friendship requires something in 
common between would-be friends, however low. But what can tyrants and their subjects 
have in common? Nothing. The definition of the tyrant, after all, is he who rules for his 
private benefit, not for the common good (paragraph 10). We recall that the tyrant treats 
his subjects like slaves, seeing nothing good in them save what he can take for himself 
(I.3). The tyrant oppresses his subjects through injustice, and the subjects feel “not loved 
but despised [se amari non sentiunt sed contemni].   
                                                
37 The Latin: Dum enim commune bonum non quaerunt, sed proprium, fit parva vel nulla 
communio eorum ad subditos.  
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Nor have tyrants any reason to complain of their subjects if they are not loved 
[diliguntur] by them, since they do not act towards them in such a way that they 
ought to be loved [diligi] by them (paragraph 78).  
 
Aquinas has thus far made no connection between tyranny and love, making this a 
surprising argument. The first Latin verb for love he uses here, amare, had become a very 
simple and earthy word by Aquinas’ time, although could have connotations of the 
romantic or lascivious.38 Dilectere, the other word, is the preferred word for “to love” in 
the Vulgate, including the Great Commandment (Matt 22:35-40), has a more elevated 
and even philosophical ring to it. Aquinas thus manages in this short section to appeal to 
a wide range of human relations. Just as importantly, he denies them all to the tyrant. 
This is the point of the portrait of Dionysius from above. The only thing stronger in 
Dionysius’ heart then his desire to oppress is his longing to share in friendship. In the 
other story told of Dionysius, at paragraph 44, a similar desire for friendship seems to 
motivate him, going out of his way as he does to meet with an old woman who prays for 
his health. How could a tyrant want to resign himself to such a life? The tales of 
Dionysius suggest that he does not wish to do so. Yet he does.39 
Note that Aquinas opened this argument with the statement “the very temporal 
advantages for which tyrants abandon justice work to the greater profit of kings when 
they observe justice.” Thus far, however, Aquinas has only emphasized the temporal 
advantages lost to tyrants. What of kings? What do kings receive? He picks up this aspect 
of the argument immediately. Kings “are loved by many when they show that they loved 
                                                
38 Lewis & Short, “amo, amare” 
39 But perhaps a tyrant can be a friend with other tyrants? This possibility would not 
have struck Aquinas as very practical, given that, as Machiavelli notes, tyrants generally 
need to be present constantly in the city they would subdue (Prince V). Moreover, who 
would trust a tyrant less than another tyrant? 
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[se amare demonstrant] their subjects and are studiously intent on the common welfare” 
(paragraph 78). Kings act not only in justice by serving their subjects, but also in love. 
That is, there is established between them a kind of friendship.  
Aquinas speaks again here to the fool: the one who doubts that just politics are 
possible. It is not hard to see that a tyrant will win little affection from his subjects, 
because his whole rule aims at their destruction, or at least at their slavery. But does this 
not point to something about a king? For what is the king’s service to the common good 
but a kind of love that is the ground for friendship between him and his subjects? This is 
no mysterious dynamic, after all, but the kind of common sense according to which 
communities grow out of personal friendships, families and neighborhoods. 
Indeed, as Aquinas goes on to write, “[t]he consequence of this love is that the 
government of good kings is stable, because their subjects do not refuse to expose 
themselves to any danger whatsoever on behalf of such kings” (paragraph 79). For love 
of their king, subjects will do anything. This is a power political tool, and Aquinas claims 
it constituted a significant part of the power of Julius Caesar over his soldiers and 
Augustus over his subjects. “Therefore,” Aquinas concludes, “it is no easy task to shake 
the government of a prince whom the people so unanimously love.” 
In some sense, then, this teaching is a solution to Aquinas’ astonishing suggestion 
that the Romans were wise to abandon their kings for a republic. “For it frequently 
happens,” Aquinas earlier noted, “that men living under a king strive more sluggishly for 
the common good, inasmuch as they consider that what they devote to the common good, 
they do not confer upon themselves but upon another, under whose power they see the 
common goods to be.” Yet in a republic, seeing that the common good is no longer 
“under the power of one man… each one attends to it [the common good] as if it were his 
own” (paragraph 31).  
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Perhaps this discussion of friendship and politics sheds some light on the matter. 
The trouble with monarchical Rome would seem to be that the kings were no longer 
thought to serve the common weal through their rule, but only themselves. If kings truly 
manifest a kind of friendliness toward their subjects, however, and serve them as friends 
would serve friends, then this difficulty vanishes. Indeed, all can love one king more 
easily than multiple rulers or a faceless council or bureaucracy. And then they do not 
begrudge the king great sacrifices, but rather leap to take them on. So it would seem that 
a king in establishing a friendship between himself and his citizens could avoid this 
problem and restore the practical advantages of kingship. 
One might recall Machiavelli’s admonition that a prince’s best fortifications are 
his own people.40 And Aquinas would agree. But there is this difference between 
Machiavelli and Aquinas: while both write for a prince of ambiguous or nascent virtue, 
Machiavelli writes to persuade the prince to secure himself in power and glory at the risk 
of considerable moral hazard.41 Aquinas, however, wants his prince to be good. Should 
the prince be good, the story runs, he will serve the people and the people will love him 
for it. Yet what if the people love an evil king, or want an evil king to love, because they 
themselves are evil? Should he manipulatively exploit their evil qualities to consolidate 
his authority? Or should he lead them to a better way of living? In such a case we can 
guess Machiavelli’s answer. Aquinas might say that such a situation gives the king all the 
more reason to rule justly, in a manner that will show them that they should love their 
true friends and not their enemies. After all, Julius Caesar as a general was loved by his 
                                                
40 Prince XX 
41 If this seems a caricature of Machiavelli’s intention in The Prince, it is nonetheless the 
caricature from which one ought to start (cf. McCoy 1989, Strauss 1958). 
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soldiers, but evidently did not attain to the same level of popularity among the Romans. 
Who perceived Caesar correctly? 
While Aquinas’ discussion of the just king makes it clear that political life itself 
depends upon a kind of friendship, in the case of tyranny he has thus far emphasized how 
deeply tyrants regret the loss of friends. Now he spells out the political consequences of 
this lack of friendship between tyrants and their subjects. He begins: “The government of 
tyrants, on the other hand, cannot last long because it is hateful to the multitude, and what 
is against the wishes of the multitude cannot be long preserved” (paragraph 79). Aquinas 
presents two arguments explaining the instability of tyrannical regimes: an argument 
from chance (paragraph 80) and a critique of fear (paragraph 81). The first directly 
proceeds from the above claim: the tyrant is odious to the people. The tyrant of course 
will seek to control their power to resist him: he oppresses them at every turn (I.3-5).42 
Yet can this regime always keep him safe?  
For a man can hardly pass through this present life without suffering some 
adversities, and in the time of his adversity occasion cannot be lacking to rise 
against the tyrant; and when there is an opportunity there will not be lacking at 
least one of the multitude to use it (paragraph 80). 
 
Tyrannical regimes are predicated upon a kind of false order. This order is false first 
because they have no popular support, but also because it depends upon a stability that no 
regime can maintain.43 For no one can escape chance. Even the best rule of law, Aristotle 
                                                
42 Cf. Politics 1314a29-1315b10 
43 This critique thus runs far deeper than the typical one of “façade” democracy or 
popular government. One is reminded of Scott’s claims in Seeing Like a State (1998). On 
the one hand, the drive for “legibility” or universal knowledge he ascribes to some 
governments could well depend upon a tyrannical impulse that seeks to re-order its 
people along the lines of commodities or resources to be regulated and exploited, and not 
“see” the natural roots of political order in family and neighborhood, with the resultant 
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warns, cannot provide for every situation, and least of all a crisis.44 The rule of a tyrant, 
of course, is decidedly less stable than that of the best laws. What weakens the tyrant is 
that his power depends upon his personal and pervasive use of power. Because Cesare 
Borgia fell sick when his protector died, Machiavelli notes, his years of meticulous 
scheming came to naught.45 And should the tyrant survive to die in office, his legacy will 
be completely undone by his death. Yet Aquinas emphasizes here that such longevity is 
unlikely, for the lack of love between the tyrant and his subjects means that the subjects 
constantly prepare for and await the moment of the tyrant’s weakness. Where they find 
pleasant and noble the task of serving the king whom they love, they find pleasant and 
noble the task of deposing the tyrant whom they hate.  
Second, the argument from fear. The tyrant maintains his power through fear. Yet 
fear, Aquinas argues, “is a weak support” (paragraph 81). For fear engenders hate and 
desperation. Prolonged fear leads to conditions that Aquinas compares to building 
pressure: the moment the pressure can expand, it does so, releasing untold violence 
against the tyrant.46 Fear, in other words, is only as good a tool of social control as the 
power behind it. What is more, Aquinas argues, this “very fear itself is not without 
danger, because many become desperate from excessive fear” (paragraph 81). 
Desperation of course makes man unpredictable because he becomes irrational. He may 
even “despair of safety,” which “impels a man boldly to dare anything.” This is a curious 
parallel with Hobbes, who worries that the fear of violent death will not hold down the 
vainglorious (Leviathan vi.39, xi.11-12). But Aquinas does not seem to have only the 
                                                                                                                                            
loss of local knowledge that Scott calls “mētis”. On the other hand, does any modern 
regime see such natural roots? 
44 Politics 1286a7-23 
45 The Prince VII 
46 Aquinas thus anticipates by several centuries the “pressure” or “safety valve” theory 
of civil society (Brownlee 2012). 
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vainglorious in mind. Anyone who values the justice that the tyrant tramples, Aquinas is 
suggesting, could be led to desperate and unpredictable acts. They return fear with fear.47 
Thus tyranny not only depends upon a level of order that no regime can maintain, but its 
very attempt to maintain order fosters disorder.  
At I.6, Aquinas strenuously urged against tyrannicide and against resistance to 
unjust rulers in virtually all circumstances. Yet here Aquinas warns the tyrant: you will 
be deposed. The people will not miss a chance to do so. Those tyrannical regimes spared 
from this fate, he says, are those regimes that “were not very tyrannical but in many 
things imitated the moderation of kings” (paragraph 82). He again references Aristotle’s 
discussion in the Politics (1315b11-39). The allusion comes at a good time for our king. 
If he worries through Aquinas’ description of the fragility of tyranny that his own 
kingdom is beyond help, Aquinas immediately reassures him: do your best to imitate the 
moderate king, and you will endure. “Moderation” [modestiam] is well chosen: it 
represents less the crown of virtue than a certain disposition to be ordered toward virtue, 
and particularly not to be intemperately controlled by love of inferior goods like pleasure 
or honor.48 This would be the direction in which our royal reader would need to move, 
after all. 
                                                
47 One thinks of James Scott’s studies in The Moral Economy of the Peasant (1976) or 
Weapons of the Weak (1985) of marginalized members of society who find ways, more or 
less dramatically, to resist their oppressors. 
48 NE 1117b23-18a26. Cf. ST II-II 161.4 sed contra: “Origen says (Hom. viii super 
Luc.): "If thou wilt hear the name of this virtue [humility], and what it was called by the 
philosophers, know that humility which God regards is the same as what they called 
metriotes, i.e. measure or moderation."” Keys notes that Aquinas makes no such 
connection in his Commentary on the “Nicomachean Ethics” (Keys 2005, 164). De 
Regno of course pre-dates both works, and so perhaps foreshadows his approach in the 
Summa. But note Pinckaers’ argument that the Aristotelian organization of the Secunda 
pars obscures the significance of humility for Christianity (Pope 2002, 21-23). 
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Aquinas opens the next paragraph with a quotation from Job 24: 30: “He makes a 
man who is a hypocrite to reign for the sins of the people” (paragraph 83). Aquinas 
explains that no one “can be more truly called a hypocrite than the man who assumes the 
office of king and acts like a tyrant, for a hypocrite is one who mimics the person of 
another, as is done on the stage.” Aquinas has raised the problem of hypocrisy before. 
The difficulty of extrinsic goods like honor is that they can be gained through subterfuge, 
in this case the simulation of virtue. So the tyrant might take office under the pretense of 
assuming kingship, when in fact he strives for tyranny. Thus another layer of irony: in the 
tyrant’s quest for order, he must upturn the very order by which he gains power. 
 After explaining the hypocrisy of tyrants, Aquinas writes: “All this becomes still 
more evident if we consider the divine judgment… Hence God permits tyrants to get into 
power to punish the sins of the subjects.” The word “permits” [permittit] is crucial here: 
God’s involvement in this play takes advantage of the tyrant’s willingness to oppress and 
the subjects’ sin. Where God does seem to be more active is the length of the tyrant’s 
reign: just as God gives the people a tyrant in His wrath, he deprives that tyrant of his 
rule swiftly in His mercy.49 Aquinas then again quotes Hosea, as at the crucial conclusion 
of I.6: “I will give thee a king in my wrath,” (Hosea 13:11).  
The last argument of this chapter concerns the temporal goods that the just king 
enjoys. Now that Aquinas has said something toward the ways in which the tyrant is 
deprived of temporal goods, he can return to his claim at the beginning of the chapter 
according to which kings and not tyrants benefit from the temporal goods for which 
                                                
49 Whatever Augustine meant by it, Aquinas has never argued in De Regno for anything 
like Augustine in The City of God V.17: “As far as this mortal life is concerned, which is 
finished in a few days, what difference does it make under what rule a man lives who is 
soon to die, provided only that those who rule him do not compel him to do what is 
impious and wicked?” 
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tyrants abandon everything. The argument is simple: tyrants expend all of their resources 
on securing their regime. They must employ “a great many satellites” to protect 
themselves against subjects, and they must pay these satellites “more than they [the 
satellites] can rob from their subjects” (paragraph 84). In other words, they must pay their 
mercenaries an amount sufficient to dissuade them from bribery, theft and corruption. 
Kings, on the other hand, need not pay such mercenary arms to hold down their subjects, 
but in fact can even ask for service from their subjects. This, we remember, is because 
kings can become a kind of friend to their subjects when they serve the common good. 
Thus the tyrant loses through taking from his subjects, whilst the king gains from giving 
to them.50 Moreover, citizens gain from kingship, because the king at the very least does 
not seek to plunder them as a tyrant would. 
Aquinas ends the chapter on a seemingly minor point about fame. I say 
“seemingly minor” because Aquinas himself begins with “It seems superfluous to speak 
about fame,” but then he does just that (paragraph 85). This apparently trifling matter, 
however, would be of tremendous importance to our royal reader. Perhaps he has been 
persuaded of the dangers of seeking honor and glory for their own sake. Yet would it not 
delight him to know, as Aquinas goes on to tell him, that good kings are praised by men? 
And in fact that those praises echo long after the death of the good kings? It would 
confirm his sense of the dangers of tyranny to read that “the name of the wicked kings 
straightaway vanishes or, if they have been excessive in their wickedness, they are 
remembered with execration.” Thus Aquinas can seal the lessons of Chapters 7-10 by 
                                                
50 This argument casts doubt upon Machiavelli’s distinction between mercenary arms 
and one’s own arms (Prince VI-VII), or at least casts doubts on its completeness without 
considering the justice of the reign of a prince. For the tyrant who oppresses his subject 
has no arms of his own. Even his own subjects are mercenaries to him.  
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assuring the king that he will receive everything he desires in ordering his rule to higher 
goods.  
We might remember, however, that at paragraph 73 Aquinas states that the 
difficulties of kingship will test the best of kings, and that not everything will go his way. 
This would surely include the material fruits of his labors. We can doubt, then, that 
Aquinas is preaching a “Health and Wealth Gospel” to the king. The temporal realm is 
profoundly ambiguous: the king is as subject as the tyrant to chance (I.10), unjust 
resistance (I.6) and the sloth of his own subjects (I.4) as any tyrant. Yet Aquinas has 
presented persuasive arguments that the king stands in a better position than the tyrant to 
rule justly, especially if he can educate his subjects to be as good as he is. And if we 
follow Solon’s dictum to judge a man’s happiness only after his death, then we know that 
the tyrant will only know the most fleeting happiness in life, and none in death.51 
 
CHAPTER XI 
Chapter 11 begins on a surprising note, and not because of something new 
Aquinas writes, but because of something we might not have realized that Aquinas has 
already told us. Noting that material goods redound to the service of kings, not tyrants, 
Aquinas goes on to argue:  
The tyrant, moreover, loses the surpassing beatitude which is due as a reward to 
kings and, what is still more serious, brings upon himself great suffering as a 
punishment (paragraph 87). 
 
Why is this surprising? First of all, we might not have realized that the punishments of 
the tyrant laid out in Chapter 10 were only losses in the temporal order. It is only after 
                                                
51 Cf. NE I.9-11 
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thoroughly explicating them that Aquinas moves on to consider the tyrant’s supernatural 
punishment. We might have expected Aquinas to write upon the supernatural first, given 
that this is the more horrifying and final one. Indeed, in Chapters 7-10 he first speaks of 
the king’s celestial reward, and at great length, only later mentioning, as a sort of 
concluding aside in Chapter 10, the temporal reward of the king. Perhaps the allure of 
temporal gains is strong for the less than perfectly virtuous prince, such that Aquinas sees 
an urgent need to that tyrants gain material goods, in addition to the opportunity afforded 
by his recent depiction of tyranny. For the king, however, Aquinas begins with his 
heavenly reward because this will fortify the king to accept the great sacrifices necessary 
to rule justly. But then in Chapter 7 Aquinas initiates a criticism of earthly goods as the 
king’s reward. In some sense, then, Aquinas adopts a deflationary tactic toward earthly 
rewards for both tyrant and king. 
Aquinas emphasizes in Chapter 11 that the supernatural fate of the tyrant is as 
surpassingly horrible as that of the king is sublime: “death in the judgment of men, and in 
the judgment of God eternal damnation” (paragraph 87). This is because of the gravity of 
trespassing against the common good (paragraph 87); their proud lack of repentance (88); 
the long-term effects they have on their kingdom (89); and the dignity of the office they 
hypocritically occupy (90). Rather than a close analysis of the chapter, I hope the reader 
will forgive me if I instead bring out three parts of the arguments. 
First, Aquinas’ treatment of repentance and pride. The tyrant does not repent for 
his crimes against man and God. Tyrants rather embrace them, “puffed up by the wind of 
pride, deservedly abandoned by God for their sins, and besmirched [delibuti] by the 
flattery of men” as they are (paragraph 88). This is a searing critique of pride. And while 
a Christian theologian’s criticism of pride might not surprise us, that criticism might lead 
us to rethink the scattered references to the magnanimous man in De Regno. For what is 
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the magnanimous man but proud? And is it not this pride that constitutes his sense of 
superiority to the earthly goods that Aquinas wishes our king to be above? Yet the pride 
of the magnanimous man extends to other men.52 Why not also to God? 
Of course, the magnanimous man, whatever his faults, is not a tyrant. Yet the 
pride of the tyrant looks suspiciously like that of the magnanimous man, at least in this 
way: neither recognizes anything greater than him in the city. The tyrant takes everything 
for himself; the final good is simply his good. The magnanimous man has some sense of 
the common good at least insofar as he seeks to serve it for honor and glory, and in this 
sense he depends upon other people who will benefit from his deeds and will give him 
honor. Yet he does not seem satisfied by this reward, as though he were not really acting 
for that common good. We might wonder yet again what good “he to whom nothing is 
great” finally seeks, and how he avoids succumbing to the temptations of tyranny if he 
never finds a good noble enough to match his self-estimation. A magnanimous man who 
was not a Christian, one might think, would have to become a philosopher to find an 
equal in the Aristotelian god.53 
This brings us to our second point about Chapter 11: the long-term effects of 
tyranny. In paragraph 89, Aquinas explains that the “malice of their impenitence” extends 
beyond the lives of tyrants, for “taking their accustomed habit [sua consuetudine] for 
                                                
52 What kind of friendships the magnanimous man has is unclear. The tenor of 
Aristotle’s description points to his awareness of his superiority over everyone and 
everything, given neither to admiration nor praise (NE 1125a5-10), and he displays 
neither gratitude nor pleasure at having any kind of dependence upon others (NE 1124b7-
15). Yet he apparently does have friends, and it is not “slavish” for him to share his time 
with them (NE 1125a1). 
53 NE X. And yet: “…Aristotle did not look upon God as Creator nor as exercising 
conscious government and providence, but regarded him as the final Cause alone… The 
virtuous man of Aristotle is, in a sense, the most independent man, whereas the virtuous 
man of St. Thomas is, in a sense, the most dependent man, that is, the man who realizes 
truly and freely expresses his relation of dependence on God” (Coppleston 1993, 410-11).  
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authority, they hand on their boldness in sinning to posterity.” Perhaps this argument 
flows simply from Aquinas’ previous argument about pride. Given that the tyrant has no 
concern for God or the men around him, why should he count for anything future 
generations? In this claim we see another possible ambiguity about the magnanimous 
man. On the one hand, it would seem at least as unlikely that he should care about 
posterity as any tyrant would. On the other hand, the magnanimous man might in his 
pride wish for his name to live on. He might especially hope, as Nietzsche perhaps did, 
that in the future would come a generation, or at least a man, who would recognize him 
as he was never recognized in his own time.54  
 But what does this curious phrase mean? The tyrant takes his own custom or 
habitual way [consuetudo] for authority [auctoritas]. The auctoritas of the tyrant might 
simply be that by which he justifies his own actions. Yet in oppressing his people by 
those actions, he inspires fear and desperation in his subjects (paragraph 81) such that 
they too might be drawn into sin. Perhaps through their struggles they might even come 
to see violence and resistance against authority as inherently good. Aquinas might have 
wished to guard against this dynamic by his strong words against resistance (paragraph 
52). Yet the tyrant’s influence might yet be subtler. Perhaps if the people choose to bear 
their suffering under the tyrant – perhaps they are not so good themselves – the tyrant 
might establish a paideia in which his consuetudo comes to be seen by many as an 
authoritative judgment as to the best way to live. One could envision a “slippery slope” 
effect across generations by which what seems forbidden becomes merely dubious, and 
then acceptable and even desirable. No one strictly speaking intends such a dynamic: the 
                                                
54 Consider, e.g. the preface to Human, All Too Human: “What I always needed most to 
cure and restore myself, however, was the belief that I was not the only one to be thus, to 
see thus--I needed the enchanting intuition of kinship and equality in the eye and in 
desire, repose in a trusted friendship...” (Zimmern translation, 1913) 
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tyrant simply seeks his own goods and the people, apparently of weak virtue, 
imperceptibly slouch into it, whether under the reign of one tyrant or a number of them. 
Thus the glory-seeking tyrant will at best be remembered by execration, and at 
worst will be forgotten (paragraph 85). But the latter is perhaps more to be feared. For 
according to this present teaching the tyrant can be forgotten not only because his tyranny 
was not excessive, but also because the people did not grasp just how excessive his 
tyranny really was. But that means that Aquinas’ and Aristotle’s teaching on the brevity 
of tyrannical rule does not hold simply. Or rather it requires this addition: tyrannies can 
endure not only by becoming more just than conventional tyranny, but also by merely 
appearing to be more just than conventional tyranny by reshaping the conventional 
meaning of justice.  
We will third note the language of Aquinas’ final argument. In paragraph 90 he 
argues that the dignity of the office trespassed by the tyrant especially recommends the 
harsh punishment of the tyrant. The language evokes strongly the teaching of Chapter 8, 
that of the king’s office as minister Dei (paragraph 62). The dignity of the royal office is 
that of “executors and ministers of His [God’s] government”, and so the punishment for 
violating that trust is greater than that for other offices, just as an earthly king punishes 
his own ministers more harshly than he does his subjects for crimes. Aquinas cites the 
Book of Wisdom’s warning to “ministers of His kingdom” about protecting [custodere] 
“the law of justice” and “walk[ing] according to the will of God.” Aquinas fittingly 
concludes this section with Isaiah’s promise of punishment to Nebuchadnezzar, the tyrant 
whose punishment by God was offered as proof at paragraph 62 that all kings serve God. 
By this point in De Regno, our king has become accustomed to thinking of himself as a 
minister of God, and Aquinas can articulate the full implications of the notion. What is 
striking about this passage, after all, is that it goes beyond the king’s failures to protect 
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the common good, to repent for their crimes or to provide for posterity. Rather, Aquinas 
singles out the dignity of the office as minister Dei, a teaching that only reinforces the 
nobility of the common good that the king is to defend. 
At the outset of this chapter, we noted that I.10 concerns the temporal 
disadvantages of tyranny, and that only at I.11 does Aquinas take up the supernatural 
punishment of tyranny. Yet I.11 justifies that supernatural punishment in terms of the 
horrific earthly consequences of tyranny: the tyrant tramples upon the common good, the 
tyrant sets up his consuetudo as a perverse paideia that inures his people to injustice, and 
so on. Even the last argument, according to which the tyrant fails in his duty as a minister 
Dei, is coupled to the health of the polity. Serving as a minister Dei, in fact, is Aquinas’ 
explanation of the God-king analogy that has struck us as so curious throughout De 
Regno. It is to be sure a specifically Christian and theological reading of the 
philosophical neo-Platonic God-king analogy. Yet Aquinas has made the best of 
philosophy and theology in these two chapters, showing that to be a good minister Dei is 
to fulfill the promises of the excellence of monarchy. It is evident from reason that 
temporal rewards are more likely to go to the king, not to the tyrant (I.10). Yet for the 
king who might grasp such arguments less clearly, revelation powerfully supports the 
conclusions of reason (I.11) Thus even if in the uncertainties of the earthly it might seem 
that injustice pays, Aquinas can remind our king that what he gains in life as a tyrant will 
be infinitely outweighed by what he loses in death.55 The king, moreover, comes into that 
reward by serving as a good king, by promoting the common good.  
 
                                                
55 Fortin 1996, 212-3 
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CHAPTER XII 
Turning to the final chapter of Book One, Chapter 12, we find a summary of our 
progress: 
If therefore temporal goods abound and come [proveniunt] to kings, and an 
eminent degree of beatitude is prepared for them by God, and tyrants are for the 
most part frustrated in seeking the temporal goods that they covet, subjected to 
many dangers, and, what is more, are deprived of eternal goods and singled out 
[reservati] for the gravest punishments, those who take up the duty of kingship 
must zealously strive to serve their subjects as kings, not as tyrants (paragraph 
91). 
 
This sentence re-organizes De Regno as it synthesizes its teaching: any king, seeing the 
king’s reward (I.7-9) and the frustrations and punishment of the tyrant (I.3-6; I.10-11), 
will exercise the duties of kingship (I.1-2) with ardor and hope. Most notably, what has 
thus far come last in De Regno, “The Reward of the King”, now comes first. In this it 
bears a certain parallel to the beginning of I.10, which prefaced the punishment of the 
tyrant, save that Aquinas there had not completed outlining the frustrations of the tyrant’s 
rule (I.4-6) with his punishments (I.10-11). Recall that before I.7, in fact, the instability 
and perils of tyranny, not the tyrant’s punishment, were the dominant theme of the work. 
But they are clearly related. Thus Aquinas’ introduction of the theme of the reward of the 
king initiates the lesson in how to avoid the ills of tyranny. In some sense this is his 
refining of the best regime (I.2), for Aquinas herein has shown what the ruler of the best 
regime must be, namely a minister Dei. 
I have suggested that I.12 is an illuminating re-statement of what comes before it. 
Eschmann, however, suspects that it is an elaboration to the text added after Aquinas. 
Chapter 12, he argues, reflects the plan set forth in the prooemium, but not what falls in 
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between.56 Most glaringly, in the prooemium Aquinas promises to discuss two subjects: 
the “origin of kingship” (regni originem) and “the things which pertain to the office of a 
king” (ea quae ad regis officium pertinent). Yet Aquinas does not execute this plan, 
Eschmann argues, because the last chapters of Book I concern not the origin of kingship, 
but rather its reward and the punishment for tyranny. The reward of the king is a practical 
rather than a theoretical consideration, and thus belongs in Book II, with “the things that 
pertain to the office of the king.” This section, I.7-12, was in fact set up as a distinct 
book, De Praemio Regis (“The Reward of the King”), by at least one medieval compiler 
of the text.57  
What can we make of this claim? Prima facie, Eschmann could have a case, 
although we might simply lack a text between I.6 and I.7 that justifies this organization. 
Further, as Jordan notes, this section could easily be transposed to Book II without threat 
to the integrity of the text.58 But we might also question Eschmann’s assumptions, 
particularly the practical nature of “The Reward of the King” and how to read De Regno. 
First, the practical nature of I.7-11. The reward of kingship has practical 
implications to be sure, yet the issue at hand in De Regno seems to be the identification of 
that reward. And that identification requires an understanding of what man is and why he 
acts. The reward of the king comes to depend upon one’s understanding of man’s soul 
and its goods, what man is. These are speculative matters. And while they can be part of a 
line of thought meant to lead to action, they are also meant to inspire reflection and 
contemplation, as is Aquinas’ intention with the Cypriot king. A political philosophy that 
                                                
56 Eschmann 1949, xiv-xxi 
57 Eschmann 1949, xvi 
58 Jordan 1992, 161-2 
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recognizes the necessity of knowledge of man’s end will always be dependent upon 
speculative philosophy for knowledge of that end.  
Even granting that the reward of the king is a practical matter, one could disagree 
with Eschmann that the concern of I.1-6 is entirely theoretical. The prevention of tyranny, 
for instance, strikes one as practical. Rather than seeing one part of De Regno as 
theoretical and another as an alien practical excursus, it might be better to think of I.1-12 
as a patchwork of theoretical and practical teachings. 
What of how Eschmann reads De Regno? We might see the prooemium as a kind 
of plan for the work, but doubt that the plan will be laid out in a deductive fashion. In 
fact, this could be a major obstacle to readers of De Regno versed in Aquinas’ works: this 
text is not a treatise, and it is not laid out in terse, logically parsimonious declarations. 
For instance, we noted that the putatively practical sections on the reward of the king 
seem to be misplaced. But is there no intrinsic connection between the origin of kingship 
and its reward? As a letter written for a king, would we not expect Aquinas to link closely 
the king’s reward with the pre-conditions for its attainment? Roguet explains that this text 
is in part a “pedagogical tract”, a suggestion that Eschmann somewhat heatedly rejects 
because it could, he fears, lead one to take a section such as “The Reward of the King” 
for a mere “exhortative sermon.”59 As we have been at pains to note, however, this work 
is indeed pedagogical. And while that fact need not lead us to reduce De Regno to a 
genre-bound manual or to a bland “exhortative sermon,” it should also not lead us to treat 
De Regno as yet another treatise. 
It is to the advantage of scholarly comity, then, that much need not hinge on I.12. 
For even were I.12 a later elaboration to De Regno, as Eschmann suggests, the textual 
ordering of I.1-11 points to several perplexities in the teaching that might lead us to 
                                                
59 Roguet 1931, vii; Eschmann 1949, xvii 
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reorder I.1-11. That re-ordering, in turn, would lead to an ordering of the text similar to 
that suggested by I.12. The perplexities are many, but the main two concern the 
confusions of I.1-6 and the relation between I.1-6 and I.7-11. First, why, after promising 
a theoretical account of kingship, did Aquinas move so quickly to the practical problems 
of tyranny? Why was our king given so little guidance as to leading his people? What 
was said only illuminated how much more Aquinas might have explained, especially his 
intriguing hints as to the meaning of the common good and the liber/servus distinction. 
Second, why does Aquinas proceed from the perils of tyranny to the reward of the king? 
This is strange first because Aquinas has said virtually nothing as to the apparently great 
royal duties that warrant this reward, but second because of its odd juxtaposition with his 
discussion of tyranny (I.3-6). In his description of tyranny, Aquinas outlines in great 
detail the features of an “excess of tyranny,” and often speaks as though many if not most 
regimes descend into tyranny (I.4-5). It is a bleak picture of political life. In “The Reward 
of the King,” however, Aquinas argues that man stands above earthly riches, glory and 
honor, and that, through his “divine” service to the common good, he merits dwelling 
with God. 
Thus, when I earlier suggested that, even were I.12 a later elaboration to De 
Regno, the textual ordering of I.1-11 nonetheless points to a similar perplexity in the 
teaching, I meant something like this: just as I.12 places the “Reward of the King” at the 
center of our inquiry, so the juxtaposition of I.1-6 and I.7-11 raise the question of the 
place of the king and his virtue and reward in a text hitherto dominated by an account of 
the tyrant and his vice.  
I would argue that we already know the solution to these concerns. At I.8, we 
noted a certain sleight of hand by Aquinas. In speaking of the “reward of the king,” 
Aquinas at times speaks of the end of man. This is reasonable in view of his analysis: the 
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king holds an office at the pinnacle of man’s achievements, and so the king’s reward 
must be that of the greatest man. Yet it also reveals or plays upon the double meaning of 
“reward”, reflected in Aquinas’ shifting use of praemium and finis. Conventionally, a 
reward is something one receives for completing a task. The reward might induce one to 
perform an activity one would not otherwise do. Aquinas thus opens Chapter 7 with “the 
task of a king may seem too burdensome unless some proper good should come to him 
from it.”60  
Yet a reward can also be something that one attains as a kind of completion of 
one’s activity. One trains to become a better athlete. One reads and argues to become a 
better scholar. One practices to become a better dancer. What is striking about such 
rewards is that they are not something accidentally added to the activity, as in the case of 
being rewarded with a candy bar for taking out the trash. They are more akin to the 
“reward” of becoming a better family member in taking out the trash. Indeed, one might 
recall Aristotle’s teaching that “virtue is its own reward.” We may thus recall from I.8: 
“It is therefore fitting to expect as a reward for virtue that which makes man happy 
[beatum] (paragraph 63).61   
It is this kind of end that Aquinas seems to have in mind in the later sections of 
De Regno. In seeking the kind of reward that would induce the king to rule justly, he does 
not merely ask what sort of reward a king would most like or desire. He does, make no 
mistake, consult the convention on the subject. For if kings were sufficiently motivated 
                                                
60 In the great example of the philosopher-kings of Socrates’ city-in-speech, it becomes 
clear that no reward would induce the philosophers to take up the task of rule: they must 
be forced to do so (Rep 516a ff.). 
61 The completion of the activity would also seem to be a completion of oneself, 
although that is less clear from what Aquinas has said. Thus Pieper: “people should not 
think about what they ought to do, they should rather think about what they ought to be.”  
Thus moral philosophy and theology should take as their points of departure “the idea of 
the good man” (Pieper 1949, 3). 
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by glory and honor, then I.7 could be the end of De Regno. But Aquinas does not think 
that glory and honor really satisfy the king (I.8). Moreover, even were these rewards 
sufficient inducement from the point of view of the king, these rewards would be 
disastrous in view of the needs of the community (paragraphs 57-9). Aquinas is led, then, 
to ask what sort of reward could induce the king to rule and genuinely satisfy his needs as 
a human being. This reward, moreover, must be of the sort that will inspire the king to be 
truly just toward his people. In other words, this reward would orient politics not as an 
extrinsic bribe for good behavior, but as something worthy in itself issuing intrinsically 
from political activity. Thus in I.8-9 Aquinas moves from the question “What would 
induce a king to rule?” to “What would make a human being happy?”  
What might strike us at this point is where this discussion of man’s end appears in 
other works of Aquinas, or indeed of many other moral thinkers through the ages. A 
series of questions on man’s happiness begins that portion of the Summa Theologiae, the 
Secunda pars, treating on moral theology.62 And this question begins Plato’s Republic, 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Cicero’s De finibus. Even the question of justice in 
the Republic proceeds through question about man’s diverse parts and their highest end.63 
Why do such inquiries often begin practical works? Practical or moral philosophy 
studies human actions, or what we do (Latin: agibilia). Practical activity can be 
distinguished from speculative activity as an attempt to do rather than to know.64 Thus 
when humans act, we quite naturally ask what the point of the action is. What is this 
person trying to do or accomplish? While words like “intention” or “end” can signify 
                                                
62 Froelich 1993 begins with illustrative citations for Aquinas’ numerous re-iterations of 
this teaching, including at the beginning of the “Questions on Law”: ST I-II.1.3; I-II.1.5; 
I-II.18.6; I-II.90.2; I-II.94.2; II-II.43.3. Wieland’s chapter in Pope 2002 (57-68) is a good 
introduction to the “so-called Treatise on Happiness” in the Summa Theologiae. 
63 Republic IV 
64 McCoy 1989 
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radically different theoretical accounts of what it means for action to have a point, 
underlying them all is a sense of praxis or action characterized by purposive doing. Thus 
on this view ethics takes ends as its point of departure and not, as some caricatures of 
teleology would suggest, because of the similarity between human beings and trees or 
plants, which reach their end instinctually as it were. Rather, ethics so conceived 
proceeds from the observation that man must learn what his end is as a human being, 
which often requires some “unlearning”65, and how he can in his community cultivate 
himself toward it: man does not spontaneously grow into his completeness.66 Thus, ethics 
studies voluntary acts – not the fall of rocks or the growth of trees – as the outgrowth of 
man’s will and reason.67   
If a given end allows us to make sense of a human action, then it is man’s ultimate 
end that “renders intelligible all those choices and activities that human life comprises.”68 
But lest this seem too abstract, let us be clear of what we are speaking: happiness. The 
question of the “good life” or the best way to live or eudaimonia are well-known to be the 
great themes of ancient philosophy. But can the same be said for Aquinas? If the structure 
of the Secunda pars is anything to go by, then yes. Indeed, Pinckaers writes: “To anyone 
with an open mind, one huge fact stands out in the history of morality: for the ancients, 
Christians and pagans alike, the question of happiness was primary.”69 
We asked at I.7: why does Aquinas introduce the question of the reward of the 
king? Now we might ask: why does Aquinas wait until I.7-11 to raise the question? Why 
                                                
65 Benestad 2011, 297 
66 Pinckaers 1995, 354-78 
67 Aquinas’ Commentary on Aristotle’s “Nicomachean Ethics” III, Lectures I-IV 
68 Froelich 1993, 609 
69 Pinckaers 1995, 18. Pinckaers means to contrast an ethics of happiness with an ethics 
of obligation, a claim that raises problems for many traditional lines of Thomistic ethics. 
We will return to this opposition in our discussion of the natural law in Chapter 4. 
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does this theme, a theme that he would later take to be the foundational teaching of 
ethics, and thus the first thing one must discuss, appear in media res in De Regno? Why 
does “The Reward of the King” come in the middle of De Regno rather than in the 
beginning? Let us consider one of Aquinas’ terser formulations of this teaching: 
“Although the end be last in the order of execution, yet it is first in the order of the 
agent's intention. And it is this way that it is cause.”70 The end is the final achievement of 
action, so the end occurs or comes into being last temporally. Yet it is the cause of all 
action because it is that in view of which the action is undertaken. To see the end as this 
cause, one must have a synthetic or philosophical view of action. The person who thinks 
less in view of formal ethics, however, in evaluating someone’s activity might primarily 
see mere acts and not the reasons for which they are done, the goals for which they are 
enacted. Acts often fail to achieve their ends, after all, and humans sometimes change the 
ends they pursue or are only vaguely aware of their own ends, such that a human life can 
appear to be a messy welter of misfires and fumbles, nothing coherent about them. And 
even were one to grasp intellectually this teaching, one might doubt that it has any 
practical significance. Can acting in view of ends allow one to cut through the tangle of 
chance and failure to achieve one’s goals? And in what sense are all of our actions 
ordered to some great and ultimate goal or end? 
In other words, the teaching and its rationale have to be taught to our Cypriot. We 
might think, then, that Aquinas’ presentation of I.3-6 is precisely what the king himself 
expects. Yes, the tyrant seeks goals. But he often fails, and not just because chance 
crushes the best plans. There is also something self-defeating about tyranny. Even when 
it goes well, it fails to satisfy the tyrant. This frightening conclusion persuades the king 
both that tyranny is bad and a fortiori that the end of politics matters to politics. Or at 
                                                
70 ST I-II 1.1 ad 1 
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least it could. Yet tyranny looks very attractive not only in its extreme elements, but also 
in the minor departures from justice that any kingdom could easily suffer. And this 
teaching could be a hard saying for the untutored king who both worries about his soul 
and fears that he will make mistakes. Thus Aquinas wants to assure the king that what we 
have called “moderate tyranny” is a very different matter from the excess of tyranny that 
Aquinas execrates (paragraph 38). Yet Aquinas also wants the king to see that these 
departures are acceptable only precisely insofar as they stem from the travails and 
mistakes of ordinary political life. This two-fold teaching gives the king courage to face it 
even as it accuses him of moral frailties that he might rather not think about it. Thus, as 
we asked at the end of I.4, Aquinas seeks to show the king not just how not to become a 
tyrant, but why not to become one. This is indeed the lesson of Politics 1315a40-b10.  
We can similarly make sense of the placement of “The Reward of the King.” For 
having been thus educated, the king will be ready to embrace a happier message, one that 
imparts a more positive teaching. Indeed, I.7-11 reads very much like a second sailing for 
our Cypriot king. “The Reward of the King” begins with the question of the king’s 
reward for his fidelity to justice, but then almost imperceptibly turns to the question of 
the king’s end (finis). So the reward of the king becomes the end of the king. Yet in 
speaking of the king’s end as particularly glorious among men, Aquinas adverts to the 
fact that the reward of the king is the reward of all just men. In securing the common 
good, then, the king is already securing his own end. And in seeking his reward, the king 
is seeking this reward for all men in his land. In short, then, Aquinas grants the king 
knowledge of his end. While the image of the king as the sea-tossed sailor is indeed 
sobering, it is connected with the reward of the king in such a way that the king’s plight 
is far less tragic than Aquinas initially suggested in I.3-6. 
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Knowledge of the end of politics, then, is what a theologian can teach a king. 
Thus the prooemium. What is more, the phrase “Omnis multitudo derivatur ab uno” 
might have a second meaning. Just as the end is first in intention but last in action, so the 
“unum” might be first in intention but last in action. The end could be what gives unity to 
the activity of the community. And so while analytically we can see that the multitude 
has to come together in time to form a unity, that unity is causally prior to that multitude, 
for the very idea of unity is what draws them together. And Aquinas thinks that we see 
evidence of that unity in the families and friendships that are the bedrock of a just regime. 
Thus his surprising stress on the amicitia that binds king and subject. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Our remaining questions about I.1-6 chiefly concern the nature and duties of the 
kingly office. What is the common good? And how does it relate to the individual’s 
good? We saw Aquinas move in I.8-9 from the question “What would induce a king to 
rule?” to “What would make a human being happy?” This involves two shifts: a changing 
notion of “reward” to “end”, and a concurrent shift from the king to man. The reward of 
the king will be greater than that accorded to the citizen. But all virtuous men enter into 
beatitude. Thus we might think that the good man, the liber, and the good king, the 
minister Dei, have at least that in common. But what is the liber or sui causa? At I.7 we 
thought he might be the magnanimous man, the one free from attachment to earthly 
goods beneath him. But then why does he act? The thrust of I.8-9 seems to be that only in 
acting in view of a worthy end can one be rational. This end, of course, is finally God. 
Thus the sui causa directs his actions toward the attainment of happiness, which Christian 
revelation shows to be the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. 
 127 
But did not God finally cause man? And so does the sui causa not finally act for 
the sake of God, not for himself? Yes, indeed. Thus we can say that the liber causes 
himself and acts for himself in only a limited sense. He could not after all create himself. 
A definition of freedom that does not account for this fact, then, would be deficient. We 
might think that the worst consequences of a mistaken view of freedom would arise in 
politics, where men have power over other men. Consider, for instance, the God-king 
analogy, and how the king might infer from it that he has arbitrary power of life and 
death over his subjects. Even if he did not know this analogy, this is obviously a 
temptation for many kings. Yet in seeing himself as a minister Dei, he would see that he 
must not be a wrathful king after all, and that he must serve his people. A certain parallel 
arises between the liber and the God-king, that they both discover their true freedom in 
directing their activity to God. Thus Aquinas wrote that “each man would be a king to 
himself under God, the highest king [sub Deo summo rege]” were man meant to live 
alone (I.1). There are two different ways to read this statement, or two different points of 
emphasis. First, that man’s obedience to political authority requires express justification, 
as otherwise he should be a king unto himself. A second reading, however, would note 
that even were man not accountable to any civil authority, he would not be entirely and 
simply causa sui: he would still be under “God, the highest king.” 
As the reward of the king comes in serving his people, perhaps the activity of the 
liber should also redound to the good of others. This makes sense of Aquinas’ frequent 
distinction between the good proper or particular to the liber [bonum proprium] and the 
private good [bonum privatum] of the tyrant: the tyrant takes goods from others, and so 
the person losing such goods receives no benefit from politics, thus being a servus not 
only in the sense of being under the control of another, but in not receiving the fruits of 
his own labor. Thus there is no common good between a tyrant and a servus.  
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As for what the common good actually is, we seem to have two candidates: the 
friendship of the subjects and king, and God. Aquinas has emphasized repeatedly the 
amicitia that holds between subjects and their ruler. This friendship might seem to be the 
common good of a polity insofar as it rests upon the common human nature of the 
citizens and produces desirable political outcomes, namely peace [unitas pacis] and 
justice. To be clear: the common human nature of the citizens could not be the common 
good because they would mean nothing politically without the development of friendship, 
as I.3-6 shows, and the peace and justice that seems to be the final end of politics are for 
Aquinas co-constitutive of that friendship. The just ordering of society is part and parcel 
of that friendship. Perhaps this is what Aquinas meant be unitas pacis at I.2.  
In some sense God is more explicitly the end of politics for Aquinas than this 
friendship, although the idea is harder to grasp. The point of politics is attaining to 
beatitude, to know and love God. This indeed seems to be Aquinas’ claim, and it coheres 
with ancient teachings according to which happiness is the final end of all human action. 
Yet we might wonder, if beatitude depends upon a God beyond the city, how beatitude is 
an end attainable by that city and in what sense that beatitude is “common.” It might thus 
be helpful to consider that the friendship between citizens is a common good intrinsic to 
the activity of the community, and that God is a common good extrinsic to the 
community. In other words, this friendship is the very kind of reward that Aquinas seems 
to be pointing toward in I.8: a reward not attained as some accidental addition to what 
one attains through activity, but as an inherent completion of the activity itself. This kind 
of reward is happiness, the fruit of virtue. Beatitude, on the other hand, requires an 
additional term beyond the community: God. If the minister Dei and the liber faithfully 
 129 
serve God, then they are ordering the community toward an end beyond that 
community.71 
If some matters are clearer than they were in I.1-6, we have as yet questions 
remaining. I shall focus on two. First, what is the relation between the king-in-his-
kingdom and God-in-His-creation? Second, how fully can politics reach man’s end? 
First, minister Dei as a gloss on the God-king analogy. We have connected the 
God-king to the minister Dei, which clarifies that the king in imitating God in his 
kingdom actually imitates God by seeing himself as less than God: by being God’s 
minister. Yet this would not seem to alter Aquinas’ claim in I.2 that monarchy is the best 
form of government and that this can be show from God’s governance of the world. It 
reinforces it, in fact. So what concrete significance does this have for political activity? 
How ought the king to rule his kingdom? This question might also include one raised in 
I.1 and I.3 but not since, whether he should seek to build or maintain a provincia. In all of 
this, he ought to be speaking to the fool from I.10: he who has faith in beatitude but 
questions whether Aquinas has shown us how to order our politics toward it. 
Second, how fully politics can actually reach man’s end? As we noted, Aquinas’ 
argument about the proper reward for the king moves from goods that are often taken to 
be conventional ends of politics, including glory and honor, to goods which seem 
surpassingly better, indeed fully satisfying to man’s highest faculties, especially 
beatitude. Yet for this very reason, such an end seems less likely than glory or honor to 
issue from politics. To put this differently: to prove that only something like beatitude 
can satisfy man’s highest faculties is far from proving that beatitude can be had or gained 
by the citizen through politics. The question is whether politics can lead or help lead man 
qua citizen to that happiness. And if some other institution must play a role in leading a 
                                                
71 De Koninck 1943 articulates this distinction masterfully. 
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man to this happiness, e.g. the Church, then Aquinas must explain the relation between 
the king and that other institution. As we saw at I.6, Aquinas has abstained from 
mentioning any such additional body. 
I suggested in our discussion of I.7 that Aquinas’ criticisms of earthly goods as 
inferior to man are rationally defensible and reflect a still-common teaching in much 
modern thought. To say this is not to prove that what Aquinas argues in I.7 can be 
accepted without revision, nor would it “prove” that Christian beatitude is man’s final 
end beyond the earthly. I would urge that modern political theory return to and revive this 
line of questions that so many ancient and mediaeval thinkers asked, even if we suspect 
from the outset that our answers to them would not be quite the same, or that we would 
not agree among ourselves. 
That being said, what room in this polity Aquinas will leave for the person who 
sees that man has ends and that they seem to go beyond the earthly, but who does not see 
that God is that final end? If we connect this concern with the two questions I just asked 
above, then we might ask: what would a government look like that somehow fulfills not 
only a community’s end of beatitude but also fosters each man’s inquiry into just what 
his happiness really is? To answer such questions would be to respond to the infidel of 
I.10. 
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Chapter Three    
At the conclusion of Chapter 2 and our investigation of De Praemio Regis, I 
suggested that two fundamental problems loom for our understanding of De Regno. First, 
what is the practical significance of the analogy between the king-in-his-kingdom and 
God-in-His-creation? Second, can politics reach man’s end? Furthermore, these two 
problems seem to be connected. What connects these questions? An analogy suggests a 
relation between terms, an identity of a particular or partial kind. While the king and God 
both govern, the king only governs part of the world, and as a servant of God, not as God: 
as a minister Dei. This inferiority suggests that the king exercises only some authority in 
conducting man to his end, that God as the master of this servant will complete the task 
and has final authority over it. Thus the king as any man receives his reward from God, 
his master. But have we not stressed that political activity must be defined by the end that 
men seek through it? Then what end do they seek? What is the end of the rule of our 
king? 
While these questions proceed from the theoretical analysis of I.1 and I.7-9, our 
king will want practical advice. Indeed, we do, as well, and can agree with Eschmann that 
the practical elements of De Regno have been brief and far-between. The putatively 
practical account of the reward of the king (I.7-9) turns out to be surprisingly speculative, 
leaving the discussion on tyranny as the only significant practical discussion we have 
come across in De Regno (I.3-6). We can hope, therefore, that Aquinas in specifying the 
king’s nature as minister Dei will descend into practical details. Perhaps less has been 
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written on Book II than on any other portion of De Regno, so we must again rely upon 
our own wits.1 
We thus continue to Book II of De Regno for answers to such questions. In this 
study I propose to consider only II.1-4, not II.5-8. While Eschmann argues that II.5-8 are 
part of Aquinas’ authentic text, Blythe and others continue to worry that those final 
chapters contain or are primarily comprised of Ptolemy’s embellishments.2 In any event, 
our study would not be enhanced significantly by their inclusion: II.5-8 primarily give 
flesh to ideas already laid out in II.1-4, especially II.4.3  
 
CHAPTER I 
Chapter 1 opens with a welcome promise. It will consider “what the duty 
[officium] of the king is and “what a king ought to be” (paragraph 93). This duty will be 
uncovered, Aquinas writes, from considering “the pattern of the regime of nature 
[regimen naturalis].” For art is an imitation of nature, he argues, and “from [nature] we 
accept the rules to act according to reason.” Thus II.1 would seem to be a continuation of 
I.2, which asked what a king is. Now that we have some sense of the answer to that 
question – the man who leads his people in justice toward God – we can detail his office 
or duty. Indeed, it seems that Book II will proffer a practical teaching. And after all the 
talk of beatitude and the minister Dei, Aquinas yet emphasizes that the duties of the king 
exhibit a consonance or harmony with reason and nature itself.  
                                                
1 The two exceptions concern its authenticity (see footnote 2) and relations between 
“Church and State” (Eschmann 1958, Boyle 2000, Smith 2010, Cain 2012). 
2 Blythe 1997, 2-3. Blythe notes that Black 1992 rejects all together that Aquinas wrote 
De Regno.   
3 Cf. Eschmann 1949, 57, footnotes 5-7. Thus II.4 ends: “These then are the duties of the 
royal office, each of which must now be treated in greater detail.” 
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If we are to learn of the royal office from nature, then we should consider the 
government of nature. That government, Aquinas argues, is two-fold: universal and 
particular (paragraph 94). As for the universal, “all things are held together [continentur] 
under the rule of God [Dei regimen], who by His providence governs all.” The particular 
is greatly similar to divine government, and is found in man. Thus man is a minor 
mundus, literally a microcosm, containing the reason and spirit that animates the universe 
as a whole.4 Aquinas then explains the parallel: reason governs the powers of the soul and 
the body as God governs the spiritual and corporeal bodies of the universe. “And thus in 
a certain manner [quodammodo] reason obtains in man as God obtains in the world.”5 
But this way of speaking only equates a single man with God, and we have repeatedly 
noted that man is “naturally a social animal living in a multitude.” Thus we should note 
that this analogy holds not only for the reason in one man, but also for the reason of the 
man that governs a multitude of humans. This analogy of reason’s role “principally 
pertains to the office of the king.” Other animals may live in society and even exhibit a 
kind of royal government, as with the aforementioned bee king. Yet such animals govern 
and are governed not “through reason” but “through instinct.” This instinct is “implanted 
[inditum] by the great ruler, who is the author of nature.” If reason is the mark of 
government, then animals do not share in universal government, but are ruled by the 
universal government of God. Thus their instinct is the pattern of that government. Note 
that “inditum” is the same word that Aquinas uses at I.8 to claim that knowledge of 
                                                
4 As is commonly attributed to Aquinas: “Homo non proprie humanus sed superhumanus 
est.” 
5 Eschmann translates quodammodo as “proportionate manner,” which raises the 
question: what is the proportion between this universal and particular? (Eschmann 1949, 
54) 
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happiness as the reward of virtue is “implanted [inditum] in the minds of all who use 
reason” (paragraph 63). 
We noted at I.1 that Aquinas argues that reason rules the soul of each man, and 
that one man rules over other men. But Aquinas never explicitly finished the syllogism, 
namely that the reason of that man would rule over other men. He has now done this. The 
government of man over men will have to be more than the instinct of animals, but it 
must also be something more than the willful caprice of the tyrant, which in some sense 
is worse than rule by beasts (I.3). The first consequence of this teaching is practical:  
Therefore let the king recognize [cognoscat] that this is the office that he has 
taken up, that he is to be in the kingdom what the soul is in the body, and what God is in 
the world. If he reflects seriously upon this, a zeal for justice will be enkindled in him 
when he contemplates that he has been appointed to this position in place of God, to 
exercise judgment [iudicium] in his kingdom; further, he will acquire the gentleness of 
clemency and mildness when he considers as his own members those individuals who are 
subject to his rule (paragraph 95). 
This passage bears a resemblance to I.1, but the teaching is crucially different. 
Aquinas emphasizes here that the king cannot simply spontaneously assume his place in 
the hierarchy of governments that justifies monarchy as best: he must “recognize” and 
“reflect” upon it through reason. In so doing he will predispose himself to a “zeal for 
justice” that will aid his service in loco Dei. Justice, we saw at I.1, requires knowing how 
to lead fittingly a multitude of free men, men who act for their own sake, to their end. He 
will thus come to understand the place of judgment and clemency in serving his people.  
This reference to iudicium is a first for De Regno. The word has a legal meaning 
as the decision or sentence of a court, and a more conventional one as judgment, 
discernment or forming an opinion. Aquinas in many of his works uses iudicium in its 
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Scholastic sense as an exercise in prudence, namely iudicium electionis, or the judgment 
of choice that finally issues in act.6 This iudicium follows upon deliberation, and is the 
intellect’s and the will’s assent to the counsel of deliberation as to what act should be 
executed.7 We can doubt that Aquinas expects his royal lector to know of the technical 
distinctions behind iudicium, and in any event the context does not prove that he means to 
invoke them. But it should be clear that iudicium even in its conventional sense denotes 
the difficult and momentous decision-making in which he will have to engage to secure 
the good of his community. What unites these differing denotations is the kind of 
decision one has to make in pursuing ends through concrete means in contingent 
circumstances: in other words, practical reasoning. The height of practical reasoning, of 
course, is regnative prudence (prudentia). Prudence requires experience with the 
contingent and the changing: with what could be otherwise rather than the necessary.8 
Yet prudentia is more than just than the application of this knowledge. It is not a techne, 
in Aristotle’s language. Rather, man can only practically reason well when one can 
discern the proper ends of action and pursue the means to achieve them. As Aquinas 
urged at I.2, man does not deliberate on ends through the virtue of prudence. To be 
prudent, one must be a virtuous person who knows and seeks the good in his activity.9 
Thus some means are ruled out: when one sees that one must secure some end, one can 
conceive of means that would be more or less fitting for that end. The ends do justify the 
                                                
6 ST I 79.8, I-II 13; cf. Goris 1997, 159, following Garceau 1968 
7 See Westberg 1994 for more on the place of iudicium within practical reasoning.  
8 Aristotle, NE VI; Aquinas, Commentary on “Nicomachean Ethics”, Book VI, Lectures 
IV and VII 
9 Cf. Machiavelli: “[P]rudence consists in knowing how to recognize the qualities of 
inconveniences, and in picking the less bad as good” (The Prince XXI.91).  
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means, in other words, but in the sense that only those means consonant with the end are 
licit.  
Thus the word arises at a pivotal moment in De Regno. The end that prudence 
pursues is precisely what was promised at I.2, namely that of the liber living in a 
multitude, but only revealed at I.8. We saw that the tyrant’s misery results from his 
failure to act in view of man’s proper end, and we have received many urgings not to 
deliberate upon ends. Thus while Aquinas has never directly raised the notion of 
prudence until now, De Regno has been a kind of education in prudence throughout. 
The regime of nature reveals not only the rule of one but the rule of the rational 
one as the best regime. In some sense, then, II.1 is an answer to the question of I.6, 
namely the sort of man who should serve as king. He will have knowledge of his end, and 
the zeal to pursue it for himself and his people. The man who can exercise judgment is in 
the first place a liber, because he is capable of ruling himself through reason toward his 
proper end. Having iudicium of a political sort, he can also rule other liberi because he 
knows the requirements of freedom and he sees their directionality toward God. 
This section thus corrects a possible misunderstanding of this chapter’s teaching. 
In the opening paragraph (93), Aquinas states that the duties or office of the king is to be 
learned from the regime of nature. One might think that the resulting politics would be 
deterministic and afford no space for human agency or rationality. Such determinism, 
moreover, might seem to imply absolutism, for the king’s claim to power would be 
unlimited within the scope of its natural basis. Yet this would be to assume a modern 
understanding of nature, one according to which “nature” is the laws of motion.10 
Aquinas states that the reason within man is to govern the polity, and clearly 
distinguishes it from instinct of animals. And he suggests that in nature itself is revealed 
                                                
10 Strauss 1953, 9-34 
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man’s reason: man’s nature is itself rational. Thus the “regime of nature” here does not 
reduce politics to metaphysics or the physics of motion and change. In fact, the king is 
exhorted to seek justice through prudence. This reference to iudicium at the chapter’s 
end, then, should only amplify what is already clear: much of political rationality is 
prudential, and the teleological foundations of Aquinas’ political theory are no denial of 
this. It is only in view of one’s end, after all, that one can in fact exercise prudence.11 
If the king serves God as a minister, how is the king’s “particular” government 
aligned with that of God’s “universal” government? We might question this alignment or 
ordering in terms of both means and ends. Are the two governments aligned by virtue of 
their being rational, or operating according to some dictate of reason? Aquinas probably 
has both in mind, as we saw at I.7-9. But how rational will the king’s rule be if his 
political activity serves revealed truth? This raises the question of the alignment of these 
governments’ respective ends. The king serves God as a minister Dei, but does that mean 
that the king himself secures what God means to accomplish in or through the world? In 
other words, we know from I.8 that the king’s rule is to conduce to the beatitude of his 
people. Does this mean that the king himself secures it for his people? The most passing 
acquaintance with Christianity suggests that the answer is no.12 And Aquinas makes no 
such suggestion in II.1: the ordering of the two governments appears mainly as a kind of 
analogy between reason in the soul and God in the world. But what precisely does the 
king promote, then? What does he secure for his people? If the king’s particular 
                                                
11 I raise this last point in part because of a footnote of Eschmann in this chapter. In that 
note he writes that the “methodical principle” of turning to the regime of nature “should 
not be considered as St. Thomas’ last word in the matter,” and refers the reader to ST II-II 
47.10-13, which questions relate to prudence in legislation (Eschmann 1949, 53, footnote 
2). The several albeit scattered references to practical reason in this chapter suggest that 
Aquinas’ current method is not something he discards in later works.  
12 As Schall often says: man cannot save himself, but he can keep himself from being 
saved. 
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government complements that of God’s universal government, then Aquinas will need to 
explain what delimits this particular government from the universal, especially in terms 
of their ends. 
 
CHAPTER II 
Chapter 2 makes a number of distinctions helpful for answering our questions. 
Chapter 1 informed the king that his duties can be discerned by considering God’s 
governance of the world, the regimen naturalis. Chapter 2 now proposes to spell out in 
what that governance consists. 
In general two works of God in the world must be considered. One by which God 
created [instituit] the world, the other by which God governs the created world. 
These two works are furthermore [quidem] performed in the body by the soul. 
First, by virtue of the soul the body is formed, and then by the soul the body is 
governed and moved (paragraph 97).  
 
Thus God’s two great activities in the world brought it into being and then subsequently 
have provided for its preservation.13 Aquinas compares God’s creation and governance of 
the world to the soul’s activity toward the body, although the difference in language is 
striking: God created [instituit] the world; the body is formed [informatur] by the soul. 
Even the passive verbal construction places the emphasis on the effect on the body rather 
than the soul’s act upon it. Man is a composite of body and soul: the soul is the form of 
the body, and it would be beyond our imagination to conceive of this body without a soul, 
as though the body were prime matter.14 Yet for all of that, the soul does not call the body 
out of nothingness. At best, it forms and shapes it, as the Demiurge of Plato’s Timaeus 
                                                
13 Cf. ST I 104.1-2 
14 Gilson 1936, 168-88 
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takes what already is and gives it form. It is worth pointing this out if only to consider 
just how radical Aquinas’ doctrine of creation is. Creation must mean calling forth being 
out of non-being.15  
When we consider that the soul cannot conjure something out of nothing, then we 
would be surprised were a king able to do so. We will be heartened to see, then, that 
Aquinas follows the above statement with an argument that “the second [activity] more 
properly pertains to the office of a king” (paragraph 98). Indeed, some kings do found 
cities and kingdoms, and no king can rule unless someone, whether himself or a past 
king, has founded that kingdom. Thus the great examples of kingship were founders, 
including Ninus of Babylon and Romulus of Rome. Aquinas also argues that knowledge 
of governance, requires some knowledge of its creation. If one is to direct something 
toward its end, then one must know for what purpose it has been established. Thus in 
some sense to maintain a city is to found it virtually. 
Aquinas then proceeds to lay down how the creation of the world illumines the 
creation of a kingdom. Creation involves production and distinction: bringing something 
into existence, and distinguishing orders of beings such that they are in harmony with 
each other. Aquinas cites the Genesis 1 account of the seven days of creation as an 
example: God not only brings the world into being, but also orders it “fittingly” into 
heaven and earth, day and night and water and land. The living creatures are similarly 
ordered within it according to their own excellences: birds for the sky, animals for land 
and fish for the water, and so on (paragraph 99). Further, man was created so as to have 
dominion over the plants and animals. In like manner, a king must provide for a suitable 
site for his kingdom, one conducive to the prosperity and security of his people 
(paragraph 100). Having selected such a sight, the king must establish where best can be 
                                                
15 ST I 44.2. See Johnson 1989.  
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placed the various offices and depots that will make the regime run, as well as the most 
comely places for various trades, law courts and churches. Finally, the founding king 
must find and shape his people such that can provide for one another each trade and 
occupation that will serve the needs of the city. 
The meaning of this parallel between God and king has a certain limit, one that 
we have already noted: the king might govern, but he does not create. Thus Aquinas 
writes: “Of course the founder of a city and kingdom cannot produce anew men, places of 
habitation and other necessities of life, but inevitably must use those things which pre-
exist in nature” (paragraph 100). Thus the king is a kind of craftsman: as the smith must 
procure iron of an appropriate character and shape it according to the purpose of the 
product, so the king must form a kingdom through the fashioning of a location, men and 
resources into a thriving community. He identifies and selects the necessary elements of 
the city, and then orders them appropriately. Throughout this series of decisions, the 
founding king must keep in mind the end of the community, attempting to order each 
aspect of the settlement toward that goal.16        
It is notable who Aquinas mentions in this section of the chapter as a founder, or 
rather that he mentions a founder without naming him as such. In many works before and 
after De Regno, Moses is cited as an example, if not the exemplar, of legislators, on par 
with Lycurgus, Theseus and Romulus. Aquinas does discuss Moses here, but only to 
introduce the Genesis account of creation: “But Moses has minutely and carefully 
expressed this plan [rationem] of creation” (paragraph 99). Thus Moses emerges in this 
chapter not as the pre-eminent legislator, but as a witness to the foundational legislation 
                                                
16 Smith 2010 has a nice discussion of this, especially in rejecting the suggestion of 
Finnis that “rulers are like “sword-smiths” [who]… make an instrument suitable for other 
to put to their own good use” (103-4; Finnis 1998, 182). This interpretation of Finnis 
would have the effect of greatly circumscribing the meaning of liber causa sui est. 
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that is the divine one. What makes him praise-worthy is not his activity, but rather his 
perception of God’s activity in the world.  
The danger of portraying Moses as a great legislator is two-fold: that he thereby 
be reduced to a purely natural role, or that he be given a quasi-divine role. For if he no 
longer serves God as prophet, then he undertakes his own political activity as a founder. 
In The Prince, Machiavelli lists Moses among great law-givers, but then writes that he 
will say nothing further of Moses, “as he was a mere executor of things that had been 
ordered for him by God” (The Prince VI.22). Yet Machiavelli famously does say more 
about Moses. While Moses appears to be a great prophet, Machiavelli praises Moses not 
for his piety or prophecy inspired by God, but for distinctly earthly virtues: he uses arms 
well, unlike the unarmed Savonarola (VI.24). Machiavelli tells us that “the actions and 
orders” of Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus “and the others who have acquired and founded 
kingdoms… will appear no different from those of Moses, who had so great a teacher.” If 
Moses had a great teacher, namely God, how did these other law-givers perform similar 
actions and construct similar orders? Were their teachers as wise as God? Or was God not 
Moses’ teacher? Consider that it was “necessary,” according to Machiavelli, that the 
Hebrews be slaves in Egypt, so that they would then follow Moses out of this slavery 
(VI.23). There is no mention here, in other words, of God’s providence and the ways in 
which God led His chosen people through Moses back to Him. Moses is rather portrayed 
as a human liberator, for which the servitude of Israel was no tragedy but a great 
convenience.17  
Moses appears again only in Chapter XXVI, when Machiavelli compares the 
contemporary situation of the Italians to that of other peoples, including to that of ancient 
                                                
17 Machiavelli would have known, moreover, of the teaching of St. Paul, taken directly 
from Exodus, according to which God Himself hardened the heart of the Egyptian ruler to 
complete the mystery of Israel’s exodus (Rom 9:16-18). 
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Israel. Machiavelli claims that the Italians at present are “more enslaved than the 
Hebrews” (XXVI.102). The “virtue of the Italian spirit” that must be summoned forth to 
liberate Italy, then, requires a virtue at least equal to that of Moses, or perhaps greater: the 
Italian leader must wrest the Italians out of a slavery worse than that of the Hebrews. 
Machiavelli seems to elevate Moses as he diminishes him: Moses is again one legislator 
among many, even if a particularly successful one. For Machiavelli, then, Moses is as a 
profoundly gifted ruler, one who can shape and form his people as he pleases. Moses 
shapes his people, moreover, through a law of God that Machiavelli seems to suggest was 
invented by Moses invented for his own purposes.18 What Moses is not, however, is a 
virtuous leader who gives his people God’s law, nor is he presented, except in a 
manifestly deceptively way, as pious or godly.19 He is what Cesare Borgia should have 
been.20 
In the framework of De Regno II.2, Machiavelli casts Moses as a kind of creator, 
a man with a preternatural capacity for molding his people to his will, as the tamer of 
Fortuna. He is thus a pagan creator or demiurge, one who cannot claim to create ex 
nihilo, one who could hardly pretend to have replaced the creating deity. Yet through that 
“creation” Moses comes to a position of great power, almost omnipotence as far as the 
beleaguered Hebrews are concerned. If one may say that Machiavelli reduces Moses to a 
purely natural one, insofar as he no longer serves God, one may also say that Machiavelli 
                                                
18 Scott and Sullivan, (1994) 898. It has been argued that Machiavelli has Mohammed in 
mind when writing of Moses in The Prince, e.g. Strauss 1958, 84. 
19 One might read Chapter XXVI in light of what precedes it in Chapter XXV. There 
Machiavelli suggests that “worldly things are governed by fortune and by God,” and 
devotes the remainder of the chapter to the question of how great men can control 
Fortuna. The initial pious reference to God simply drops out, and Moses comes to light 
in Chapter XXVI not to reintroduce the question of God, but as exemplary of the fortune-
taming man. 
20 Cf. Beiner 2011, 21-8 and Strauss 1958, 68-74, 308, n.32 
 143 
elevates Moses insofar as Moses attains to a god-like status for ancient Israel. Moses, 
according to Machiavelli, treats the Hebrews as though they were his own, as though they 
were there primarily for his own ends. By contrast, Moses is firmly a governor for 
Aquinas, leading them to God’s ends. What makes him a formidable legislator is that he 
seeks God’s wisdom that he strives to be a minister Dei. Thus Moses in this passage is 
presented as a prophet, one who can discern the pattern of God’s wisdom in the world. If 
he is a worthy law-giver, it is because of this power and its fruit.21  
To be sure, Aquinas argued at paragraph 98 that even kings who do not establish 
kingdoms must nonetheless envision this act of founding as they govern, for to govern 
properly entails knowing the end for which something was founded. Moreover, the true 
foundation of being itself, not just the shaping of this or that bit of being, came to pass 
because of God’s creation. This is the pre-eminent act of foundation, one from which all 
must learn. Thus even those kings who “found” kingdoms in the conventional sense must 
envision themselves as governors, not as founders, to the extent that they take their 
bearings from God’s founding action.22  
This chapter sets up a distinction between creation and governance, a rather 
abstract discussion for a speculum principum. Aquinas however means for this distinction 
to clarify how man’s rule mirrors that of God. Aquinas’ teaching herein does not consign 
all previous political teaching to the dustbin, but rather reforms and purifies it. Founders 
                                                
21 Cf. ST I-II 105. One might also consider Spinoza’s treatment of Moses and prophecy 
in his Theologico-Political Treatise, as well as the discussion of prophecy in the 
Leviathan of Hobbes. 
22 Mansfield shows Machiavelli argues in the Discourses that the only true beginning is 
an independent one. Every founding act is pre-eminently abandoning an old way of life, 
not embracing a new one, for which reason even “native founders,” like Romulus, must 
become foreign to their homeland (Mansfield 1996, 62-66). It is hard to see where God 
would fit in such an account, never mind discerning the proper order of a regime from 
His government. 
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of kingdoms are indeed the pre-eminent kings. But what they do is best done as an 
imitation of God, an imitation undertaken in the recognition that man’s foundation of a 
kingdom must always be derivative of God’s foundation of the world, and in a two-fold 
sense. First, the activity of the king’s foundation mimics or imitates that first act. And 
second, kings ought to order their own activity such that it serves the end intended by that 
exemplary creation. Perhaps this discussion and conclusion should not surprise us. We 
learned in I.8, after all, that kings must govern their kingdoms in conformity with the 
final end sought through politics: beatitude. It would stand to reason, then, that such 
kingdoms were founded for that purpose, and that the very being constitutive of such 
kingdoms was created by God to facilitate man’s beatitude.23 In a sense, what Aquinas 
has done is connect man’s origins with his end.  
If these concerns seem distant from modern politics, we would do well to 
remember the pervasive influence of (often liberal) social contract theories in our time. 
Hobbes and Locke see a state of nature, whether hypothetical or historical, as the 
beginnings of political philosophy. The social contract arises to remedy the deficiencies 
of that state of nature, not to perfect men. Even Rousseau, who envisions a rich pre-
political human community, says of his law-giver in the Social Contract: 
Anyone who dares to institute a people must feel capable of, so to speak, 
changing human nature; of transforming each individual who by himself is a 
perfect and solitary whole into part of a larger whole from which that individual 
would as it were received his life and his being; of weakening man’s constitution 
in order to strengthen it; of substituting a partial and moral existence for the 
independent and physical existence we have all received from nature. In a word, 
he must take from man his own forces in order to give him forces which are 
foreign to him and of which he cannot make use without the help of others.24 
                                                
23 This is not to say that all founders conform to this raison d’être, or to deny that many 
cities are founded on blood and injustice. 
24 Social Contract II.7.3 (Gourevitch trans, 1997). 
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Even if such stories are not argued about or seriously considered in 21st-century 
quotidian politics, their picture of political authority as solely coercive, society as 
artificial, man as but weakly adapted for social living, and the point of politics being 
something low has certainly retained its currency. Even when the aim of society becomes 
something quite high, as with Rousseau, that end is in some sense artificial, for the 
“perfect and solitary whole” of man must be molded into a social being. A politics based 
upon Genesis, as suggested in De Regno, would at least recognize that man does not 
create, and so he must govern in that humility. Society and its authority are natural, and 
man is made to live for and with others, not in spite of others, for with others he can 
become a most noble animal. The world is something given to man, and that his 
knowledge of it requires a receptivity, not mastery. Not only is the world given to man, 
but men are not given to other men: they are peers. If men are meant to live harmoniously 
in nature with other human beings, then the point of their community would surely be 
more than self-preservation.  
There could not be a stronger contrast with the tyrant of I.3-6. He assigns himself 
the power of life and death over his subjects, and decides on the basis of caprice. He 
remakes the political order to achieve such power, but never as a founder, for he ruins 
and perverts rather than creates and orders. Yet when we consider the cult of founders, 
e.g. Romulus, Theseus, Ninus, it can almost seem that they founded their cities for the 
purpose of achieving honor and fame throughout the ages, or at least that such cults are 
maintained to justify the injustices of the foundings of their cities. This is certainly the 
strong suggestion of Machiavelli. That they built lasting cities whose prosperity redounds 
to the benefit of each citizen is a very happy consequence, and necessary to preserving 
the cult of the founder. But if in some sense the founder secures the peace and prosperity 
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of his people instrumentally, that is, only or primarily as it serves their glory, we can 
wonder what circumstances lead such founders to seek glory and honor in a way that 
benefits others, and what would lead them to trespass upon the goods of others if it would 
bring them similar glory. Perhaps the obvious difference is accidents of birth: Romulus 
was born among the Latins, and so served them. His attitude to the Etruscans was, for 
them, fatally different. If living in the city is essential to man, there is still something 
accidental about the boundaries of that city.25 
The founder who can be made to turn against his duty to his people could easily 
become a tyrant. The founder who wants to be remembered as such, however, has an 
obligation to his people that runs deep. It runs, in fact, centuries after his own death. That 
is why his office is so divine. If securing the good of a community is more noble than that 
of an individual person, as Aristotle says, then how much greater a feat would it be to 
secure the common good of a community for generations? This is what Aquinas points 
our king toward. Indeed, the Cypriot king is among the first generations of his dynasty on 
Cyprus. He continues to play a founding role, then, in entrenching and extending the 
execution of justice. In I.1, for example, we noted that the Cypriot kingdom emerged 
from the military operations of the Crusades. This led to a fear that the provincia is not 
simply that a provincia is too large to attain to the excellence of a polis, but that the 
provincia as a state was valued chiefly for its military capacities. To some extent, of 
                                                
25 Even the myths acknowledge something “accidental” about the city’s foundations: 
Romulus and Remus were descended from Aeneas, who came to Italy through the 
vagaries of the Trojan War, culminating in his shipwreck, and the brothers themselves 
were conceived through the unlikely congress of a virgin and a god, raised by a wolf and 
fortuitously rescued by a shepherd family. It is perhaps worth noting, then, that Romulus 
killed Remus over a dispute as to the meaning of the auguries by which they were to be 
directed in the construction of Rome. In other words, the very founding act of Rome was 
an attempt to control the mythical authority of their city-building (Plutarch, Life of 
Romulus 9.5-10.1.) 
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course, Aquinas promises just such a dynamic: each kingdom comes together out of the 
contingent circumstances of human history. But will the rulers of the place recognize that 
the causal foundation of the kingdom is God’s creation of the world? Will they recognize 
that, whatever the vagaries of the kingdom’s founding, the end of the kingdom must be 
serving God?26  
  
CHAPTER III 
Chapter 2 lays out a distinction between creation and governance, and then 
explores in detail the activity of creation. In Chapter 3, Aquinas turns to governance. As 
he has told us that governance more properly relates to the office of kings than does 
creation, we can expect this chapter to have more to say about the duties of kingship than 
did Chapter 2. But after an introductory paragraph promising just this, Aquinas again 
appears to change the subject: “It must first be considered, however, that to govern is to 
lead that which is governed fittingly to its proper [debitum] end” (paragraph 103).  
Aquinas explains that there are two kinds of ends: an end beyond the thing 
governed, and one whose end is in itself. An ocean-going ship, for instance, has an end 
beyond itself, namely the port. Yet the ship also has an internal end: to be a ship. It is 
therefore the office of its governor, the pilot, not only to preserve the integrity of the ship 
as it was made, but also to conduct it to the port. Something whose only end is within 
itself would only need to be governed insofar as it required preservation, for it would 
need no external principle to obtain what is already intrinsic to it. There is only one such 
thing that has its end within itself: God. This might be taken to suggest that only God can 
                                                
26 Thus later Aquinas considers piety to be a species of justice (ST II-II q. 101).  
 148 
be the final good of things, for everything else has some good external to itself. It also 
raises a question: how is something brought to its external end?  
Aquinas does not, however, linger on the example of God. Among those things 
that must be directed to an external good, in some cases they can be ruled by two or more 
governors with different responsibilities for them. Most obviously, there could be a 
governor with the office of preserving them, and another with the office of conducting 
them to their extrinsic end. For instance, one might think of a carpenter as tasked with 
maintaining the being of the ship, and the aforementioned pilot with conducting the ship 
to the port. This is the case with man: 
Now if man were not ordered to another external good, the aforesaid cares would 
suffice for man. But there is a certain good extrinsic to man so long as he lives 
mortally, namely final beatitude, which is looked for [expectatur] in the 
enjoyment of God after death… Therefore the Christian man, for whom that 
beatitude was purchased through the blood of Christ, and who has received the 
pledge [arrham] of the Holy Spirit in order to attain it, needs another, spiritual 
care through which he is directed to the port of eternal salvation. This care is held 
forth to the faithful by the ministers of the Church of Christ (paragraph 105). 
 
Aquinas packs a great many lessons in this short text. Man has an end beyond 
himself: final or ultimate beatitude, which is to say, perfect happiness. Thus, the 
“aforesaid cares,” referring to those of the leader of a regime, are not sufficient to lead 
man to that end. His attainment to that end requires the direction of the Church. It is, 
moreover, a Church guided by the supernatural both in its activity and in the very 
revelation of this truth. Thus man would seem to have two masters: an earthly ruler and a 
spiritual one. There is some sense, then, in which the royal regime we have discussed 
from the prooemium is inadequate to the final happiness of man. If the intrinsic end of 
man were the only end to which society were ordered, whether it be health or wealth or 
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something else, than the government of the prince would suffice to conduct society 
toward that end.  
Aquinas does not, however, move on to say that men in society act for external 
good X, and so should be governed by some power with care for their direction toward it. 
Rather, he pushes the question of what internal end men seek in society.  
It seems, however, that the end of a multitude gathered together is to live 
according to virtue. For men gather so that they may live well together, which the 
individual man living alone could not attain. The good life is in accord with 
virtue; the virtuous life therefore is the end of human congregation…. If men 
gathered merely for the sake of living, then animals and slaves would form a part 
of the civil congregation. If men gathered for the sake of acquiring wealth, then 
all those who traded together would belong to one city. Yet we see that only those 
who are directed toward living well by the same laws and the same government 
are reckoned [computari] in a multitude (paragraph 106). 
 
This section seems to recapitulate I.1 and I.8. That man must live in society to 
attain to his virtue is an essential aspect of the teaching that man is a political animal. 
Aquinas thus speaks of the good life as secundum virtutem, according to virtue. Here he 
has in mind no particular virtue, but the general excellence of man, the aretê of Homer. 
One must know why man lives in society, Aquinas urges, for this will determine how one 
conceives of the city. If the city is a place to maintain bare life, then it is no different 
from the bee hive: brute survival requires instinct, not man’s reason.27 If the city is 
merely a place to trade, a glorified market, then citizens would be merely producers and 
consumers, and the city would seek no more than to secure their property. The citizens of 
a city aiming at virtue, however, live under a government of laws that direct them to 
living well. We note also that this section contains Aquinas’ very first reference to law in 
                                                
27 Of course Aquinas means to suggest at I.1 that man’s instincts are inadequate to his 
survival. But society does not arise only to meet these deficiencies. 
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De Regno. It might seem a minor reference, but notably citizens live under the same law, 
and that law directs them to virtue. Thus law shapes citizens, and citizens of a particular 
regime are shaped by the same law. Law itself comes from a government, but arises from 
the necessity to live well, and thus is only as good as a regime’s knowledge of and 
service to man’s end of virtuous living. Thus regime would seem to be a central category 
of Aquinas’ analysis.28     
The life of virtue, then, is an internal good for man and an intrinsic end of society, 
although it depends upon external conditions. As the point of a ship is to be able to be a 
ship do what ships do, so the carpenter keeps the ship in sailing condition. All the more 
must the ruler of a society ensure that the laws of the regime promote the excellence of 
his people. In reading through II.3, we have not been surprised that Aquinas would posit 
for man an external end: we learned in I.8 that man’s end is beatitude in God. What has 
not been quite clear, however, is the relation of beatitude to the virtues that are the 
excellence of the perfect king at I.8, and the lack of which is the great deficiency of the 
tyrant in I.3-6. Aquinas shortly goes on to explain this: 
Yet because man through living according to virtue is ordered to a further end, 
which consists in divine enjoyment, as we have said above, it is necessary for a 
human multitude to have the same end as one man. It is therefore not the ultimate 
end of an assembled multitude to live according to virtue, but through the virtuous 
life to arrive at divine enjoyment (paragraph 107). 
 
Man, like the ship sailing to port, seeks not only an end internal to himself, but 
also one external to himself, namely beatitude. Society is similarly ordered to this end. 
Aquinas chooses his words carefully: homo vivendo secundum virtutem ad ulteriorem 
finem ordinatur. Virtue may be the final or ultimate end of society, but it is not the final 
                                                
28 Cf. Guerra 2010, 66-70 and Strauss 1953, 138 et seq. 
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or ultimate end of man.29 It seems that virtue would be an end of society regardless of 
whether beatitude had been offered to man. Man attaining to the virtue of man, after all, 
fulfills what it means to be man, much as the ship must be a ship (103-4).30 In this sense, 
then, virtue is not an end merely instrumental to the final end of beatitude. But virtue 
does somehow conduce to the attainment of beatitude, for “through living according to 
virtue” man is “ordered” to beatitude. The word “ordered,” ordinatur, does not mean that 
virtue itself secures beatitude, much as an arrow does not hit its target simply because the 
archer aims the arrow at that target. It might be better to think of politics as a “secondary 
efficient cause” rather than instrumental, as Maritain would say. The life of politics is not 
merely “instrumental” to the supernatural life man seeks; yet in Aquinas’ picture the life 
of virtue pursued in politics is complementary to the external good of beatitude.31 To 
press the point, if “civil religion seeks to instrumentalize religion on behalf of political 
purposes,” it does not follow that any attempt to invert this order of priority necessarily 
leads to a theocracy whereby religion instrumentalizes politics.32 
Aquinas explains that the king would govern man toward beatitude “if this end 
could be attained by virtue of human nature”, but in fact it cannot (paragraph 108). For 
the loftier the end of government, the loftier that government. And when one government 
serves a final end, then other governments that serve ends conducing toward that final 
                                                
29 Or, perhaps natural virtue is the final end of man qua part of the whole that is society, 
but not qua intellectual and therefore whole being. Gardner 2011 raises many questions 
that would require answering to know Aquinas’ position on the matter. 
30 One can see from the Genesis account of creation that man and his activity are good, 
and that God recognizes this, quite independently of whether God then later raises men to 
beatitudo. Cf. Laborem exercens §4. 
31 Cf. Maritain’s Freedom in the Modern World, 105-7; Dewan 2000 and Pakaluk 2001 
(discussed by Smith 2010, 101-105)  
32 Beiner 2011, 309; emphasis in original. This is not Beiner’s point, although he makes 
clear with his frequent references to “true” theocracy that the bar for what counts as 
theocracy is rather high. 
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end are subordinated to that final government. Note that Aquinas does not argue here that 
any government higher than another directs that lower one in all things, but the more 
restricted proposition that the higher one “commands those who execute the things that 
are ordained to that end.”33 The government that tends to man’s final end, however, is not 
that of the king, but of the God-man king: Christ. By making men sons of God, and by 
virtue of His eternal dominion over man, Jesus is not just a priest, but a king.      
Therefore the ministry of this kingdom, that spiritual things might be 
distinguished from earthly things, was committed not to earthly kings, but to 
priests, and especially to the chief priest, the successor of Peter, the vicar of 
Christ, the Roman pontiff, to whom all kings of the Christian people [populi 
Christiani]34 are to be as subject as to Lord Jesus Christ Himself (paragraph 110). 
Therefore to him to whom pertains the care of the ultimate end should be subject 
those to whom pertains the care of antecedent ends, and be directed by his 
command [imperio].35 
 
Kings do not govern this spiritual kingdom, for to do so would confuse the spiritual and 
the earthly. Therefore priests are entrusted with this mission, and all kings are subject to 
the head priest, the pope. Aquinas refers to them not just as kings, but as “kings of the 
Christian people.” The necessity for distinguishing between “spiritual things” and 
“earthly things” is not difficult to see. Most obviously, this distinction is necessary 
because they fulfill different ends of man. The earthly king cannot fulfill man’s final end 
                                                
33 This argument appears to concord with Aquinas’ famous claim at II Sent 44, 
according to which powers derived from the same source are ordered to one another only 
insofar as the end of the superior specifies. For instance, the temporal power is ordered to 
the supernatural one only insofar as the temporal end directly conduces to the spiritual 
end (Boyle 2000). We will return to this consideration in Chapter 5. 
34 Populus Christianus is often translated by the ubiquitous “Christendom.”  
35 “Sic enim ei, ad quem finis ultimi cura pertinet, subdi debent illi, ad quos pertinet 
cura antecedentium finium, et eius imperio dirigi.” Note that the syntax emphasizes the 
governor with care for the ultimate good, placing the political subordinate governors in a 
distinct subordination to him. 
 153 
of beatitude, because grace is required to do so. Thus the Church has been given the grace 
to govern man toward beatitude. The necessity of separation, then, rests perhaps more on 
theological grounds than on any political reason. Perhaps our king can more easily accept 
this loss of power because it seems to have a spiritual rather than a political motive.  
It should also be clear that the king’s duty to propagate “living according to 
virtue” is no mean feat. This has been the point of the exposition on tyranny (I.3-6) and 
the great reward of the king (I.7-9). One might think that kings have plenty to do without 
serving as priestly mediators of God’s grace. Kings as rulers of communities have a 
natural function, readily apparent to reason alone. The distinction of a separate power to 
govern man toward a separate end, then, in some sense is a confirmation of the role that 
kings already perform. Aquinas does not argue that the appearance of a grace-given end 
for man renders the governance of man toward his natural end as worthless or 
meaningless.  
Even more so, however, we have seen in De Regno what is readily apparent to the 
most amateur student of history: kingdoms come and go, the seeds of decay planted 
within their own foundations. Even proverbially eternal polities, such as Rome, suffer 
many deaths. If the kingdom of God is really to be eternal, then it would do well not to 
associate itself too closely with the passing and corruptible, but, as far as possible, to 
form a regime that in human terms endures or is the visible expression of what endures. 
Perhaps this seems a modern, post-Vatican II position, but in fact it is well supported by 
Aquinas’ own considerations. What has Aquinas done, after all, but emphasize the 
ephemerality of regimes?  
Most curiously about this section, Aquinas does not start by asking why the 
temporal and spiritual powers are separate and distinct, nor does he begin by asking 
which power is superior. The powers, rather, arise out of the ends of man, an inquiry that 
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Aquinas began at I.1. And the superiority of one power over another is not based upon 
that power as such, but the end that it serves. In fact, for most of De Regno, Aquinas has 
spoken of only one end of man, and has argued that ends matter to politics. This was his 
sleight of hand at I.8, when he showed that what one would want to get from politics, 
even what the tyrant would want, would be incomplete without considering what fulfills 
man’s end. He has, in turn, said little more about its governance other than that it belongs 
to the king to direct man to his end. And this would be all that need be said “if man were 
not ordered to another, external good” (paragraph 105). He thus avoids, it seems to me, 
defensive positions according to which one power is superior without articulating the 
proper coordination of man’s ends, or whereby the two powers have no point of contact a 
priori, thus foreclosing discussion on the identification and coordination of man’s end or 
ends. One can, of course, disagree with Aquinas at any step in this argument. Yet the 
manner in which he lays out his argument is a great strength for rational debate.36 
A word might be necessary about this “Christian people.” For what is their status 
vis-à-vis these kingdoms of temporal rulers? For all the national divisions in Europe 
continuing to form the nation-state in Aquinas’ own time, this account of the pope at the 
apex of spiritual power is one of a vision of one people, name the children of God. 
Curiously, Aquinas does not specify that the pope has supremacy in matters of faith or 
spiritual things. He simply states that “to him all the kings of the Christian People,” and 
thus presumably the people themselves, “are to be subject.” The pope would seem to be a 
symbol of their unity.37 But what kind of unity? Aquinas has already urged the 
importance of the regime. But he has also implied its transitory nature. Does this populus 
                                                
36 Hittinger makes a similar point concerning the polemical use of natural law (Hittinger 
2003, 3-37). 
37 Cf. Eschmann 1949, 62, fn 15. Manent 1994, 3-9, for the problem of the universalism 
of Empire and Papacy. 
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Christianus undergird regimes? Perhaps this could be a salutary aid to governance, but it 
would also mean that this populus would be in some sense more fundamental than any 
regime. Would such a doctrine not diminish the importance of the regime, denying its 
claim to be fully self-sufficient?  
Such considerations underline our problem: what arrangement does this doctrine 
prescribe for a regime? Aquinas opened Chapter II, after all, with a promise to discuss 
how a kingdom ought to be governed. Will he disappoint us yet again, as he seemed to at 
I.6 and II.1? Perhaps not, as Aquinas next turns to the character of this priesthood.38 
Aquinas speaks first of the “priesthood of the gentiles” (paragraph 111). That priesthood 
and “the entire cult of [their] divinities” served nothing more than acquiring temporal 
goods, all of which were ordered to the common good.39 Thus that priesthood and cult 
were governed by kings. This discussion might call to mind Aquinas’ discussion at 
paragraph 72, in which he notes that ancient peoples often saw something godly or divine 
in their kings, and singles out the Roman emperors’ appellation Divus. Aquinas’ point 
there was to illustrate the testaments in even pagan societies to the likeness between king 
and God that he wants to advance within a Christian teaching. Now if we take Aquinas’ 
further suggestion here that many ancient kings had cultic duties and were in some sense 
at the head of the priests, then we can see all the more why a king would seem god-like to 
his people. After all, these cults were chiefly dedicated to the temporal advancement of 
the kingdom. The head of the cult, there, would naturally be that society’s prince. Besides 
ancient peoples praying in earnest for fair weather, good crops and peace, we know that 
                                                
38 I owe much in the following discussion of paragraphs 111-113 to Gilson 1948, 209-
216. Gilson points to the necessity of a comparative study of De Regno and the De 
Monarchia of Dante.  
39 Aquinas speaks of divinorum, divinus being a less direct word than deus or deitas. He 
acknowledges that pagans took certain powers to be sacred without equating them with 
Christianity. 
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many such cults evolved into “civil theologies” whose purpose increasingly became to 
grant legitimacy to rulers and laws, to bind the people to the land and their ruler by a set 
of mythic norms that some rulers were at times rather cynical about propagating.40 
Whatever their sincerity, Aquinas here recognizes that such cults were instituted by 
man’s hand for man’s natural needs, and to satisfy his most pressing concerns of life and 
death. They are also ergo fittingly directed by the leader of man’s community. 
Aquinas then turns to priests under the “lex vetera,” or Old (divine) Law. This 
was the law that God gave to the ancient Hebrews, especially to form their community in 
Palestine.41 The priests of the Old Law were also subject to the Hebrew rulers, whether 
judges or kings. The Old Law, after all, promised to secure the peace and prosperity of 
the Hebrews. It promised to educate them, in other words, in “earthly goods.” This was a 
salutary provision, and indeed divine instruction. But with this law the community was 
directed to goods they could attain by their own reason, even if God’s word was helpful 
to pointing out what they needed and specific contingent formations of their society.42 
Thus in this respect the regime of Moses was indeed earthly. But the conclusions of 
Machiavelli and Spinoza go farther than can be warranted.     
As went the Old Law, though, so went its customary modes of governance. For 
“in the New Law there is a higher priesthood by which men are carried [traducunter] to 
celestial goods” (paragraph 111). Aquinas often uses the language of duco, ducere to 
                                                
40 Rousseau argues in the Social Contract that lawgivers attribute laws to divine origins 
so that what the people lack in rational apprehension of his wise dictates, which in any 
event many not be so wise, they may gain in awe and respect for their authority (II.7.9-
12). Thus “at the origin of nations the one [religion] serves as the instrument of the other 
[politics],” (II.7.12). Compare this to Hobbes’ doctrine at Leviathan I.12 according to 
which religion explains unknown causes.  
41 ST I-II 98-105 
42 ST I-II 114.10.1 
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speak of direction or governance. But here Aquinas uses traduco, from the compound 
trans-duco, and in the passive voice, as in to be borne or carried by another. Such 
nuances might seem insignificant were this not the first use of a word whose root, duco, 
has been used many times in the active voice hitherto. Indeed, this section reinforces 
Aquinas’ earlier points. The priests mediate grace so that man can do what he could not 
do by his own natural faculties, namely attain to beatitude. The primary element of this 
dynamic, then, is that man is given this grace and is rendered capable of acting upon it, 
not that he accepts this grace and acts upon it. Instead of the priests serving the earthly 
needs of the city, these priests grant men access to an end beyond the earthly one. Thus, 
“in the law of Christ, kings must be subject to priests.” The king retains a special office in 
ordering the earthly to this heavenly end, but he must take direction from those with care 
for man’s final end. The great shift in this priesthood, then, is not one of subordination to 
superiority, but of man to God. The shift thus indeed represents a change, but not an 
inconsistency between Christian and pre-Christian modes of politics.  
This section of II.3 fascinates us in part because Aquinas gives persuasive 
arguments to justify what we now call civil religion or civil theology.43 He grants their 
validity in other orders, offering reasons for thinking that they effected salutary 
arrangements in other times. What Aquinas proposes, however, is the sweeping away of 
these ancient and pervasive orders: distinguishing clearly these two ends of man, 
identifying the two governments that lead man to them and fixing the hierarchy of those 
governments based upon the hierarchy of their respective ends. But in acknowledging 
that such civil religions exist in many times and places, and have existed to such benefit, 
                                                
43 It is the most direct and “pungent” discussion Aquinas undertakes on civil religion, as 
Russell Hittinger has helpfully pointed out. Moreover, this section offers an excellent 
point of comparison between the thought of Aquinas and Augustine, for whom the 
critique of Roman civil religion was so integral to the argument of his City of God. 
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Aquinas seems to admit that such civil religions are likely to endure after the arrival of 
Christianity. From a purely earthly point of view, then, we might add another reason for 
why this new priesthood of Christianity ought to be separate from the political order: the 
New Law will not be accepted in all places and all times, and in some cases political 
power will have a vested interest in maintaining older forms of religion that serve under 
Caesar. Thus the supra-political basis of Christianity must be firmly emphasized. 
But it could also be necessary to address another problem, namely the attempt to 
reduce the Christian Church to a part of the state, one serving the terrestrial benefit and 
no more. Such a dynamic represents not a rejection of Christian doctrine, but a partial one 
according to which at least some aspect of the new religion is accepted but under the 
guise of the old forms of subjection to political authority. This partial acceptance could 
range from a conservative “Crown and Altar” or divine right of kings vision, as with de 
Maistre, to a liberal one in which a simplified church or religion legitimizes certain 
visions of a tolerant and egalitarian society, as with Spinoza or Rousseau.44 The fear of 
such false accommodations or rejections is only an argument for the priests being distinct 
from political governance, not for them being superior to the governor, but such a 
distinction would be necessary for claiming the superiority of the Church. 
Aquinas closes Chapter 3 with two seemingly mundane historical examples: 
Rome and France. This is how Aquinas raises the example of Rome: 
Because of this Divine Providence wonderfully provided that in the city of Rome, 
which God had foreseen would be the principal seat of the Christian people, the 
custom was gradually established that the rulers of the city should be subject to 
the priests. For as Valerius Maximus relates: “Our city always placed religion 
before everything else, even those things in which it aimed for the splendour of 
the highest majesty to be seen. For this reason the imperial did not hesitate to 
serve the sacred [non dubitaverunt sacris imperia servire], considering that they 
                                                
44 See Murray 1949 for de Maistre 
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would thus hold the regime of human affairs if faithfully and constantly they 
attended to the divine power (paragraph 112).45  
 
Valerius flourished under Tiberius, and this city that “always placed religion 
before everything else” is imperial and pagan Rome.46 The example of imperial Rome is 
important for at least two reasons. First, it shows that even pre-Christian Rome had a 
sense of the importance of religion. This awareness of the pre-eminence of religion was 
strong enough to arise even in a city for which religion was tightly fused with politics: the 
emperors were treated as gods, and the civil cults were conducted not only in terms of 
their temporal benefits, but as goods in themselves.47 Such recognitions of the connection 
between kings and God, as Aquinas enumerated at paragraph 72, can become obstacles to 
seeing the necessity of the Christian ordering of the temporal and spiritual (paragraph 
111). 
Second, because Aquinas invokes imperial rather than Christian Rome, the point 
he stresses is not the typical one, and by invoking imperial Rome he clearly elects not to 
stress that typical one. Indeed, the progression from pagan societies to the Old Testament 
and to the New Testament might lead one to suspect that a contemporary example from 
Christendom would be in order. The king could well have expected to hear that in Rome 
come together the two powers, spiritual and temporal, in the person of one ruler, namely 
the pope. The pope sits at the apex of spiritual and temporal authority, and his temporal 
authority extends well beyond those territories of central Italy that he directly controls.48 
                                                
45 In the quotation of Valerius Maximus I abandon entirely Eschmann’s translation, 
instead borrowing from that of Blythe. 
46 Valerius Maximus, Factorum et dictorum memorabilium, I.1.9. 
47 Cf. Machiavelli’s Discourses I.11-15, which should be compared to I.19. 
48 A point Aquinas does earlier choose to make in his Commentary on the Sentences (II 
d. 44 q. 2 a. 3). 
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He has the power to command any Christian ruler, with a special care for the chief 
temporal ruler, the Holy Roman emperor. This was the point of Henry IV’s humiliation at 
Canossa: he literally made himself humble [humilis] before his superior, Pope Gregory 
VII. The Emperor had resisted the Pope’s efforts to reform the Church, but incredibly 
sought forgiveness after being excommunicated, walking barefoot and in a hair-shirt to 
publicly apologize to the Pope in 1077. But Aquinas invokes neither this theory nor this 
history. Aquinas instead chooses to emphasize that with Rome emerges the fundamental 
ordering of the spiritual and temporal, with the spiritual superior to the temporal.  
Why not discuss Christian Rome? Perhaps Aquinas means to avoid controversies 
surrounding the extent of the pope’s temporal power. After all, in later theology the claim 
that the spiritual had some superiority to the temporal was made to stand or fall with the 
supremacy of the pope in temporal affairs. One such teaching comes from John of Paris, 
or Quidort, which is notable if only because Quidort is sometimes said to be the first 
Thomist.49 Quidort’s theory sets this conjunction of the temporal and spiritual power of 
the Papacy as the great question of his theory, and finds that the pope has no such 
conjoined authority. From this he concludes that the pope has no temporal authority, and 
therefore that the spiritual authority of the popes has no meaningful superiority over the 
temporal.50 In fact, Christian kings may control the pope as ancient cults were by pagan 
                                                
49 Quidort joined in the defense of Aquinas during the heated debates shortly after 
Aquinas’ death, but it is doubtful that his own work conforms to that of Aquinas 
(Griesbach 1959). 
50 See De potestate regia et papali, Chapters 3, 7-13. The above Griesbach is the best 
account, with several sourcebooks, including, surprisingly, 402-3 of Fortin’s introduction 
to the excerpts in Medieval Political Philosophy (Lerner and Mahdi 1972), making 
reference to neither the unique argument of Quidort nor his lack of congruence with 
Aquinas. (It is to be regretted that Ernest Fortin never conducted a study of Quidort.) 
Note however McCoy 1963, 123-126, wherein McCoy links Quidort to Marsilius of 
Padua and his Defensor Pacis. 
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kings. Further, Quidort assumes the power of temporal kings based upon a kind of proto-
state of nature account, and he never raises the question of man’s ends, their 
coordination, and whether the Christian revelation gives us reasons to revisit what we 
might have assumed about them.51 Most interestingly, it does not seem to occur to 
Quidort that even in pre-Christian cultures, including imperial Rome and ancient Israel, 
the problem of how the spiritual relates to the temporal was also an important aspect of 
political arrangements, as Aquinas has pointed out. So Aquinas’ approach wisely 
distinguishes between such matters.  
In other words, if Aquinas seeks in De Regno to avoid controversies as to the 
pope’s temporal power, then that is not to say that he is not interested in engaging in a 
serious discussion of that matter. And, as we have seen, if Aquinas does not directly 
broach the problems raised by Christian Rome, he has given the king guidance as to how 
to think about them, and reflectively rather than polemically.  
France, the Elder Daughter of the Church, figures as the second example. It is 
again the condition of the country prior to Christianity that interests Aquinas.  
Since, however, it was to be that the religion of the Christian priesthood should 
especially thrive [vigeret] in Gaul, God permitted that among the Gauls the 
gentile priests, whom they called Druids, should prescribe [definirent] the law of 
all Gaul… (paragraph 113).52 
 
France’s ancient precursors, the pre-Roman Gauls, saw the wisdom in subordinating the 
temporal to the spiritual, at least insofar as they recognized a priestly solicitude for their 
laws. The claim is relatively modest, then: not that gentile priests were theologian-kings 
or undisputed in temporal authority, or even that such ancient societies clearly 
                                                
51 De Potestate, Chapters 1-2 
52 Perhaps Aquinas refers to France as “Gaul” to link it to its ancient Celtic piety. 
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distinguished between temporal and spiritual matters. In fact, Aquinas’ earlier claims 
make it clear that such cults dealt largely in immanent matters and ordered their priestly 
class to the king. Yet however inchoately, the relation of priest to ruler in Celtic Gaul 
foreshadows the Christian teaching on the superiority of the spiritual to the temporal, a 
claim made on the basis of wisdom rather than power.53  
Rhetorically, this is a brilliant manner in which to teach our king. In the time of 
Aquinas and our royal reader, France had become a hotbed of anti-Roman sentiment. As 
the Holy Roman emperors became increasingly weaker, the French kings took up the 
mantle of temporal power, claiming the right to appoint and control bishops of French 
dioceses, farm revenues from Church properties, and had little truck for papal 
objections.54 In other words, the French came close to founding a Christian civil religion, 
and we know now that France became a leading center of the so-called “divine right of 
kings” theory in the early modern period. These controversies came to a head shortly 
after Aquinas’ time, with Philip IV (le Bel or the Fair) against Pope Boniface VIII and 
then Clement V. King Philip was notably aided in his arguments against Rome by two 
theologians who were sometime-students of Aquinas: John of Paris (Quidort) and 
Guillaume de Nogaret.55 We can thus wonder about the effect this teaching on France’s 
history would have on the Cypriot king, coming as he did from a baronial family in 
                                                
53 The Druid case is a counter-example to Rousseau’s claims at Social Contract IV.8.1-4 
that only with Christianity came a subordination of the temporal to the spiritual. 
Rousseau is correct, however, that among ancient cities gods were in the main confined 
to a particular city. Aquinas does not directly address herein the crucial fact behind this 
shift in orientation, monotheism, except insofar as it is the one and true God who create 
the one people of the true Faith, the populus Christianus. Cf. Assmann 2010, 31-56 (but 
see Ratzinger 2003, 210-230). 
54 Cf. Moody 1953 and Sturzo 1939 
55 Brown 2012 
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western France with close ties to the Capets.56 It would be all the more striking given his 
dynasty’s new situation in Cyprus: possessing a tenuous and military hold on their 
kingdom, they were after all there in the first place for the supremely spiritual mission of 
freeing the Holy Land, never mind their dependence on the erudite Dominicans for the 
administration of that kingdom.57 
In short, this has been a rich chapter. In many times and places, man has 
recognized some correspondence between himself and what is beyond the merely 
terrestrial or temporal. This correspondence has some significance for his communal life, 
as well. His search to understand this correspondence, therefore, has not been a private 
activity or individual hobby, but a public activity of the community itself. Philosophy can 
give flesh to this intuition, as Aquinas showed at I.7. Further, Christianity reveals this 
natural desire to seek our end as fulfilled in God. The desire to know God may be natural, 
but its fulfillment is supernatural, or above nature. The king leads man toward beatitude, 
but he does not secure it as such.58 What is new with Christianity, then, is not just an 
identification of man’s spiritual end, but a government by which to govern men toward 
                                                
56 Hill 1948 
57 The Dominican Order itself had a tumultuous relationship with the Empire and the 
Papacy, in many periods favoring the Empire (Eschmann 1958, 189-90). Aquinas might 
have sought to avoid joining this fray, or perhaps rather joins it insofar as he offers the 
possibility of a more reasoned and dispassionate account of the problems plaguing the 
Europe of his time.  
58 Thus there is a distinction but also complementarity between “nature” and 
“supernature” that is perhaps better expressed by “nature” and grace” (Torrell 2009, 155-
88). 
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it.59 A distinct spiritual government, the Church, conducts man to a distinct end, 
beatitude.60  
But consider this possible problem. Book II, we saw, finally turns to the practical 
considerations of a king’s reign. Chapter I distinguishes between God’s creation and 
governance of the world for models of royal governance, and Chapter II sets out how the 
former aides the king in his task. Chapter III naturally follows with a promise to set forth 
how our king may learn to govern by studying the divine government of the world. Yet 
Aquinas then writes: “It must first be considered, however, that to govern is to lead that 
which is governed fittingly to its proper [debitum] end” (paragraph 103). We are then led 
to a consideration of the distinct ends of man, and the distinct powers that govern man 
toward those ends. As Eschmann suggests, this discussion, as absorbing as it has been, 
does not seem to answer to the putative purpose of the chapter. It has been yet another 
digression. 
The digression, then, would consist not in teaching the king how to govern from a 
consideration of God’s governance of the world, but rather in distinguishing the ends of 
temporal and spiritual government. This is not the teaching we were expecting, and 
surely not the one the Cypriot would look toward after chapters of anticipation for some 
concretely useful guidance. This chapter, however, has provided an elaboration on the 
significance of the minister Dei concept for the king’s governance, because we see that 
the temporal power is to be subordinate to the spiritual. We might think that Aquinas 
means to make of the king a minister Ecclesiae. For the ends are not just distinct: the 
                                                
59 Eric Voegelin seems to attribute the distinction between the temporal and spiritual to 
particular and contingent formations of Christianity. See Niemeyer 1992 and LeQuire 
2011 on the ambiguity of Voegelin’s thought on Christianity.  
60 Cf. Strauss 1953, 144-5, especially Strauss’ suggestion that “even this crucial 
modification of the classical teaching was in a way anticipated by the classics.”  
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spiritual is superior to the temporal, and the temporal is antecedent or intermediate to the 
spiritual. There is not just a distinction of ends, then, but a hierarchy of ends. Yet what 
kind of arrangement is actually proposed? Must a community’s temporal authority simply 
avoid contradicting the law or activity of the spiritual? Must it actively serve it? An 
entrée into such questions might start by asking what it means for man’s temporal or 
earthly end to be antecedent or intermediate [antecedentium] to man’s eternal or heavenly 
end. The end of baking bread is antecedent to that of making a sandwich, but not in the 
same way that the end of learning the alphabet is to learning how to read. Similarly, while 
we recognize that certain authorities have final power over others who perform tasks 
subsidiary to their own, there is a range of such relations, from the construction 
supervisor who directs the electrician to wire a house, but does not know how to do such 
things himself, and so can only judge the activity of the electrician in light of its effect on 
his own task, to the professor who is finally responsible for every activity of his teaching 
assistant, to the point of re-performing his TA’s assignments himself if they go awry.  
Beyond the question of how these powers are to be ordered and how the king 
ought to comport his rule to the Church, we might revisit this intriguing concept of the 
populus Christianus.61 Is the king responsible in some sense for constituting that people 
or some portion of it? Must he seek its unity with other kings, as might seem to be the 
case with the Holy Roman emperor? Or is this primarily the task of the Church? Perhaps 
the Church somehow aims to rule the populus Christianus with little regard for that same 
people as citizens of diverse states? How are kings of several and diverse regimes to 
accommodate their laws to a Church that aims to rule men without distinction as to the 
character of those regimes? This would likely put uneven burdens upon kings, as the 
                                                
61 Voegelin notes that this populus Christianus raises a doubt about the perfection of the 
polis (Voegelin 2000, 218-20). It certainly separates the question of natural right from the 
best regime (Kries 1993, 222-5). 
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Church’s law would be more and less like those of different kings. In other words, would 
the principle of universalism inhering in this populus be a force for stable harmony in 
politics, or a chaotic and disordering one? 
We might finally note the significance Aquinas grants to the New Law, or the 
Gospel. It is through this revealed teaching that man is shown to have two ends, and 
moreover that the supernatural is man’s final end. As we saw at I.7, one might be able to 
see that no reward on earth is adequate to man’s highest faculties, and man might spend 
his days in despair over finding such an end. Yet Christianity, Aquinas says, claims to 
reveal this end. It is furthermore through this law that the governor of man toward this 
end is revealed: the Church. We might not know the precise arrangement of the king and 
the Church, but we do know that we need to know the necessity of such an ordering. In 
other words, the king needs to know that his rule does not extend to the spiritual. The 
king must know that rather the Church supplies the government, and that somehow their 
diverse ends must be reconciled. These teachings can only be had from the revealed 
teaching of Christianity.  
 
CHAPTER IV 
Aquinas begins II.4 by synthesizing what he has argued throughout II.1-3. Yet 
because thus far Book II has underlined what the king cannot do, namely lead his people 
to beatitude, this synthesis appears to be also a re-formulation, for it emphasizes what the 
king should do. As man’s earthly life is ordained to his celestial life, Aquinas now argues, 
so the goods of his earthly life are ordered to the common good of his community. This 
point was discussed in I.1-6, or at least it was established that man’s goods cannot be 
used against the common good. This leads to an important basis of the king’s temporal 
authority:  
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If, then, as we have said, who has care of the ultimate end ought to take 
precedence over those who have care of things ordained to that end, and to direct 
them by his command, it is clear from what has been said that the king, just as he 
ought to be subject to the lordship and regime administered by the office of 
priesthood, ought to take precedence over all human offices, and order them by 
the command of his regime (paragraph 114). 
 
In II.3 Aquinas made a point that could be difficult for our king to accept, namely that his 
rule ought to be subordinate to that of the Church. Yet the same principle grants the king 
responsibility over those earthly things that tend to the benefit of the common good: he 
rules them. For if he is to lead the people to their end, then he must be able to order the 
goods of society to that common end. If the priesthood rules the king, the king rules those 
below him. We might think that, being prepared by the great reward of the task at I.7-9, 
he is willing to accept this role.62 
But what is the character of this rule? Aquinas explains this further. When one 
performs an activity whose end serves a higher end, one must ensure that one performs 
that activity or preserves that end in such a way as to conduce toward that further end or 
activity it serves. The builder, for instance, does not construct a home in any fashion that 
strikes his fancy, but constructs it such that in general “it is apt for habitation,” and 
particularly such that it meets the needs of its future inhabitants (paragraph 115). We 
have seen, moreover, that the end of the community is ordered to something beyond it, to 
beatitude. The rule of the king that secures the end of that regime, then, must be such as 
to conduce to beatitude. The end of the community, we have been told several times, is 
the “life according to virtue” (paragraph 106-7) or “living well” (paragraph 114).  
                                                
62 Boyle offers a similar interpretation of this passage, urging that it is “in the best 
dualistist tradition,” and notes that Eschmann 1958, who develops a distinctly hierocratic 
interpretation of De Regno, makes no mention of this passage (Boyle 2000, 6). 
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Therefore, since heavenly beatitude is the end of that virtuous life we live well at 
present, it pertains to the duty of the king to procure the good life of the multitude 
in such that it suits [congruit] the attainment of heavenly happiness, that is, he 
should order those things which lead to the happiness of Heaven and, as far as 
possible, forbid their contraries (paragraph 115). 
 
We now have an answer to the question of II.2 as to what the king promotes. He does not 
govern men finally to beatitude, but to the life of virtue, which somehow conduces to 
beatitude. But precisely what mode of virtuous living congrues with beatitude? How is 
the king to know it?  
From divine law is known the way [via] to true beatitude and what are 
impediments of it, the teaching of which pertains to the office of priests, 
according to Malachi [2:7]: “The lips of the priest shall guard knowledge and they 
shall seek the law from his mouth”… Instructed by this divine law, therefore, [the 
king] ought to attend to this principal concern, how the multitude subject to him 
may live well (paragraph 116).  
 
Divine law is needful for good governance, for the king learns through lex divina what 
leads to beatitude and what prevents it. Of course there is still the question of what 
precisely among such things he is supposed to perform. We do know one reason why 
kings must consult lex divina: to know what they must not do. Recall the teaching of 
paragraph 111 in II.3 according to which the traditional subordination of priests to kings 
must be reversed, as must be the concomitant ordering of cult and liturgy to statecraft. It 
is an innovation of Christianity, Aquinas tells us, that the king should not only be beneath 
the priest, but also, more basically, distinct from the priest: there is no Imperator Divus, 
Amun-Ra or king-deity who mediates or incarnates the Godhead. Thus the king, just like 
Aquinas himself, must consult the lex divina nova, the new divine law, for a principled 
justification of the division of political and spiritual authority.  
 169 
One might object that this information only sets the terms of the problem we must 
solve. We do not know what Aquinas expects the king to do because the duty of the king 
has been stated in negative terms: he is not to govern them toward beatitude, but to 
govern them toward some kind of virtuous life that would conduce to beatitude. If this is 
a negative teaching, however, it is yet an important one. Aquinas gave our king the 
history lesson at paragraphs 111-113, we might think, at least in part to make clear how 
pervasive civil religions have been and will continue to be. Yet this objection also brings 
home the crucial point of II.4: the knowledge the king need seek is not finally in De 
Regno or any speculum principum, or, indeed, in the Justinian Code, Aristotle’s Politics, 
Gratian’s Decretals or any such book. The knowledge the king must seek is in the Bible. 
In some sense, then, II.4 is a transformation of the teaching of De Regno: just as I.8 
claimed to give the king the great wisdom he needs to govern, so II.4 directs the king 
beyond De Regno.63  
On the other hand, nothing in the progression from I.1. to II.4 suggests that the 
activity of politics is mysterious and in need of radical clarification. Indeed, I.1-6 gave 
the king a persuasive image of what politics should not look like, and it was persuasive 
because the king untutored could agree. But I.1-6 in fact was a kind of tutorial, one 
toward the need for knowledge of ends in politics. Thus the point of I.8 was less to 
instruct the king in specific political activities than to show him the great point of politics 
and of the earthly existence of man. Perhaps seeing the end proper to politics will alter 
somewhat his political activities, rationalizing it and purifying it of contradictions and 
elevating its task. Thus at II.3 we see the king urged to see God as the founder of cities, 
and himself as a founder in only the most derivative way. On the other hand, the king is 
                                                
63 Cf. ST I-II 90.3 on the prince as “vicem gerens multitudinis” and Maritain at Man and 
the State 134-8 and Freedom in the Modern World 154 (fn 1), the latter of which includes 
helpful references to Billot and Journet.  
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now the governor of this city that God founds, as Aquinas emphasizes in the beginning of 
II.4.  
Thus it may well be that the point of the king referring to the divine law is 
primarily negative: the virtue that Aquinas wishes the king to propagate among his 
people are “intermediate” or “antecedent” to beatitude, and it turns out to be Aquinas’ 
great teaching that the end of political activity is emphatically not beatitude. A ruler 
pursues intermediate goods, however “ecumenical” those intermediate goods are, and 
knows that they are not final goods.  
As we have read, the king must lay down a regime by which “the multitude 
subject to him may live well” (116). How is he to do it? Aquinas takes the task to be 
three-fold: to establish virtue among the multitude; to preserve that virtue; and to improve 
upon it. A description of these tasks occupies paragraphs 118-121.  
First, to establish virtue among the citizens is the great task of founding: not just 
to build a city, but souls. And it is not easy work: “Yet the unity of man is caused by 
nature, while the unity of multitude, which is called peace, must be procured through the 
industry of the ruler” (paragraph 118). The king may take his direction from the regime 
of nature, but his own work is a product of human intelligence. This unitas pacis, 
discussed at I.1, must be such that men are directed to acting well. This unity, Aquinas 
explains, has a two-fold nature: it has a material basis in the necessities that permit life in 
the first place, e.g., food and shelter, but also in the kind of harmony that permits men to 
work together rather than contradict and counter-act one another. In other words, this 
peace is an active state, not the stability of a “system” closed in on itself, as in the 
artificial order propagated by the tyrant. This pacis unitas seems a more organic thing. 
Second, to preserve this life of virtue requires a consideration of what can harm or 
bring to an end this unitas pacis: mortality, perversion of wills, and external attack 
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(paragraph 119). Even the most virtuous regime must reckon with mortality, namely that 
men die. To preserve the immortality of the regime, as it were, men must be replaced, 
meaning raised well to virtue and then assume their offices in the community. Even 
within the span of a life, Aquinas warns, men are suited for different tasks. Thus the 
regime must be rendered “in a sense perpetual” although men be not. The second concern 
is the “perversity of the wills of men.” This perversity can lead to laziness and thus 
failures to perform duties, as was the case, we might recall, with the Romans under the 
early Roman kings (I.4), or active transgressions of justice in the form of violence and 
usurpations of power. This was the kind of tyranny that came to characterize the Romans 
after they overthrew their kings, although at least for a while they enjoyed the bounties of 
republican liberty. There is, finally, attack from external enemies, by which a city, 
Aquinas dramatically notes, can be “completely blotted out [funditus dissipatur].” The 
ability to fend off such attacks, again, was the reason for the superiority of the provincia 
to the city at I.1. 
Aquinas’ explanations for each of these factors are matter-of-fact and relate 
directly to the health of the city. We thus might find them obvious and mundane. But it is 
first extraordinary that external attacks come last in this list, for they are the most obvious 
threat to a community. Indeed, while all three threats can disorder a community, attack 
from enemies is the only threat that Aquinas explicitly claims can end the very life of the 
community. Yet the life thus extinguished could be virtuous to the end, and snuffed out 
through no fault of its own. Humans, after all, cannot control their enemies. They seek to 
secure concord with their neighbors as they can, but they cannot prevent empires from 
threatening them when those empires have a mind to do so. Even when the external 
enemy “blots out completely” a city, one rues the size or strength of that city, not their 
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virtue. Thus what makes the threat posed by external enemies the most daunting to our 
king might also make them the least morally significant. 
Then again, we might wonder if external enemies are distinct from this second 
cause, the perversity of wills. Most obviously, citizens with little love for their country 
render it vulnerable to external attack, making it difficult to assay whether the country 
was finally brought down by internal sloth and decadence or external invaders who sense 
such weakness. This was often how the question of Rome was put in the Enlightenment.64 
But consider the ideal case, when one’s city is perfectly virtuous but overcome by a 
hostile opponent with greater force of arms than one’s own. In such a case, is the root 
cause not also perversity of will? Is the problem not, in other words, the desire for 
domination or glory at the cost of others’ lives and liberty? This perversity of will, in 
turn, leads to attacks upon other communities.  
What is distinct about this cause, however, is that it is the perversity of others’ 
wills, not one’s own. And there is far less one can do about those wills. In some sense, 
this is the problem of mortality. For it would seem to be necessary for Aquinas to point 
out something here that he does not: death does not “arise… from nature” strictly 
speaking, but from maimed nature, nature after the Fall.65 And that Fall occurred because 
of the sin of man. Thanks to the Fall, then, came both death and the intransigent 
persistence of man’s perversity of will. Here, of course, classical and mediaeval political 
philosophy must part ways on what makes man mortal and the source of his viciousness, 
if classical political philosophy ever had an answer to such questions.66 But death is 
                                                
64 Cf. Edward Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776) 
65 Such a teaching would not simply be a later development of Aquinas’ thought that I 
seek to impose upon him now, but a standard Christian doctrine of which neither he nor 
his reader could be unaware. 
66 Cf. Schall 2000, 56-7.  
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something with which all men must come to terms, even if that means attempting to 
fashion a life that allows one to ignore or avoid the question of death.67 
Avoiding reckoning with death might seem to be the goal of the provincia. The 
provincia, we recall from I.1, has an advantage over the polis in its ability to defend itself 
from external attacks. External attack, we see here, is a great threat to the community. 
Yet the city that protects itself from external attacks is not necessarily a city that seeks to 
order itself according to virtue. Such a city might come to orient itself around military 
pursuits such that it no longer cares for virtue. We recall the examples Aquinas gave of 
the ruin to which this can bring a city. Thus we wondered if the development of the 
provincia ultimately represents an unfortunate compromise between virtue and necessity. 
To be clear: a community ought to defend itself. As Aquinas argues in the next 
paragraph: “it would be useless to prevent internal dangers if the multitude could not be 
defended against external dangers” (paragraph 120). Indeed, his argument at paragraph 
106 that men live together for an end surpassing survival does not deny that men do live 
in multitudes for such survival. A citizenry that sought no higher end, however, would be 
stunted. Moreover, would the virtue they would thereby be neglecting not be a help 
toward their defense? Vicious citizens cannot protect their city against external enemies 
or, we might add, against themselves. There could be something self-defeating in this 
decision, then, if a provincia ends in tyranny because of a lack of concern among its 
citizens for justice. 
                                                
67 The relation the liberal state bears to death is of course a question well worth puzzling 
over further. It is a great theme of Beyond Good and Evil and Genealogy of Morals of 
Nietzsche, although Daybreak has this remarkable line: “Are we not, with this 
tremendous objective of obliterating all the sharp edges of life, well on the way to turning 
mankind into sand? Sand! Small, soft, round, unending sand! Is that your ideal, you 
heralds of the sympathetic affections?” (174). 
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This worry about the provincia as the best regime, then, is the fear that such a 
regime would orient itself around bare survival, and that such a strategy would require 
close attention to a problem that will not go away and that, as we said above, is not fully 
knowable or predictable: the perversity of other people. If one cannot predict or prevent 
the aggressions of others because of their disordered wills, then one might attempt to 
impose a high level of order upon one’s own people so as to prepare them for such 
aggression. There would be a striking structural similarity between this quest for order 
and that of the tyrant detailed at I.10. And if living for nothing more than survival stunts a 
regime’s citizens, it also denies them the chance to establish rational and virtuous 
concourse with citizens of other regimes, to extend the lines of friendship beyond the 
contingent lines of political borders. If one must regularly fear the intentions of others, 
would it not in the long term be more rational to befriend them and lead them toward 
virtue, rather then engage them in endless violence? Such virtuous relations between 
nations are rare, and certainly not instantly formed through invoking the populus 
Christianus, but that notion of universal solidarity ought to be connected to the simple 
point that peace and just exchange between nations is salutary for all.68        
Leaders must not forget that it is regimes that stand some chance at immortality, 
not humans. On the other hand, regimes become immortal through virtuous citizens. And 
no regime actually lasts forever. What, then, is the solution to this perversity of will?  
…by his laws and precepts [legibus et praeceptis], punishments and rewards, he 
should restrain [coerceat] the men subject to him from wickedness and induce 
                                                
68 It is thus worth noting that Aquinas makes no explicit reference in De Regno to the 
Holy Roman Empire, despite speaking often of this ambiguous provincia. He apparently 
did not share the nostalgia of Dante for the days before Canossa (Gilson 1948, 171-73). It 
is difficult to see how the perversity of man would not prevent such a community (thus 
the this-worldly opposition between the civitas Dei and civitas terrena of Augustine), or 
how men would maintain much love for such a distant and far-flung community of 
humans. Cf. Republic 334c1-335b and Stauffer 2001, 40-45. 
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them to virtuous works, following the example of God, Who gave His law to man, 
and handing out reward to the observant, punishment to the transgressors 
(paragraph 120). 
 
This statement does not sound surprising. We already know that the king must lead his 
people toward virtue and thus away from vice. Perhaps it is similarly not surprisingly that 
he should imitate God in this, laying down laws and punishing and rewarding men as the 
case calls for it. This latter concern speaks to the king as minister Dei, and might be 
another reason for the king to turn to divine law: to study how God made His law known 
and how such punishments and rewards have been meted out. We might press the point 
further and say that it is in many of those interactions between God and men that we see 
the full display of man’s perversity. Thus perhaps another teaching the king can glean 
from the divine law concerns the cause and character of man’s perversity. If one must 
know the moral condition of citizens to know what sort of laws is appropriate for them, 
then a teaching on the concrete condition of men is a very practical one.69      
This is also only the second reference to “law” in De Regno, and at that the only 
one directed to our king.  This advice to enact laws is the most concrete counsel that 
Aquinas has given to the king. It is also notable because Aquinas’ political thought is 
generally thought to hinge crucially upon law, and especially the natural law.70 If the 
natural law is in some sense the foundation of Aquinas’ political theology, why does he 
never discuss it in De Regno? In fact, this law is directly related to God and His 
legislation, not some law that we can apprehend without revelation. The range of ways to 
approach this question is broad, and the implications of many possible answers are 
                                                
69 Maritain 1955, 38-41 
70 Guerra 2002, 14, footnote 2 
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substantial. Thus I propose to leave this question for thematic treatment in Chapter 4 of 
this study. 
So much for the second task: preserving virtuous living among his people. The 
third task of the king toward the virtuous life, namely seeking to improve it, serves as a 
seal on the previous two duties. Maintaining the virtue of his life as best he can, he 
should seek always to identify what ails it and improve it. Aquinas thus quotes from 1 
Corinthians 12:31: be “zealous for the better gifts.” The king, in other words, should 
govern knowing that he serves something beyond him or his kingdom.71  
A consideration of these three tasks appears to confirm our suspicion that Aquinas 
has not defined the king’s task in great detail because Aquinas does not mean anything 
particularly novel or radical by those tasks. After advising the king to read Deuteronomy, 
he then exhorted the king to cultivate virtue in his people, a somewhat less “theocratic” 
enterprise than the one we might have expected. In fact, after admonishing the king to 
turn to divine law for instruction, Aquinas never subsequently clarifies just what the king 
should be looking for in Scripture. Similarly, the earlier consideration of the three ills of 
politics, mortality, the perverse wills of men and external attack, are not in themselves 
novel ideas of which our king would be ignorant. But there does seem to be a “Pauline 
dialectic,” as Servais Pinckaers would call it, whereby Aquinas confronts political 
convention with Biblical wisdom, and then effects a reconciliation on new terms.72 This 
is most evident in his discussion of perverse wills, which turns out to be a more 
fundamental problem than external attack. More generally, if Aquinas has arrested us 
with this need to uncover and develop the minister Dei, what has been finally intriguing 
                                                
71 The chapter ends with a promise for the content of II.4-8, which we will not discuss 
for the aforementioned reasons (supra n. 3). 
72 Pinckaers 1995, 125-127, and cf. Ratzinger 2003, 227-230. 
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about the concept is less the operation of such a man than the justification of his activity 
and its final end.      
 
CONCLUSION 
We began Chapter 3 of this study with two questions to which we thought our 
king might also desire answers: what is the practical significance of the analogy between 
the king-in-his-kingdom and God-in-His-creation, and can politics reach man’s end? At 
the time these questions seemed related, and the answers that Aquinas gives in Book II 
confirm that they are. In short, the significance of the analogy is clear but limited, and 
politics cannot reach man’s end. 
Aquinas wants to make two points clear to our king: political activity has a 
discrete end, but that end is also antecedent or intermediate to a superior end. Aquinas 
has taken pains to assure the king that his political rule is not undermined by the special 
responsibility of the Church for man’s beatitude: Aquinas does not promote hierocracy.73 
Thus Aquinas frames the king’s subordination to the Church as a kind of imitation of 
God. We should not underestimate the rhetorical strategy of II.2-3, which makes it clear 
that the king imitates God in governing man toward his natural end.  
But neither does Aquinas recommend some kind of “secularism” or a return to 
civil religion whereby political leaders make their own claims about man’s supernatural 
end: the Church will have some direction for political leaders on matters touching faith. 
Thus the minister Dei analogy is revealed to be even weaker than we thought, both 
insofar as it binds the king to the service of the common good, and it prevents him from 
                                                
73 McCoy 1973, 163 
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arrogating the spiritual power for his own uses. Our worry that this analogy implies some 
kind of “divine right” absolutism has been allayed.  
Aquinas strikes this balance by founding his speculations primarily upon man’s 
ends, not upon the governments that serve those ends. Thus Aquinas has detailed the rise 
of the virtuous city almost simultaneously with the rise of the ideal king. And this king 
has the same ends as man, the liber whose development we have attempted to track 
throughout De Regno. We thus might wish to speak thematically of this “development.” 
This “developmental” approach is decidedly practical: it allows one to see how these 
units ought to grow and how members of society can help them progress. This approach 
permits Aquinas to adumbrate the moral development of ruler, citizen and city. Aquinas 
does not, in other words, simply present us with a “before” and “after” picture of the city 
reformed according to his proposals. This approach is thus distinctly pedagogical: he 
leads us through the reform of the city. One might call it a “practical teleology” to 
underline that it captures the movement of the multitude toward their ends, and the 
relation between citizen and community is static. Thus the developmental model not only 
allows us to grasp the temporal dimension of political change, but also allows one to 
speak of the growth and change of men toward or away from justice.  
If we return to our earlier consideration of social contract theory, note that in 
general such theory assumes a certain condition of man in his pre-political state, and 
assumes a particular reason or set of reasons for man’s entrance into political community. 
The state thus imagined, in other words, has a specific set of ends and a relatively static 
outcome. Yet this hardly seems to do justice to the ways in which citizens grow and learn 
from each other, never mind how rulers develop in their understanding of politics. In the 
“developmental state” of Aquinas, on the other hand, we are drawn to a dynamic picture 
of a community, however inchoate, that changes with the ethical perceptions of the 
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people living in it. We have, after all, seen the king’s city develop over time, from the 
tyrannical lower points to the celestial high ones. What is more, the reason that the city is 
founded, to supply for man’s wants, is not the height of the city’s existence, as we see in 
Book II. Of course Aquinas argues for particular ends of politics, but he can distinguish 
between the ends that bring man into political community and the ends that man comes to 
seek as his life in community becomes more rational.74 He can also distinguish, more 
importantly, between the ends of the community and the citizens’ apprehension of those 
ends. Closing the gap between knowledge and opinion, one might say, is a key task of 
politics.75 The point of De Regno, then, is to suggest to the king that there is such a gap 
between his opinions and true knowledge. 
In fact, Aquinas has shown us at least three different cities in De Regno: the 
tyrannical city of I.1-6, the just city of II.1-2, and the supernaturally-directed city of II.3-
4. One might also, however, conceive of De Regno as exhibiting distinct moments in the 
life of the same city, in its progress toward its perfection.76 Aquinas prefaces the 
articulation of each moment or developmental level of this city with an account of how 
                                                
74 Cf. Politics 1252b27: “and though it originates for the sake of staying alive, it exists 
for the sake of living well.” 
75 There is all the difference in the world between recognizing the necessity of 
knowledge and having it. As Pieper says, philosophy, which he understands quite broadly 
as the wondering posture of any human seeking to know, is both a search for first 
principles and an awareness of its status as in via (Pieper 1952, 91-97, 104-15; cf. 
Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles IV, 33).   
76 De Regno would thus parallel the development of the “city in speech” of the Republic 
of Plato as Socrates, Glaucon and Polemarchus flesh out their description of the soul. 
Whatever one thinks of the character of that Socratic city, Aquinas in De Regno clearly 
means to articulate a kind of “realist” theory of politics: he lays down principles for 
political activity whose final form must be attentive to and negotiated in the realm of the 
changing and contingent. From this perspective, the “realist” argument that “high 
liberalism represents a desire to evade, displace, or escape from politics” is most 
welcome (Galston 2010, 386; cf. Schall 1996 on realism more generally). 
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the city can be advanced to the next stage. Most strikingly, in I.6 he calls for the 
conversion of citizens toward justice. The citizens of I.6 are exhorted to fortitudo in the 
name of justice: to discern what would be best for the city, not to dispose immediately of 
a ruler who does not suit their interests. They are urged to reform themselves in the name 
of a better regime. If the conversion of the people involves them seeing the temporal end 
of man as intermediate to that final end, then conversion has a profoundly political 
dimension. One might think of this as the “magnanimous regime”: the city whose end 
must be great and worthy of man’s higher nature, even if its citizens are not yet clear on 
the precise nature of this end. What precisely this end should be is not discussed at any 
length, but it is at least clear that it is not tyranny. We might even think of this as 
Aquinas’ “state of nature”: man naturally lives in society and seeks how best to secure 
virtue through it.  
Learning what conduces to man’s nature is an important dimension of the city. In 
I.7-9, the king is taught the great end of such justice: beatitude. Of course only the king is 
given the secret of the end of politics, or at least Aquinas presents it that way, both in the 
sense that Aquinas directs this knowledge specifically to our king at I.8, and insofar as it 
is presented or given to him as the “reward of the king.” This difference between I.6 and 
I.7-9 might seem to reflect a certain asymmetry between the king and the citizen. On the 
other hand, a full understanding of justice on the part of the citizens would require them 
to see this reward of the king as also the end of man. Thus we move from the aporetic I.6, 
where Aquinas urges against a certain attitude or orientation toward tyranny without 
naming its alternative, to I.8, in which the end of politics becomes clear. The new city at 
II.1-2 would seem to depend upon a decent ruler and body of subjects.  
Finally, II.2 prepares the ruler for the bombshell of II.3 by taking a step behind 
the end of man’s activities: the activity of the God behind the universe. In differentiating 
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between God’s governance and creation of the universe, Aquinas makes clear to the king 
the basis of his status as servant to God: God makes and orders the cosmos to His 
purposes. If the king had not been led through I.7-9, this discussion might appear as a 
power grab or as a cynical assertion of political authority rather then a necessary response 
to the two-fold nature of man’s end.  Thus, while we have read this work as the education 
of a prince, or have at least attempted to consider what reading it as such would entail, De 
Regno could also be a kind of education of a city. 
Just as our discussion of the king’s education has led to our new understanding of 
the minister Dei, so we can consider what kind of citizen has emerged from the work, 
most notably in I.6. Aquinas does not treat upon the “citizen” at great length, but it does 
arise in at least three ways. First, the ethical foundations of the city, to recall, lie in the 
inquiry into the ends of man and the further question of the competence of the 
community to fulfill them. Thus the “reward of the king” ultimately means the end of 
man and man as citizen.  
Second, at I.6 Aquinas clearly means to educate the king as to the proper role of 
citizens. Most obviously, they ought not to reject lightly the rule of a king even if they do 
think him tyrannical. Rather, they should mull their own virtue and discern what is best 
for the city. But if the citizens do participate in the good laws of the king, and are called 
to a thoughtful judgment of the politics of their city, this would make them virtuous 
citizens, indeed. They could well become the sort of citizen who knows how to ascertain 
the nature of and resist tyranny in a proper manner.77 But to the extent that they become 
virtuous, does that not make the city as whole – the ordered multitude under their rulers – 
a more perfect harmony? Thus, third, citizens are called not simply to abstain from 
                                                
77 There could be a “prophetic” dimension to this citizenship, as Maritain notes at Man 
and the State, 139-46. 
 182 
interfering with the rule of kings, but to become virtuous and active members of their 
city, as should be clear from II.1-4. They build these virtues, Aquinas has argued, through 
friendship with their ruler and with other citizens (I.10).  
When we argued above that Aquinas’ “developmental” model of politics “allows 
one to speak of the growth and change of men toward or away from justice,” we did not 
simply mean “allows” in an extended or metaphorical sense of “casts words in a fitting 
manner.” We also meant it quite literally: it has allowed Aquinas to say what he might 
not otherwise want to say. For if De Regno is a work of education, then it has been 
addressed to someone who must learn, a student. This student, of course, has been our 
king. The king himself has not been called idolatrous (I.4), a hypocrite (I.6-9), a tyrant 
(I.3-6), desperately friendless (I.6), a thief (I.6), a murderer (I.10), a liar (I.10) or 
vainglorious (I.6). He has been shown, however, that such perils threaten the reader who 
does not heed Aquinas’ teaching. Moreover, if the king thus comes to see himself as 
lacking in virtue, he sees it not under the aspect of a harsh law or of the critique of a 
political opponent, but rather in the estimation of a theologian who shows him the means 
by which he might increase his virtue and live out this imitatio Dei. Thus there is an 
invitation to greatness in the criticism that De Regno might imply against our Cypriot.78 
The high point of this education is at I.7 and the characterization of the magnanimous 
man. The magnanimous man might ultimately be tragically defective in the account of 
Aristotle. Yet in De Regno we see him not as a static character to whom nothing is great, 
but rather as dynamic figure, one whose virtue would increase as his knowledge of what 
is good does, as well. He wants to be godlike in serving God, not in usurping God’s role. 
He is just and capable of friendship with his citizens, things we would not expect from 
                                                
78 As we mentioned in Chapter 1, there is an aspect of “saving tyranny” here that might 
call to mind Politics 1315a40-b10 (cf. Simpson 1998, 411-5). 
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the magnanimous man. To seal this teaching, Aquinas presents the teaching of St. 
Gregory at I.9: you work for God, and He will forgive your mistakes. While it would be 
beyond the bounds of this study to explore it, it would thus seem that it is the friendship 
of Aquinas’ magnanimous man with God that differentiates him from that of Aristotle.79  
When Eschmann and others claim that Book II has been less than practical, we 
can sympathize with them in a certain way: it is not Aquinas’ interest here to specify how 
this teaching should best be realized in concrete political arrangements.80 But no 
institution could flourish, he would surely say, that did not follow the principles laid out 
here. Aquinas’ final goal is thus to detail the order of man’s ends.81 We might thus note 
another possible misunderstanding that Aquinas wishes to head off: the association of the 
relation between man’s two ends with a particular political formation. Surely further 
historical work on the nature of relations between political and ecclesiastical authorities 
on Cyprus and in France of the period would be illuminating to our understanding of De 
Regno, and we have attempted as it has been helpful to sketch in broad strokes what of 
those relations Aquinas might have in mind at points. Yet that theologico-political 
controversies in Europe so often revolved around the defense or justification of particular 
arrangements of political and ecclesiastical authority, rather than their proper goals in 
light of man’s ends, must surely be Aquinas’ great concern.82 I thus suspect that Aquinas 
has seemed less than practical because he does not want to tie his teaching to any 
                                                
79 Faulkner and Howland direct our attention to the problem of Zeus in Aristotle’s 
discussion of magnanimity (Faulkner 2007, 41-2, 54; Howland 2002, 41, 47-8). 
80 Eschmann 1948, xxxviii-xxxix; Jordan 1992 
81A study of the connections between De Regno and the Summa Theologiae would 
compare this order of ends in De Regno with the orders of charity, justice and piety in the 
Summa. I thank Michael Breidenbach for this suggestion. 
82 That these political disputes rarely rose to the level of controversy over principles is 
not to say that it was not fundamentally such principles that were at issue. Höpfl 2004 
and Tuttino 2010 are in some sense studies of this problem. 
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particular, and therefore contestable, institutional arrangement; he recognizes that such 
determinations would necessarily be prudential; and that our king in any event needs to 
grasp the principles of man’s two-fold end before he can bring prudence to bear. This 
two-fold government, after all, depends upon man’s awareness of his two-fold ends, an 
inquiry laid out at I.7-9.83 Thus Aquinas presents three different phases of this city (I.1-6, 
II.1-2 and II.3-4) as the king’s understanding of politics improves. 
A great concern of Aquinas, then, has been to explain the fall of civil religion. 
Civil religion, as the name suggests, is a political and a spiritual theme. What Aquinas 
proposes is three-fold: distinguish the “political” and the “spiritual”; order those ends to 
one another in a hierarchy of ends; and lay out principles for the ordering of those ends in 
the activity of man. Civil religion has not been a thematic concern to many Christians 
after Aquinas. Understanding what civil religion is and what Christianity changes about 
it, however, helps one to see the full political consequences of Christian revelation, as 
well as explain likely variations of civil religions within nations.84 Even if this or that 
civil religion arises as a merely contingent social formation, the concept broadly 
interpreted embodies notions that law historically has had some kind of divine grounding, 
that cults and liturgies have typically had political significance, and that the figures of 
                                                
83 I thus agree with Jordan 1992, as one might have surmised, that De Regno is not a 
political theology after the manner of Carl Schmitt, which is to say the theological 
prescription of particular political orders. But it certainly is a political theology, or a 
“theology of politics,” insofar as Aquinas brings theological principles to bear upon 
political phenomena (cf. Riedl 2003). I thank Matthias Riedl for our conversations on this 
point. 
84 Civil religion surfaces as a concern among certain scholars explaining the “creed” of a 
country, often the United States. Part of the limitations of such studies, however, is their 
tendency to assume the social transformations wrought by Christianity, the teachings of 
which are generally not explicitly stated. See especially Bellah 1967, but also Lipset 
1963, Wimberly 1976 and Bellah 1992. 
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king and priest have often not been clearly distinguished.85 Attempts within the Christian 
age of Europe to resurrect civil theology have thus born this double aspect: a rejection of 
the Christian teaching and a return to pre-Christian ways of thinking about politics and 
religion. Other political philosophies, most notably those of Locke and his forbears, have 
appropriated the distinction between the temporal and spiritual posited by Christianity but 
not the hierarchical ordering of the two.86 At the core of civil theology is a question of the 
rationality of the law: how does man’s spiritual end bear upon law? Is man’s natural end, 
what he pursues through politics, in fact instrumental to that spiritual end? This is not a 
question whose answer can easily be worked out, not least because we have hardly 
spoken of law in our study of De Regno thus far. Indeed, we noted its lone occurrence at 
II.4 (paragraph 120), and thought it might be best to delay its consideration until the next 
chapter. I again propose to do so, with the caveat that we be concerned in that study to 
consider how the law of Aquinas’ king will reflect its detachment from civil theology. 
With all of this talk of religion, theology and man’s ends, a reader of the 21st 
century will be disturbed that I have not yet broached the great watchword of modern 
political philosophy: toleration. We should note two things: first, toleration without a 
doubt is not the great theme of this work, as it is for instance with John Locke’s A Letter 
Concerning Toleration, nor is it the great goal of its author, as is perhaps the case for 
Voltaire or John Rawls. Most notably, the “freedom” of which Aquinas has spoken in De 
Regno is not that of an “autonomy” to do as one pleases, but the moral excellence to 
pursue one’s proper ends.87 
                                                
85 This captures at least part of Voegelin’s objections to the treatment of Varro by 
Augustine (The New Science of Politics, CW Vol. 5, 153-162). 
86 Benestad 2011, 35-47, and Long 2011 on “dignity,” but cf. De Koninck 1943. 
87 Pinckaers 1995, 354-78. Taylor explores the contemporary grounds of this problem as 
the question of what excellence to follow (1-3). 
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Yet if toleration has not been a thematic concern for Aquinas in De Regno, this is 
not to say that a basis for toleration cannot be found in De Regno. One would have to 
locate the source of that toleration without the help of Aquinas, however, and one would 
have to attend to whether it is a toleration of principle or of prudence. In other words, is 
toleration itself a good that should be maintained in all times and in all places? Or is 
toleration something like what the quotidian meaning of the word suggests, a kind of 
“permission,” that is, prudential forbearance toward some activity or idea that one takes 
to be wrong, dangerous or obnoxious but sufferable at least immediately?88 
Without attempting to answer any of these questions definitively, I might first 
note that the political theory of De Regno seems to rest on a certain understanding of 
politics as education, and toleration plays an important role in education. In the education 
of a person, a good teacher knows that for any given lesson certain knowledge can be 
assumed of the pupils, and other knowledge cannot be assumed. The teacher will then 
consider what knowledge must be acquired to master a lesson well, and what sorts of 
falsehoods or misapprehensions of knowledge will prevent pupils from learning well. 
That teacher, then must structure his lessons such that the student is gradually instructed 
in what facts or claims conduce to the main objectives of the lesson, and also that he is 
informed as appropriate of certain errors or misunderstandings that would obstruct his 
mastery of those lessons. In education, then, toleration emerges as the prudence of the 
teacher in enduring the errors of the student until it is timely to correct them, that is, until 
the student is able to see the grounds of the truth.  
I have argued that De Regno presents three different stages on the way to the ideal 
city. At each stage, the city achieves a certain level of perfection because the rulers and 
                                                
88 Budziszewski 1993. One might consult Aquinas’ own Summa Theologiae I-II 90.96, 
2-3; II-II 10, or his neglected (even more so than De Regno) Letter to Margaret of 
Flanders on the treatment of the Jews.  
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citizens orient their activity toward a certain truth. To the extent that they share that truth, 
then, they can assume it in their political activity. And not just assume, but collectively 
clarify the basis of that truth and ponder its implications. Toleration would then be 
necessary to the extent that pushing the boundaries of this truth would be in part 
constitutive of political discourse. Yet it is also true that to the extent that citizens share 
this truth and actively seek to embody it, then, they would expand its ambit. On this 
reading, toleration would thus be a “moving target,” as it were, a kind of exploration to 
move the truths of political discourse further.89 Perhaps in later modernity we are in the 
first city, debating about the character and purpose of political life and, without any 
agreement as to what humans ends are superior to it, if any, unable to negotiate how our 
political life can foster something beyond it. 
Let me secondly note this. Concerns about toleration most often arise when the 
state is taken to have some kind of dogmatic or “theocratic” element, or when some 
church is itself invested with political authority.90 Consider Rawls’ discussion in Political 
Liberalism whereby he defines liberalism vis-à-vis the religious wars and the 
secularization of political authority as a result of intractable religious pluralism.91 This is 
also Locke’s concern in his Letter Concerning Toleration, in which he argues both that 
governments have no legitimate concern for care of souls and that churches are voluntary 
associations with no coercive authority, in fact whose chief mark is toleration.92 One 
                                                
89 This notion parallels in a limited form Mill’s arguments for the toleration of false 
opinions in On Liberty, especially in chapter 2. 
90 It can never be sufficiently pressed that “theocracy” describes a rule by a god, as in the 
Middle Dynasty of ancient Egypt. Rule by priests is “hierocracy,” and is a more 
interesting phenomenon insofar as it not only presupposes a god, but indeed a god who 
permits men to mediate or represent his rule. 
91 See Beiner 2011, 283-300, on Rawls 1996, xxiii-xxx.  
92 Locke [1689] 1983, 26-8; 23, 28-9. 
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might in fact think that a certain attempt at moral neutrality, at avoiding any sort of 
“comprehensive doctrine,” arises from the essentially reactive dimension of some strands 
of liberalism against an understanding of Western history as a gradual liberation from 
religious authority.93 
For such reasons, we might think that the close coordination of spiritual and 
temporal authorities proposed by Aquinas in De Regno would lead to such hierocratic 
conditions, thus diminishing toleration. Yet if Aquinas does take man’s ends to be finally 
one, the State and Church serve distinct modes of that end: the state cannot lead men to 
beatitude because it lacks the grace-given mission of the Church. Aquinas does not argue 
for Jefferson’s “wall of separation,” to be sure, but he does lay down a distinction and 
asks us to reflect upon man’s ends in conversation with other men. This is the force of the 
de-legitimization of civil religion we above detailed. Thus a founding assumption of most 
liberal notions of toleration, namely that the political and spiritual can be distinguished, 
owes at least something to this Christian critique of civil religion and “gentile” political 
theology.94  
This chapter concludes our general exegesis of De Regno. This study has been 
incomplete at every step, but we can hope that it lays the groundwork for more perceptive 
students of this letter. We might also venture that this analysis has been a kind of an 
apology for reading De Regno, if only because it has left many questions unanswered. I 
intend in the next two chapters to consider in detail two concepts that have loomed in 
                                                
93 Taylor calls such accounts “subtraction stories” (Taylor 2007, 26-9). 
94 As we saw earlier, one can also criticize Christianity not for its political power, but for 
its attempt, however uneven, to de-sacralize politics. Instructive is Rousseau’s well-
known argument for “reuniting the two heads of the eagle,” i.e. religion and politics 
(Social Contract IV.8). Rousseau goes on to explain why Christianity is a poor eagle 
head. 
 189 
these first three: law and the common good. Our basic questions will be “What is law?” 
and “What is the best regime?” for this city in speech Aquinas proposes. 
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Chapter Four    
In Chapters 1-3 of this study we began to identify some of the central questions of 
De Regno. In this chapter, I propose to consider not some additional aspect of something 
that Aquinas treats, but a topic wholly absent from De Regno: law. And not simply law, 
but the kind of law that is often said to be the singular political teaching of Aquinas: the 
natural law. 
The phrase lex naturalis nowhere appears in De Regno. Why is this significant? 
Aquinas also does not discuss lemurs, limericks or lariats, yet we do not feel compelled 
to ask why. And such a question need not be just irrelevant but also dangerous. For if 
Aquinas does not discuss a topic, then it seems improbable that evidence from the text 
itself would provide demonstrative proof for a hypothesis, but rather might simply be 
used to reinforce one’s preconceived judgment on the matter.1 So allow me to outline my 
three-fold purpose in asking this question. 
First, we expect the natural law to be in De Regno. This expectation is borne of a 
certain familiarity with the work of Thomas Aquinas, which is to say a tradition 
according to which the natural law is a central teaching of Aquinas concerning politics.2 
Even if the natural law is not the fundamental doctrine of Aquinas’ political thought, 
however, it surely still appears in the Summa Theologiae, and it can hardly be said to be 
irrelevant. Because the natural law does appear in the Summa Theologiae, and because 
                                                
1Thus we are not approaching the question of natural law in De Regno as a “problem,” 
even if its status may be a problem for the integrity of later schools of Thomism or for the 
textbook version of Western political philosophy (cf. Fortin 1996, 199).  
2 Cf. Guerra 2002 
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moreover many following Aquinas found their politics upon it, it is curious that De 
Regno as a work of Thomas Aquinas should have no mention of it. 
Second, even if we are wrong to expect the presence of natural law in De Regno, 
perhaps especially if we are wrong to do so, then we have some questions about what 
natural law is and why it is not there. These are questions for which De Regno 
conceivably holds answers, although it is not necessarily a reflection of De Regno. 
Perhaps we misunderstand the Summa Theologiae. Perhaps the natural law “matters” but 
not to the extent or in the way that it has often held to do so. Such a study might help us 
ask just what it means for the natural law to be absent from De Regno. Must Aquinas 
explicitly invoke the precise phrase? Would it count if the work assumed the natural law 
without directly raising the issue; if it contained the idea in an inchoate form; or if it 
simply did not deny the existence or contradict the conclusions of the natural law? Or 
will only a recapitulation of the Questions on Law from the Summa Theologiae satisfy 
us?3 
Third, the question of natural law teaches us more about De Regno. As we 
discussed in the introduction, no scholar has subjected De Regno to extensive study in 
recent years. Yet those who have touched upon it have noted this apparent lack of natural 
law. Indeed, this absence is typically what makes De Regno gripping for them: a weighty 
political work by Thomas Aquinas without the “baggage” of natural law. This would be a 
tidal shift in our understanding of Aquinas’ political thought, regardless of what took 
natural law’s place. For some, it demonstrates the primacy of virtue in politics in 
Aquinas, in conformity with “virtue ethics”; for others, an irrational divine law after Carl 
Schmitt. On the other side of the scale, the work’s simple naturalism might be taken to 
                                                
3 Tractatus is a broad Latin term, but the English equivalent “treatise” has connotations 
of deduction and self-containment that are best avoided. I thus prefer “Questions.” 
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uncover a surprisingly practical or pragmatic political science, or its dour focus on 
tyranny Aquinas’ fundamentally tragic or even absurd view of politics in line with post-
modern thought.4 Any of these possibilities, one might think, would ease relating 
Aquinas to modern political thought and phenomena. 
In our reading, however, De Regno has not been the dark story of overweening 
tyranny that we expected: it has something to teach us about the best regime, the good 
ruler and the good citizen. Perhaps there is an account of justice and law undergirding it. 
Thus we might raise the question: what in De Regno is “doing the work” of natural law in 
its absence? Indeed, where is law in general? One of our great questions for Aquinas has 
been just what difference the theoretical teaching of De Regno makes for a ruler. What 
changes under Aquinas’ instruction that the king become a minister Dei? If we can gain 
some sense for what Aquinas, at least in some texts, takes to be the function of natural 
law, and then examine what in De Regno would seem to fulfill that same function, then 
we have not only learned something of interest to Thomists in general, but moreover 
advanced our understanding of De Regno, which is after all the primary subject of our 
study.  
This chapter proceeds in three stages: a consideration of the meaning of natural 
law; a study of De Regno in light of that meaning; and then my own claims about the 
natural law in De Regno. I conclude that Aquinas indicates the foundations of the natural 
law as they are revealed in the exigencies of political life, but always relates them to the 
eternal law from whence they issue and the human law toward which they point. Thus the 
                                                
4 Cf. Eschmann 1949, xxxviii-xxxix, on De Regno as an occasional piece; Keys 2006, 
64, on tyranny; Mohr (cited in Blythe 1997, 3-5) also on tyranny and the putatively 
corollary absence of any doctrine of the common good; Guerra 2002 and the classic 
arguments of Goerner 1979 and 1983 on virtue (cf. Bourke 1974); and Cain 2007 on the 
divine law. Voegelin 1997, 215-23 is difficult to categorize, perhaps because he did not 
intend for this work to be published.   
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role natural law plays in De Regno does not mean that Aquinas or his natural law theory 
have no purchase in modern politics, but is the pre-condition for such engagement. 
 
WHAT IS NATURAL LAW? 
Among Thomas Aquinas’ numerous treatments of the natural law, that found in 
the Summa Theologiae is definitive. In fact, when scholars speak of “natural law,” they 
usually have in mind the account of the Summa.5 This is not unwarranted. Aquinas’ 
arguments therein, while brief, are comprehensive, integrating each kind of law within its 
broader genus.6 Further, insofar as the Summa Theologiae is precisely that, a summation 
of theology, this discussion of natural law is not only situated in terms of law, but also in 
terms of Aquinas’ theological science tout court. To the extent that our question about the 
natural law is an extrinsic question motivated by the popular association of Aquinas with 
natural law, then the Summa is the obvious text with which to think about it. Moreover, to 
the extent that the text of De Regno itself has led to questions about the natural law 
precisely as an aporia about the basis of law and virtue, then the Summa again seems 
most promising for our purposes. 
If Aquinas means to state the principles of Christian theology systematically and 
tersely, however, as he says in the prooemium to the Summa, then it could be risky to 
read the natural law section without reference to its context, to those principles that 
eventually lead Aquinas to discuss the natural law. While I do not here propose a full 
reading of the Summa, permit me to sketch briefly the contours of that work, such that, 
                                                
5 Brown 1981 points to the need of studying the Summa Contra Gentiles on law. 
6 As goes it being brief, it is noteworthy that the “Questions on Law” constitute only 19 
questions in a work of 513 questions, although we ought to bear in mind that Aquinas 
moves with alacrity throughout the work. Aquinas notably grants only 5 questions to 
man’s final end and 6 questions to grace, indisputably central doctrines for him.  
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when we arrive at the natural law question, we will know where we are. I thus intend to 
treat briefly on the scope of the Summa, before turning to the Questions on Law. 
The Summa opens with a lengthy prologue, which itself begins: 
Because the doctor of Catholic truth ought not only to teach the proficient, but 
also to instruct beginners (according to the Apostle: As unto little ones in Christ, I 
gave you milk to drink, not meat -- 1 Corinthians 3:1-2), we purpose in this book 
to treat of whatever belongs to the Christian religion, in such a way as may tend to 
the instruction of beginners. 
 
Aquinas next indicates that he means to correct the many flaws in contemporary works, 
particularly their ad hoc and disjointed manner of outlining theology: “the plan of the 
book” will follow the dictates of theology [sacra doctrina], not vice versa. If this is a 
work for beginners, however, it also promises to be challenging: Aquinas will treat the 
entirety of theology in a systematic and parsimonious fashion, avoiding “the 
multiplication of useless questions, articles, and arguments.”7 The result will be daunting. 
What follows can be divided into three subjects: God, man and Christ. Aquinas 
proceeds from God and His creative activity to the great fruit of that creation, man, 
concluding with the salvific acts of Christ whereby man is redeemed and reclaimed by 
God. Thus some speak of an exitus-reditus model: man proceeds from God and returns to 
Him. On this account, what comes in the middle cannot be read without looking back to 
the beginning and forward to the end. That Aquinas has something like this design in 
mind is evident from the prooemium to this middle section, the Secunda pars, on man:  
Since, as Damascene states (De Fide Orthod. ii. 12), man is said to be made to 
God's image, in so far as the image implies “an intelligent being endowed with 
free-will and self-movement”: now that we have treated of the exemplar, i.e., 
God, and of those things which came forth from the power of God in accordance 
                                                
7 Aquinas has in mind beginners in theology, who have had an extensive liberal 
education, including in philosophy and logic. 
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with His will; it remains for us to treat of His image, i.e., man, inasmuch as he too 
is the principle of his actions, as having free-will and control of his actions. 
 
Having spoken of man as the creation of God, Aquinas will now discuss man as an image 
of God (cf. ST I.93). Man is not simply a creature of God like a tree or a squirrel: he is 
“the principle of his [own] actions” in a manner analogous to God. Thus man must be 
considered not only as the creation of God, but as in some sense a creator in his own 
right. While Aquinas treats on reason, the will, the passions, the virtues and vices, law 
and grace in this section, it is indisputably man’s final end that has pride of place in the 
Summa, a point easy to forget as one winds one’s way through it. As we noted in Chapter 
2, the Questions on Happiness explore the teleological character of man’s moral life, 
showing how man returns with his reason and will to God, and are thus key to Aquinas’ 
moral theology.8 
The Secunda pars ends with the questions on grace, the other extrinsic principle 
leading man to his end.9 It is thus fitting that Question 114 concludes the Secunda pars, 
leading us into the Tertia pars and the redemptive work of Christ. The Tertia pars begins 
with a prologue:  
Forasmuch as our Saviour the Lord Jesus Christ, in order to "save His people 
from their sins" (Mt. 1:21), as the angel announced, showed unto us in His own 
Person the way of truth, whereby we may attain to the bliss of eternal life by 
rising again, it is necessary, in order to complete the work of theology, that after 
considering the last end of human life, and the virtues and vices, there should 
                                                
8 As Eric Voegelin writes: “The world, including man, is the creation of God; it bears the 
impress of the divine intellect; the meaning of created existence is the movement back 
toward God. The rule that motivates the action of man in his return to God is, therefore, 
the ratio of the creation in the intellect of God Himself.”(Voegelin 1997, 223-4).  
9 “Now there are five effects of grace in us: of these, the first is, to heal the soul; the 
second, to desire good; the third, to carry into effect the good proposed; the fourth, to 
persevere in good; the fifth, to reach glory” (ST I-II.111.3 resp). 
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follow the consideration of the Saviour of all, and of the benefits bestowed by 
Him on the human race. 
 
Aquinas then promises to treat on Christ, the sacraments instituted for man’s 
salvation, and “the end of immortal life to which we attain by the resurrection.” Aquinas 
stopped working on the Summa shortly before his death, so this part remains 
incomplete.10 For our purposes we ought to note that Christ brought man the New Divine 
Law, by which man might be saved from sin and restored to union with God (ST III.1), 
and instituted sacraments and the Church to administer them (ST III.61; III.82). In other 
words, as man depends upon divine revelation for knowledge of his final end, he depends 
upon revelation to attain to that end.     
The Questions on Law are to be found in the Secunda pars, the part treating on 
man as the image of God. In the Secunda pars Aquinas outlines man’s final end (ST I-
II.1-5); human acts (6-21) and the passions (22-48); and the principles of human acts (49-
114). We have already discussed the centrality of man’s end for his activity: every part of 
the Secunda pars should be read with that end in mind, much as every part of the Summa 
must be read in view of the question of creatures’ return to God. Question 49 promises to 
investigate the principles of the human act, of which there are two kinds: intrinsic and 
extrinsic.11 Of extrinsic principles of human action, there are two: law (90-108) and grace 
                                                
10 As with Ptolemy of Lucca’s extension of De Regno, one of Aquinas’ confreres 
“completed” the Summa with his own elaborations, the Supplement. 
11 Cf. Hittinger 2003, 294 fn. 58. An “intrinsic” principle directs men to his end as the 
sort of thing that he is. The virtues are intrinsic principles of action in the sense that virtue 
is part of the acting subject: as the kind of thing that a human is one has basic capacities 
for virtue, and one develops and perfects those virtues or excellences as one acts (ST I-
II.48-89; ST II-II). An extrinsic derives from and points to something beyond man. As 
Hittinger notes, Aquinas likes to describe extrinsic principles through the metaphor of a 
seal on wax: the seal impression left by the ring shapes and direct the wax, even as the 
seal is distinct from the wax. Yet while there is nothing intrinsic to the wax that fore-
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(109-114). God “both instructs us by law, and assists us by grace…” (ST I-II.90 
prologue). Law is thus a means whereby God draws man back to Him.  
In Question 90, Aquinas defines law and differentiates its four kinds. Law, he 
writes, is “an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of 
the community, and promulgated” (ST I-II.90.4 corpus). Law as a fruit of reason exists in 
man in two ways: as something measured and as that which measures. In other words, by 
law man is guided and ruled, and through law man can guide and rule other things (ST I-
II 90.1 ad 1). We also see in this question Aquinas’ first reference to the natural law. 
Aquinas considers the objection that promulgation is not necessary for something to be a 
law, because the natural law “above all has the character of law,” yet is not promulgated. 
Aquinas in his response to this objection grants the first part: the natural law is law. Yet it 
is also promulgated “by the very fact that God instilled [inseruit] it into the minds of men 
so as to be known by him naturally” (ST I-II.90.4 ad 1). Thus the natural law is law, and 
it is natural in the sense that it is naturally known by man. Yet if it is known naturally, it 
is also “instilled” into man’s mind by God. But how can the natural law be “natural” if it 
is also divine, i.e. comes from God? We will have to explore further this connection 
between nature and God, but for now it seems that there is no easy separation of them.  
Question 91 lays out four kinds of law: eternal, natural, human and divine. There 
is also a quasi-law, the “law of sin.” Aquinas structures each article around the question 
whether the law under discussion exists, thus signaling the importance of justifying this 
multiplicity of laws. Eternal law is the first (Article 1). How can God govern the universe 
through “eternal” law when nothing in the universe is eternal such that God could have 
legislated and promulgated that law for them eternally? Moreover, nothing that is ordered 
                                                                                                                                            
ordains it become a seal, wax is the sort of thing that is apt to the power of the ring to 
form a seal.  
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to a final end is eternal, because only that final end, its cause and source, could be eternal. 
How, then, is there an “eternal” law? Aquinas argues that the eternal law is eternal by 
virtue of being in the “mind” of God, which is beyond time. He concedes that the created 
universe is not eternal, and so the promulgation of the eternal law cannot be eternal “on 
the part of the creature that hears or reads” (ST I-II.91.1 ad 2). While the created universe 
cannot be eternal, these creatures were “foreknown and preordained” by God, who again 
is beyond time. His foreknowledge of them implies His governance of them, meaning 
that the eternal law stands outside time and is in this sense eternal. Thus the eternal law is 
indeed eternal: the “Divine Reason” whereby “the whole community of the universe is 
governed” (ST I-II.90.1 respondeo). 
Aquinas next asks whether there is a natural law (Article 2). The objections to its 
existence are strong. First, as we just noted, man is governed by the eternal law; there is 
no need for some additional law. Second, man is not led to his end by some law like the 
animals are: he has reason and free will. Third, man’s freedom is defined by not being 
under a law. But man is clearly freer than animals. So if the animals are not under the 
natural law, man is surely not, either.  
Aquinas’ responses reflect one basic insight: the natural law is not something 
different from the eternal law. He thus immediately concedes the greatest objection to the 
natural law: if God governs man, then nothing else does. In fact man’s freedom, what 
distinguishes him from animals, is the key to seeing this point. The eternal law governs 
man, just as it governs everything: “they derive their respective inclinations to their 
proper acts and ends” (ST I-II.91.2 respondeo). Man does not, however, simply obey 
these inclinations as though they were instinctual, as animals do. To return to a 
distinction from Article 1, the eternal law is in man both insofar as it “rules and 
measures” man, and insofar as man uses it to “rule and measure.” Thus his rational nature 
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is the sign of a creature that has some providence over himself and others. This self-
governance is his freedom. This self-direction is moreover the natural law. Thus Aquinas 
defines natural law as “the participation of the rational creature in the eternal law” (ST I-
II.91.2 respondeo), participation in this case meaning something like “share.”12 These 
arguments moreover echo the prooemium of the Secunda pars, in which Aquinas 
promises to treat on man as an image of God, “the principle of his [own] actions.” Man 
uses his reason and will to govern himself, his reason based on what he can know 
naturally and his will moved by the natural inclinations that God grants him (ST I-II.91.2 
ad 2).13 Thus man’s freedom is not a freedom from law: it is freedom of and through law. 
God’s law is precisely what makes man free (ST I-II.91.2 ad 3). These arguments 
strengthen what Aquinas has already said of natural law in Question 90: the natural law is 
a law because the eternal law is a law, and it is natural because it is knowable naturally.  
In Article 3 Aquinas inquires into the existence of human law. The first objection 
parallels the first objection of Article 2: if we have just established that there is such and 
such a natural law, why need there be another law? Additionally, human reason is not a 
measure of things, but is measured by things: it does not create or direct things, but 
apprehends and grasps them. A “human” law would thus seem to be oxymoronic. And 
finally, if human reason does issue in some kind of order, it is not anything approaching 
the certainty or necessity of “law”: human law concerns what is uncertain. 
                                                
12 Most basically, participation is the passage of non-being into being, with every being 
dependent finally on the ground of being (Di Blasi 2006, 121-4). 
13 Aquinas speaks further about these inclinations in Question 94. The natural law directs 
us to good and away from evil. Thus man has three inclinations fundamental to our 
pursuit of the good and arise from our nature as rational and spiritual animals: (1) the 
inclination to self-preservation; (2) the inclination to pro-creation and the rearing of 
children; and (3) the inclination to live in society and to know the truth of God (ST I-
II.94.2 resp).  
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In his response, Aquinas concedes parts of these points.14 Human law concerns 
contingent and unique things, he argues, and therefore does not attain to great certainty. 
But if the natural law is the reflection of the eternal law in man, then the human law is the 
natural law applied to the concrete situation in which a community finds itself. Aquinas 
insists that the natural law is not the entirety of the eternal law: that would make humans 
God. The natural law is rather man’s imperfect share of the eternal law. Moreover, 
Aquinas agrees that the human law must grapple with the practical and contingent. Ergo, 
what humans know through the natural law has to be adapted for those practical 
contingencies. Aquinas will insist that “every human law is derived from the natural 
law,” but he recognizes that this derivation requires the prudence of human legislators. 
Thus Aquinas can acknowledge both that man’s law is a far cry from God’s law, as we 
suspected in our study of Question 90, but also that the foundation of man’s law in God’s 
law is the source of man’s great freedom. 
Article 4 asks a somewhat different question from the first three articles. While 
others begin, “It would seem that there is not a such-and-such law,” this one begins, “It 
would seem that there was not any need [necessarium] for a divine law.” This is a 
stronger claim, and for good reason. As Aquinas has already explained, God governs the 
universe through the eternal law, and man shares in that governance through the natural 
law and fashions human laws to govern his community. It is difficult to see where 
another law would come in without questioning the sufficiency of one of these other 
laws. And this is indeed how Aquinas frames the objections to the possibility of a divine 
law. The eternal law is already a divine law, a hypothetical objector says, and man 
participates in that law through the natural law. Moreover, man governs himself through 
                                                
14 A study of the objections in the Summa, which would be most welcome to this writer, 
might take its bearings from the frequency with which these objections quote the works 
of St. Augustine and Aristotle, two of Aquinas’ greatest teachers. 
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his reason, and now we know that reason issues in human law. Finally, to repeat from 
Article 2, man is far more self-sufficient than the irrational animals, particularly now that 
we have seen that he has this natural law. Yet the animals have no divine law, so why 
should man? 
Aquinas gives four reasons for the necessity of the divine law, and in so doing 
responds to these objections. First, man needs the divine law to direct him to his divine 
end. Law, we have been told, directs man to his end. If man’s end were merely natural, 
then the natural law and its determinations in the human law would suffice for his 
governance. “But since man is ordained to an end of eternal happiness… it was necessary 
that, besides the natural and the human law, man should be directed to his end by a law 
given by God.” As Aquinas will argue in Article 5, God has led man toward knowledge 
of this new end through the fulfillment of the Old Law through the New.15 Second, “on 
account of the uncertainty of human judgment, especially on contingent and particular 
matters… it was necessary for man to be directed in his proper acts by a law given by 
God, for it is certain that such a law cannot err.” Otherwise, “different people [will] form 
different judgments on human acts; whence also different and contrary laws result.” This 
is a brilliant move. While repeatedly denying the objection that the uncertainty of man’s 
judgment proves that it cannot be directed by some law, Aquinas acknowledges that man 
benefits from this gift of God, that he “may know without any doubt what he ought to do 
and what he ought to avoid.” The third and fourth reasons are closely connected: “man is 
not competent to judge of interior movements, that are hidden, but only of exterior acts 
which appear,” and “human law cannot punish or forbid all evil deeds.” These are curious 
phrases for 21st-century moderns to hear from Aquinas, for he agrees that human laws are 
                                                
15 Article 5 is one of the most fascinating parts of the “Questions on Law,” but Article 4 
tells us enough about the nature of the divine law for our purposes. 
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bad at directing interior actions. As Aquinas quotes from Augustine’s De libero arbitrio, 
“while aiming at doing away with all evils, [human laws] would do away with many 
good things, and would hinder the advance of the common good.” Yet if human law 
cannot do such things, it does not mean that they do not need to be done: “yet for the 
perfection of virtue it is necessary for man to conduct himself aright in both kinds of acts 
[i.e. exterior and interior].” Divine law ensures that man learns and is corrected as to his 
interior life, “that no evil might remain unforbidden and unpunished.” 
The divine law guides man to an end beyond that proper to the natural law. But 
Aquinas then points out some problems with the natural law, or at least problems with the 
human perception of it. Human judgment about even mundane things can be uncertain, 
and even people who agree on ends can disagree on the proper means to that end. Human 
law, moreover, can “see” only what humans do, not what they think. Thus it can demand 
outward conformity, but it cannot cultivate true assent. It is worth noting that Aquinas 
invokes Augustine on the limitations of human law, for Aquinas has quoted him in 
several objections against the existence of natural law. The argument of Augustine does 
not deny a natural law that participates in the eternal law, Aquinas shows, but rather 
reveals that there is a delicate concert of laws, divine and human, which laws all 
fundamentally originate in God. 
Article 6, the concluding article of Question 91, raises a surprising question: is 
there a “law of the fomes of sin”? Sin, as Aquinas defines it at ST I-II.71.1, is a vicious 
act, meaning that it is an action arising from a disposition to act against virtue. Thus it is 
voluntary and not in accord with reason (ST I-II.71.6).16 The fomes is a poetic name for 
man’s inclination or habitual impulse to sensuality (ST I-II.91.6 respondeo; cf. ST 
                                                
16 Of course a virtuous person can occasionally do evil, but sin is characteristic of 
vicious habit, not virtuous habit. Aquinas explains vice and sin at ST I-II.71-89, as well as 
in his De malo. 
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III.27.3-4). This is the impulse St. Paul bemoans when he says, “I see another law in my 
members, fighting against the law of my mind” (Rom. 7:23). This law is a deviatio a lege 
rationis: a “deviation from the law of reason” that affects all men, but particularly those 
who give in to their bodily appetites. It came about “when man turned his back on God,” 
in other words, the Fall. A law may incline a subject to a certain end, which is a “direct” 
inclination, or the inclination may be “indirect,” whereby “the very fact that a lawgiver 
deprives a subject of some dignity, the latter passes into another order.” So man is to be 
ruled by reason, but, falling away from it, man is under the “law” of sin. The law of 
fomes, neither based on reason nor directed toward the common good, is not strictly 
speaking a law. But it is a “law” insofar as it is a sign of divine justice.17  
Aquinas has already made clear that natural law is not the whole of eternal law, 
and that the limitations of human judgment and the vagaries of practical affairs place 
considerable constraints on the legislation and execution of human laws. But in Article 6 
Aquinas says more: if man is directed in principle by the law of reason, he must also 
contend with a law that inclines him away from the common good. The law warns us that 
men will often act against reason and the common good. As Aquinas will later explain, 
the natural law cannot be removed from man’s conscience. But its secondary precepts can 
be “blotted out” when reason is made the slave of the body and the passions (ST I-
II.94.6).18 
Thus we have assayed the four elements of law and the five kinds of law. I do not 
intend to proceed through Questions 92-108, gripping as they are. For our current 
                                                
17 The law of fomes will remind some of Giorgio Agamben’s “law of exclusion,” and 
Aquinas perhaps has the same Roman background in mind (Agamben 1998). Agamben’s 
law concerns the “spell of law” the criminal remains under by virtue of his violation of it, 
whereby he is removed from its protection. The “law,” then, is the state of his 
punishment.  
18 Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics X.1179a33-1181b24 
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purposes, Questions 90-1 suffice for defining the natural law in itself and in relation to 
the other laws, conclusions that Aquinas assumes rather than explicates in Question 94. 
Moreover, insofar as we cannot expect the accounts of law in De Regno and the Summa 
to be identical in every detail, we might suspect that the broad arguments of Questions 
90-1 are more likely than those of 92-108 to comport with the arguments of De Regno. 
We may, in any event, return to portions of those later questions should they prove 
helpful to our treatment of De Regno. 
We now have some sense of what the natural law is in the Summa Theologiae: the 
natural law is man’s participation in the eternal law. Because of man’s rational nature, the 
eternal law directs him in a special way, as it grants him a share in his own direction to 
his end. The natural law is thus a sign of man’s freedom, a freedom subject to prudential 
judgments of contingent practical circumstances. The human law is the determination of 
this participation, the joint fruit of man’s inclinations and the reason whereby he governs 
himself and others. Yet the whole purpose of law is man’s end, an end that man sees most 
clearly through the divine law. Thus, as we saw in Article 4, divine law is critical to our 
knowledge of the natural law and for the support of the human law. The law of sin is not 
insuperable, but it is a law with which humans must always contend. 
We can perhaps recast this conclusion in light of the work of Yves Simon. Simon 
has drawn attention to the “three foci” of the natural law: God, man and nature. As 
Hittinger ably recounts it: 
In the first place, natural law can be regarded as a matter of propositions or 
precepts that are first in the order of practical cognition… In the second place, 
natural law can be regarded as an issue of nature or human nature, in which case it 
is a problem not only of epistemology and logic but also of how practical reason 
is situated in a broader order of causality. Third, natural law can be approached 
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not only as order in the mind or order in nature but also as an ordinance of a 
divine lawgiver.19  
 
We have seen these foci in Aquinas’ account: natural law as directive of man’s 
action, as in the order of things and thus naturally knowable, and ultimately coming from 
God. What we have not seen, as Hittinger points out, is any suggestion that the natural 
law can be reduced to anything in creation, whether the mind of man or nature. “The fact 
that we first perceive ourselves discovering or grasping a rule of action,” Hittinger 
argues, “does not mean that the human mind is first in the causal order, or in the ultimate 
order of being.”20 The natural law is a share and participation in the eternal law, and 
paradoxically it is only “natural” because of this divine origin. Because of this divine 
origin, moreover, we cannot forget that God is always behind the law that governs man: 
the whole of His revelation to man must be considered, including the divine law.  
   
NATURAL LAW AND DE REGNO 
Now that we have some sense of the definition and significance of the natural 
law, I propose to investigate key moments of De Regno to explore the possible presence 
of natural law therein. Granted that the phrase “natural law” is absent from De Regno, 
can we yet discern some elements or clues of that law? And if we can uncover some such 
elements or clues, do they cohere as the natural law? Why does Aquinas never mention 
the natural law by name? Is this silence connected to the silence of Aquinas on law more 
generally in De Regno? 
                                                
19 Hittinger 2003, 4 
20 Hittinger 2003, 9 
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As we have advanced through an extensive exegesis of De Regno in Chapter 1-3 
of this dissertation, in this chapter I will assume the basic tripartite structure of the work 
set out therein: I.1-6, I.7-12 and II. While these divisions should be employed no further 
than they are useful, I would suggest that they will remain helpful for assaying our 
present concerns.   
I.1-6, we noted, has two distinct parts. First, Aquinas lays out the necessity of 
political authority and argues for kingship as the regime that best fulfills the end of that 
authority (I.1-2). Second, he discusses tyranny, including its causes, its effects and the 
proper response of citizens to it (I.3-6). One could also divide this section into political 
authority as such (I.1) and the best and worst regimes (I.2-6).21 Yet what caught our 
attention was not Aquinas’ regime typology, but the degree to which he dwells on 
tyranny as a theoretical and practical problem. Aquinas devotes scant paragraphs on the 
best regime before asking at some length what causes tyranny, why it inevitably fails, and 
what can prevent or end tyranny.22 Even if extant manuscripts lack the purportedly 
missing section of I.6 on preventing tyranny, the general tenor of I.3-6 is bleak.23  
In I.1-2 Aquinas presents a picture of rational and peaceful politics, but in I.3-6 
the will and violence come to the fore. Aquinas explains in I.1 that man “has an end to 
which his whole life and all his actions are ordered” (3), an end that he attains with “the 
light of reason,” which is “placed by nature in every man” (4), and in society (5-7). 
Indeed, man does not simply pursue his own private good through society: as a free man 
(liber) he seeks the common good of the multitude of free men (10). Such social activity 
requires political governance: “If, then, it is natural for man to live in the society of 
                                                
21 Eschmann 1949 does this (xxi). 
22 Keys 2006, 64 
23 Eschmann 1949 calls this discussion “remarkable,” (xviii). 
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many, it is necessary that there exist among men some means by which the group may be 
governed” (8). A necessity born of nature is a natural or intrinsic necessity; it is thus 
natural that man should implement the “means by which the group may be governed.” 
Government must seek good and avoid evil, then (10). Thus tyranny, or that rule directed 
against the common good, is “unnatural”: it is not in conformity with man’s nature or 
character as a political being, and it works against the nature of governance, which arises 
to secure the common good (11). Aquinas argues that history shows that monarchy is the 
best regime, although he does not claim that all peoples in all times and places have 
recognized and acted upon this fact, or that monarchy spontaneously leads to the 
perfection of a community.24 Far from it: “history” is instructive precisely because of its 
ambiguity. It often happens that “provinces or cities… are torn with dissensions and 
tossed about without peace” (20), and while it would behoove them to follow the 
example of monarchical rule in nature, whether that of the bee over the hive, of reason in 
the soul, or of God in the cosmos, this is rarely the course of action humans adopt (19).  
This discussion sets us up for I.3-6, in which the regime of reason is put to the 
test. The best government, monarchy, follows “the order of Divine Providence, which 
disposes everything in the best way.” Man’s “providence,” so to speak, lies dormant 
when the tyrant rules by force and according to his ever-changing desires rather than by 
reason (26). His actions are not directed to the common good of the multitude, and the 
effects of his action are directly opposed to that good: he has to suppress them and stamp 
out any virtue that might be used against him (28). He threatens marriage, offspring, 
friendship and the very lives of his subjects, utterly destroying the social basis of the 
polity (28-9). 
                                                
24 Recall from our discussion of I.6 that Aquinas has not ruled out a “tempered” 
monarchy as he argues for in ST I-II 105. 
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Vicious rulers can undo a society, but often those rulers rise to the top because of 
vicious citizens (33-4), and perfectly virtuous rulers can be undone by citizens who lack a 
commitment to the common good (31). When Aquinas urges that the best resistance to 
tyranny is the prayerful conversion of citizens, he likely also means it as the best 
prevention of tyranny (51-2). Throughout I.3-6, Aquinas attests to the pervasive and 
enduring corruption of men and their political activity. Many in fact do not seek the good, 
or rather seek something that is only an apparent good. Political institutions and laws 
apparently routinely fail to prevent such outcomes, making all the more urgent: from 
whence comes this perversity, and wherein lies its remedy? Aquinas’ enigmatic 
“Therefore sin must be obliterated, that the plague of tyrants may cease” is all he says 
directly (52).25  
Let us consider what we have read thus far. Man acts by reason for the common 
good and in a manner recognizing and, indeed, emulating the divine providence behind 
things.  He clearly proceeds, moreover, from inclinations to live in society and to find 
what is good and true. Is this not something very much like the natural law? The 
promulgator of this would-be-law, however, is mysterious. This is for two reasons: first, 
because Aquinas never specifically mentions the human legislator that would have to 
enact ordinances for this community. Second, more interestingly, because it would seem 
that man in following the pattern of God’s rule is in the first place acknowledging God’s 
legislative acts whereby creation is ordered. Aquinas takes particular care to emphasize 
that the actions of the human ruler stem from man’s natural necessities, and these 
necessities reflect God’s design. Yet man apparently has a choice in how he responds to 
these necessities: the best community is one of free [liberi] men rather than servi, 
meaning that they act for their own good rather than for that of another. 
                                                
25 Tollenda est igitur culpa, ut cesset a tyrannorum plaga. 
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Yet Aquinas does not once use the word lex in this section, much less lex 
naturalis or lex humana. He does, to be sure, use iustitia and iustum. And for all that we 
have said, what seems to emerge most clearly in I.1-2 is not this or that law, or even law 
as such, but authority. What I mean by “authority” is not the technical language of 
“sovereignty” of Hobbes, Bodin or Weber, but simply the moral agent with some 
directive care for his community. Aquinas, in establishing political authority as both 
arising from man’s nature and in the image of God, wants to highlight such authority as 
both natural and rational. Man as a rational creature has a kind of providence by which he 
provides for the natural needs of himself, his family and his fellow men. Particular men, 
in turn, can be designated by their community to direct that multitude in its pursuit of the 
common good.26 But such men are only explicable as political agents precisely because 
they are moral actors. The authority in question would certainly be a lawgiver, but there 
is no indication that Aquinas means to isolate that element of his office. So it is possible 
that here Aquinas is interested in the full range of the moral life and its foundations rather 
than just law.  
In so pointing to God and man as the authors of order, it is not a great leap to the 
eternal law and human law. But what about the natural law? We saw in ST I-II.91.2 that 
natural law is the same law as the eternal, yet reflected in man rather than originating in 
God. Insofar as man knows this eternal law, then, it is natural law, regardless of how far 
he acts upon it. What man applies of his knowledge of the eternal law, whether he knows 
God to be its author or not, is also the natural law. In a sense, then, the best “clue” for the 
natural law is this formative link between the legislation of man and God. Indubitably 
man’s execution of such a link requires other things, notably prudence. But for man to 
                                                
26 Cf. Simon 1953, 144-194 on the designation and transmission of political authority 
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bring prudence to bear, there must be something upon which he might bring it to bear. 
Thus natural law.27 
But what of I.3-6? Perhaps Aquinas presents the eternal, natural and human laws 
in I.1-2. Yet the subsequent four chapters do not give heart to anyone expecting those 
laws to promote a rational paideia. Apparently man routinely and willfully flouts justice 
to secure what he wants, untroubled by his “natural” inclinations to seek his good through 
society and with others. Monarchy is the best regime according to reason and divine 
providence, but the people reject it as often as it lapses into tyranny. Aquinas does argue 
that monarchy lapses into tyranny less than does polyarchy, but this claim is no great 
comfort on the heels of his frank assessment of the ills of monarchy. Classical political 
philosophy makes clear the dangers of political ambition: once seated in power, the 
reward of virtue never seems to be enough. Thus the king who would rule in justice 
becomes the tyrannical perverter of truth and order.28 But if the natural law is something 
that every person knows, it is the more extraordinary that ordinary citizens should also 
participate in the corruption of their regime. How strong can man’s participation in the 
natural law be in such case? The operative law would seem to be that of sin, the fomes. 
What we read in I.3-6 need not be a denial of the presence of those laws in De 
Regno, but it is worrisome given that politics is a practical concern, one in which what is 
desirable and what is possible do not always coincide. If it would be desirable for men to 
conduct themselves according to the natural law, it is nonetheless dangerous to organize 
politics around it if such conformity to the natural law is unlikely or improbable. This is 
indeed a great concern of Aquinas’ thought, determined by ends as it is.29 Must we say 
                                                
27 I do not mean for this to be a dispositive argument in terms of the role of virtue in De 
Regno, but only to lay aside such questions in the interim as secondary. 
28 The classic studies are Plato’s Alcibiades and Xenophon’s Education of Cyrus. 
29 Cf. ST I-II 96.2-3 
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that Aquinas promotes what Weber calls an “ethics of ultimate ends,” according to which 
the end is to be pursued at all costs, regardless of its effects on the society? 
Aquinas dwells on evil in politics rather more than we might expect someone 
attempting to persuade his audience of “political moralism” to do.30 Aquinas does not 
present the concurrence of man’s moral knowledge and habits with his political behavior 
as a fait accompli: Aquinas promises rather that this concurrence will be hard-won. He 
also acknowledges the roles that the passions and appetites for material and spiritual 
pleasures can play, factors that a strictly rationalist analysis would miss.31 In short, 
Aquinas has given us reason to think that the natural law thinking we hold so central to 
his moral theology is irrelevant to De Regno and man’s political activity. If what we need 
is a realism that underlines man’s irrational and violent nature and attempts to mitigate 
the worst effects of those traits, then De Regno might show us the necessity of that 
realism, but it does not supply it.  
Given our review of the Summa Theologiae, however, we would do well to recall 
the richness of Aquinas’ mature moral theology, rooted as it is in a fulsome theological 
anthropology and metaphysics. Perhaps De Regno, as an early work of Aquinas, lacks 
much that we find in the Summa, meaning that in De Regno Aquinas simply cannot tackle 
the difficulties we have raised.32 His investigations in De Regno, in fact, may have 
spurred Aquinas on to a deeper study of Aristotle’s Ethics and Augustine’s Commentary 
on the “Sermon on the Mount,” both thought to be pivotal to Aquinas’ composition of the 
                                                
30 I intentionally use a phrase that has regained currency in contemporary political and 
moral philosophy, especially in the works of Bernard Williams and Raymond Geuss.  
31 Cf. Fortin 1996, 210-11 and his perhaps intentionally misleading account of natural 
law (Cf. Guerra 2010, 102-6) 
32 Eschmann 1949, xxvi-xxx.  
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Secunda pars of the Summa.33 Then again, we have only begun to read De Regno. 
Perhaps we should continue reading. We should bear in mind, however, the emphasis of 
Aquinas on the naturalness of political authority but also evil in politics. 
I.7-12, as we have seen, marks a profound break with I.1-6. Its traditional title, De 
Praemio Regis, tells us a great deal: it indicates a shift from the tyrant to the king, and 
from the blame-worthy actions of the tyrant to the praise-worthy ministry of the king. 
This suggests that Aquinas will return in De Praemio Regis to the office of the king, 
discussion of which he abandoned after I.2, and that he will explain why the morass he 
describes in I.3-6 is not inevitable.  
I.7-9 make clear what seems implicit in I.3-6: earthly goods, including glory and 
honor, are fine things, but they are not the best things. Aquinas argues for the 
insufficiency of such ends in I.7 entirely on the basis of natural reason, in the tradition of 
Aristotle and Cicero. So what is the proper reward of the king? It is beatitude, or the 
vision of God in Heaven (I.8). Here we have left natural reason, for only revelation can 
grant man such knowledge. Aquinas has argued at several points in De Regno that sound 
politics depends upon a knowledge of man’s end, but only here has he made clear that 
this end can only be known through revelation. To be sure, philosophy can tell man that 
only something as universal and ultimate as God can be the source of man’s end (63-5), 
but it cannot have discovered for itself that the providential and legislating God of 
Abraham is that end (62).34 The king is a minister of God, and thus receives his reward 
for faithful service from God. Through such service the king helps his people, not only 
                                                
33 It is interesting to see Pinckaers emphasize Augustine (1995, 134; 174) and MacIntyre 
Aristotle (1984, 177-80). 
34 We can thus distinguish between the order of discovery and the order of 
demonstration or proof in philosophy (Wippel 1984, 2-21 and Wippel 2007, 11-30; cf. 
D’Andrea 1992). 
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negatively in avoiding the dangers of becoming a vainglorious tyrant, but also positively 
in seeking to govern them toward what is alone the common good: God. The king 
therefore indeed merits honor and glory, but not as final ends (66).  
I.9 ends on a curious note. The king deserves beatitude for serving God well, but 
he can receive this reward for service that fails or flounders. According to Gregory the 
Great, “when the sea is troubled by stormy waves, even an experienced sailor is 
bewildered” (73).35 Politics can bring out the best in men, for those who only seem 
virtuous are unmasked as vicious once in power, while those who weather the great 
difficulties of politics with virtue intact are proven to everyone to be good. If the king is 
“tried in the work of virtue... [and] is found faithful,” then he will yet receive his reward. 
Moreover, God recognizes that the king faces special temptations. Thus, “if through 
weakness they sometimes do amiss, they are rendered more excusable before men and 
more easily obtain forgiveness from God.” Such forgiveness can be theirs if they offer 
“humility, mercy, and prayer for their sins.” 
There are at least three related points one might take from this section. First, this 
section echoes I.3-6 on the trials and tribulations of kingship. The tyrant makes life 
oppressive for everyone and frustrates the basic aims of his community. But the king’s 
knowledge of man’s end does not make politics easy, nor does it assure that the 
community will attain to its good. Aquinas frankly assesses the probability of success as 
dubious at best, and does not pretend to offer instant recipes or solutions to the intractable 
difficulties of politics. Second, if a ruler’s knowledge of the end of man does not provide 
for a technology of politics, Aquinas nonetheless urges a political theology that 
acknowledges that man will suffer setbacks and even fail in the pursuit of that end. The 
                                                
35 To the mediaeval mind, the analogy between a king and sailor would have been a 
conspicuous demotion of the king as navigator on the ship of state. Thanks to Andreas 
Kalyvas for this suggestion. 
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king must do his best and persevere, but Aquinas acknowledges that circumstances can 
make difficult or even impossible success, and that ambition and greed can tempt even 
the most virtuous men in power. The king does have a high standard up to which he 
ought to live, but these standards are motivated by no “idealism” on Aquinas’ part. 
Aquinas can hardly be accused of utopianism.36 Third, the king is a servant of God, but 
he is an exalted one. Unlike the servus who is rewarded or punished precisely insofar as 
he serves or fails to serve the interest of his master, the king can attain to beatitude by 
loving and offering himself up to God. Aquinas thus reinforces and extends our 
conclusion from I.1-2 according to which political authority is natural and good, and that 
the king as a servant of God has a liberty to choose that service. The king not only reaps 
the natural rewards of such service, namely honor and glory, but these rewards are indeed 
insufficient without the supernatural reward of that service. As it happens, the king 
receives that reward as the fruit of his virtue, even if that virtue is frustrated by external 
circumstances, as is so often the case.  
All of this, naturally, works to reduce the temptations of tyranny. Thus the tyrant 
in I.10-11 becomes “the fool”: given the vagaries of politics, he often loses the earthly 
goods that he seeks, and he always loses the heavenly ones that he should seek but does 
not. 
While one can cast doubt on the presence of the eternal and natural law in I.1-6, it 
would be difficult to deny that of another law in De Praemio Regis: the divine law. 
Divine law is God’s revelation, instructing man in the content and pursuit of his 
supernatural end (ST I-II.91.4; 98-108). Aquinas speaks of precisely such things in I.8-9.  
He makes clear that man’s supernatural end is beatitude, he establishes its basis in divine 
                                                
36 Cf. Maritain on Machiavelli in Man and the State (56-62) and “The End of 
Machiavellianism” (1942). Thanks to Chris Wolfe for thoughts on this point. 
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revelation, and he completes the argument of I.1-2 by arguing for such beatitude as the 
final end of man’s activity. Even if one agrees that the subject matter of De Praemio 
Regis is the divine law, however, one can still be perplexed as to why Aquinas would 
invoke such a law after his incomplete discussion of the eternal and natural laws in I.1-6. 
I.3-6 raises doubts, we note, that such laws can direct man’s politics to the good, and the 
discussion of the king who fails yet is still rewarded perhaps only exacerbates such 
concerns. 
Charles McCoy offers the beginnings of a solution to this question.37 As we saw 
in ST I-II.91.4, the divine law plays a pivotal role in the political thought of Aquinas. 
First, it gives man knowledge of what he cannot otherwise know, namely knowledge of 
his supernatural end. Second, the divine law serves as a forceful reminder of what man 
ought to know but does not. Man needs such a reminder because of his vicious 
tendencies. McCoy does not claim anymore than does Aquinas that man is in a Calvinist 
state of depravity. Au contraire, the divine law addresses itself to man’s reason precisely 
because his faculty of reason is not maimed. But man does encounter characteristic 
obstacles to his knowledge of the natural law, as we also noted in Aquinas’ explanations 
of the “law of sin.” Man can be better than he knows, and he requires a reminder of this 
fact. Third, the divine law does what the human law simply cannot. McCoy notes: “The 
perfection of liberty must come through a law that, by reaching the interior movements of 
                                                
37 McCoy’s The Structure of Political Thought (1963) is a neglected classic, in the 
reading of which I was aided by Haggerty 2008 and Neumayr 2011. I hope in the future 
to consider some of the arguments of McCoy in relation to those of Ernest Fortin. Thanks 
to Father James Schall, Mark Henrie, Matthew Peterson and Chris Wolfe for their 
thoughts on McCoy. 
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the soul, forbids and prescribes, rewards and punishes without compelling. And this 
perfection of freedom is the end at which every lawgiver aims.”38  
In the light of such arguments, it is clearer how I.7-12 constitutes a response to 
the problems of I.1-6. Aquinas indeed returns in De Praemio Regis to the office of the 
king that he tables at I.3. The king who serves God will turn to the divine law, learning 
not just right from wrong, which most people have at least some sense of, but knowing 
that justice involves serving the common good and that God is the ultimate end of man. 
The king will moreover know the reward and punishment of justice and injustice, even if 
it does not come from his citizens. Such comprehensive knowledge is difficult for anyone 
to come by, and, to repeat, Aquinas does not claim or promise that its possession will 
lead to flourishing economies, robust democratic participation or justice and peace in 
terris. But he does claim that the king will weather the storm as well as anyone with this 
knowledge, and will continue to grow in virtue through it. Thus, as a measure of justice, 
the natural law will become as possible as it is desirable.      
The tyrant, however, has no chance. If he does seek something slightly more 
noble – perhaps he really does want honor and glory – then he must go to extraordinary 
lengths to simulate the experience of his subjects granting him such things. And if some 
of his subjects will be willing, as the decline of Rome illustrates, it will be of benefit to 
no one. In Augustinian terms, we might say that I.1-6 shows Augustine’s Two Cities in 
tension: De Praemio Regis promises their eschatological reunion. But Aquinas has made 
no effort in De Regno to disguise that man has great trouble in grasping the natural law, 
                                                
38 McCoy 1963, 154. Further: “Unlike civil law which, finding the common 
denominator, extends indifferently to all (communiter proponitur) and unlike the natural 
law, which reflects an objective order of essences, the divine positive law brings the 
perfect order of the common good by extending to individuals in their very diversity, in 
their being not all alike.” Cf. McCoy 1989, 24-38. 
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much less in discerning how to apply it as human law.39 Aquinas has made no effort, in 
other words, to re-unite prematurely the Two Cities. While he does not hide such facts in 
the Questions on Law, only in De Regno does he paint the picture of the regime failure 
induced by this amnesia or denial of the natural law.40 What seems like a simple detail in 
the Summa becomes in De Regno a fact of signal importance. Politics is perhaps best 
understood as the history of man getting simple but fundamental things wrong.    
We have seen Aquinas implicitly speak of the eternal and natural law (I.1-6) and, 
to our surprise, the divine law (I.7-12). There has been little thematic treatment of the 
human law, although it has at times been implied. As we turn to Book II, we must ask 
whether Aquinas proceeds to spell out in greater detail the relation between the laws, and 
further whether he speaks further of the human law. According to Eschmann, Book II is 
supposed to begin the practical section of De Regno. We know this from the prooemium 
and from the introduction to Book II. While he does not deny that Aquinas takes up 
practical matters in Book II, Eschmann thinks that at §103 Aquinas changes the subject.41 
Book II deviates quickly from its own plan, Eschmann urges, changing from discerning 
“the right practice of royal government… by studying the model of God’s government of 
the universe” to “the ecclesiastico-political teaching on the relations between the two 
powers,” i.e., the Church and “State.”42 Is this “two powers” discussion a digression, or is 
it a manner of approaching the right practice of royal government?    
                                                
39 De Regno seems to conform to the teaching of the Summa according to which 
everyone has some grasp of the primary precepts of the natural law, but fewer to its 
secondary precepts and only the wise to the tertiary (ST I-II 94.2; 100.1). 
40 We might wonder if something of this kind would have come forth in Aquinas’ 
Commentary on the “Politics” had he completed it. 
41 Eschmann 1949, xix 
42 Eschmann 1949, xix; see Brague 2007, 262.  
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Book II strikes the reader in the first place as a recapitulation of Book I. 
Promising to explain “what the kingly office is and what qualities the king should have,” 
Aquinas suggests that “it seems best that we learn about the kingly office from the pattern 
of the regime of nature,” given that “things which are in accordance with art are an 
imitation of the tings which are in accordance with nature” (93). From nature, moreover, 
“we accept the rules to act according to reason.” Such arguments closely track the 
arguments of I.1-2, in which Aquinas demonstrates the excellence of monarchy through 
its relation to the rule of one in nature. In this restatement of that teaching, as we also 
noted in Chapter 3, Aquinas distinguishes so as to unite the government of God and man: 
there is a “universal government” whereby all things are governed, and the “particular 
government” whereby man is governed. The former government is headed by God, and 
the latter by man (94). There is a two-fold similitude between these governments: first, 
“in a certain manner [quodammodo] reason obtains in man as God obtains in the world”; 
and second, “the multitude of men is governed by the reason of one man” as God rules in 
the world. There is a key distinction between man and God, of course, and this distinction 
is grounded in creation: God created and governs the cosmos, with man as a part of that 
cosmos. Man does have a role in the “particular government” of himself and others, but 
this should not be mistaken for the role of God. Thus Aquinas elaborates at some length 
the distinction between creation and governance (96-101): creation sets the end of things, 
an end that government does not invent but rather discerns and to which it conforms.   
If II.1 is a recapitulation of I.1-2, then I would suggest that it is a most telling 
restatement. For while we saw the great role played by eternal law in I.1-2, it would seem 
that here Aquinas means to highlight the natural law and its connection with the eternal 
law. Or perhaps that would be too hasty. For there is no direct reference to “law.” Rather, 
Aquinas relates man to God through reason. True, this reason has a directive or governing 
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authority that supplies a government, whether general or particular, for a community, 
whether cosmic or terrestrial. Aquinas without a doubt foreshadows law here, but his 
emphasis on the providence of God that makes natural law possible in the first place.43 
II.3 takes up the suggestion of II.1 that the government of man can be learned 
from how God governs the world, a lesson qualified by II.1. As government involves 
leading something to its proper end (103), we must ask to what end God governs. In the 
case of man, God governs toward two ends: man’s natural happiness and final [ultima] 
beatitude (105). Man thus has two governments leading him to his two ends: the “natural 
government” of men, and the supernatural government of the Church. The end sought by 
the government of the Church is higher than that sought by natural and political 
government (107), and it is an end that cannot be secured through political government 
because it is beyond the reach of man (108). Thus the king must govern recognizing that 
the Church, and not the king, has final and supreme government over men. As the king is 
not the creator of men, he cannot dictate the end of man for which man was created, and 
cannot dictate any ends of man beyond that natural end. The king is neither a creator-god 
nor a sōter, a savior-god.44 For such distinctions to be made, however, “spiritual things” 
must be clearly distinguished from “earthly things” (110), a discussion in which Aquinas 
forecloses the possibility of religion serving politics in a kind of Hobbesian political 
theology (110-13).         
II.3 would seem to be a restatement of I.7-12, for it again raises the problem or 
question of divine law. In I.7-12, or De Praemio Regis, divine law is presented as the 
source of man’s knowledge of his reward or end: beatitude. In II.3, revealed law is 
                                                
43 McCoy 1973, 264-70 
44 Byzantine emperors often referred to themselves as “Sōter,” a claim not only to hold 
royal authority from God, but as a terrestrial power uniquely instituted by Christ Himself. 
The resemblance to the nation-state comes to light in Cavanaugh 2011, 7-45. 
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presented as the source of a second authority on earth to govern man toward that end: the 
Church. The law has a double task, for if it proclaims the final end of man, it must also 
set the end man achieves in politics as intermediate.  
This is a tricky business. Aquinas urges throughout De Regno that wise men from 
times untold have had a sense that man is destined for more than he can obtain on earth, 
that the spiritual nature of man yearns for more even as his material dimension is never 
satisfied. Yet attempts to explain such doubts to “politics” have never gone well, Socrates 
being the case in point. But Christian revelation provides politics with not just a doubt or 
a question as to whether politics obtains man’s final end, but a rejection with great 
assurance that politics could do so. Thus the divine law has to set the end man achieves in 
politics as intermediate to that of his supernatural end, and also teach man that he has 
always stood on the threshold of such a possibility.   
The divine law performs great labors. Eschmann worries that in II.3 Aquinas 
digresses from the topic announced in II.1: how a king should rule.45 But Aquinas is 
following his statements to the letter: the king needs to know how God rules so that he 
himself may rule. But the king is of course not God, so he must rule not like God but as 
man. It will be vital for the king to see that he is not a creator and not steward of the final 
end of man. In recognizing the earthly ends that God has set for man, however, the king 
will see what his purpose ought to be in acting. Thus, as we noted in our study of the 
Summa, the divine law both teaches man new things and reminds him of what he could in 
principle know through unaided reason.46  
It seems at the outset of II.4 that Aquinas will finally treat upon the human law 
thematically. Indeed, this section contains Aquinas’ only use of the word lex in De Regno 
                                                
45 Eschmann 1949, xix 
46 ST I-II.91.4 
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(121).47 Aquinas begins by arguing that, “just as the king ought to be subject to the divine 
government administered by the office of the priesthood, so he ought to preside over all 
human offices, and regulate them by the rule of his government” (114). According to this 
way of viewing it, the divine law serves as a divine guarantee of political authority, 
articulating the rule of the state within its place in cosmic governance. Again, then, as we 
saw in II.3: Christianity exalts politics as it subordinates it to the divine. Moreover, if the 
activities of the king are to be intermediate to those of the Church, then it behooves him 
to have some knowledge of this end of beatitude, so as to learn how “to promote the good 
life of the multitude in such a way as to make it suitable for the attainment of heavenly 
happiness” (115). Thus the king should be “taught the divine law” (116). Note that 
Aquinas does not claim that the king needs to read the Bible to know how to rule as such, 
although this could be implied by what he says. Aquinas rather argues that the king ought 
to consult revelation so that he may direct his own efforts to the final one. In other words 
Aquinas does not directly question the ability of the king to discern and execute his duties 
as king. Aquinas does, however, ask the king to scrutinize their conformity to the final 
end of man. 
As we have already seen, Aquinas proceeds in what remains of II.4 to lay down 
the duties of the king and what obstructs them. For our purposes, we might note that the 
obstructions that Aquinas describes seem to track closely with the ills of tyranny raised in 
I.3-6 and with the obstacles of man’s apprehension of the natural law in ST I-II.91.4. 
“Now there are three things,” Aquinas argues, “by which the public good is not permitted 
to endure…”48 To repeat our earlier study, they are mortality, the perversity of will of 
citizens, and the attacks of other communities (119). The latter two, I earlier suggested, 
                                                
47 That the law in question is the law of God we will leave aside for now. 
48 Sunt autem tria, quibus bonum publicum permanere non sinitur… 
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overlap: external attacks occur at least in part because of the perversity of will of others 
outside the community, but also because of the perverse wills of those within that 
community to the extent that they fail to establish peace with other societies.49  
It would be difficult to condense Aquinas’ criticisms of tyranny in I.3-6 to bullet 
points, but he has therein something in mind like the troubles of II.4. The tyrant denies 
his own mortality, is profoundly perverse of will and encourages others in his regime to 
be so, and invites external attacks both insofar as he weakens his state and as he engages 
in vainglorious and needless foreign exploits. The tyrant elevates his perversity into a 
regime-wide way of life, if it can be called that, which is precisely the conditions that 
would test a people morally: will they resist and restore good morals and justice, or will 
they be co-opted for material reasons or for lack of fortitude? The risk of course, as 
Aristotle would also agree, is that the citizens thereby accept the tyrant’s pretense to 
immortality, taking his willful caprice as the standard for justice.50 
As for difficulties with apprehending the natural law, we noted that the secondary 
precepts of the natural law can be entirely blotted out from man: such blotting stems from 
perversity of will, often as passed down through the mores of a culture.51 I would also 
note that, of the three inclinations that undergird the natural law, two of these factors 
directly work against the problems here: the inclination to self-preservation and the 
inclination to live in peace and truth with others. One ought to take care for one’s life, but 
one should be willing to sacrifice that for higher goods. Similarly, those who refuse to 
live in peace with their neighbors have arbitrarily restricted a regard for truth and 
goodness to those of their own community. A difficulty arises, however, when a lack of 
                                                
49 In view of this section and I.2-6, De Regno would seem to have a substantial teaching 
on war and international relations.  
50 Politics 1285b33-1286b27 
51 ST I-II 94.6 
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regard for other peoples begins to impinge upon one’s own. We moderns did not need to 
wait for “globalization” to know this. 
These problems have political remedies, but a proper approach to such remedies 
must accord a central role to the divine law: to remind man of his higher calling. The 
natural law is not a panacea. Men know it and reject it as often as they fail to apprehend 
its precepts and act in ignorance of them. Where it must be strengthened, the divine law 
steps in. Even were man’s knowledge of the natural law perfect, however, he would still 
need the divine law for knowledge of his supernatural end, as Aquinas makes clear at I.7-
12 and II.4. With specific reference to our minister Dei, Aquinas seems to argue that it 
would not be enough for the king to know the precepts of the natural law as the 
thoughtful fruit of man’s phronesis. The king rather needs to see the author of the natural 
law as God, and thus the natural law as not originating from man, but rather participated 
in by man. The king must direct his community to beatitude, and thus all his actions must 
be directed to that great final end. This king cannot afford to meander aimlessly toward 
the end of the natural law. Moreover, although Aquinas never argues that man needs to 
know God as the author of the natural law to grasp its precepts, he does make clear that 
not knowing this is blame-worthy.52 Such ignorance would be doubly blameworthy for a 
king, because he ought to lead his people to virtue. The cultivation of virtue can be a 
hazardous business when its final end, “happiness,” remains obscure and its sole obvious 
avenue, man’s reason, appears so frail.  
This perhaps explains in part why Socrates sought to quell political ambition with 
his failed Kallipolis and why Cicero saw a need to praise both the political and the 
philosophical life, even though deep tensions between them were made clear by Aristotle. 
                                                
52 ST I 2.1; II-II 85.1; and SCG III 38 
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Yet the divine law of Christ reveals the end, beatitude, and the means, grace, in which 
and whereby man can finally be reconciled with his own fullest nature.  
 
WHITHER NATURAL LAW? 
By this point we can be fairly certain that the natural law lurks within De Regno, 
even basing this search upon only the broadest definition of the Summa Theologiae. Yet 
granted that Aquinas’ chief aim is grounding the moral and political life of man in God, 
as is clear from his frequent recourse to the naturalness and divine sanction of man’s 
political authority, one might think that his concern is less with the multiple kinds of law 
as discussed in the Questions on Law than with law simply as originating with God and 
as enacted by man. One might even argue that Aquinas is not concerned with law at all in 
De Regno, but with some other moral concept like virtue. 
One might object that there is no way to know whether in De Regno Aquinas 
simply sees law as human and divine, as some would say of Augustine, especially as De 
Regno was composed before the Summa Theologiae and its exhaustive taxonomy of 
law.53 To this we might say two things. There are several reasons in De Regno to think 
that Aquinas has several notions of law in mind, as we have compassed. Further, the 
distinction between laws at ST I-II.91 is not wholly original to Aquinas, so we need not 
insist that he could not have known of it prior to his composition of the Summa.54 Yet 
there could be a certain truth to this claim. Just as Augustine’s notion of law seems 
compatible with Aquinas’ more differentiated legal schema55, so Aquinas’ presentation of 
                                                
53 Augustine does sometimes speak of lex naturalis, e.g. De Diversis Questionibus 
Octoginta Tribus 53.2.  
54 Kossel in Pope 2002, 386-8 
55 Hittinger 2003, xxi-xxii 
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law in De Regno might be consonant with his richer elaboration of the Summa, and 
indeed could reveal or clarify something foundational about the latter. What foundation 
could that be? Just what our hypothetical critic suggests: the relation between God’s law 
and man’s law. This is the question of participation. 
As we have already gleaned from the Summa, the participation of the rational 
creature in the eternal law is crucial to Aquinas’ understanding of natural law and to his 
teaching on man’s relation to God more generally.56 “Participation” has a long and 
ambiguous history in the canons of philosophy, and is in some sense an answer to 
questions about the relation of the one to the many, or between creator and creatures.57 
For Aquinas participation means the ordering of creatures to God, both insofar as they 
proceed in their being from His own being as effect from cause, and insofar as God 
moves and governs their operations through the eternal law. In the rational creature, God 
imprints the principles of the eternal law upon the intellect, so that intellectual creatures, 
most notably man, can partake of a share of God’s providence.58 It is a bold metaphysical 
position that fears neither reducing man in elevating God nor sullying the high in granting 
that it stoops down to the low.59 
The human being as rational can participate in the eternal law cognitively through 
the natural law: he shares in a higher intellect, a share that Aquinas at times calls a 
“spark” (scintilla), and this intellect is the foundation of the law that moves us to virtuous 
                                                
56 Viz. ST I-II.91.2. Rziha 2009 discusses the recovery of participatio in Aquinas’ moral 
theology (6-28).  
57 See Anscombe 1991, and Socrates’ discussion with Parmenides in the Parmenides 
(130e-134e).  
58 Fabro 1974, 453-61. In a similar vein, Aquinas suggests in his Commentary on 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics that “what is principal in man” is “a thing found most 
perfectly in superior substances but imperfectly and by participation, as it were, in man."  
(Comm NE VI, 1 n.2110 on 1177b31-1178a8) 
59 Fabro 1974, 477, footnote 33 
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action toward the good.60 Man’s habit of apprehension of this “spark” is synderesis.61 
Through synderesis humans can freely direct themselves to their ends, insofar as the will 
is conformed to reason as habituated through the virtue of prudence.62 It is in this way 
that “the natural law is the practical intellect’s natural cognitive participation in eternal 
law.”63 Participation thus reconciles two seemingly disparate intuitions of the moral 
order: that man chooses his end in his own freedom, and that man depends upon God for 
direction toward his end. God creates man to choose the end that God reveals as good and 
ultimate.64 
It would be easy to unsettle the fine balance constituting the doctrine of 
participation, namely by emphasizing one half of this dynamic at the cost of the other. 
Undercut man’s freedom, and one makes man God’s slave, as in the teaching of Ockham 
or al-Ghazali. Deny God’s foundational role in every human act, and one ends up with a 
deism that obliterates God’s providence.65 The error need not be theoretical, especially in 
the latter case. Man can err practically against participation simply by forgetting or 
neglecting his dependence upon God in making use of his freedom, a temptation all too 
present for an embodied soul living in time. In such instances it becomes easy for man to 
                                                
60 ST I 79.12-13 and De veritate I.16-17.1-2. Aquinas locates the fons of synderesis in 
Saint Jerome’s commentary on Ezekiel (ST I 79.13), although it seems to be in Aquinas’ 
own Commentary on Aristotle’s “Nicomachean Ethics” that he moves beyond Jerome to 
link synderesis to prudence (Comm NE VII, 1-4). Synderesis appears only at ST I-II 94.1 
ad 2 in the “Questions on Law,” prompting West to speculate, with the support of Crowe 
1977, that synderesis has less significance for Aquinas in his later works (West 2006, 24). 
61 II Sententia, d. 39, q. III, a. 1 
62 ST II-II.47.5 ad 1 
63 Rziha 2009, 104, paraphrasing and elaborating on ST I-II.91.2 
64 Rziha 2009, 1-3 
65 Rziha 2009, 92 
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imagine himself as the source of this law and its creator. He can forget that he not only 
“measures” with law, but also is measured by it.66  
Characterizing the natural law as man’s participation in the eternal law helps us to 
answer both of our present questions: is the natural law in De Regno, and, if so, why does 
he never explicitly discuss the concept? Yes, the natural law is in De Regno: natural law 
as “between” eternal and human law is precisely what we uncovered in our analysis of 
the text. The prince would not need to know a full-blown theory of participation, of 
course, nor could he be expected to understand it. But although Aquinas does not mean to 
turn princes into theologian-kings, he does want to lay down how they can become good 
men and rulers. His direct concern would be enlivening the prince’s sense of participation 
in the eternal law rather than teaching him the theory of participation. And to what end? 
The point of law, after all, is the service of some common good. Thus man is not only 
steward of the eternal law, but of the common good that it promotes. Aquinas is guarding 
against the kind of “political deism” that would mistake a steward for a creator. 
So why not name that natural law? After all, this is a pedagogical work. Ought 
Aquinas not to make clear distinctions between key concepts, clarifying their basis and 
end, and disabusing the reader of misconceptions of them? As a preface to my answer to 
this question, let me re-iterate that, just because it is a pedagogical work, Aquinas need 
not be overly concerned with presenting the king with a taxonomy of law or articulating a 
completely theology of politics. After all, the addressee of this speculum, a king trying to 
consolidate his rule in a precarious political situation, has practical goals in mind. And 
while we have unearthed many rich theoretical dimensions of De Regno, much of what 
Aquinas explicitly argues has been practical. The Questions on Law in the Summa 
Theologiae, while a great source of wisdom, is clearly not the kind of text through which 
                                                
66 ST I-II.90.1 ad 1 
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Aquinas means to teach our king. Indeed, not only has De Regno not been systematic in 
the manner of the Summa, but it has contained virtually no sustained discussions of 
virtue, the common good or law in general. It could be the case that Aquinas simply did 
not see the need to raise the issue of natural law except insofar as he needed to make 
practical points.  
Granting this point, however, we might recall our earlier claims that De Regno 
offers a primarily indirect teaching, the manner in which Aquinas forces us to discover 
for ourselves the natural law being an example of this characteristic of the work.67 Rather 
than asking why Aquinas never uses the phrase lex naturalis, we might ask why Aquinas 
teaches the king about natural law indirectly. The doctrine of participation reveals a 
possible answer to this question: in order to underline the basis and limitations of human 
law. Allow me to make three suggestions toward explaining this. 
First, the natural law comes into view in De Regno as a participation in the eternal 
law because Aquinas wants our king to understand the natural law not in the first place as 
some distinct concept, but as his own awareness of the eternal law. In the first two 
chapters of De Regno, Aquinas speaks primarily of the divine providence whereby man 
was made for earth and men for each other. Thus man is by nature political and political 
authority is natural. Yet Aquinas’ purpose herein is not to question or cast doubt on 
man’s nature as political. He rather links it to God’s creation and governance of the 
world, explicating the divine basis of man’s society. Note also the priority of these 
activities: the weight of Aquinas’ account in I.1-2 rests on God’s creative rather than 
governing act, and this would be all the more reason to emphasize not the natural or 
human law, but the eternal law: man cannot after all create. Aquinas reinforces this claim 
                                                
67 The arguments of De Regno are indirect insofar as most of the theoretical claims of 
the work are raised implicitly; at least part of this indirection depends upon the lessons of 
I.3-6, which as we saw are primarily negative. 
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in his critique of founding myths at II.2. One might object that the king needs to have a 
firm understanding of the natural law as a kind of share in this eternal law. I concede this 
point, if only to clarify that the natural law is nothing without the eternal law, for which 
reason we and the king must have a clear vision of just what the eternal law is. This is the 
significance of Aquinas’ argument according to which the natural law is “nothing but a 
participation” in the natural law: without the eternal law, there would be no natural law.68 
To make the claim even more radical: without God, there is no man. On this line of 
reasoning, Aquinas does not invoke the natural law because he wishes to train the 
attention of the king on his existential dependence upon the eternal law.  
We see Aquinas striking this balance repeatedly in De Regno, moments wherein 
our royal reader is exalted through his subordination to God and to His Church. Aquinas 
begins De Regno by flattering the king: he is as God in his kingdom (I.1-2). De Regno, or 
at least II.4, ends with the king diligently serving his people under the aegis of the 
Church. Between these two points, Aquinas urges the king that he receives his reward 
from God (I.8); that the king rules in his kingdom as God rules in the cosmos, but not as a 
creator (II.2) and not as a savior (II.3). He is a minister Dei: not God, but a servant of the 
highest. This dynamic emerges in the Summa as the argument that reason is in man as 
something measuring and measured, but more the former than the latter.69 
                                                
68 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si lex naturalis esset aliquid 
diversum a lege aeterna. Non autem est nisi quaedam participatio eius, ut dictum est (ST 
I-II.91.2 ad 1). 
69 ST I-II.90.1, 91.3. Father Ernest Fortin characterizes Aquinas’s political thought as a 
via media between radical Augustinians, who denied any distinction between nature and 
grace, and Christian Aristotelians (or Averroists), who took that distinction too far. Fortin 
claims that Aquinas failed to strike such a balance insofar as his teaching tends towards 
the Aristotelian, culminating in thinkers like Marsilius of Padua and Dante (Fortin 1996, 
212; cf. Manent 1996, 3-10). While De Regno cannot speak for Aquinas’ corpus on this 
matter, it certainly betrays no Averroistic tendencies. 
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This leads me to my second reason as to why Aquinas does not expressly 
denominate the natural law in De Regno. Aquinas wishes to present natural law as a 
challenge, not as an accomplishment, or as a question rather than a factum brutum. This 
may seem a strange claim: Aquinas after all thinks that the primary precepts of the 
natural law are known to all people in all places and times.70 So how could it be anything 
other than given? Although Aquinas does not anywhere “prove” the existence or 
plausibility of the natural law in De Regno, he does makes references to man’s 
inclinations and knowledge of good and evil. He further has much to say of the natural 
end toward which the natural law points (I.7-8; II.1). Thus we might return to our 
pedagogical preface: Aquinas relies upon the natural law as a background assumption but 
does not draw it out more than necessary for his purposes in teaching the Cypriot. Yet 
Aquinas makes clear in I.3-6 that such facts about humans are not easily translated into a 
just political order. In fact, human history suggests quite the opposite is characteristically 
the case.  
In other words, one would not think from De Regno that the chief challenge of 
politics is identifying the ends of man. True, such identification is a worthy and important 
task. But it is after all the contention of Aquinas that all somehow know, not least due to 
classical political philosophy, that man’s basic inclinations toward the good direct him to 
self-preservation and pro-creation, living in society and the true and divine.71 Moreover, 
revelation gives us a clear-sighted view of man’s supernatural end. The challenge, rather 
is to articulate those ends as of distinctly political concern, and then discern what 
significance those ends have for political practice. That discernment must be a dialectical 
                                                
70 ST I-II 94.4. Budziszewski (forthcoming) offers an illuminating and consensus-
challenging treatment of Aquinas’ famous comment on Julius Caesar and the thieving 
Germans. 
71 ST I-II 94.2 
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activity, one that proceeds from what we think we already know, on the way to ordering a 
society to fulfill those ends according to the concrete possibilities of a given community. 
But note that this discernment, in turn, requires persuading political leaders to 
contemplate political life in order to recognize such difficulties. De Regno is a discursive 
letter and not a set of disputed questions precisely because Aquinas wishes to lead our 
king subtly toward an understanding of these teachings – an education that does not rely 
upon extensive scholastic training or great intelligence on the part of the king. Aquinas 
again does not present the natural law as a concept, as a silver bullet whereby man can 
reach his ends. Rather, natural law comes to sight as a series of concrete problems as to 
how man will make difficult decisions toward attaining those ends.  
Third, then, we might suggest that when Aquinas does speak to the king of his 
own legislative authority (II.4), he wishes for the king to set his sights primarily upon the 
human law in the light of eternal law, not the natural law.72 Or, to put it another way, 
Aquinas seeks to direct the king’s attention not to the natural law as such, but as the 
proportion between the human and eternal law that man effects through his knowledge of 
the natural law. The challenge of natural law is to institute the good human law. Even in 
the perfect community, legislation has its difficulties. In the typical community, however, 
a ruler must negotiate all of the travails that Aquinas depicted at I.3-6 and II.4. He must 
do so with an eye to the concrete possibilities for building upon his people’s virtue.73 The 
king must, moreover, be persuaded to see himself as an object of inquiry and moral 
cultivation. After all, he seeks not power or honor but the good of his community, which 
good requires that he himself be good. For if man is more measured than a measure, then 
                                                
72 As we have noted, the only three explicit references to law in De Regno have been 
God’s law (I.7), the law of Gaul under the Druids (II.3), and the king’s human law (II.4).  
73 ST I-II 94.3, 95.1, 96.2-3 
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the natural law is less something given to man than something that demands much of 
man.74 And this is the balance we sought to strike earlier: man is a cooperator with God, 
and senses this cooperation as a kind of freedom even when he does not know God. This 
liberty gives man an incredible dignity among worldly things. Hence the ambiguity. Man 
enjoys this sharing in the eternal law but is not its giver; man cooperates with it but 
cannot control it. Man in his execution of the natural law is but a steward of the eternal 
law. 
These reasons do not coerce Aquinas to remain silent on the natural law. He could 
have elected to use the term, arguing that it be understood in light of the preceding 
considerations. Yet his decision not to do so concords with his effort to underline for the 
king the particular problems in politics to which it speaks. This is in keeping with the 
primarily negative teaching of De Regno: rather than emphasize the necessity of the 
natural law as a solution to political problems, Aquinas emphasizes the difficulties of 
framing good human laws to meet those problems. Moreover, by the logic of my claims 
Aquinas could with perfect consistency have expressly discussed the natural law in Book 
II after guiding our king through the education of I.1-II.4.75 By Book II, however, the 
focus of our king is on the dignity of the human law as a reflection of God’s providence, 
and further on the need to work for the reform of his rule toward that level of excellence.   
But note something more. We expect Aquinas to instruct the prince to subordinate his 
rule to that of God. Yet Aquinas inures him in this subordination not by denigrating 
                                                
74 ST I-II 91.2-3 
75 As some take De Regno to be incomplete, I should add that nothing I have argued 
would have prevented Aquinas from discussing the natural law in a hypothetical chapter 
subsequent to II.4. 
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temporal life in the name of eternal life, but rather by affirming the importance of earthly 
living. 76  
As we noted in the introduction, we can hardly expect Aquinas to settle 
dispositively the number of and relation between man’s ends in De Regno: the nature and 
purpose of the text do not conduce to such an inquiry. Yet, that said, we can see that 
Aquinas indicates at least partial answers to such questions insofar as they are helpful to 
the purpose of the work. After all, as we saw in I.3-6, Aquinas threatens the bad prince in 
the first place not with Hell, but with the hell-on-earth that are the natural consequences 
of tyranny. And while Aquinas does see Heaven as the final end of good rule, this reward 
is gained for ruling on behalf of the common good of the temporal community. Against 
the common complaint that Christianity views man’s temporal existence as purely 
instrumental to his supernatural one, Aquinas clearly means to avoid any facile 
distinction between this life and the next one. 77 The thesis of participation, after all, 
proposes that man’s freedom is divinely grounded. As Book II makes clear, divine law 
has its place, but not one that eliminates the natural law. The prince serves directly the 
temporal common good, and only indirectly man’s spiritual common goods; the latter is 
the province of the Church (II.3). This teaching is a clear blow to dreams (or fears) of 
                                                
76 Cf. Strauss 1953, 144-5 
77 As Maritain writes: “The temporal order would be subordinate to the spiritual, no 
longer, of course, as an instrumental agent, as was often the case in the Middle Ages, but 
as a less elevated agent; and above all, the earthly common good would no longer be 
taken as a mere means in relation to eternal life, but as what it essentially is in this regard, 
namely, as an intermediary or infravalent end” (Maritain 1968, 177; emphasis in 
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theocracy, and reinforces our conclusion in I.1-6 about the weakness of the analogy 
between divine and human government.78 The king is the people’s vicar, not God’s.79 
This is not a “secular” argument, to be sure. But it is an argument for seeing politics as a 
serious and noble endeavor.  
Thus participation lies at the heart not only of Aquinas’ doctrine of natural law, 
but also of his practical teaching of it as advanced in De Regno. It is, moreover, 
intrinsically connected to a great theme of De Regno: man’s end. I would again argue for 
the centrality of “The Reward of the King” (1.7-12) to De Regno. By making man’s end 
the central concern of political philosophy, Aquinas can make central to politics how the 
prince, in serving man’s temporal end, might serve the rule of God. Man’s ultimate end is 
set by God, and in seeking goods short of God, even very great goods, such as that of the 
pacis unitas of the city (I.2), all such goods must remain intermediate to God as man’s 
end. In this way the natural law that governs man is but man’s share in the eternal 
wisdom of God. The natural law is not presented as a burden or an extrinsic duty, but 
rather as the guide and measure of all men seeking their end. As the “Reward of the 
King” makes clear, it is not only the good of the king as an individual and ruler that he 
thus promotes, but that of all men in his domain. This is yet another way Aquinas lays the 
foundation of natural law, for he grounds the common good of man in God, and responds 
to the suggestion that virtue and not the natural law is at the heart of De Regno: they are 
                                                                                                                                            
original). It is worth recalling Maritain’s claim that Aquinas was too great a thinker to be 
representative of the thought of his age (Maritain, 1968, 12-13). 
78 Jordan 1992, 167-68 
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both subordinate to end.80 If the virtue of something is its excellence, and its “virtues” the 
habits whereby it lives out that excellence, then God’s law supplies the definitive 
knowledge of that excellence because it tells man in what his end consists, the end toward 
which all of man’s virtues must be directed.81 To be sure, the king as a minister Dei must 
seek to be like God, and this is a question of virtue. But consider: who or what tells the 
king that he is to be like God? What and Who is God? What the virtues of the godly king 
are? In what ways the king cannot be like God, i.e. as creator and savior? The answer to 
all of these questions is the divine law.  
In conclusion, it seems that a certain “pincer movement” emerges from De Regno: 
the natural law comes to man from within and the divine law descends to man from 
above. Between them one can discern the human law: where man can recognize his 
participation in the eternal law, knowing that it directs him to seek the good, and thereby 
disposes him to be open to the supernatural gift promised to him.82 This is indeed a 
profoundly Augustinian teaching, and one that Thomas is not afraid to make his own.  
   
                                                                                                                                            
79 cf. ST I-II 90.3 
80 Guerra 2002 or Nelson 1992 about Aquinas’ work generally 
81 Consider MacIntyre in a postscript to After Virtue: “Any reconciliation of biblical 
theology and Aristotelianism would have to sustain a defense of the thesis that only a life 
constituted in key part by obedience to law could be as such as to exhibit fully those 
virtues without which human beings cannot achieve their telos” (MacIntyre 2007, 278). 
82 I am grateful to Russell Hittinger for the notion of this “pincer movement.” (Cf. 
McCoy 1989, 37.) 
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CONCLUSION 
I will conclude this chapter with three sets of conclusions: on De Regno, on the 
Summa Theologiae and on the natural law. First, our conclusions about De Regno. The 
natural law exists and matters in De Regno, but it is one of a range of important 
teachings. Political leaders are ambitious and need to be flattered: Aquinas does this from 
the beginning. But the flattery of Aquinas is not the lies and illusions of the courtesan, but 
rather the measured praise of the theologian who sets the office of the king to be noble 
and its duty arduous.83 This flattery in fact is a challenge: a challenge to the king to see 
his duty as critical but not final. Thus in De Regno Aquinas promotes the divine law not 
as the justification of a fideist theocracy, but as a provocation to questions about the full 
range of man’s excellence, the answers to which are frequently knowable through 
reason.84 For politics to conduce fully to man’s ends, however, in most situations political 
activity will depend upon divine law or revelation to point out man’s final end and to 
“purify” reason and remind it of man’s natural ends.85 Man never loses his most basic 
understanding of right and wrong, Aquinas argues. The question is how many men permit 
their activity to be governed by such knowledge in a given regime, and whether this 
knowledge can be politically efficacious without the divine law. For precisely because 
man suffers imperfections in his intellect and will, he needs divine law not in the first 
                                                
83 Perhaps one might call it pedagogical flattery (ST II-II 115). 
84 MacIntyre comes to a similar conclusion about the “Questions on Law” in his 
“Natural Law as Subversive” (2006). 
85 I take the language of “purification” from Pope Benedict XVI in his encyclical Caritas 
in veritate, e.g., “Secularism and fundamentalism exclude the possibility of fruitful 
dialogue and effective cooperation between reason and religious faith. Reason always 
stands in need of being purified by faith: this also holds true for political reason, which 
must not consider itself omnipotent. For its part, religion always needs to be purified by 
reason in order to show its authentically human face. Any breach in this dialogue comes 
only at an enormous price to human development,” (n. 56; emphasis in original). 
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instance to realize the perfection of politics, which will not happen in any event, but just 
to grant him the humility to recognize his limitations.86 While an awkward phrase, I think 
“political deism” to be the great foe of this work. To ensure the proper presentation of the 
natural law, Aquinas builds the concept throughout De Regno rather than naming it. 
Second, the Summa Theologiae. This chapter has been about reading De Regno, 
but it also bears upon how we read the Questions on Law in the Summa. Aquinas presents 
those questions in the context of a moral theology for theology students; we should not 
expect the same treatment for a different audience in De Regno. So we must ask: how 
does Aquinas’ audience shape his presentation of the teaching in the Summa? To be clear, 
I do not argue that the Summa Theologiae is wrong or even different from De Regno; we 
are not even in a position to make such a claim given our procedure and focus on De 
Regno herein. Yet we have learned from De Regno a certain relation between the natural 
and divine law that does not emerge as clearly in the Summa. It is not at all clear from De 
Regno that Aquinas recognizes a “self-sufficient or self-contained realm of nature” whose 
law can be fully explicated without reference to God, an influential – and wrong – 
interpretation of the Summa.87 Perhaps this is a problem of reading the Summa as though 
one could pluck questions out of the work and treat them in isolation. Yet it is also true 
that in the Questions the exigencies of political life are not Aquinas’ chief concern. If 
Aquinas’ stock is to rise in political science, we must be on guard lest his best-known 
work become tasked with duties he never intended for it.  
Third and finally, our conclusions about the natural law. We did not seek to 
question the category of natural law. Indeed, we attempted to assay it from the Summa 
Theologiae and rather question what we thought we knew about De Regno. Yet at least 
                                                
86 On humility in politics, see Keys 2008 and Garrigou-Lagrange 1939. 
87 Fortin 1996, 212; cf. ST I 103-5 and McCoy 1963, 191-7 (on Grotius). 
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one insight came into view: the natural law must be analyzed with reference to other 
laws. Indeed, it was through other laws that we discovered natural law in De Regno. This 
conclusion might seem trivial, but consider what observations we have collected. First: 
no divine law, no natural law. Perhaps the natural law could have been comprehensively 
grasped by man without the divine law, but that is not the world in which we now live. 
The divine law, moreover, reveals to us the fomes and the sources of man’s weakness. 
Political theory must indeed be “realist” and confront the quasi-systematic manner in 
which man errs against other men and against the truths that order his society. I do not 
mean “realist” as it is often used, as a code for one’s particular brand of pessimism.88 
Rather, we mean in touch with the real, what is. As Guerra argues, political theorists must 
“let the actual workings of concrete political life influence the tone and the content of 
their reflections.”89 Aquinas agrees, and in De Regno he lays out a politics that is “realist” 
in a substantive way. A theory that does not account for man’s potential for excellence 
will distort the significance of his deficiencies and deny him the strengths he can gain 
from aspiring to be noble and other-serving, thus damning his communities to mediocrity. 
Thus the later theories of natural law (one thinks particularly of those of Hobbes and 
Grotius) that excise both the Fall and beatitude from their accounts are a far cry from that 
of Aquinas.90     
These laws urge us to frame politics in term of what is characteristically best and 
worst in man. Our study of the natural law in De Regno underscores the need for leaders 
                                                
88 Not to be confused with metaphysical (ontological) realism. 
89 Guerra 2010, 10 
90 There might be good reasons for teaching and sharing the natural law without explicit 
reference to the divine law, e.g., if one is speaking with those who do not share faith in 
this law. Yet it is quite another thing to formulate a theory, in other words, to account for 
the order of being rather than the order of knowledge, as though there were no such law. 
Perhaps this is a failure of the “New Natural Law” school. 
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and citizens to grasp that man has a higher end. The right kind of politics sets the goals of 
that community before men without shying away from the difficulties involved in 
obtaining it and the patience required to lead citizens toward it. Aquinas’ attention to the 
eternal law in I.1-2, as we noted in the section on participation, directs us to contemplate 
human law as the fruit of our pursuit of the good, a good we do not create but discover.91 
In short, we need to think of the natural law not as an isolated doctrine of 
Aquinas’ philosophy of law, or as an inflexible axiom from which to deduce his politics, 
but rather as a capacious vantage point from which to view manifold political 
phenomena. And in his striking defense of the inherent value of temporal life, Aquinas 
opens the possibility of broad conversations about the nature of the common good. While 
we cannot always agree on much in this pluralist age, we can appreciate Aquinas’ fear 
that we will shrink from the task of promoting the common good because it is less than 
our final goal. Such false deliberation, in which communities consign themselves to 
mediocre goals or worse, arises precisely when communities stop thinking of themselves 
as meaningfully political, i.e. rationally directed to common goods. This deliberation is 
not only false, because communities have the deepest obligation to strive toward common 
goods, but also self-defeating: in so “deliberating” they render themselves vulnerable to 
tyranny. Aquinas can help us, this study suggests, prevent this difficulty by resisting the 
temptation to view political ends as merely instrumental, and to contemplate the goods 
sought in political life and the virtue we must cultivate to achieve them.92 
But what kind of regime can emerge from Aquinas’ prescriptions herein? For if 
the natural law is not as widely accessible as is sometimes claimed, then we cannot 
                                                
91 This is the difference between art and prudence (McCoy 1963 , 31-35 and 157-66 on 
Machiavelli). 
92 See Froelich on Aquinas’ elusive understanding of the common good (Froelich 1995, 
43-53; cf. ST I-II 90.2.2).  
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construct a natural law-based “overlapping consensus.” Yet the religious pluralism of our 
day makes a regime ordered by divine law equally impossible. In the next and concluding 
chapter of this dissertation, I will synthesize the central lessons of De Regno in search of 
answers to this question: what is the regime of De Regno in late modernity? I will argue 
that, for those living in an age where the most basic political principles are in doubt, the 
dialectical and aporetic nature of De Regno has much to recommend itself. 
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Chapter Five    
This dissertation began with a question: can explicitly Christian principles be 
invoked and put into practice in political life without thereby rendering that politics 
fideistic, exclusionary and immoderate? I turned to De Regno for the grounds of an 
answer to this question. In what followed, we conducted a survey of the text (Chapters 1-
3) and an inquiry into the status of the natural law in it (Chapter 4). In this fifth and final 
chapter, I will synthesize the conclusions of those efforts toward an answer to our 
question. 
I particularly wish to single out two conclusions. First, as we explored in Chapters 
1-3, Aquinas directs our king to think of politics in terms of education. When we spoke of 
the “developmental state” in Chapter 3, we suggested that Aquinas means to devise a sort 
of “practical teleology” of politics for the king. Politics has a goal or telos, but its 
attainment is subject to practical exigencies. In other words, politics must be defined both 
by the end sought through politics, and by the concrete condition of a given human 
community. Second, as we saw in Chapter 4, Aquinas desires that our king see the eternal 
and divine law as his tutors in this education. Human law depends upon natural law, it is 
true, but natural law is itself nothing other than a reflection of the eternal law, which is 
clarified and amplified by the divine law.1 Thus Aquinas chooses to emphasize for the 
king the true basis and fulfillment of the natural law rather than that law itself. With these 
two principles in hand, the king can begin to build up the best regime for his people. 
                                                
1 For Aquinas’ arguments to this effect in the Summa Theologiae, see ST I-II 100.1, 
where he argues that the moral precepts of the Old Law (the divine law of the Hebrews 
before Christ) are contained in the natural law, and Questions 106-7, where he claims that 
the New Divine Law (that announced by Christ and proclaimed in the Gospels) 
introduces no innovations in matters moral, although it does impart to man grace to 
strengthen man’s ability to grasp and act according to the law. 
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There is thus an interior connection between these two teachings, for it is the divine law 
that reveals man’s final end, and it is the eternal law that clarifies the basic inclinations of 
man that shape his daily activity. 
In this chapter, then, we will ask toward what sort of community has Aquinas 
been building in De Regno. What is the best regime according to Thomas Aquinas? Can 
it be realized in our time? Just how rational, tolerant and moderate will it be? In this 
chapter I will lay out four considerations: the significance of the question of the best 
regime; the relation between regime form and end; the bearing of revelation upon the 
question of the best regime; and conclusions about Aquinas’ political science. Our 
conclusion will reveal the intimate connection for pre-modern thinkers, and particularly 
for Aquinas, between the question of the best regime and the nature of the science of 
politics. 
 
CLASSICAL REGIME ANALYSIS 
The primacy of the best regime for classical political philosophy is perhaps a 
cliché, but like many clichés its meaning remains strange to the thoughtful. After all, do 
not thinkers of other times, including our own, reflect upon the best regime? Do they not 
ask what government suited to justice and peace ought to look like? And, in any event, 
how much can an inquiry into the best regime tell us about quotidian political life, which 
is often far from the “best,” whatever that may be? Should we not be on our guard against 
“imagined republics”?2 
These are helpful questions, because they allow us to draw out the distinctive 
character of much of classical political philosophy. First, ancient political philosophers 
                                                
2 Machiavelli, The Prince XV.61 
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engaged in serious and critical inquiries into the best regime. “What is the best regime?” 
was a question with a number of potentially reasonable answers: Aristotle after all took it 
upon himself to survey the breadth of human political life to develop his taxonomy of 
regimes. By contrast, in general it has been difficult to find political thinkers in modernity 
who have argued for political regimes other than some sort of democracy, much less who 
have studied alternatives seriously beyond the residual “tyranny” or “authoritarian” 
categories. Indeed, our great debates have concerned not democracy vis-à-vis other 
regimes, but the proper justification of democracy: what is the best defense of 
democracy?3 
Second, while the rule of the most virtuous man was optimal according to this 
ancient line of thought, it was generally recognized that other forms of government were 
legitimate. In other words, that monarchy was thought to be the best regime was not an 
argument in se against adopting other regime forms when that was prudent. Indeed, the 
best regime was the “regime of prayer,” as Aristotle says: it was best, but for that very 
reason hardly common.4 The regime advocated by Plato or Aristotle was not the one that 
they thought could obtain in most places and times: it was an aspiration rather than a 
lowest common denominator. Moreover, because it depended upon the right people 
living in the same place and the same time, with a relative paucity of obstacles to their 
political power, its coming into being was in some sense dependent upon chance, a subtle 
theme of Plato’s Republic. In our time, democracy is the best and the only regime: 
                                                
3 It is notable that perhaps the greatest liberal political philosopher of the 20th century, 
John Rawls, nowhere questions the primacy of democracy. This “democratic 
exclusivism,” moreover, is not just a theoretical attitude but a popular practical one of 
global proportions. 
4 Politics 1331b21-2; cf. 1325b33-8. Aristotle’s word “prayer,” or εὐχή, can also be 
translated as “wish” or “hope,” and should not be taken literally as an entreaty to the 
gods, if only because Aristotle’s gods cannot or will not hear him (Metaphysics 12.6-10). 
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precisely because it is the best, no other regime will do. This is because although it is the 
best, we typically do not think that it is difficult to institute in most times and places.5 
The viability of democracy is rarely thought to depend upon the virtue of the people, as 
we shall discuss shortly, although a lack of democracy is often blamed upon the vice of 
elites. It is rather the force of the will of the people that inaugurates democracy. Solon has 
been replaced by the protester. 
The difficulty of instituting the classical best regime introduces our third 
consideration. The different sorts of regimes, whether monarchy, aristocracy and so on, 
are the forms of the regime. Yet what is the matter of regimes? If these regimes types are 
the order of the regimes, what is the “stuff” that makes them up? The people in them. But 
people vary in many things, and most relevantly in virtue. It may be, then, that the degree 
of virtue possessed by a people determines the kind of regime form into which they can 
be ordered. Further, beyond the virtue of the people is the virtue of the specific ruling 
element, that ruling element itself being the regime.6 Monarchy and aristocracy 
presuppose a high degree of virtue in one or a few men in a regime. But if they are not to 
be found, then those regime forms are not to be had by that community. The question of 
the best regime, then, is the question of the best man, or how closely the sort of citizen 
that arises from a regime approximates the best man.7 What is the best life for man, and 
what city best provides it? Does any city fully provide such a life? Such questions do 
arise in modern political thought, of course, but only in the context of democracy: the 
sine qua non of just politics in our time is not some set of virtues that can be judged 
against the best man, but freedom, the only standard of which would seem to be more 
                                                
5 This has not always been the attitude of democratic theorists. See notably Mill’s 
Considerations on Representative Government. 
6 Politics 1278b8-14 
7 Cf. Apology 20a-c and Politics 1276b16-78b5 
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freedom. While this freedom comes with some restrictions, and thinner or thicker norms 
about how it ought to be used, the question of what this freedom is to be used for is in the 
main left to the citizen as a private individual. 
We begin to see the significance of this line of inquiry for quotidian politics: 
regimes form certain kinds of men, and the thoughtful person must ask himself what kind 
of man his regime forms, and whether it is good. As Strauss wrote: 
There is a variety of regimes. Each regime raises a claim, explicitly or implicitly, 
which extends beyond the boundaries of any given society. These claims conflict, 
therefore, with each other. There is a variety of conflicting regimes. Thus the 
regimes themselves, and not any preoccupation of mere bystanders, force us to 
wonder which of the given conflicting regimes is better, and ultimately, which 
regime is the best regime. Classical political philosophy is guided by the question 
of the best regime.8 
 
Every regime is the embodiment of a claim as to how man ought to live. But is what we 
love and are familiar with also what is good or best? This is the philosophical question 
that always lurks beneath political life. 
As we turn specifically to Aquinas’ regime analysis at De Regno I.1-3, we see that 
it is prima facie unremarkable. He speaks of a typology of just and unjust governments, 
and lists the usual suspects: monarchy, aristocracy and polity among the just, and 
tyranny, oligarchy and democracy among the unjust (I.1.11-12). Aquinas indicates that 
monarchy is the best regime (I.2) and tyranny is the worst (I.3). If anything distinguishes 
his account from that of the ancients, it is his metaphysics. As Blythe points out, 
Aquinas’ defense of monarchy as the best regimes rest largely upon a metaphysics of 
unity, one according to which the unity of order that political activity must seek for a 
                                                
8 Strauss 1989, 32-3 
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community is best sought through a unified cause, i.e. one prince.9 For Aristotle, the 
superiority of monarchy arises from the superlative virtue of the best man chosen to serve 
as king. To be sure, Aquinas does not merely provide a metaphysical argument: he walks 
us through the history of regimes as proof of the excellence of monarchy. Then, too, one 
could recast Aristotle’s argument in Aquinas’ terms, for in speaking of the singular ruler 
as the cause of the virtuous society, Aristotle seems to think of this cause as itself a 
perfected cause, the perfection of man being virtue. Still, Aristotle does not choose to 
argue this way, and Aquinas never seems to ask in I.1-3 the question that haunts 
Aristotle’s Politics: can superlative virtue and political power coincide? 
We might note something else. While Aquinas gives an unqualified endorsement 
of monarchy in De Regno I.1-3, in the Summa Theologiae he argues for the superiority of 
the mixed regime. Is this a contradiction within Aquinas’ political thought on a question 
of great import? Or is it a sign of development in Aquinas’ thought? In the latter case, 
perhaps Aquinas’ defense of monarchy in De Regno is predicated upon a simplistic view 
of monarchy, one that misses the true excellence, and thus rarity, of monarchy. Perhaps 
Aquinas’ purportedly philosophical ideal of monarchy in De Regno is in fact the merely 
sociological form of mediaeval monarchy, something that he comes to reject at least in 
part in the Summa. While we have begun to address this question in Chapters 1-3, our 
current investigation of the best regime will clarify the stakes of this question, and will 
prepare us to work out this puzzle more thoroughly.10 
 
                                                
9 Blythe 1997, 5-7 
10 It should now be clearer why the opinion of Eschmann, to which we earlier adverted, 
is unsatisfactory: I.2-3 purports to be a full regime analysis. If Aquinas does choose to 
hint at the necessity of a mixed regime at I.6, then Aquinas either failed to realize how 
radically incomplete his regime analysis at I.2-3 is, or he has weighty reasons for 
intentionally leaving it so, which reasons would require exposition.  
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A SECOND SAILING: REGIME FORM AND END 
Regime form is not the sole consideration of regime analysis, but more and 
especially the end of the regime. Different regime forms characteristically seek different 
ends, but all regime forms can be judged against the ultimate end of man. The typical 
regime typology, after all, is divided according to just and unjust regimes, raising the 
question of the nature of justice. Aristotle explains in the Politics that different regimes 
rule on the basis of different claims, and they characteristically seek different sorts of 
ends in politics. Monarchs and aristocrats rule on the basis of virtue, and the virtue of the 
city is what they seek. The people rule on the basis of number, and they seek freedom. 
But note a few important qualifications. Many kinds of monarchs exist, and often their 
justification is not virtue but rather military prowess or ancestry.11 Few men in any time 
or place will be of sufficient virtue to justify ruling alone.12 There is also the inconvenient 
fact that many are not inclined to follow the lead of the supremely virtuous man13, who in 
any event would likely not desire to rule.14 It may also happen that the many collectively 
exhibit a wisdom to rival any single or small group of men in a particular regime. In that 
case, it would be wise to incorporate the people in the regime.15  
One could continue to outline the vagaries of regime analysis, but we have 
collected a few main points. The question of the best regime is the question of the best 
man and perfect justice, for only the best regime realizes the best man, and only if it can 
instantiate perfect justice. The standards are quite high, and expectations for fulfilling 
them ergo moderate. Yet if the best regime cannot be realized in every time and place, it 
                                                
11 Politics 1284b35-85a1 
12 Politics 1284a3-16 
13 Politics 1284b25-34 
14 Republic 515e-17e 
15 Politics 1281a42-b37, 1283b27-34 
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can serve as a challenge to other regimes to consider how they can serve justice as best 
they can. For the thoughtful citizen, further, contemplation of what the best regime would 
look like is a superb undertaking as an investigation of what kind of citizen one’s own 
regime produces, which is to say what kind of man one is. In this way, the classical 
analysis of the best regime always remains a question, and a question that always turns to 
the speculative and thus supra-political: what is man’s true happiness, and how can it best 
be fulfilled in politics? Can any regime completely fulfill it? 
De Regno shows Aquinas to be engaging in this kind of analysis, although 
admittedly his regime analysis tends to be subordinate to his exposition on monarchy. 
After his argument for monarchy as the best regime (I.2), he turns to a denunciation of 
tyranny (I.3-6), one that allows him to justify monarchy against detractors who confuse it 
with tyranny (I.4) or claim that it lapses too easily into tyranny (I.5). This justification 
culminates in a theory of resistance granting citizens a surprisingly wide ambit in the 
affairs of their community (I.6).16 Instead of a close reading of these chapters, which we 
amply undertook in Chapter 1 of this study, we will examine their themes for the 
purposes of articulating Aquinas’ regime analysis.  
Aquinas goes to considerably more trouble to show that tyranny is the worst 
regime than to show that monarchy is the best regime.17 This might seem odd, for the 
odiousness of tyranny would appear to be far less controversial than the excellence of 
monarchy. Yet monarchies were quite common in Aquinas’ time, and the intended 
audience of De Regno was a king. Certainly Aquinas writes for a reader inclined to take 
                                                
16 For a more extensive study of the role of citizens than space permits herein, including 
a comparison with the Summa, see Breidenbach and McCormick (forthcoming).  
17 As we noted in Chapter 1, this focus can lead to frustration that Aquinas fails to 
answer his own questions, as at I.6, as well as suspicions of corruptions of the text 
(Eschmann 1949, xiv-xxi). 
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for granted the superiority of monarchy. His focus on tyranny perhaps permits him to 
spell out some propositions about monarchy that would otherwise be unwelcome to his 
reader.  
After explaining that tyranny is the worst regime, Aquinas can state a problem: 
the best and worst regime form both issue from the rule of one. To put it another way, the 
same form, rule of one, can lead to opposite ends, justice and injustice. This fact leads 
many to conflate the two forms, tolerating tyranny under the pretense of kingship and 
excoriating kingship under the mistaken belief that it is tyranny (I.4). Yet the examples 
that Aquinas gives are sobering: history points to few kings genuinely worthy of the 
confidence placed in them. The example of the Hebrews is particularly damning, because 
God explicitly warned them that they would come to evil through kings (I.4.34). The 
common misperception concerning the distinction between tyranny and kingship, then, 
arises from the very real problem that kings often do become tyrants. 
Aquinas next explains in I.5 that monarchy is less likely than other regimes to 
lapse into tyranny. These arguments return repeatedly to one fact: kingship can and often 
does degenerate into tyranny. As Aquinas writes almost as an aside, “Monarchy is 
therefore to be preferred to the rule of many, although either form of government might 
become dangerous,” (I.5.27). Other forms of government do not guard against tyranny as 
well as kingship, perhaps, but we must add to the fulsome praise of I.2 the considerable 
challenges a king must face in remaining just. 
When Aquinas returns to monarchy in I.6, his avowed goal is the devising of a 
kingship that can withstand the threat of tyranny. What Aquinas discusses instead, 
however, is the possibility of resistance from citizens or subjects against unjust kings. In 
this discussion he makes a number of distinctions, most of which we have compassed. To 
recapitulate the main claims, however, let us recall that he distinguishes between mild 
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and excessive tyranny. Mild tyranny is to be tolerated, and Aquinas implies that it is 
common: cities would be in endless tumult if citizens revolted against every injustice 
(I.6.44-5). This distinction is important, moreover, because much of Aquinas’ argument 
in I.5 would seem to be based on the expectation that kings lapse into mild tyranny, while 
aristocracy and polity descend into excessive tyranny.18 Aquinas does not directly raise 
the problem of kingship devolving into full tyranny, then, which would seem to be the 
strongest argument against it, as Aquinas himself acknowledges at I.4.  
Aquinas also in I.6 reinforces the lesson of I.1-2: political authority is natural 
because political life is natural, and divine law sanctions that natural goodness and its 
consequent authority. While this would seem to be a regalist paean, the examples of 
subjects “obeying” their rulers that Aquinas gives are pagan despots who persecuted 
Christians and apostate kings who turned their backs on God (I.6.46). Aquinas thus 
connects the problem of citizens’ obedience to the fact that God works even through 
tyrants, first using them and then punishing them. Is this a warning to would-be rebels, or 
to a would-be tyrant, e.g. our king?  
 These considerations shed new light on the close of I.6. We noted in Chapter 1 
that I.6 ends with an appeal to a conversion of the people: “Sin must therefore be done 
away with in order that the scourge of tyrants may cease.” The conversion is two-fold: 
the citizens ought to pray in all holiness that they be delivered from this or that tyrant, but 
they also must reform their wills and direct their reason to the cultivation of a healthy 
regime that educates virtuous citizens and princes. This conclusion still holds. Yet we 
have presently unearthed something that was less obvious at the time: our own royal 
reader must undergo conversion. Let us consider that I.2 is a triumphal and abstract 
defense of monarchy as the best regime. Yet throughout I.3-6 we were reminded of the 
                                                
18 Eschmann 1949, 22 fn. 1 
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pervasive influence of vice in politics, problems from which kingship is by no means 
inoculated. Aquinas in fact acknowledges throughout what Aristotle makes much clearer 
in the Politics: while monarchy is a superficially common form of government, it rarely 
lives up to its end as the rule of the truly virtuous man. Aquinas indirectly argues with 
Aristotle that the people are rarely happy with a king (I.4), that many other regime forms 
appear to be more practical (I.5), and that kingship fails to include the people in rule, 
except paradoxically when they reject their exclusion in the case of resistance (I.6). 
Aquinas thus worries, again with Aristotle, about the low probability of the coincidence 
between virtue and political power. 
For the purposes of our inquiry into the best regime, we might extract two aims of 
Aquinas from I.3-6. First, he seeks to temper expectations for monarchy. Aquinas does 
this by drawing out the distinction between the form and end of a regime. Although our 
king could easily read I.2 to suggest that the metaphysics of unity will almost 
automatically inscribe just government into the regime of one, the lessons of I.4-6 are far 
less sanguine. Yet while no regime is a fool-proof prevention against tyranny, Aquinas 
marks out kingship in a special way. Aristocracy and polity seem to have a kind of 
“institutional” strength: their numbers ensure that many have power, decreasing the 
chance that a majority will rule ineptly, and even more so that a majority will rule 
viciously. These are indeed good reasons to elect such regime forms. These institutional 
safeguards are meaningless, however, in a fundamentally vicious regime. Thus 
aristocracy and polity may be unavoidable forms when no one is fit to be a monarch, but 
they will be short-lived unless they continue to grow in virtue. In other words, aristocracy 
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and polity must be adopted with the understanding that they should in due time develop 
toward monarchy.19  
 Of course the metaphysical unity of monarchy will be equally worthless if its 
occupant is vicious. But that is Aquinas’ point: virtuous governance finally depends upon 
virtuous men. In singling out monarchy among the regimes, Aquinas singles out virtue. 
Our king is thus warned that, without virtue, his monarchy will become a tyranny. We 
might put it this way: an emphasis on the form of a regime can obscure the directionality 
requisite of a community. That form must be not a static and ossified structure, but a 
dynamic configuration of men moving toward the end of that regime. We see this 
teaching reflected in the structure of I.1-6: Aquinas urges the form of monarchy as that 
best disposed toward justice (I.1-2), but then complicates this picture by presenting 
justice as something to be sought and realized through monarchy, rather than flowing 
from the institutionalization of monarchy (I.3-6). A regime, then, is not a set of rules that 
can be obeyed or disobeyed, but an aspiration to grow into promise. The founding of a 
regime is not the full extent of justice, but its inaugural form.20 
 Thus, second, the question of the best regime is indeed the question of the best 
man for Aquinas. The kind must ask himself: can his kingdom ensure the emergence of 
this best man? Can any kingdom do so? The central claim of I.6, which leads us into I.7-
11, concerns the necessity of virtue in the king, and indeed in any ruler. Yet after reading 
through I.4-5, the king will see the danger that tyrannical rapacity presents to his 
kingdom. Through the litany of tyrants and despots mentioned in I.6, the king will be 
encouraged to ask himself how he can avoid their fate, one that is to some extent 
                                                
19 This is a strong formulation of the claim, and should not be taken to contradict that 
according to which all of the just regime forms can be legitimately employed. 
20 We can think back to our discussion of Machiavelli and Aquinas on founding in 
Chapter 3. 
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dependent upon the virtue of his citizens. It is striking that Aquinas gives no examples of 
good kings in I.2, but many examples of bad ones in I.3-6, all of which support the 
underlying argument that rule demands much of kings, and is often their undoing. The 
king will then be led to wonder whether monarchy is a just form of government in 
practice. 
I.7-11 is therefore integral to the question of the best regime, and expands beyond 
the focus on our royal reader. In those chapters, Aquinas discusses the proper reward of a 
prince, thus affirming the value of virtue and promising its reward. Examining the 
competing claims of honor, glory, material goods, and happiness, Aquinas finally opts for 
the latter. Moreover, while he initially only raises the issue of what reward is fitting for a 
king, Aquinas subtly turns the conversation toward the question of man’s end, i.e. what 
the work of a regime should seek to achieve. The reward (praemium) becomes a cause 
(causa) or end for action. Thus, Aquinas raises the question of which regimes are capable 
of attaining this end. He does not explicitly say which regime best fulfills that end. He 
does, however, state that any regime must fulfill this function, because every human is 
fulfilled through virtue, and the end of the regime must somehow fulfill the end of man. 
Further, insofar as this happiness is that had with God, Aquinas suggests, but does not 
state until Book II of De Regno, that the king’s polity is indeed insufficient to attaining to 
man’s final end. We shall return to this theme. 
Given that this section directly follows the exhortation for the conversion of 
citizens in I.6, we might think the virtue expounded at I.8 is precisely the virtue that the 
king and the citizen are being urged to seek at I.6. Yet the sort of regime that is supposed 
to cultivate the virtue of every citizen (I.8) would seem to be one in which citizens are 
somehow incorporated into rule, not simply ruled as subjects. I.7-11 do not reject the 
teaching in I.3-6 that the virtue of the ruling element is of paramount concern. But this 
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section does remind the king that the goal of the ruling element ought to be to promote 
the flourishing at all, and perhaps one manner of effecting that involves the inclusion of 
citizens in rule. The incorporation of citizens into the regime is also the goal of the best 
regime in the Summa Theologiae. Thus we might think that this claim about the end of 
man is another reinforcement of our suspicion that the regime of De Regno comports 
more with that of the Summa Theologiae than is at first obvious. 
Insofar as De Regno is a practical work, and it is in part a theoretical work, its 
principal aim is not to teach the king knowledge for its own sake, but knowledge toward 
action.21 This characteristic separates De Regno from the Summa Theologiae, for the 
latter is primarily a theoretical work, not a practical one.22 It would seem, then, that 
Aquinas is investigating politics in De Regno not to teach the king how to construct some 
account of politics, but how to act and how to think about acting. Aquinas does not 
simply state in De Regno that the king must be virtuous; he leads the king through an 
education toward virtue. These differences must be better understood before we can 
inquire into the reconciliation of the accounts of the best regime, or of any subject, in De 
Regno and the Summa.  
Such a consideration also helps to address our question as to the significance of 
the question of the best regime for quotidian politics. At its best, the search for the best 
regime, whether in Plato’s Republic or Aquinas’ De Regno, is a meeting of theory and 
practice: we subject how we act to the rigors of what we say we know. Such an 
interaction is bound to lead to criticism of both our actions and our thought, and that is 
part of the point. We challenge our political thought to explain and account for our 
                                                
21 NE 1103b20-2 
22 Cf. ST I.1.4. To Jordan (1992), I would note that De Regno is indeed more theoretical 
than many of its readers have admitted, but its theoretical concerns arise from and return 
to the practice of politics. 
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political practice, and we hope to scrutinize our political activity through theoretical 
speculation. But what we do not do is impose an arbitrary theoretical abstraction upon 
our politics or reduce political philosophy to an ideology that justifies current political 
practice. Rather, the classical quest for the best regime accords closely with Aquinas’ 
own notion of political activity as an education. The regime is founded out of necessity 
but proceeds according to the faculties of a particular people toward excellence, the 
excellence of man. 
One might elaborate a helpful contrast between this vision of the regime and 
modern theories of the social contract and state of nature. Many proponents of a “state of 
nature” take man to be naturally asocial. Or, to put it another way, when we say he is 
“asocial” or “apolitical,” we may find disagreement among thinkers such as Hobbes and 
Locke concerning how far to envision the individualistic isolation of man in his “natural” 
state, but they agree that we ought not to presuppose that man expresses his fullest virtue 
through and in community.23 In this way, the state of nature has little to do with the 
nature of man at all, at least as we know him: it presupposes an abstract “man” rather 
than the men we know to conduct politics, men already bound by customs, traditions and 
nomoi of all sorts.24 As a device against which every political practice is measured, a new 
politics is rationalized along its imperatives. For Aquinas, however, the key to reforming 
politics is to know what political practice is, and to criticize it internally toward its 
                                                
23 Cf. Hobbes, Leviathan I.xiii; Locke, Second Treatise on Government II-V; and 
Rousseau, Social Contract I.2-5  
24 As Jacob Levy notes, social contract theory tends to flatten and idealize, not to say 
ignore, the socio-political bonds that pre-date a constitutional order. Yet these bonds are 
often the very objects of reform, revision and reconciliation in the formation of that new 
constitutional order (Levy 2009). Aquinas, seeking to reform the community, would want 
to take cognizance of precisely such things. 
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improvement. The search for the best regime is a search guided by politics as it is lived 
out.  
We can also profit from a contrast between the social contract and Aquinas’ 
developmental state. In some sense, social contract theory expresses the common-sense 
intuition that men to live together peacefully must on some level share basic norms of 
justice. Implicit in these norms, more or less articulated, are understandings about the 
ends of society. There is something admirable about this sort of overlapping consensus. 
Real communities need to make decisions, and cannot wait for the utterances of their 
intellectuals on such matters. Yet there is this risk, namely that the terms of a social 
contract be taken as the ne plus ultra of communal development. For on the one hand, 
whilst a regime might be founded by necessity, it is human excellence it ought to pursue. 
But we might ask why conditions of pluralism and diversity should be turned into a 
permanent condition.25 Again, such accommodation may be necessary as a matter of 
prudence. Indeed, some sort of accommodation between conflicting visions of the world 
may always be necessary in modern politics. But to enshrine that tragedy in theory, 
Aquinas would argue, belies the pull toward final happiness that all men seek. Thus in De 
Regno Aquinas does not cease to educate our king.26 
                                                
25 At root here is the question as to whether the modern rise of pluralism is good. That 
rise has been excoriated by most pre-20th-century Catholic thinkers, and not a few since 
(Kraynak 2002, Rowland 2003, Kozinski 2010). Maritain takes it as a good, although he 
clearly took modernity in general to be in need of substantial reform (cf. Maritain 1968, 
16-69 on the breakdown of humanism into atheism, after which there is need for a new 
humanism (69-71)). For some, that pluralism may not itself be a good, but it has had 
positive consequences, e.g. a clarification of the role of the Church as a spiritual and not a 
temporal authority (Ratzinger 2008, 200-8). 
26 Buchanan, however, describes a kind of two-part social contract whereby actors forge 
a “protective” state that unites them with negative rights, and then negotiate the terms of 
a “productive” state whereby they come to cooperate within that state (Buchanan 1975, 
39-42).  
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Moreover, if Aquinas and Aristotle are correct that man seeks to know and will 
organize his community after that knowledge, seeking to instantiate it through his civic 
friendships, then the pretensions of a social contract to deny that development are nothing 
more than that. Indeed, the presuppositions of neutrality and toleration associated with 
social contracts aimed at minimizing the negative effects of pluralism often become the 
basis of very vigorous, and state-enforced, conceptions of the good, as has been revealed, 
for instance, in the arguments concerning homosexual marriage and contraception in 21st-
century America, or in religious jurisprudence.27 A caricature of liberal modernity will 
miss, as Jeffrey Stout has noted, that liberal democracy can be a rich tradition with 
substantive goods of its own, and indeed has developed just so.28 This is precisely 
Aquinas’ point. Man as a rational animal cannot help but employ his intellect and pursue 
his natural desire for the good in his communal life. Whatever the intentions of man to 
avoid “comprehensive doctrines” or “political moralism,” Aquinas suggests, what man 
loves will continue to animate his activity and relations with others. Thus Aquinas 
suggests that the pressing question of man’s final end be brought to the center of man’s 
politics rather than a marginal “social” or “cultural” concern. The notion of the social 
contract, which enshrines some particular sets of norms or some definite end for a 
community, fails to account for the human desire to grow and to grow with and toward 
his fellow man. 
In some of his later works, Jacques Maritain calls for a “democratic charter” that 
resembles in part Rawls’ “overlapping consensus”: although citizens do not agree as to 
the theoretical foundations of their regime, they reach a practical consensus as to how to 
                                                
27 Hittinger 2003, 163-82  
28 Stout 2004 
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act.29 To be sure, Maritain encourages discussion and disagreement about the foundations 
of the city.30 But the practical consensus that Maritain envisions in no way depends upon 
such deliberation. What Aquinas shows in I.7, however, is not the picture of a prosperous 
city whose citizens cooperate in peace despite severe theoretical disagreements. In fact, 
these citizens agree on quite a lot theoretically, at least implicitly, and are fully invested 
in the quest for the best regime. Yet this does not mean they are complete as a 
community. They are animated by a pressing question: what is the final end of man? Can 
politics secure it? If not, what can? What is the nature of the horizons of city and world, 
and how do they function in politics and in man’s quest for the good? How, in other 
words, can man grow in friendship with other men and the good through truth? 
Theoretical justifications of a given practical consensus, whether that of Maritain 
or of Rawls, will always seem attractive to humans precisely because they allow one to 
fashion a reality that mimics a certain kind of theory.31 We can imagine one moment or 
epoch as a status quo in which our community can more or less flourish: tensions or 
conflict exist only at the margins, and do not inspire fundamental change. In this way, 
modern political philosophy has not strayed far from the aspiration of Hobbes to model 
politics upon unchanging geometry.32 Such practical settlements, however, do not do 
justice to the ability of men to grow in the moral life, to the intransigence of men who 
refuse to do so, and to the prudence a regime must exercise to cultivate virtue and limit 
                                                
29 Rawls 1993, xx: “The problem of political liberalism is to work out a conception of 
political justice for a constitutional democratic regime that the plurality of reasonable 
doctrines – always the feature of the culture of a free democratic regime – might endorse. 
The intention is not to replace those comprehensive views, not to give them a true 
foundation.”  
30 Maritain 1952, 170; 1951, 163 
31 Schall 2000, 58; also see Voegelin’s New Science of Politics 
32 Strauss 1952, 2-5 
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opportunities for vice. They fail to recognize, then, the ways in which theory should and 
must accept its limitations in describing and directing human life.  
 
REVELATION AND THE QUESTION OF THE BEST REGIME 
Thus far this chapter has explored the profound inquiry into man that Aquinas and 
ancient philosophers undertake in interrogating the nature of the best regime. This is a 
deeply rational enterprise, for at base it is a question as to the nature of man and his 
ability to interact in a meaningful fashion with other humans. Politics is indeed a kind of 
education. 
Yet we must yet admit some differences between Aquinas and those ancient 
thinkers. For while I.8 and De Praemio Regis allow us to see the common ground that 
Aquinas and ancient thinkers share concerning the significance of the end of the regime, 
I.8 also introduces a topic that would seem to be absent from the classical inquiry into the 
best regime, and indeed would seem to derail it. For it might seem that this consideration 
would render the whole undertaking fideistic or irrational. That topic is revelation. 
While one might identify several citations or quotations of Holy Scripture in De 
Regno, we would do well to focus on two points of De Regno in which the invocation of 
revelation is pivotal for the argument of the work. As we noted in Chapter 4: “The law 
has a double task, for if it proclaims the final end of man, it must also set the end man 
achieves in politics as intermediate.” We will explore revelation vis-à-vis the best regime 
in two steps: in this section, on revelation as revealing the final end of man, and, in the 
subsequent one, as setting the task of politics as intermediate to that final one. 
First, revelation appears in De Praemio Regis as God’s answer to the question of 
man’s final end. It is crucial to De Regno that the ancients speculated as to the end or 
purpose of man, because this perplexing and ever-present question is precisely what 
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Christianity answers (I.7-11). No less crucially, Christianity directs man’s attention to the 
significance of this question and makes it of universal importance. As we saw in Chapter 
4, Aquinas argues that the divine law states that man has an end and ought to seek it, and 
promises that happiness is not the sole preserve of the wise or of the lucky, but of all who 
seek God’s love. Christianity does not reject the claim that the final end of man matters to 
his communal life. We may not know exactly how this final end bears upon man’s 
political life; perhaps it would be best to exercise some humility on that score. But we 
can say that any argument that a priori rejects the relevance of man’s final end for his 
political life is missing the point. We speak of man, after all, not some arbitrary reduction 
of him.  
I have presented revelation in De Regno as though it were a complementary if 
unexpected contribution to ancient speculations on the best regime. Yet if the classical 
quest for the best regime is the height of human reason directed to political things, does 
Aquinas’ adoption of Christian revelation signal an abandonment or betrayal of that quest 
insofar as he abandons or betrays reason in favor of faith? Aquinas proposes that man’s 
final end is to be found, not in the city of man, but in the City of God. How does reason 
know this? What is in question is whether reason ought to be proud and jealous of its 
autonomy, or humble and accepting of the gifts of revelation.33 This concern informs the 
entire dialectic of De Regno through I.12, and will help us to assay our question: is the 
employment of revelation by Aquinas a betrayal of the classical quest for the best 
regime?34  
                                                
33 As Augustine puts it: "Salvation, such as it shall be in the world to come, shall itself 
be our final happiness. And this happiness these philosophers refuse to believe in, 
because they do not see it, and attempt to fabricate for themselves a happiness in this life, 
based upon a virtue which is as deceitful as it is proud," (The City of God, XIX.4). 
34 I have considered this question in a different context in McCormick (forthcoming), 
and am deeply indebted here and therein to D’Andrea 1992. 
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For Leo Strauss, the answer is unequivocally yes: 
Philosophy is quest for knowledge regarding the whole. Being essentially quest 
and being not able ever to become wisdom, as distinguished from philosophy, the 
problems are always more evident than the solutions. All solutions are 
questionable. Now the right way of life cannot be fully established except by an 
understanding of the nature of man, and the nature of man cannot be fully 
clarified except by an understanding of the nature of the whole. Therefore, the 
right way of life cannot be established metaphysically except by a completed 
metaphysics, and therefore the right way of life remains questionable. But the 
very uncertainty of all solutions, the very ignorance regarding the most important 
things, makes quest for knowledge the most important thing, and therefore a life 
devoted to it, the right way of life.35  
 
For Strauss, reason properly speaking is philosophy.36 Philosophy in turn is not a method 
or a system, but a way of life, a quest and a search that cannot be subordinated to any 
other enterprise. It cannot, for instance, accept the claims of revelation as truth: it can 
only subject them to human reason. “Confronted with an unproven possibility,” Strauss 
argues, the philosopher “does not reject, he merely suspends judgment.”37 But revelation 
“as such refuses to acknowledge… [the] tribunal of human reason.”38 Therefore we reach 
an impasse, as Strauss seems to conclude.39 
Aquinas agrees with Strauss that reason cannot discover man’s supernatural end, 
and that philosophy cannot demonstrate revealed truths.40 Such things are beyond 
philosophy. In fact, Aquinas distinguishes philosophy and theology according inter alia to 
                                                
35 Strauss 1979, 113-4 
36 Cf. Strauss in Meier 2006, 141: “We rise above the level of neutrality, or of triviality, 
we enter the arena of conflict, if we confront revelation with a particular interpretation of 
reason – with the view that the perfection of reason and therefore the perfection of man is 
philosophy.” [Emphasis in original.]  
37 Strauss, 1979, 113 
38 Strauss 1979, 116 
39 Cf. Strauss 1979, 199-200 with Strauss in Meier 2006, 141-80. 
40 Although see Walgrave 1976, 182-4. 
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their first principles. Philosophy proceeds from what can be known by natural reason, 
theology from what is known by faith.41 Such a division seems to be supported by the 
structure of De Regno: I.1-6 are decidedly naturalistic, and I.7 signals a transition to what 
becomes theological by II.1. Moreover, Aquinas recognizes that there is a kind of 
philosophy that will never permit itself to countenance belief, that is, will never recognize 
that something is that cannot be demonstrated through man’s unaided reason.42 Aquinas 
in fact never refers to a Christian as a philosophus, and his use of “philosophy” is often 
explicitly linked to pagan schools of thought.43 Whatever the desire of man to know God 
and to find him, Aquinas knows well that the revelation of God’s creation and incarnation 
require an orientation of man without precedent in history, and one for which reason 
could prepare man in only the most metaphorical sense.44 Moreover, I welcome Strauss’ 
intervention just where we have had a tendency in this study to suggest that “the 
Christian message is said to be that which everyone is more or less waiting for, at least 
obscurely, and the power of human thought and desire to transcend any particular object 
is taken as an anticipation of Christian revelation, of the Christian understanding of God, 
and of the Christian questioning of the world as a whole.”45 We risk losing what is 
strange and extraordinary about Christianity when we deflate it to the conclusion of 
natural philosophy, and even more so the conclusion of the kind of modern philosophy 
that has precious little resources for rigorous theology.46  
                                                
41 Aquinas, De Trinitate Boetii, 3.1 ad 4 
42 Jordan 2006, 234-5. Cf. In Sent. III 35.1.1 
43 Jordan 2006, 234; cf. Jordan 2006, 248, footnote 5 for an apparent exception 
44 Nichols 2012, 66-7  
45 Sokolowski 1982, 89 
46 Elders 2008, 551-2 
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That said, Strauss’ desire to sharpen fundamental alternatives has the effect of 
obscuring key details about the character of philosophy and theology in their connection 
with each other. Explicating these shows how Aquinas has not “betrayed” reason in 
invoking revelation in De Regno. 
First, the nature of philosophy. For Aquinas and Strauss, wisdom is knowledge of 
the whole. They also agree that philosophy cannot supply such knowledge, but for 
different reasons. According to Aquinas, knowledge of the whole further requires 
theology, which is to say the study of God’s revelation. God must reveal himself because 
God is beyond being as man knows it. The cosmos is not all that there is, but the effect of 
a cause, a cause that must be anterior to its effect.47 For Strauss philosophy does not 
attain to full wisdom, because according to Strauss philosophy is characterized above all 
by a determination to embark upon a quest that one takes to have no end.48 As he argues: 
“Being essentially quest and being not able ever to become wisdom, as distinguished 
from philosophy, the problems are always more evident than the solutions. All solutions 
are questionable.”49 Thus the philosopher is not wise, does not possess wisdom. Rather, 
he is the suitor or would-be lover of wisdom. 
This move, however, might lead us to neglect the fact that philosophy arises out 
of self-transcendence. Josef Pieper notes that philosophy begins in wonder, an attitude or 
orientation toward the other, as Socrates famously describes it and as Aquinas affirms to 
                                                
47 Sokolowski 1982, 23-9 
48 This reminds one of Kant’s insistence that philosophy be a Herculean struggle, an 
opinion that led Kant to dismiss Plato as a genuine philosopher (cited in Pieper 1952, 8-9, 
12). 
49 Strauss 1979, 114 
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argue for the humanity of Christ.50 Wonder and subsequent contemplation take man 
beyond himself and beyond reason. Just as a way of life, philosophy is characterized by 
its openness, not its closure, to wisdom. Any a priori closure of philosophy to wisdom 
would deny the Socratic ignorance that underlines man’s desire to know.  The cosmos is 
not, after all, a product of philosophy to be manipulated, but a given to be investigated to 
determine what is. Strauss’ understanding of philosophy, however, stresses the subject of 
philosophy, the philosopher, more than its object, knowledge. He thus misses the 
inevitable attraction that revelation must have for the philosopher. 
What about theology? In opposing philosophy to revelation, Strauss claims, we 
saw above, that revelation “as such refuses to acknowledge… [the] tribunal of human 
reason.”51 But is this true? Consider Brock on the place of wonder in theology: 
[I]n Thomas’s view, the knowledge that God wants to teach us is not merely 
useful or practical knowledge. It does not regard only the movement toward 
salvation or toward the bliss of eternal life. Revelation also informs us that what 
beatitude consists in is a kind of knowledge. “This is eternal life, that they may 
know you, the one true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent” (John 17:3). 
This knowledge is not practical; it is theoretical, contemplative, for its own sake. 
It is maximally delightful… The supernatural vision of God is the object of a 
natural wonder.52 
 
If Strauss’ formulation of the relation between theology and philosophy grants us a 
perspective on the encounter between God and man, what comes forth from that 
encounter is not only piety and obedience, which Strauss constantly invokes as the 
                                                
50 Theaetetus 155c-d. See Symposium 210e, Phaedrus 247d. Cf. Summa Contra Gentiles 
IV.33. As Brock notes for Aquinas, there is a striking range of possible meanings for the 
Latin and Greek words associated with “to wonder.” 
51 Strauss 1979, 116 
52 Brock 2012, 722 [emphasis in original]; cf. Sokolowski 1982, 111 
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obstacles that revelation sets for knowledge, but also a love and a desire to know.53 
Moreover, piety and obedience are inspired not because God is something great within 
the world, but beyond the world, as the Prologue to the Gospel of John beautifully 
testifies. To comprehend this is to grow both in piety and in reason.54 In other words, 
revelation does not come to the believer as a question of what to do, but in the first place 
simply as a supreme object of contemplation or knowledge. The determination to cling to 
that goodness, the practical decision, arises as a response to that divine self-disclosure. 
For Strauss, however, whilst philosophy begins in wonder, the philosopher then restricts 
himself to what unaided reason can discover for itself. In this way, his practical decision 
to cling to reason is not a theoretical openness to all there is, but a self-imposed limitation 
of the bounds of inquiry and wonder itself. On this plane, there is a radical asymmetry 
between theology and a philosophy closed off to revelation: they are not a choice 
between knowledge of and piety toward the whole, but a choice between two entirely 
different wholes. They simply inhabit different universes.  
Strauss in his emphasis on philosophy and theology as ways of life again directs 
our attention from object to subject.55 In his articulation of the nature of philosophy, 
Strauss emphasizes man’s ascent to wisdom. That ascent demands much of man, and 
                                                
53 In fact, one could argue that Strauss fails to consider revelation as a personal 
encounter between man and God, and rather treats it strictly propositionally (Ratzinger’s 
1999 interview with Hvidt). 
54 Sokolowski 1982, 111-112; cf. ST I 1.4 resp. 
55 The “openness to all that is” is a key theme of the work of James Schall, to whom I 
am greatly indebted in these pages. In one discussion, he cites this revealing teaching of 
John Paul II: "Philosophy must obey its own rules and be based upon its own principles; 
truth, however, can only be one. The content of revelation can never debase the 
discoveries and legitimate the autonomy of reason. Yet, conscious that it cannot set itself 
up as an absolute and exclusive value, reason on its part must never lose its capacity to 
question and to be questioned.” (Fides et Ratio, n. 79, in Schall 2000, 53) 
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calls for a rule for living that orients all of one’s life toward it: an ascesis.56 For Aquinas 
and Pieper, and I dare say Socrates, the emphasis is less on man’s ascent toward wisdom 
than on wisdom’s descent toward man. Thus wisdom appears as an intervention or 
intrusion into man’s life, even if it also seems to explain what one already knows. For 
Aquinas, wisdom is not something so much struggled for as given. To be sure, man’s 
ascent and wisdom’s descent appear in both accounts: most notably, in De Regno the 
king struggles toward knowledge in I.1-6, to find in I.7-11 that his struggles have 
disposed him to accept wisdom, which is finally a gift. But there is a difference in 
emphasis, for De Regno I.7-11 reveal man’s ascent to wisdom to be a response to 
wisdom’s very descent. 
Aquinas would accept Strauss’ claim that an openness to revelation as such would 
fundamentally change philosophy as the pagans knew it; indeed, his extended 
consideration of civil religion at De Regno II.3 emphasizes the novelty of the Christian 
recognition of a God who transcends the immanent and terrestrial yet also became 
incarnate and speaks to man through revelation.57 The question is the nature of the 
change – perfection or abolition – and whether it is something that philosophers have 
been waiting and hoping for. Perhaps this is ultimately why Aquinas does not seem 
anxious to distinguish philosophy from theology in his own work.58 
Whatever their disagreements, Strauss’ formulation reveals to us a 
phenomenology of the disclosure whereby Christian revelation appears to reason, one 
                                                
56 “Ascent” and “ascetic,” despite similar appearances in English, come from different 
roots: “ascent” from Latin scandere, to climb, and “ascetic” from Greek askein, to 
exercise or train. 
57 Although, as Pieper notes, revelation does not make the task of philosophy any easier. 
In fact, Pieper, suggests, revelation offers “fruitful impediments” to spur on philosophy 
(Pieper 1952, 129-30). 
58 D’Andrea 1992, 211-4  
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that Aquinas adopts in De Regno. He does so, I urge, because this formulation sets up the 
encounter between revelation and reason, and helpfully raises the question of their 
relation.  
The regime of De Regno, we noted, paints a dynamic picture of development, one 
in which philosophy and theology bear a “contrapuntal” relation.59 De Regno exhibits 
three distinct moments: (1) the assaying of human needs, which can be known through 
the philosophic investigation of convention as a deposit of human experience; (2) 
revelation’s challenge to man’s understanding of himself as bound by city and world; and 
(3) the re-examination of man’s existence in light of that challenge. The “counterpoint” 
between philosophy and theology, to borrow the language of Pieper, arises from the 
challenge at this second moment: revelation offers data to man with which he can 
philosophically engage. Philosophy as the development of reason in man can lay the 
foundations for an exploration of the data of faith, and dares theology to address what 
man says that he already knows. This counterpoint between revelation and reason is 
something like the “creative tension” Strauss so often spoke of between Athens and 
Jerusalem.60 
Ernest Fortin often spoke of “living the tension” between philosophy and 
revelation.61 Fortin’s ideal, it turns out, resembles Aquinas’ magnanimous man in I.7, 
who lives out this counterpoint between theology and philosophy. That man, who the 
king imagines himself to be as he reads De Regno, lives in what I called in Chapter 2 
Aquinas’ “state of nature”: he accepts the naturalness of the city as instantiated in its 
conventions, and therefore accords respect to the gods and human reason that are said to 
                                                
59 Pieper 1952, 125 
60 Strauss 1967 
61 Fortin 1996, II.245 and Guerra 2010, 103-4 
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have built it. Yet he questions whether the goods of the city are an ample reward for his 
virtue, which is to say just how natural its conventions are, and in so doing must consider 
what his virtue is and in what it is fulfilled.  
He then must question the rational and theological foundations of his city to 
uncover “the city,” i.e. what the best city and the best man would look like. To the extent 
that his view of the human end develops through a philosophical inquiry into the good, 
then he begins to transcend the city and is on the way to becoming the kind of 
philosopher that Aristotle’s magnanimous man is not.62 Yet he still fulfills Aristotle’s 
conception of the magnanimous man just because he seeks the proper reward of his 
excellence, in doubt that it exists on earth.  There can be no greater gift to such a man, 
then, than the revelation that draws his attention to the difficult and obscure knowledge 
he needs to attain to happiness.63  
 
THE CHURCH AND THE BEST REGIME 
We said at the beginning of the previous section that revelation poses two 
problems for the congruence of Aquinas’ De Regno with classical inquiry into the best 
regime. The first, already discussed, concerns the relation between revelation and reason. 
The second, which we will now treat, concerns the proclamation of man’s natural end as 
intermediate to his grace-given one. 
Revelation declares man’s end to be supernatural: super naturam, or beyond 
nature.64 Christian revelation does not just question whether man is bound by the horizon 
                                                
62 Holloway 1999 and Arnhart 1983  
63 ST I.1 
64 See Bonino 2001 for more on the meaning of the “supernatural” for Aquinas. Here we 
mean the word quite literally. 
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of convention. It also proposes to transcend the horizon of nature. As Sokolowski 
explains, “In pagan religion and philosophy distinctions are made within the context of 
the world or the whole, the matrix of being in which one thing comes forward as 
differentiated from other.” But “in Christian belief the world or the whole itself is placed 
as one of the terms of a distinction,” because there is a God beyond the world. This is the 
“fundamental distinction” of Christianity.65 Yet, one might add, the world came about 
through creation: “God looked at everything he had made, and found it very good,” as 
Genesis 1:6 records. In other words, the world’s existence is contingent, not necessary. 
Thus God is the seat of all being, and it is to him that all being seeks to return.66 We see 
this in De Praemio Regis: man’s final desire to attain to the good is realized in celestial 
beatitude, beyond immanent existence. Thus Aquinas had to distinguish at II.3 between 
the creator and governor, the activity of the latter being fundamentally ordered by the 
creator and toward the end set in his creative action. In turn, we see the final limit on the 
causa sui of I.1: he can direct himself to his end, but it is not one he finally creates. 
Thus we see the second task of revelation in De Regno. Christian revelation arises 
in De Regno to set up the Church as the authority through which man is led to this 
supernatural end (II.4). The Church is not simply a human institution with a negotiable 
end: it is of divine institution and one with an end set and brought about by God. This 
discussion, we note, comes quite late in De Regno, long after the disquisition on man’s 
end. We might find this surprising. Many modern conversations about revelation, after 
all, begin with the question of “Church and State,” or the problem of having a rival to the 
state for power.67This problem takes the form of contest over the proper relation between 
                                                
65 Sokolowski 1982, 31 
66 Sokolowski 1982, 31-40 
67 Cf. Brague 2005  
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those powers, seen as in some sense competitors despite their very different roles. The 
struggle gains a new dimension when citizens contest the authority of the spiritual power. 
Such difficulties can lead to Westphalian settlements dividing states by religion, or to 
regimes in which some practice of toleration allows religiously divided communities to 
live as one politically.  
But for Aquinas the central question of political philosophy is the end of man. 
Whether the city is enough for man, including whether we can live under the state and 
“bracket” other institutions, depends upon a close examination of man and the 
possibilities of his development in the city. If we do not agree on the nature of man’s 
ends, then discussions about the authorities designed to serve those ends will be confused 
at best. In a similar way, Aristotle proposes to frame the science of ethics around the 
question of the best way of life.68 Like Aristotle as well, however, Aquinas does not have 
great expectations that societies will often instantiate that way of life. Thus he takes the 
political function of man’s end to be foundational, or meta-ethical, rather than juridical. 
Further, while the end of man, contemplation of the good, seems to be solitary for 
Aristotle and Plato, for the Christian there is a way in which it is communal, insofar as all 
rational creatures worship God as their common object.69 What seems to be an 
uncomfortable dissonance in the life of the philosopher, perhaps a tragedy, is given new 
hope in the Christian Church as a visible and corporate struggle toward contemplation of 
the good.70 But of course the state can kill the theologian as easily as the philosopher. 
                                                
68 NE I 
69 De Koninck 100; see Aquinas’ Commentary on the “Politics,” Bk VII, lectio 2 
70 Nichols 1995 on Bartlett 1994 
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What I propose to be the relation between the political regime and Church is 
analogous to that between human law and divine law.71 Just as divine law reminds human 
law that man has an end and adverts further that this end extends beyond politics, so the 
Church reminds the state both that man has an end – and one not created by the state, at 
that – and that this end is infravalent to that of the Church. From the perspective of the 
magnanimous man, the Church is an agent of his education: it proclaims a divine law that 
questions his understanding of the world. He is thus urged to build a state that is receptive 
to this end. 
Consider how the Church arises in De Regno. As we have noted, it first appears as 
a consequence of revelation. Aquinas does not assert the authority of the Church as such, 
but as the keeper of something that he has described and justified in I.7-11: revelation and 
the promise of God to man. When the Church emerges in Book II, Aquinas has 
surprisingly little to say about it. He notes that it fulfills the requirement of leading man 
toward his grace-given end, a governance that the king cannot fulfill. Prima facie it is 
difficult to discern what sort of arrangement between church and state Aquinas envisions, 
as is perhaps true of all of his works. Bearing in mind the progress of De Regno, we 
might argue that, to the extent that our king must continue to learn what his role is as 
king, he must also continue to learn what the role of the Church is, at least in its relation 
with the king. We might also think that, in a polity where the people have a share in rule, 
the relation between the state and the Church also depends upon their moral development. 
In this way, the Church indeed serves for theology a kind of counterpoint to the state. 
                                                
71 Insofar as human law is the subject of political philosophy, and divine law that of 
theology, one could also devise an analogy with the pairs “political regime and Church” 
and “philosophy and theology.” Of course human law often fails to benefit from political 
philosophy, imposing a tremendous limitation on the role of the Church. 
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Yet if the Church arises as a kind of counterpoint to the ruling element, then we 
might first say that the Church is not simply a static entity parallel to the state. Man’s 
community as political seeks to fulfill a particular function: preserving man’s life and 
securing his excellence. The Church, however, points beyond itself and the world as we 
know it. As Father Nichols puts it, the Church is the “inaugural form” of the Kingdom of 
God. 
The fruits of the transformation of persons in the New Adam are to be expected in 
three modes: contingently in a well-ordered Christian polis; essentially but 
provisionally in the Church; essentially and definitively in the Kingdom of which 
the well-ordered Christian polis is the shadow and the Church, the inaugural 
form.72 
 
The polis instantiates Christian virtues “contingently” because those virtues must 
be built ever-anew by each human and through each polis, reflected perhaps in the 
vagaries of Aquinas’ consideration in Book I as to whether the provincia or polis are 
most excellent. Christians as members of the Church, however, posses the gifts of grace 
granted the Church by Christ. Those “fruits” do not exist as the terminus of the Church, 
but exist for and toward the transformation of the world. Thus the Church does not 
“administer” or “manage” a status quo that must be maintained, but rather leads men to 
live in hope of something quite new.73 “Church” and “state” not only have different 
goals, but one is oriented toward the “now” of present obligations and aspirations, often 
leading to Gnostic temptations, whereas the other toward the “not yet” of the Kingdom-
to-come, meaning that earthly existence, for all of its value, is not taken to be the final 
                                                
72 Nichols 2012, 30 
73 Cf. Agamben 2012, 34-5, 40-1, but also Nichols 2012, 61. A fuller study would 
differentiate more clearly between the “visible” and “invisible” Church, as developed out 
of Augustine’s City of God. 
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site of man’s perfection.74 For all of these reasons, one might think that the ecclesiastical 
and civil polities would be uneasy partners. Indeed, after detailing the naturalness of 
political life and the excellence and evils of political life, Aquinas turns his attention 
primarily not to the Church but to the significance of revelation, and then only the Church 
in its necessity to proclaim that revelation. In fact, he says little beyond that, and nothing 
concrete about the relation between the Church and polity. One might think, then, that the 
primary role of the Church in De Regno is prophetic.  
Yet the image of the prophet, who is never recognized in his own land, lays bare 
the corollary of Church as “essentially but provisionally” manifesting Christian 
excellence: he speaks but is not often heard. In connecting the Church so visibly to a 
revelation that Aquinas knows so many reject, Aquinas might also be cautioning that the 
success of the Church will be quite limited in secular terms. That is, it should expect little 
in the way of influence with the state.75 Indeed, a difficulty arises from the relation 
between human law and philosophy: most states are to some extent unjust in their 
foundations and activity, uncritically and unreflectively unjust to other states and to parts 
of their own populations. As Augustine says, there has never been a truly just res 
publica.76 Aquinas comes quite close to this argument in De Regno I.3-6, admitting at I.4 
that for most people there exists no difference between tyranny and kingship. Further, the 
advent of Christianity affords to states new ways of misbehaving, particularly arrogating 
the Church’s task for itself. This perhaps explains in part why Aquinas never expands 
                                                
74 It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to explain this in full, but suffice to say that 
the Church’s concern for present earthly existence, real though it is, rests upon an 
orientation to the Kingdom of God, which is here in some sense but not in full (cf. 
Ratzinger 2007, 46-63). 
75 I take this to be a central argument of Robert Kraynak in his Christian Faith and 
Modern Democracy, and it holds for De Regno. 
76 Augustine, City of God XIX.21; but cf. XIX.24 
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upon the relation between Church and State in his writings: the practical determinations 
of that relation must be worked out by each community, and in most cases the prince and 
not the Church will have the final say. 
If we had hopes of a political theology from De Regno, then, its chief principle 
would seem to be this: a community must come to grips with the distinct tasks of the 
divine and human law, and not implement any sort of accommodation or settlement that 
risks confusing them. The king as minister Dei has a surprisingly mundane task. And 
each task is important. Indeed, Aquinas clearly takes the identification of those tasks to 
be a struggle, particularly with the temptation to subordinate spiritual matters to the 
temporal. The great goal of Aquinas in De Regno on this score, we might say, is a reform 
from pagan-like civil religion and political theologies. As with Augustine in his City of 
God, the great dramatic climax of De Regno is the confrontation between the Two Cities: 
that of man, and that of God. According to Maritain, then, this political theology is a 
théologie politique, not a politische Theologie.77 Aquinas has not supplied us with a 
concrete political program for transforming the polis into the Sacrum Imperium. Rather, 
he has given us insights to think theologically about politics. In urging us to distinguish 
the political from the spiritual, and to be cautious about their practical relation, he has 
provided us principles with making determinations in our own particular situation. 
But assuming that we could say a bit more about the relation between the Church 
and political regime, what could this community look like? We said in Chapter 4 that 
divine law ought to tutor human law, and the Church in tutoring the regime precisely 
serves to tutor human law through that divine law.  The constitutional arrangements that 
could arise from such a teaching are multiple. We can, however, outline a few principles.  
                                                
77 Maritain 1968, 100-1 
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First, man is political and naturally lives in community. This is of grave concern, 
as Aquinas makes clear from the very first chapter of De Regno: “Where there is no 
governor, the people shall fail.”78 From the beginning of De Regno, Aquinas has 
defended the political community as natural (cf. De Regno I.1-2).79 Consider in De Regno 
that Aquinas treats extensively (I.1-6) on the necessity of the regime to secure the 
necessities of life and moreover human excellence. Political theology calls attention to 
this natural end first to distinguish it from the grace-given one to which it wishes men to 
attend, but further to ensure that the state attends to man’s natural end. Indeed, the whole 
movement of De Regno takes such natural ends as given, and those revealed by God to be 
the curious and strange ones. The end of the regime, which Aquinas calls unitas pacis, or 
the unity of peace, clearly involves more than just health and wealth, but further man’s 
virtue. As Kraynak notes, Aquinas envisions a most substantive end for the regime than 
Augustine with his tranquillitas ordinis, or tranquility of order. Then again, “unity” and 
“order” both suggest a harmony, and those harmonies are ordered toward similar things: 
peace and tranquility.80 These considerations are properly political philosophy, not 
political theology, of course. Yet the polis that fosters the natural desire for the good in 
men is the polis that cultivates a pre-disposition in them toward the source of good, God. 
In this way, whilst the state is therefore not a divine institution, its activities do bear upon 
man’s spiritual life.81  
Allow me to re-state this principle: in performing its own task, the regime helps 
the Church immeasurably. Perhaps this is surprising. For someone expecting Aquinas to 
advocate that the state engage in holy wars, the persecution of heretics and infidels, and 
                                                
78 Proverbs 11:14 
79 Kraynak 2002, 86-87. 
80 Kraynak 2002, 95-6 
81 Krayank 2002, 88 
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in general the preservation and enforcement of the Faith, this is a curiously minimalist 
political theology. If it is minimalist, however, I would repeat that it is in part because 
Aquinas is an Augustinian: he does not expect the political community often to attain to 
excellence, nor its relations with the Church often to be peaceful. 
Thus we come to the second principle. If the Church ought to remind the regime 
of its task, the Church must also indicate the task of politics to ensure that the regime 
does not exceed it, as with the attempts throughout history, even in “Christendom,” to 
legitimize state authority through veils of religious authority.82 I would point yet again to 
Aquinas’ discussion of civil religion in Book II. One can also return to Aquinas’ 
diagnosis, the man controlled by libido voluntatis. “Nobody,” Aquinas claimed in I.3, 
“will be able firmly to state: This thing is such and such, when it depends upon the will of 
another, not to say upon his caprice [libido]” (paragraph 26). 
 In chief, this means that the Church must not be obstructed in its task. The 
Church is not simply one among many social institutions, as we might say in liberal 
modernity. It does not serve the needs of man as subsidiary or auxiliary to his terrestrial 
end: it points him toward his final end. In other words, “reasons of state,” more or less 
cynical, cannot be advanced to deprive the Church of its ambit. Insofar as the Church 
exists for this mission, Aquinas would argue, it must have total liberty to carry it out. 
Thus, for instance, an argument that the Church must marry homosexuals because of state 
concerns about equality, or that the Church must accept government-appointed bishops, 
as happens now in China, must be rejected.  
If the Church and a regime in a particular time and place do maintain cordial 
relations, however, or are at least capable of communication by words rather than by 
                                                
82 Kantorowicz 1998 is the canonical study, but also see the very different Peterson 2012 
and Agamben 2011. 
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force, then their cooperation or dialogue can be a great boon to society. Most notably, as 
McCoy indicates, the divine law can reward and punish in a way that human law cannot. 
As we saw in De Regno I.4-6 and I.7-11, this is no small matter. The state that can exhort 
its citizens to seek Heaven and avoid Hell in exercising their moral virtues has a great 
advantage. Moreover, while Aquinas has expressed a general concern of the Church that 
the state propagate virtue, later theologians have outlined particular areas of attention, 
e.g. the family,83 war,84 health and medical ethics,85 and issues of justice toward the 
poor.86 In some places, notably the United States, the Church has also adopted modern 
rights-language to speak of “religious liberty” or the “freedom of religion.”87 As we can 
see, however, Aquinas seems to admit that, as a practical reality, regimes have difficulties 
inculcating even basic virtues.88  
I have underlined the fundamentally Augustinian nature of Aquinas’s De Regno 
to draw our attention toward the moderate expectations for reform implicit in this work. 
Yet this character of the text also draws out the relation between political philosophy and 
theology in concrete politics, found as we have seen in the “developmental state” through 
which Aquinas juxtaposes philosophy and theology. Sane politics requires a careful and 
judicious political philosophy that proceeds along the “developmental state” Aquinas 
adumbrates. 
                                                
83 E.g. marriage, pro-creation (contraception, in vitro fertilization, abortion), the 
education of children 
84 E.g. just war theory, both ad belllum and in bello 
85 E.g. euthanasia, stem cells, many of the issues concerning pro-creation 
86 A particular focus of multiple papal encyclicals, e.g. Rerum novarum, Quadragesimo 
Anno, Centesimus annus and Caritas in veritate 
87 Schindler 2012 
88 Ratzinger 2008, 206-7 
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Such considerations allow us to compare the position of Aquinas in De Regno to 
some better-known positions on the relation between Church and state.89 Indeed, scholars 
have been at pains to reduce Aquinas’ theologico-political teaching to a conventional 
category, whether hierocratic, conciliarist, or even Erastian.90 As Cardinal Bellarmine 
famously once said, however, the inscrutability of De Regno makes this no easy task.91 
By our first principle, it is clear that Aquinas does not espouse a hierocratic 
teaching after the manner of Aegidius Romanus (Giles of Rome). Such hierocracy, often 
referred to as “political Augustinianism” in a rather grand misnomer, subordinates the 
political activity of man completely and directly to his supernatural end.92 For Eschmann, 
“the ultimate and preceding ends” in De Regno, which is to say man’s grace-given and 
natural ends, “constitute an ordo per se causarum, a closed system of causes, in which 
the second cause per se depends on the first cause.”93 This claim has a lovely Scholastic 
ring to it, and it may seem to concord with the teaching of De Regno II.3: “the Christian 
People are to be subject as to our Lord Jesus Christ Himself.  For those to whom pertains 
the care of intermediate ends should be subject to him to whom pertains the care of the 
                                                
89 I am greatly in the debt of Douglas Kries for the following discussion. 
90 As Eschmann (1958, 177-80) notes, the controversy over Aquinas concerns portions 
of De Regno and Aquinas’ Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, the latter of 
which we can consider only parenthetically. Murray (1948) considers Aquinas an 
Erastian after John of Paris, although he does not seem to be aware of the nature of his 
characterization; Acton, Finnis and Novak consider Aquinas as a kind of American-style 
liberal (Stoner 2007, 2 fn 1; see Kries 2013 for similar claims about Bellarmine); 
Eschmann (1958) and Cain (2007) consider Aquinas a hierocrat; and Boyle (2002), 
perhaps also Kries (2013), sees him as somewhere in between. 
91 As Fitzgerald has it, Bellarmine was also reluctant to rely upon De Regno as an 
authentic text of Aquinas (Fitzgerald 1979, 526). Bellarmine frequently however does 
just that (Kries 2013; Eschmann 1958, 177). 
92 “The civitas Dei cannot become an empirical political entity, as Augustine (unlike his 
interpreters) clearly saw…” (Ratzinger 2008, 201). 
93 Eschmann 1958, 179. I am thus inclined to think that the account of De Regno bears a 
greater affinity to that of the Commentary on the Sententiae than Eschmann avers. 
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ultimate end, and be directed by his rule.” Yet it should be in clear that in the teaching of 
De Regno the natural end of man does not depend upon his grace-given end. Such 
dependence would deny the integrity of the political activity that Aquinas outlines 
metaphysically in De Regno I.1-2 and calls unitas pacis, and moreover would defeat the 
entire gratuitous character of grace. Moreover, whilst there may be a way in which man 
must finally reconcile his political activity to his spiritual end, Eschmann overstates the 
cause in calling their relation a “closed system of causes,” except in the most formal of 
senses. For there is nothing closed about a system of causes in which grace intervenes, 
and Aquinas has certainly not shown us how those ends are materially related. 
By the second principle, that according to which the Church must indicate the 
limits of politics such that the state does not exceed it, the solution of John of Paris must 
also be excluded. As we noted in Chapter 3, John of Paris, or Quidort, proposes an 
Erastianism or caesaro-papism whereby the natural character of the state grants it 
absolute power over the Church. In other words, because the political community is 
natural, it governs the supernatural end of man.94 Just because man has a supernatural 
end, Aquinas argues in De Regno II.2, he must have a supernatural governor, i.e. the 
Church. This is the entire “Christian distinction” that overturns pagan orders of civil 
theology.95 Therefore, while there may be some grounds on which one can advance 
Quidort’s position, they are not orthodox Christian ones.96 As the wisest pagan 
philosophers suspected that their contemplation of the good took them beyond the 
confines of the polis, so the Church reminds the state that it cannot secure, and thus has 
                                                
94 De potestate regia et papali, Chapters 3, 7-13. This account of Quidort is at odds with 
that of Murray 1949, but see Griesbach 1959 and McCoy 1963, 123-6. As we noted in 
Chapter 3, the teaching of Quidort bears considerable affinities with that of Hobbes.  
95 Sokolowski 1982, 31 
96 Kries 2013, n.p. 
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no governance over, the supernatural end of man. We thus recall our second principle: the 
Church must not only remind the regime of its task, but also ensure that the regime does 
not exceed it. 
Does this mean that Thomas Aquinas stakes a via media between Aegidius and 
Quidort? We might think that Bellarmine’s notion of indirect power, which is a via media 
of a kind, bears a close relation to what we have seen in De Regno. For Bellarmine, the 
Church must govern in spiritual matters with a recognition that man is naturally political 
and also fallen, while the state must rule man in temporal matters knowing that man is 
destined for higher things.97 As Kries aptly summarizes his teaching: 
[W]hile the spiritual end is surely superior to the temporal end, it does not follow 
that the temporal is simply absorbed into the spiritual, for the temporal goal stems 
directly from nature, which is created by God.  Thus both authorities have their 
common source in God; the higher authority has precedence over the lower, but 
the lower does not have its source immediately in the higher.  The spiritual 
authority’s power over the temporal authority is therefore mediated or indirect.  If, 
however, conflict should break out between the two, the higher end would trump 
the lower, and therefore priests must have precedence over princes and, in 
extreme situations, popes may depose kings.  The simplest formulation of 
Bellarmine’s position on the indirect power in his own words is probably the 
following:  “The Pope, as Pope, does not have directly and immediately any 
temporal power, but only spiritual; yet by reason of the spiritual he has at least a 
certain indirect power, and that supreme in temporal affairs.”98 
 
The Church through the Pope is not the ruler of man toward his natural end, and it 
therefore has no direct rule over he who does govern man toward that natural end. Like 
Socrates’ horseman vis-à-vis the bridlemaker, it is not the job of the Church to perform 
the task of the regime, nor should it dictate the terms of that task to the regime just so far 
                                                
97 Controversies 5.3.5, trans. Kathleen E. Murphy (New York:  Fordham University 
Press, 1928).  
98 Kries 2013, n.p. The quotation of Bellarmine is from Controversies 3.5.1, trans. 
George Albert Moore (Chevy Chase, MD: Country Dollar Press, 1951). 
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as the activities of the regime require prudence and judgment. The Church does have an 
indirect rule over that governor of man’s natural end, however, insofar as that natural end 
impinges upon the governance of man’s supernatural end. For when the state neglects or 
perverts man’s natural happiness, then it also disorders man’s natural desire to seek the 
good, which good the Church mediates. 
It would seem, then, that Aquinas’ teaching in De Regno accords with something 
like the indirect power of Bellarmine, and, so far as we can compass herein, with the 
teaching of the Sentences commentary: 
Both the spiritual power and the secular power derive from God’s power.  And so 
the secular power is subject to the spiritual power insofar as God has subjected the 
former to the latter, namely, in matters pertaining to the salvation of souls.  And 
so we should obey the spiritual power rather than the secular power in such 
matters.  But in matters pertaining to civic welfare, we should obey the secular 
power rather than the spiritual power.99 
 
To be clear, this via media is not quite a liberal one. How far this approaches the teaching 
of the “Religion Clauses” of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, for instance, 
is a matter of conjecture, but they are not identical.100 Certainly the Free Exercise Clause 
is of a piece with De Regno, so long as we interpret “exercise” broadly to include acts, 
not merely belief, and “religion” narrowly, such that “religion” refers to man’s natural 
                                                
99 Commentary on the Sentences II, d. 44, ad 4 (Regan trans, 2002). As Kries notes, one 
question left open by this analysis is the meaning of the teaching according to which the 
pope can be at the apex of both spirtiual and temporal power despite those two powers 
have independent causes in God (Kries 2013, n.p., footnote 25). 
100 “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof...” A sufficient analysis of this question would require a separate 
study, but we can here raise some relevant questions and perhaps inspire future research. 
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desire to know God.101  The Establishment Clause presents more difficulties. Were the 
Establishment Clause understood to maintain the distinction between the temporal and 
spiritual, then Aquinas would not object so far as our study of De Regno can conclude. 
Aquinas might even see prudential reasons to interpret the Clause along the lines of non-
preference or accommodation, according to which the Clause permits government to 
foster religion in general so long as that government does not favor a particular sect. Thus 
Aquinas might support Congressional funding for religious education that permits 
religious education for Catholicism, Protestantism and Judaism.102 
Were the Establishment Clause interpreted along the lines of Thomas Jefferson’s 
Letter to the Danbury Baptists, however, then Aquinas would deny its validity. The 
regime should view its goals as complementary to that of the Church, and thus should not 
be opposed in principle to supporting it through schools, for instance.103 While there may 
be prudential reasons for not praying in schools or including scrolls of the Decalogue in 
court rooms or on capitol grounds, Aquinas again would not see how the regime could in 
principle be opposed to such things.104 Further, it may not be the task of a regime to 
mandate prayer or religious oaths for office, but a regime in which such laws prudently 
educate citizens in their duties to God would be a happier one than a regime in which 
toleration was preferred above God.105 
                                                
101 There may be other reasons to protect the activity of adherents of non-religions, such 
as Confucianism, ethical culture or vegetarianism, but they would not strictly be 
protected by the Free Exercise Clause on Thomas’ construal. 
102 O’Neill 1949, 56 
103 Cf. Everson v. Board of Education (330 U.S. 1 (1947)) 
104 Cf. McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky (545 U.S. 844 (2005)) and Van Orden v. 
Perry (545 U.S. 677 (2005)) 
105 Cf. Engel v. Vitale (370 U.S. 421 (1962)) and Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. 
Doe (530 U.S. 290 (2000)) 
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Note again, however, that we can only speculate as to what Aquinas would say of 
such matters, nor can we take De Regno as Aquinas’ final word. Yet we know that the 
teaching of De Regno recognizes that politics is a communal activity, and that man 
cannot legislate laws for a better sort of citizen than his community contains. Whatever 
the limitations of the Religion Clauses, then, Aquinas would likely agree that they 
represent a favorable settlement given the circumstances, even as he held out a hope for 
their improvement.  
At the conclusion of the section on the best regime, we criticized the notion of the 
social contract. We can also add that it fails to register the proper role of the Church as 
beyond the community. For the Church stands as a constant challenge to the self-
sufficiency of the state. It does not exist as subordinate to man’s natural end: it proclaims 
one beyond it. As the divine law reminds human law that man has an end and adverts 
further that this end extends beyond politics, so the Church reminds the state both that 
man has an end and that this end is infravalent to that of the Church. Just as the social 
contract circumscribes the philosophical critique of convention, so any contract-theoretic 
relation between church and state attempts to crystallize the relation of political 
philosophy to political theology: certain theological facts about rights, conscience and the 
person are accepted as part of our political discourse, and other importations of political 
theology are off limits. This move again limits the moral development of a community: 
what a community knows and can agree on at a given point in time is not obviously all 
that they can and should know, and in any event they are likely to recede even from that 
level of agreement just because it becomes a given rather than a question. This 
theologico-political strategy also, moreover, distorts political philosophy. Attempting to 
codify what theological data are and are not legitimate in public discourse can stunt the 
ability of philosophy to inquire into man’s end, or pervert it insofar as political 
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philosophy becomes the exclusive realm of metaphysical speculation about such things. It 
is a key function of the Church to sound the alarm on such matters. 
Thus, above all, this vision of regime has directionality: it is a moral progress or 
education, and the people of that regime either grow in virtue or stagnate and decline in 
vice. Our king wants to learn to rule well, just as any would-be ruler would. But does he 
know what it means to rule well? Is what he thinks he knows true? Is what he knows to 
be desirable also possible for his regime? Can he evaluate the excellence of his people to 
determine what they need here and now, and the excellence of himself to determine 
whether he can give that rule to them? These are not questions that inspire complacency 
about one’s knowledge and accomplishments. These questions invite one to “live the 
tension” between philosophy and theology, as Fortin urged. In De Regno, man’s reason 
leads him to ask questions beyond himself and his community; revelation leads him to 
ask questions about himself and beyond the world. In the interplay between these two 
sources of wisdom, each community can move toward an understanding of the whole. 
What Guerra argues of theologians is true more generally of modern men: “theologians 
needs the moral and intellectual courage to think seriously about what faith and reason 
jointly allow us to know about ourselves, our world, and God.”106  
 
MODERATION 
I have argued throughout that Aquinas’ approach to politics, which he enjoins to 
us, is an exceedingly rational one. It might be helpful to say a few words about the ways 
in which his political proposals are moderate and tolerant. Or, rather, we can collect the 
already-considerable reflections we have adduced about them.  
                                                
106 Guerra 2010, 108-9 
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First, their character as moderate. What is moderation in politics? We should note 
that the meaning is analogous to moderation as a quality of the soul, which is to say a 
virtue. Thus, for Socrates in the Republic, moderation in politics is a harmony between 
the parts of the polis as moderation in ethics is a harmony between the parts of the 
soul.107 This harmony, in turn, depends upon the moderation of appetitive desires: on the 
part of the lower class in the polis and in the appetitive part of the soul. While Aquinas 
does not speak of moderation in the analogical sense as a quality of the city, he does 
espouse a notion of the virtue of moderation (temperantia) that is consonant with that of 
Socrates, defining moderation as the rule of reason in man’s soul through reason’s 
governance of the passions.108 
How do such views square with modern notions of political moderation? Consider 
the following quotation: 
Moderates start with a political vision, but they get it from history books, not 
philosophy books. That is, a moderate isn’t ultimately committed to an abstract 
idea. Instead, she has a deep reverence for the way people live in her country and 
the animating principle behind that way of life. In America, moderates revere the 
fact that we are a nation of immigrants dedicated to the American dream — 
committed to the idea that each person should be able to work hard and rise.109 
 
For David Brooks, moderation is grounded in the concrete circumstances of a political 
context. In opposing it to a stance dictated by “philosophy books” or an “abstract idea,” 
Brooks means to draw out the essentially pragmatic nature of political moderation. Yet 
this is not the sort of pragmatism that trades anything for whatever: it loves what it 
                                                
107 See e.g. Republic 431a-b and 441e-42d. I cannot of course do justice to the 
complexities of moderation in the Republic. 
108 ST II-II.141-70. Aquinas notes the close relation between moderation and courage at 
141.6.3 respondeo. 
109 Brooks 2012 
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knows. As Brooks’ argument emphasizes, the loved and familiar, the “animating 
principle” behind a “way of life,” becomes the baseline for political activity. Often we 
think of moderation as a kind of middle ground between extremes, and this is both true 
and false. It is true insofar as moderation is often articulated against positions of change 
and reform, and the “moderate” is the one who favors pursuing none of the reforms in 
excess. Yet as an active appeal to strike a balance between such conflicting claims, 
moderation typically rests on a judgment that the status quo does not call for the 
revolutionary changes that are suggested. What changes ought to be effected, moreover, 
ought to be brought about in a spirit of prudence and caution that preserves what is good 
in the status quo and guards cautiously against ill-advised innovation. What Brooks 
shows, however, is that when we speak admiring of “moderation,” we tend to emphasize 
a prudent restraint opposed to radicalism, a realism guarding against idealism, and a love 
of one’s own that eschews utopianism.110 
For a modern like Brooks, then, moderation is a quality of stability that does not 
deny the dictates of reason but seeks to limit the hazards of abstract rationalism. Any 
reform must maintain such stability. This, of course, is part of the intentional irony of 
Socrates’ imagined republic: its so-called moderation emerges only through a radical 
revision of society built upon the “three waves” (radical sexual equality, the abolition of 
the family and rule by philosophers) and the exile of everyone over the age of 10.111 
Brooks would no doubt vociferously object to Socrates’ proposals. Radical political 
reform disrupts the equilibrium between the parts of the city that makes good whatever is 
                                                
110 Craiutu 2012 is one of the few recent book-length scholarly accounts. I am grateful 
to Laura Rabinowitz for discussions on this point. 
111 Socrates describes objections to his reform as “waves” at Republic 457b-c, and rather 
off-handedly mentions the exile at 540d-541b 
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good about it. Such reform, moreover, can never promise to be as good in practice as it 
looks on paper.  
As to Aquinas’ suggestions in De Regno, however, Brooks would be far more 
tolerant, and indeed challenged. Perhaps we might put it this way: Aquinas proposes 
radical ends through moderate means. Aquinas recognizes Brooks’ concern that justice be 
implemented in a cautious and measured manner. To be sure, Aquinas calls on our king 
to ask how his rule aligns with the celestial end of man. He does nothing less than stage 
an encounter between God and man, drawing man’s attention to that revelation of God as 
the gift and challenge of man’s existence. In our study of De Regno, however, Aquinas 
has not proposed we turn society upside down. As the fruit of a kind of progress or 
education, this community does not propose the radical re-ordering of society on alien 
terms. It further does not demand that everyone immediately cede to the final end of the 
community. Rather, Aquinas invites us to question the basic needs of our society, how 
they are best obtained, and how we can always keep one eye on the question of our true 
and final excellence as a community of humans. He suggests gradual reform determined 
by a careful consideration of current political circumstances. He has also, I might add, 
provided numerous examples of regimes that attempt and fail at such reform, thus 
constantly moderating the expectations of our king and chastening his ambition. There 
could be nothing less precipitous or immoderate than the education enacted in De Regno. 
This is no politische Theologie that urges the transformation of the state into a holy object 
and man into a perfect saint. Aquinas is far too much the realist to expect overnight 
change, and his emphasis on political reform as an education shows that he hopes for 
long-lasting, and thus slow-built, change in the hearts of men, not revolution by fiat in 
 288 
institutions and laws. Aquinas’ Augustinianism is a great source of moderation for his 
political work.112  
Brooks speaks of a love of the familiar, and any politics to be moderate must have 
a healthy respect for what is and what is possible. Thus we come to the problem: how can 
the conventions of a city, what that city loves and takes to be its “animating principle,” be 
scrutinized and subject to the criticism of higher aims? How, in other words, can 
moderation truly lead to the rule of reason?113 While I take Aquinas to be concerned 
about Brooks’ concerns for moderation, Aquinas would no doubt push Brooks on the 
necessity of justice: Aquinas certainly does not represent the sort of political moderation 
that rests content with the past achievements of a regime.114 
 
TOLERATION 
Along with moderation, we might consider another topic relevant to modernity: 
how tolerant is the teaching of De Regno? First we must ask: what is toleration? We 
might characterize it as prudent forbearance and neutrality. Rather, a state might be 
tolerant insofar as it abstains from suppressing or rejecting an activity because not to do 
so would be imprudent, which we might denominate “prudential tolerance.” A state 
might also be tolerant insofar as it claims to be neutral on matters concerning a subject, 
                                                
112 As Schall has it: “Augustine is like Machiavelli because he sees the deep resources 
of disorder in the human city, even when populated by Christians.  He is unlike him 
because he knows himself, knows that the disorders arise from the human heart, from a 
heart such as that possessed by the actual Augustine,” (Schall 1997, 7). 
113 In some sense this is the question of the revolutionary character of the American 
Revolution, as Diamond nicely explains in his revealingly titled “The Revolution of 
Sober Expectations” (1974). 
114 Brooks does not address one possible ramification of moderation, namely preserving 
laws, rather than endless reform, such that through time familiar laws build upon and 
themselves become customary. Aquinas addresses this at ST I-II 97.2. 
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e.g. religion, morality or differences in language, race or ethnicity.115 Toleration in the 
latter conception could be supported by notions of respect, dignity, autonomy and 
individualism, but also relativism and historicism.116 This we will call “principled 
tolerance.” 
We noted in Chapter 3 that tolerance is not the central concern of Aquinas in De 
Regno, and moreover that he would not see tolerating any particular idea or activity as an 
end in se. We were speaking of his rejection, as it turns out, of the latter sort of toleration, 
one aiming at neutrality between or affirmation of pluralism. Aquinas does not prescribe 
toleration in this sense. To see the teaching of De Regno in full, however, we should 
recall that in De Regno Aquinas guards carefully the distinction between the temporal 
and the spiritual, if out of a concern more for the latter than the former. This makes him 
sympathetic to claims for principled tolerance to a degree: Aquinas is clear that 
government does not direct man to his final good (De Regno II.3). In light of these 
considerations, we might think the more strongly that Aquinas intends no Gregorian 
hierocracy by his arguments in De Regno. Close fusions between “church” and “state,” 
whether Gregorian or Erastian, blur distinctions of the greatest necessity. The political 
authority of a regime has an important task, as Aquinas establishes in I.1, and it is not that 
of the Church. To miss this point is to deprive man of the noble task of politics, a task, 
moreover, that is propaedeutic to tasks still nobler.  
That sympathy only exists to a degree, however, because Aquinas desires that 
community to realize its potential beyond the political, to grasp that the community is 
constituted toward something beyond political authority. Aquinas argues that the final 
good of citizens is not something to be individually pursued in private, but rather its 
                                                
115 King 1976, 44–54 
116 Mill’s On Liberty encapsulates many such arguments. 
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pursuit should be an activity constitutive of the community beyond the political. Just 
because this realization of communal good requires education, however, as we have 
noted throughout this study, Aquinas has advocated the toleration of a teacher, that which 
accepts the blunders and mistakes of novices. It would seem, then, that the endeavor 
toward excellence that Aquinas prescribes is the source of toleration in his political 
thought. 
Another point we might miss is this: Aquinas nowhere raises the issue of the use 
of coercion for the purposes of faith in De Regno. Indeed, this is something we should 
take very seriously. For Aquinas has had much to say on the duty of the king to secure 
man’s end, and surely the use of the regime’s force in matters of heresy and apostasy 
would be a cardinal feature of that duty. The lack of any overt reference to force in the 
service of faith cannot in itself demonstrate that Aquinas foreswore such measures. That 
said, such abjuration could be complementary with the explicit arguments of De Regno. 
For we have seen Aquinas claim that the tasks of the Church and regime must be clearly 
distinguished. We have also seen him elaborate an education of our king and his citizens, 
one characterized by reason and persuasion rather than by force and threats. The need for 
the Church to present itself as a disinterested teacher and prophet, to prove its temporal 
power to be truly indirect, may rule out such appeals to force. I would also note that, at 
least in I.1-6, Aquinas seems to be ambivalent about the ability of the regime to cultivate 
basic moral virtues in its citizens, let along enforce the higher dictates of the Church. 
Whatever claims we may recall from other works of Aquinas, the argument of De Regno 
does not exclude the possibility that the state be banned from using its force for spiritual 
purposes.  
Yet we may not be content with such an answer, as it is well known that Aquinas 
in other works advocates for the use of coercive state power in the name of faith. 
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Granting that Aquinas does not address the use of a regime’s power to enforce the faith in 
De Regno, should we not yet imagine from his advocacy of it in such work as his Letter 
to the Duchess of Brabant and in the Summa Theologiae that the use of coercion in 
matters of faith is at least implicit in De Regno? 117 Perhaps, in fact, the reasons I have 
cited above to believe that Aquinas disavows such force are in fact only reasons to 
remain silent on such force. After all, we have seen Aquinas establish principles for 
thinking about certain topics in De Regno toward the education of our prince rather than 
explicitly setting policy guidelines on them. Allow me then an excursus on this question, 
which may in any event be useful for exploring the limits of Aquinas’ prudential 
toleration in De Regno.  
When a community is faced with unbelief in their midst, Aquinas explains in the 
Summa, they must first recall that belief is an assent of the will to truth. Two sorts of 
failures of assent are possible, and thus two sorts of cases present themselves: pagans and 
heretics. Pagans simply deny this assent to Christ. The heretic, on the other hand, assents 
to Christ yet in a disordered way, for “he fails in his choice of those things wherein he 
assents to Christ, because he chooses not what Christ really taught, but the suggestions of 
his own mind.”118 Aquinas proceeds to argue that heresy is punishable by death. Yet 
while heresy merits such punishment, that judgment comes from the Church. The Church 
for her part, however, is not animated simply by justice, but also by charity and mercy. 
She may then tolerate heresy if she thinks admonitions likely to bring a heretic back, and 
in the case of repentance ought to restore the former heretic to his full rights and benefits 
in the Church.119 Of course there is a limit to such toleration, and she may yet hand over 
                                                
117 See ST II-II 10-15 for his full (later) argument; cf. Keys 2006, 226-38  
118 ST II-II 11.1 corpus 
119 ST II-II 11.4 
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the heretic to the regime for punishment. Nonetheless, such mercy is central to the 
mission of the Church as a teacher of men and, further, it is the Church, not the regime, 
making such decisions.  
As Aquinas goes on to explain: “it is not within the competency of the Church to 
punish unbelief in those who have never received the faith, according to the saying of the 
Apostle (1 Corinthians 5:12): ‘What have I to do to judge them that are without?’”120 
What kind of toleration, then, does this imply for those who do not assent to the truth of 
Christ, e.g. pagans and Jews? I will note two forms of toleration Aquinas advocates in the 
Summa: obedience to pagan rulers, and the right of Jewish parents to raise their children 
as Jewish. In both cases, Aquinas invokes the natural law to defend such toleration. 
Christians owe obedience to pagan rulers because “dominion [dominium] is a device of 
the law of nations [ius gentium] which is a human law: whereas the distinction between 
believers and unbelievers is of Divine right, which does not annul human right.”121 In 
other words, the lordship that a prince has over his people arises from natural justice, not 
from divine law. Thus political authority need not be Christian, although without doubt it 
is preferable that it be.122 
Aquinas argues against the forced conversion of Jewish children to Christianity, 
writing “it would be an injustice to Jews if their children were to be baptized against their 
will, since they would lose the rights of parental authority [ius patriae potestatis] over 
their children as soon as these were Christians.”123 Aquinas makes such an argument fully 
aware that it contradicts the teachings of many doctors of the Church, as he explicitly 
says of Augustine and Jerome, and the practice of many Christian princes, explicating 
                                                
120 ST II-II 12.2 respondeo 
121 ST II-II 12.2 respondeo 
122 ST II-II 10.10 
123 ST II-II 10.12 sed contra 
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citing Constantine and Theodosius, who were advised by “most holy bishops”: Sylvester 
and Ambrose.124 In the face of such powerful authorities and counterarguments, Aquinas 
holds that forcible conversion violates natural justice, which is to say the responsibility of 
the parent to the child. Further, he adds, such forced conversions are deleterious to the 
faith, for the children are likely to become apostate. Indeed, the rites of non-Christians 
are generally to be tolerated when more evil than good would fall from their 
suppression.125  
One cannot call these texts the model of Lockean toleration. We can see, 
however, that according to the Summa Aquinas adumbrates a fairly wide ambit for 
toleration. I will argue now that it is one that we can see more clearly in De Regno. We 
might say that toleration can be enjoined along three principles: (1) the natural law; (2) 
the moral and spiritual development of the people; and (3) the relation between church 
and state. For just as Aquinas confirms the natural necessity of the city and the integrality 
of its end in De Regno, so in the Summa Aquinas argues that Christians must tolerate the 
dominium of non-Christian rulers. Indeed, is this not the implicit teaching of De Regno 
I.1-6? We have in those chapters a king who seeks to secure the final end of his people, 
but his first responsibility is to restore a modicum of peace for them. Indeed, throughout 
De Regno Aquinas argues for the necessity of political authority independently of an 
consideration of religion, and makes clear in his critique of civil religions that the 
prince’s legitimacy in no way depends upon his fitness to celebrate theologico-political 
liturgies. Further, Aquinas extends this concern to the family. Like the regime, the family 
has a necessary role, that of rearing and educating children, and this is not a job the 
                                                
124 ST II-II 10.12 respondeo 
125 ST II-II 10.11. For Aquinas, the Jews are superior to other non-Christians in that their 
religion is ordained by God and foreshadows the Christian religion.  
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Church or regime can usurp. Thus Aquinas can boldly argue that Jews, who deny that 
Jesus is the Son of God, can nonetheless raise their children according to their teaching 
just because they are the parents of said children. 
Second, the moral and spiritual development of the people. The Church has an 
obligation as a font of mercy to teach and reform heretics if it can. Moreover, should 
punishment be ineffectual or futile, perhaps in a fundamentally non-Christian society, 
then punishment is not required, but rather evangelization.126 We see in the Summa that 
the Church must be merciful with heretics. All the more so, we see in De Regno that the 
Church must through the divine law indicate the task of human politics and remind 
princes of the limits of human activity. Note at I.6 Aquinas’ call to the people to convert 
from sin to avoid tyranny. There is an implicit threat of Hell, no doubt, but Aquinas does 
not argue for their juridical punishment but for the consequences of their moral failures.  
Moreover, in those chapters the king himself sees mirrored his struggle to understand 
what that final end is, beatitude, and comes later to understand after that, in Book II, that 
he himself does not secure this end for his people in some kind of Gnostic Erastianism. 
Even as our royal reader comes to understand his political task better, he must be worried 
that his people will be some steps behind him in their understanding. Then he is called to 
toleration in his pedagogy toward them.127 
 This leads us to our third point. As I noted above, according to the Summa the 
Church and not the regime judges matters of heresy. If a regime is not a Christian one, 
                                                
126 Aquinas notes that the Church has been particularly tolerant of heretics and pagans 
“when they were very numerous” (ST II-II 10.11 respondeo). 
127 My interpretation is thus at some variance with that of Mary Keys, who sees 
“insufficiently check indignation” more than mercy underlying Aquinas’ reasoning in 
these questions of the Summa (Keys 2006, 226). While there are no doubt differences in 
our conclusions, perhaps part of the difference arises from the contrast in our approach: 
whereas I do not expect tolerance to play a central role in Aquinas’ political thought, 
Keys expresses considerable surprise that Aquinas might advocate such force. 
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then the Church would in many if not most circumstances not wish to turn over heretics 
for punishment by it. Moreover, should the regime be not only pagan but also hostile to 
Christianity, then the Church, as we also noted above, will be in its orientation directed 
more to evangelization, which is to say instruction in faith through mercy and charity, 
rather than to punishment. It will, moreover, be more concerned about protecting its 
liberty and that of its faithful than enforcing its prerogative under such a regime. The 
distinction that Aquinas repeatedly elaborates between the spiritual and temporal in De 
Regno becomes ever more important in such a context, because it means that the Church 
accepts a broad toleration because of its relation with the regime. Indeed, the Church may 
not only not be able to deliver heretics to the state for punishment, but in many cases it 
may well prefer not to do so. 
This last one is a point worth emphasizing, for it is a “historical” one, namely that 
the concrete constellation of relations between church and state at any one moment 
matter to the possibilities of perfecting those relations, much as the development of a 
people itself reflects the possibilities at any given time for the best regime.128 It also 
invites further consideration of the parallels between Aquinas and Augustine. As is well 
known, Augustine was at least at some points in his life a proponent of the use of force to 
check heretical or apostate citizens.129 Given his tremendous ambivalence as to the use 
and abuse of political power, however, one can imagine that Augustine harbored no great 
hopes that such violence would restore moral order to a community. For typically such 
exercises of power would be clumsy at best, the state using raw power to check heretics 
yet failing on a more quotidian basis to inculcate even the most basic virtues in its 
                                                
128 As Maurer argues, while we do not often think of Aquinas as a historical thinker, it is 
precisely man’s freedom that makes history possible, and man is free because he is 
rational (Maurer 1979, 11-3; cf. ST I-II 17.1 ad 2). 
129 Brown 1964, Rist 1994, 203-55 
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citizens, or downright dangerous, as with a political power using heresy as a pretext to 
consolidate and expand its power. Such consideration could well explain Aquinas’ lack 
of enthusiasm for advocating such measures in De Regno. After all, while he adumbrates 
principles of political theology in both the Summa and De Regno, in De Regno Aquinas 
makes clear that most regimes fall well short of realizing such principles. Such awareness 
of the limitations of political power may perhaps incline him to favor prudential 
tolerance, and thus the absence of state violence, more than one might suppose.130 
In another work, however, Aquinas seems to call into question our claims about 
the role of toleration in the Summa and De Regno. In the work known variously as the 
Letter to Margaret of Flanders, the Letter to the Duchess of Brabant, and On the 
Government of the Jews, Aquinas considers how a ruler ought to deal with non-Christians 
insofar as they engage in activities considered illicit by Christians, in this case how the 
Duchess may deal with the proceeds of the financial activities that sustain the Jews in her 
demesne, which activity Christianity considers usury.131 Aquinas’ chief argument is that 
the Jews may be dealt with harshly insofar as they profit from sin; particularly, their 
usurious profits may be confiscated from them. This is undeniably harsh language. In the 
context of usury, however, a highly polemical and charged issue in mediaeval Europe, it 
is striking what Aquinas goes on to write.132 For if the Jews may be deprived of the 
profits of usury, yet the Jews may not be dealt with in such a way that “the necessary 
subsidies of life” are taken from them, nor can novel or innovative burdens be imposed 
upon them: “the services coerced from them do not demand things that they had not been 
                                                
130 I am grateful to Luke Perez for discussions on this point. 
131 It is not clear that this Letter was actually requested by or addressed to Margaret of 
Flanders (Boyle 2000, 105-21). I will quote the Thomistic Project translation, citing 
according to the response. 
132 Hood 1995, 81 
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accustomed to do in times gone by, because those things that are unexpected more often 
rattle souls.” Further, these usurious profits no more belong to the Duchess than to the 
Jews, so she should seize them not for her personal gain, but for “pious uses” and the 
“common utility,” particularly restitution to the debtors apparently defrauded by the 
usury (First Response). Intriguingly, Aquinas later goes on to speak of the advantages of 
securing reasonable employment for Jews that does not involve usury (Second 
Response). The proceeds from usury, then, could potentially be used for providing for the 
integration of the Jews into the Christian economy, which not incidentally would shelter 
them from charges of usury and the threat of punitive financial levies.133  
The Letter to the Duchess of Flanders shows Aquinas again confronting calls for 
persecution with appeals to natural justice and the moral education of peoples. The Jews’ 
right to material sustenance must be respected, much as in the Summa their rights and 
duties as parents must be protected, and while Aquinas does not exclude the possibility of 
punishment, the aim of the Christian ruler in dealing with them should be reform, as is 
most obvious in his suggestion about new forms of employment for Jewish peoples. 
While we may find Aquinas’ discussion of the Jews condescending, I would again note 
that it bears themes we have come to know well in De Regno. Particularly, Aquinas’ 
demand that the Duchess use the confiscated money for the common good, including that 
of the Jews, bears a strong affinity with his desire in De Regno that the king exercise his 
office not for his own private gain, but for the people. There is thus a counsel to mercy 
here that would otherwise be ignored or rejected by ambition. 
This survey of the Summa and the Letter to the Duchess of Flanders suggests that 
Aquinas takes there to be a number of grounds for toleration. Let us also note that, as far 
                                                
133 Aquinas thus may be seen to argue implicitly against contemporary laws that forbid 
Jews employment other than the banking activities that incurred persecution. 
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as most scholars can tell, Aquinas composed De Regno before either the Summa or the 
Letter.134 Thus, the concerns we see in De Regno are not forgotten or dropped, but 
maintained and developed as he continued to ponder matters political. Of particular 
moment are the continued distinctions he makes between the temporal and spiritual, and 
the new role of the family that emerges. While Aquinas perhaps does not advance the 
cause of toleration as far as we like, we have found surprisingly secure foundations for it 
in Aquinas’ work, foundations that could perhaps be further elaborated for periods in 
which cooperation between the Church and regime is minimal.135 Indeed, for modern 
liberals Aquinas’ emphasis on the importance of the regime, apart from any religious 
task, indeed must be welcome. Yet, as we have noted with reference to the social 
contract, the point of such toleration is not to freeze man’s growth toward virtue, but to 
open him up toward it. There is of course no guarantee that such discussion will lead to 
convergence: the question is just how far we do agree. Aquinas would urge Western 
societies to recover an image of the modern state as a place for education and growth, one 
in which “citizenship” is not a juridical classification of a static political category, but an 
orientation or way of life open to the integral development of each citizen.136 Citizenship 
should be understood as a kind of education, one in which ideas that are at the basis of 
political community, including justice, liberty, virtue and man’s happiness, are explored 
and contested.  
Such endeavors are particularly important in conditions of late modernity, during 
which international cooperation has been a key theme. Yet international political 
community is no substitute for national political communities. As Aquinas shows in De 
                                                
134 Eschmann 1956 
135 One might consider Maritain’s analogy between mediaeval and modern Christian 
politics in Integral Humanism (Maritain 1968, 143-53; 162-207). 
136 Pocock 1995; Villa 2001; Collins 2006  
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Regno, some of the most important political questions arise in quotidian experience, e.g. 
the problem of distinguishing the king from the tyrant, of knowing how one can interact 
with citizens with whom one has little in common, leading to questions about the nature 
of rule, citizenship and justice. These are not experiences, however, that communities are 
typically good at articulating, and they do not easily draw necessary questions from them. 
Indeed, while the “reward of the king” is a key political question, Aquinas has to 
transform the meaning of the question completely to direct the attention of the king to the 
common good. In other words, if meaningful political conversations within small 
communities are hard work, how much more difficult will they be in the modern nation-
state? Between nation-states? 
For this is the question: what is to be more highly valued, unity toward the truth 
or tolerance?137 Disagreements are virtually inevitable with man, and surely tolerance 
will always play a role in politics. As Aquinas has it in De Regno, politics is an 
education, meaning that a community must learn to tolerate disagreement concerning 
what is in dispute and what can be legitimately dissented from. But if the community 
prizes tolerance above all else, they may find the very foundations of tolerance, namely a 
vision of man who desires to do good and to have good done to him, under threat. 
 
CONCLUSION 
De Regno is preoccupied with the best way of life from the beginning, as we 
noted with the allusion to Cicero’s De Oratore in the prooemium. According to Thomas 
Aquinas, the best regime is the rule of the virtuous man directed toward human virtue and 
                                                
137 Of course, this is finally a false dichotomy, as tolerance is a kind of truth whose 
elevation as a central political good grants a regime a certain unity, with serious 
consequences for the pursuit of other goods (cf. Budziszewski 1993).  
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open to the teachings of divine revelation. The best form is monarchy, but behind that 
question are deeper ones about the end of the regime: will a given community allow the 
most virtuous men to lead them to virtue, and will they leave themselves open to 
something greater than themselves? That inquiry into the best regime, what it is and 
where it can obtain, remains foundational for Aquinas’ enterprise in De Regno, and he 
recommends it as propaedeutic to the role of revelation in politics. Indeed, Aquinas’ 
teaching on revelation in I.7-II would make little sense without the regime typology of 
I.1-6. Yet Aquinas’ invocation of revelation transcends that classical quest insofar as 
revelation possesses knowledge of man’s end, and the means to it, beyond man’s reason 
and beyond the world. As we noted in Chapter 3, where classical philosophy meets 
aporia, Christian revelation claims to provide a decisive answer. The divine law, not the 
human law, must finally be trusted to rectify man’s will toward the good.138 
Our analysis of the coming-into-being of this regime, moreover, reveals it to be 
tolerant and moderate. This is because, like classical philosophers, Aquinas can 
distinguish between the desirable and the possible. More broadly, De Regno uncovers the 
close connection between political science and the search for the best regime: what we 
know and say about man founds that science as an investigation about the best regime 
and the best man. Whereas classical political science takes its point of departure from the 
distinction between convention and nature, Aquinas’ political science further considers 
the distinction between nature and grace.     
Can the best regime be realized in our time? In the short term: no. In the long 
term: probably not. As we have noted throughout this study, Aquinas’ vision for politics 
in De Regno is considerably at odds with modern prescriptions for politics. We have 
already noted the modern insistence on toleration as a central political good, the modern 
                                                
138De Regno I.7-11 and ST I-II 91.4 
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tendency to view the common good as instrumental, and the commitment to democracy 
to the exclusion of other regimes. For Aquinas, however, toleration is a prudential 
necessity, the common good is clearly not merely instrumental, and democracy pure and 
simple, besides being incredibly rare, can at best be only one of a range of legitimate 
regimes, and is far from the best. Behind these differences between Aquinas and 
prototypical modern thinkers, we might discern diverging understandings of the 
relationship between law and virtue, between reason and faith, between the ends of 
government and man, and between man and God.139 Such differences will not be 
overcome in a lifetime.  
Yet, I hasten to add, we can answer affirmatively our original question: can 
explicitly Christian principles be introduced into our political life without prejudice to our 
commitments to toleration, moderation reason? Can these principles even strengthen 
reason? For Aquinas’ understanding of what humans are meant to become, and what they 
need to attain to that flourishing, are far from as foreign as we might think. Further, while 
philosophy and human reason are in need of rehabilitation in our time, I would submit, in 
line with the teaching of De Regno, that revelation can prompt us to ask questions of 
ourselves and our communities, challenging us to ask what we say about ourselves, what 
we think about ourselves, and what of it is true.  
Particularly, Aquinas invites us to reconceive the relation between religion and 
politics. Does the divine law pull us away from the terrestrial, distracting us from the 
challenges before human community? Or does it elevate the dignity of all that man is and 
does, prompting him to turn more seriously to the task of justice and friendship between 
men? No one doubts that a crisis of reason has arisen in the West, leading some to argue 
                                                
139 Just how such differences have arisen also occasions great controversy, much less 
whether we can find anything like the root cause of modernity. 
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that “in our age it is much less urgent to show that political philosophy is the 
indispensable handmaid of theology than to show that political philosophy is the rightful 
queen of the social sciences...”140 Yet perhaps we ought to think of revelation as a means 
whereby the power of reason can be restored rather than a dangerous intruder. This, 
anyway, seems to be the thought of Aquinas in invoking the divine law in De Regno to 
direct man’s attention to the difficulty and nobility of politics.  
Perhaps, then, fears about a faulty “separation between Church and State” do not 
grasp the true danger to our regime, nor do religious citizens necessarily help their cause 
in endorsing such a Jeffersonian construction of the American political-religious 
settlement.141 In our time, for instance, we have seen a resurgence of natural law talk on 
the so-called “Christian Right,” but it is not always clear that secular interlocutors take 
reason seriously enough for such arguments to be persuasive.142 Perhaps arguments from 
revelation could challenge arguments from narrow conceptions of reason, alerting us both 
to understandings of the cosmos beyond earthly philosophies, as Hamlet told Horatio, and 
                                                
140 Strauss 1964, 1 
141 Perhaps the American pre-occupation with the First Amendment has limited our 
thinking about the relation between religion and politics in the U.S. A cursory view of the 
Anti-Federalist essays makes clear that we have significantly narrowed the conversation, 
ignoring more fundamental questions about the relation between religion and the 
American regime in favor of more circumscribed juridical concerns. For instance, as 
Storing explains, while the Anti-Federalists favored the toleration and (with some 
qualifications) the rights-centered language of the U.S. Constitution, they worried that the 
new constitutional edifice failed to recognize the necessity of religion both as a moral 
educator and as deterrent against crimes. Further, some Anti-Federalists, in line with their 
broader concerns about national unity, questioned whether the colonies were too 
religiously diverse to support a national constitution of the sort envisioned by the 
Federalists, and further that a lack of “any publicly useful religious foundation for the 
nation as a whole” would lead to the invocation of “some other foundation of political 
morality – which the Anti-Federalists foresaw would be an aggregate of selfish interests 
held together by force,” (Storing 1981, 22-23). 
142 It is a conversation largely inspired by Finnis 1980, but also by the extensive work of 
Robert P. George. 
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reminding us that the achievements of modern philosophy are necessarily questionable 
because of man’s weakness. Aquinas can both challenge modern thinkers to move 
beyond stale and intractable intramural disputes while also cautioning “postmodern” 
thinkers about their hasty abandonment of reason.143   
Further, Aquinas casts political activity as an activity of learning precisely to 
remind us of the limits of man’s reason and the foibles and flaws of convention. Much as 
De Regno is itself a kind of education or speculum principis for our royal reader, so men 
must conduct the tasks of politics with an eye toward how they themselves grow in their 
roles as political subjects, both in their development of reason and experience and in the 
uncovering of their characteristic weaknesses or limitations. Aquinas takes politics to be 
a practical activity, that is, directed toward an end sought within a particular and 
contingent context. This is the true “art of the possible,” and the grounds for Aquinas’ 
“developmental state” that I claim characterizes the movement of De Regno: a political 
community learns and grows as it develops an understanding of its end and how it can 
best pursue it hic et nunc. If we were expecting a harsh and utopian Aquinas who would 
violently refashion conventional community after his theoretical vision of politics, we 
were deeply gratified to be proven wrong. To restate the significance of the best regime: 
it serves to guide reflection in the regime in which we now find ourselves, not to 
condemn us as inadequate. Thinking of politics as an education reminds us of the 
temporal aspect of politics and urges us to balance immediate experiences and needs with 
those of the longue durée. In fact, Aquinas asks us how we can steer between a “realism” 
that sees in every failure proof that man can do no good, and a Gnosticism that refuses to 
learn hard lessons from the inevitable failures of man. To see politics as an education, 
                                                
143 Cf. the exchange in Habermas and Ratzinger, 2006. Thanks to Ben Gregg for 
thoughts on this dialogue. 
 304 
however, we must first see politics as the activity of men, not that of faceless structures 
and processes.144 
And to where does this education lead? To happiness. Throughout De Regno, 
Aquinas calls us to happiness. As we suggested in Chapter 3, Aquinas practices an ethics 
and a politics of happiness. We might call it an inversion of the “Augustinian 
imperative”: revelation does not make politics its instrument for violence, but revitalizes 
it with a new sense of man’s purpose on earth toward peace.145 One does not use politics 
as a weapon against those who disagree with you, but rather seeks through public life to 
attain toward unity dialectically whilst acknowledging pluralism. The challenge is to 
defend political life as natural through a Church conceived of as prophetic. To defend 
political activity as natural, moreover, requires articulating man’s natural end and the 
ways in which he fulfills it communally. Yet such efforts entail careful discernment of 
those things which draw men toward them, whether wisdom, pleasure, honor or 
something else, thus leading to the cautious criticism of political convention and of 
institutions. This task, then, requires political philosophy, one that identifies the end of 
man as distinct from the claims a regime might make about him, and one that thus 
recognizes the limitations of man and his community. In all such activities, man’s natural 
wonder and desire to know must be encouraged. 
                                                
144 Along these lines, James Q. Wilson’s Bureaucracy is an incredible study of how 
institutions grow and change precisely as products of the activity of men and the man-
made structures that bind them. 
145 Connolly 1993 describes “the Augustinian imperative” as “the insistence that there is 
an intrinsic moral order susceptible to authoritative representation,” an “obligatory 
pursuit” of investigating and realizing one’s “morality identity through de-moralization of 
the other” (xvii-viii). Connolly’s notion of “critical pluralism” perhaps has some parallels 
with Aquinas’ proposals in De Regno, but Aquinas would view this pluralism, as with 
that of Rawls and Maritain, as something to be regretted and overcome so far as possible 
(Connolly 1993, 28-30, 88-90).  
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To conceive of the Church less as an institution with privileges and prerogatives 
than as a prophetic voice is not to say all that one might say about her.146 In fact, grasping 
the full meaning of De Regno for our time requires that we recover an understanding of 
Church, revelation and prophecy that has largely been neglected in political theory since 
the critiques of these concepts in the works of Hobbes, Locke and Spinoza.147 Yet what 
we have uncovered of the Church herein does capture something like what one must 
know to adumbrate adequately a political theology. In articulating man’s grace-given 
end, the Church can remind a regime that it is called to great things, both in its promotion 
of man’s earthly activities and in its role in allowing man in his excellence to transcend 
earthly virtue. Such promptings ought to encourage men, then, to turn to political 
philosophy to explore the proper role of the regime. Thus the source of greatest wonder, 
the vision of God, can through its partial realization in the Church be a prompting to man 
about the full range of his needs and ends. This is not Carl Schmitt’s political theology. 
The sum total of these two goals is to conceive of politics less as a battle between 
institutions and more as a question of the ends of man. Accordingly, we may expect no 
immediate implementation of the best regime according to Aquinas. Yet his teaching in 
De Regno is after all not meant to be magically applied, but rather to meet us where we 
are and lead us beyond it. Perhaps this is his true gift to us. For we rightly worry that the 
fragile peace that underlies Western politics will be disrupted in the coming era, and 
particularly whether that disruption will come in the form of intolerance for differences 
of religion and ways of life that have become more or less politically neutral in recent 
                                                
146 Indeed, we may well have come to conclude that the interpretation of De Regno is a 
task more for the theologian than the political philosopher.  
147 See Beiner 2011. One could point to some interesting exceptions, e.g. Agamben 
2012 and Schmitt 2008, although they tend to appropriate of theology for distinctly post-
modern purposes, which is to say not in the service of a reason intelligible to that very 
theology. 
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centuries. The grounds of that neutrality, one could urge, have been forgotten because its 
necessity has been obscured.148 Liberalism may indeed have become a victim of its own 
success.  
Yet we can also wonder if the real source of danger lies in another intolerance, 
namely an antipathy for the provocative questions that have always undergirded political 
philosophy, and a fortiori political theology.  Aquinas’ solution to the ills of modernity is 
no “solution” in the traditional sense: it is a call not simply to question how we practice 
democracy or how best to defend liberalism, but rather to question man as such. We may 
then see whether that inquiry leads to a sounder defense of liberal democracy, or to some 
new chapter in man’s communal life.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
148 Owen 2004 and Gillespie 2008 
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